Is The Conventional Wisdom On China's Island Bases Dangerously Wrong?
Contents
The Conventional Wisdom On China's Island Bases is Dangerously Wrong
Gregory B. Poling
War on the Rocks
- The conventional wisdom holds that the US can quickly and easily neutralize China's artificial island bases in the South China Sea
- Bases are remote
- US military is accustomed to naval and aerial domination
- However, it is likely that China would have the advantage in sea and airspace control in the event of a conflict
- Neutralizing these bases would be prohibitively costly in the early stages of a conflict
- China's island bases would make the South China Sea a no-man's-land for US forces (except US submarines)
- There is a worrying disconnect between regional experts and the broader defense community
- Regional experts are very concerned about Chinese base construction
- However, the conventional wisdom is that the island bases would lack strategic value in a conflict
- The main purpose of China's naval bases is not to win a war against the US
- China's primary approach is to use civilan and paramilitary pressure in order to coerce its Southeast Asian neighbors
- The island bases allow militia and coast-guard vessels to operate far away from China for months at a time
- These vessels have the implicit support of the PLAN, making it risky for for Southeast Asian countries to respond forcefully to incursions by these ships
- The goal is to undermine the US as a guarantor of regional security, undercutting support for US military presence
- However, China recognizes that this strategy might fail
- A miscalculation could provoke a US response in the South China Sea
- A conflict on Northeast Asia (for example: Taiwan, or the Senkaku Islands) could spread south
- To this end, the PLAN has invested in facilities that can shift the balance of power in a future conflict
- 72 combat aircraft hangars at three airbases in the Spratlys
- Another 16 hangars on Woody Island in the Paracels
- If China was the first mover in a conflict, the planes it has based at those airbases would give it air dominance
- The closest US ground-based combat aircraft would be operating out of Okinawa and Guam
- Carrier operations would be difficult
- China has deployed YJ-12B and YJ-62 anti-ship cruise missiles to the Spratlys
- These missiles are backed by longer-range missiles that could be launched from mainland China
- Heavy investment in radar and SIGINT — can see anything that moves on the surface
- US Navy surface assets would have to pull back to the Sulu and Celebes sea at the start of a conflict
- US carrier battle groups are far too valuable to leave deployed in a forward position
- Can the US neutralize these island? Yes, but the cost in terms of risk to US platforms and expenditure of US ordinance is unacceptably high
- Artificial islands are larger and their facilities are more durable than outside experts seem to realize
- Mischief Reef's lagoon can encompass the entire Washington Beltway area
- Pearl Harbor could fit inside Subi Reef
- This allows critical infrastructure to be widely dispersed, making it costly to even temporarily disable bases
- Completely disabling these bases would require a massive amount of ordinance
- US fired 59 cruise missiles at Shayrat Air Base in Syria, and only put the runway out of commission for a few hours
- Chinese air bases are far better defended than Shayrat
- HQ-9 surface to air missiles
- Point defenses
- Hardened infrastructure
- Missile shelters
- Large hangars
- Ammo dumps
- The most effective means of cratering the runways would be air-dropped bombs but that would put US pilots at unacceptable risk
- Therefore the easiest way to permanently disable these island bases is to hit their key infrastructure with standoff weapons
- A reasonable estimate is 100 cruise missiles per base
- This means 300 missiles for the Spratly Islands and 100 more for Woody Island
- If the US wanted to disable smaller facilities, that would require dozens more missiles
- How would these missiles be launched?
- The only platform that could safely operate in the South China Sea after the start of hostilities would be US submarines
- However, even US subs would find it difficult to stay hidden after they started launching missiles
- Moreover, US subs should be attacking Chinese surface ships, not fixed island targets
- The number of missiles required to disable the islands would deplete US magazines
- The best way to change this math is to establish an Enhanced Defensive Cooperation Agreement with the Philippines
- Allow rotational deployments of US combat forces
- Allows for the basing of combat aircraft at Basa Air Base and Antonio Bautista Air Base
- Enables the US to rapidly set up fire bases in the Philippines in the event of hostilities
- This agreement is unlikely under the current Duterte administration, but the US can lay groundwork
- Without an Enhanced Defensive Cooperation Agreement, the US will have little choice but to concede the South China Sea to China in the opening stages of any future conflict
The Conventional Wisdom Still Stands: American Can Deal With China's Artificial Island Bases
Olli Pekka Suorsa
War on the Rocks
- There is an emerging consensus in American military circles that Chinese island bases in the South China Sea are more of a strategic liability than an asset
- Perception that the US could neutralize these bases quickly if it wanted to
- Poling argues that this conventional wisdom is wrong
- China's man-made installations pose a threat to the US military in the Western Pacific during wartime
- Could even be used to deny US forces' access to the region
- Poling's arguments are plausible, but not convincing
- US military still possesses the ability to fight its way past the island defenses
- US has multiple options in dealing with China's island bases
- China's ability to resupply the island bases is questionable in the face of US cruise missile strikes and airstrikes
- Without a robust supply train, the ability of these bases to amass air power and generate sorties will be severerly curtailed
American Options in the South China Sea
- Satellite photos show that critical infrastructure on the bases is not dispersed
- Limited real-estate forces Chinese planners to tightly cluster critical infrastructure
