Chinese Amphibious Warfare: Prospects For A Cross-Strait Invasion

Editors:
Andrew S. Erickson
Connor M. Kennedy
Ryan D. Martinson

Foreword

• In August 2022, the PRC conducted a series of military exercises that encircled Taiwan
  • Live-fire drills
  • Air sorties
  • Naval deployments
  • Ballistic missile tests
• These provocations will continue as long as Xi Jinping wishes to send the message that China has the capability and willingness to use the PLA to unify China and Taiwan by force
• However, in order to succeed in this, the PLA will have to accomplish the hardest task a military can undertake: an opposed amphibious landing
• The last time any military accomplished this successfully was the United States, when it landed troops at Inchon in 1950
• The PLA must transport thousands of troops and their equipment approximately 100 miles across the Taiwan Strait
• Must land them on the few beaches that are suitable for such a large body of troops
• Has to move inland into a mountainous island with rugged terrain
• Has to accomplish this task in the face of an American and Taiwanese military that has been preparing for this eventuality for 70 years
  • I think that's overstating the case
  • For the vast majority of those 70 years, neither the US nor Taiwan spared much thought to the prospect of an invasion from the mainland
  • It was clear until very recently that China had neither the military capacity nor political inclination to launch an invasion
  • It's only since the late '90s that China has had an economy that could build up the naval power to make an invasion possible
  • It's only since 2008, with Xi Jinping's ascent to Chinese leadership, that the PRC has actually started working towards building out a military capable of carrying out this task
  • On the other side, I don't think that the Taiwanese government has seriously considered the possibility of an invasion aimed at forcible reunification until recently
  • For much of the last 30 years, Taiwan has increased its economic ties with the mainland, even as the PRC's rhetoric towards Taiwan has sharpened
  • I think Taiwan started taking the prospect of an invasion seriously after two things
    • Suppression of pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong
    • Russian invasion of Ukraine
• Most of the analysis of a potential invasion scenario covers the political, diplomatic, and informational factors leading up to an invasion
• Far less studied is whether the Chinese military actually has the ability to successfully carry the invasion out
• This is because, unlike analyses of political decision making, assessments of warfighting capacity require careful consideration of a wide variety of interacting systems
  • Maritime operations
  • Aerospace operations
  • Cyberwarfare
  • Logistics and supply chains
  • Weather, tides and currents
• From May 4 to May 6, 2021 the US Naval War College's China Maritime Studies Institute assembled a collection specialists for a conference on large-scale amphibious warfare in Chinese military strategy
• This book is the final volume produced by that conference
• Authors look at the key elements needed for a PRC attack on Taiwan to succeed
  • Weapons
  • Technology
  • Doctrine
  • Logistics
• Attempt to answer how ready China is to employ its most advanced military capabilities on a large scale for the first time in its history since 1979
• This volume is timely because the war in Ukraine shows that technological capability does not automatically translate into military might
  • Doctrine matters
  • Logistics matter
  • Morale matters
  • The enemy always gets a vote!
• This volume attempts to provide a baseline evaluation of Chinese amphibious warfare capabilities, from which we can build to incorporate lessons from Ukraine

Introduction: Taking Taiwan By Force? Chinese Amphibious Warfare In the New Era

• Taiwan and mainland China are separated by the Taiwan Strait
  • Approximately 81 miles across at its narrowest point
  • The presence of this sea barrier has prevented an armed resolution to the Chinese Civil War
• Over the past several decades, the Chinese PLA has sought to increase its ability to project power over water
• This presents a major threat to Taiwanese security and threatens to upend peaceful cross-strait relations
• This volume examines 5 different aspects of Chinese readiness to conduct an amphibious operation to take Taiwan
  1. Doctrinal foundations of Chinese amphibious warfare
  2. The "Joint Amphibious Force"
  3. Enablers of Amphibious Warfare
  4. Scenario Factors
  5. Implications