- Nature of islands makes it difficult to bury critical infrastructure underground
- Cruise missiles remain the most viable option for disabling these bases
- Degrade the bases' ability to generate sorties
- Cut off logistical support
- Keep the Spratlys out of operation until air power can brought to bear against them
- 30-50 cruise missiles would be required per outpost
- This number is inclusive of the need to disable runways, strike aircraft shelters, disable fuel facilities, target command and control nodes, etc
- Also inclusive of the required redundancy — assigns 2-3 missiles for command facilities and air defenses and 3-4 missiles for hardened targets
- These missile strikes would be followed up with air power
- The B-2 (or future B-21), along with electronics warfare aircraft would penetrate Chinese air defenses
- These aircraft would use both direct and standoff weapons to further destroy infrastructure and cut off the bases from resupply
- Given the rushed construction and ongoing problems with erosion with the islands themselves, American ground penetrating weapons could very well damage the foundations of these bases
- Poling's assertion that cruise missiles would be ineffective against these bases is incorrect
- Cites the US attack against the Al-Shayrat air base in Syria
- However, the US never intended to disable the airbase with its attack
- The US's objective was to disable the Syrian Air Force's ability to deliver chemical weapons
- As a result, the US targeted aircraft, aircraft shelters and fuel infrastructure
- The goal was to degrade the base, not destroy it, and this goal was accomplished
- Precision guidance makes dispersion easier to deal with
- Even widely dispersed targets can be individually targeted with precision munitions
- Dispersion is more of a problem for airstrikes, as more aircraft are needed to cover the necessary attack vectors
- However, the limited amount of dispersion on China's island bases means that even airstrikes would be sufficient to neutralize the bases
What if China is Able to Deny America Access to the South China Sea
- If the US is unable to neutralize China's outposts at the start of a conflict, it can use strategic bombers to attack the Spratly Island bases
- Can launch attacks with B-52 launched cruise missiles, B-1s, and B-2s based from Guam, Diego Garcia or Darwin, Australia
- Attacking from Japan and Korea is also a possibility, but airbases there are well within China's missile range
- Air power and logistics could be marshalled at Hawaii's Hickam Air Force Base
- Coordinated airstrikes from these three bases would be sufficient to render the Spratly bases unable to launch or service aircraft
- This then allows for follow-up strikes to permanently destroy the bases or allows the US to shift its focus
- Poling also underestimates the willingness of other East Asian littoral countries to offer basing to the US
- It's likely that any conflict with China will have regional spillovers and other East Asian countries might be willing to offer basing arrangements or expand basing arrangements in exchange for security guarantees
- The US has plans to gain access to a contested South China Sea
- US Air Force has plans for rapid dispersed deployments of 5th generation fighters, supported by a single C-130 or C-17, allowing us to take advantage of airbases without extensive facilities
- US Marine Corps has plans to use its big-decked amphibious vessels to launch F-35s, supplementing the Navy's carrier capacity
- Basing in the Philippines makes the fight easier, but the US can win even without access to such basing
- While the US Navy's surface vessels might be temporarily pushed out of the South China Sea, they have other options for retreat than the Sulu and Celebes Seas
- US naval vessels can launch attacks from the Java Sea, the Flores Sea, or the Molucca Sea, in the Indonesian archipelago
- Can also launch attacks from east of Luzon in the Philippines
- US Navy submarines can effectively cut off supply lines to these bases
- The more planes and equipment China puts on these bases, the more dependent they are on regular supply shipments from the mainland
It's Hard For China To Maintain A Large Military Footprint on the Spratlys
- Most of the island bases have only a single runway
- China has constructed enough aircraft shelters to deploy a regiment (24 fighters) to each of its largest island bases
- However, with just a single runway, getting that regiment in the air quickly will be difficult
- If the runway is cratered, aircraft on the ground become vulnerable to follow-on attacks and aircraft in the air have to try to make it to Hainan Island
- The islands have little or no natural resources of their own — all food, water and fuel has to be brought in via ship
- Any disruption in these supplies would quickly impact the operational capabilities of these island bases
- Moreover, satellite imagery indicates that there is little or no redundancy to electricity generating infrastructure
- The islands are located relatively deep waters, which give US attack submarines ideal operating conditions
- The true value of the island bases is granting China unmatched situational awareness in all situations short of war
- The island bases allow Chinese military and militias to observe ship and aircraft movement in the South China Sea
- China has escalation dominance in scenarios short of war
- Island bases are especially useful in deterring smaller East and Southeast Asian nations who do not possess military capabilities comparable to the US
- In other words, it seems like China is using the island bases to carve out a "sphere of influence" for itself
The Big Picture
- China's outposts in the Spratlys are a strategic liability
- Hard to defend
- In addition to the forces discussed above, the US will soon have additional capabilities to attack these bases
- Conventionally armed intermediate-range ballistic missiles (now that the US is out of the INF treaty)
- Hypersonics
- The US has many options to neutralize the Spratly Island bases
- Complete destruction of the bases isn't necessary — only need to neutralize them long enough to create a permissive environment for the US Navy
- While we should pay attention the goings-on at these bases, we should not lose sight of the bigger picture w.r.t. competition with China