Doctrinal Foundations of Chinese Amphibious Warfare

• Start with the historical experiences that both Chinese and foreign militaries have had with amphibious warfare
  • Shi Lang's successful conquest of Taiwan during the Qing Dynasty
  • Lang defeated a Ming loyalist commander, Zheng Chenggong who had ruled Taiwan for 20 years after expelling a Dutch colonial presence
  • Shi assembled a force of 300 junks and 21,000 men
  • After defeating Zheng's fleet near the Pengchu Islands, Shi conducted a largely uncontested landing and led a military campaign that subdued Taiwan
  • Although Shi's campaign holds few practical lessons for a modern invasion of Taiwan, the Chinese Communist Party has used it to justify China's historical claims to Taiwan
  • The historical precedent serves to raise morale and remind Chinese audiences that China has invaded Taiwan in the past, and could do so again in the future
• Examine the PLA's existing experiences with amphibious warfare
  • Failed campaign to seize Kinmen Island in 1949
  • Successful attacks on Hainan and Yijiangshan in 1950 and 1955
• How have Western analyses of amphibious landings influenced Chinese thinking
  • Chinese plans for amphibious assault emphasize the following six pillars
    1. Dominance of the air, sea and information domains
    2. Precision strikes on key points
    3. Concentration of "elite strengths"
    4. Rapid and continuous assaults
    5. Integrated and flexible support operations
    6. Psychological warfare
  • All of these have analogs in Western doctrine on amphibious assaults developed during World War 2

The Joint Amphibious Force

• Examine the four main components of the PLA's joint amphibious force
  1. Amphibious units of the PLA's ground forces (PLAGF)
  2. PLA Navy (PLAN) Marine Corps (PLANMC)
  3. PLAN amphibious fleet
  4. Civilian support fleet
• As a result of reforms carried out in 2017, the PLA Ground Force possesses six amphibious combined arms brigades (ACABs)
  • Despite further efforts to modernize, readiness is hampered by conscript-heavy units and lack of combined-arms training above the battalion level
  • While the PLAGF's amphibious brigades could seize contested islands, they are unlikely to be able to carry out an invasion of Taiwan itself
• The PLAGF's amphibious brigades would be supplemented by the PLA Marine Corps
  • The Marine Corps has been designated as an expeditionary force tasked with protecting China's offshore interests
  • Has tripled in size in recent years
  • Consists of 8 brigades
  • Would be expected to participate in any large-scale assault on Taiwan
  • The PLANMC would be tasked with conducting advance operations to create favorable conditions for the main invasion force
  • Focus on smaller-scale landings throughout objective areas
  • The PLANMC includes mechanized ground and air assault battalions, so it might also be tasked with helping follow-on operations in urban areas for example
• The PLAN will support any invasion with its amphibious assault ships
  • Consist of 10 ships total
    • 8 amphibious transport docks (LPDs)
    • 2 helicopter assaults ships (LHAs), with a third under construction
    • 30 tank landing ships (LSTs)
    • 20 medium landing ships (LSMs)
    • Many smaller landing craft
  • Recently the PLAN has prioritized production of larger amphibious assault ships better suited to supporting operations farther overseas
  • Reflects a balanced approach to force modernization that emphasizes creating a naval force capable of addressing a wide range of contingencies across the globe
  • However, China has tremendous shipbuilding capability and could surge production of smaller amphibious assault vessels necessary for a Taiwan invasion
• In addition to its own shipping, the PLA is expected to requisition a substantial number of civilian transport vessels
  • This should not be viewed as a "stopgap" capability
  • The integration of nominally civilian vessels is a key component of the PLA's invasion strategy
  • These ships would likely be operated by China's maritime militia, which consists of reservists whose day jobs are in civilian shipping
  • Chinese sources acknowledge the challenges in using maritime militia to man civilians vessels in support of a military operation
    • Uneven levels of training
    • Incomplete laws and regulations
    • Inadequate data sharing
    • Widespread use of flags of convenience
  • However, they also state that these civilian vessels could fulfill many important supporting roles
    • At-sea support
    • Force delivery
    • Over-the-shore logistical support
    • Helicopter relay stations
    • Early warning
    • Deception and concealment
  • It is possible that the Chinese maritime militia is sufficient to enable a cross-strait invasion

Enablers of Amphibious Warfare

• Consider the other forces that would support a cross-strait invasion
• PLA Airborne Corps
  • Consists of six combined arms brigades and one special operations brigade
  • PLA paratroopers' role would be to land behind enemy lines and seize important terrain
  • Questions remain about the Airborne Corps' ability to coordinate with other invasion forces
• PLA Ground Force helicopter units
  • The PLA has invested heavily in growing its helicopter units
  • However these units are not sufficient to carry out a "lightning invasion" on their own
• Special operation forces
  • Like special operation forces in other nations, these units would infiltrate prior to an invasion
  • Would provide intelligence and targeting data
  • Conduct strikes and raids to disrupt enemy formations and logistics
  • As with the airborne forces, questions exist about the ability of Chinese SOF to coordinate with regular military units
  • There are also questions about the Chinese SOF's proficiency with advanced equipment
• Mine warfare
  • The PLA has a large inventory of sea mines
  • These would be used to block the sea lanes around Taiwan prior to an invasion
    • Isolate Taiwan from international trade
    • Make it more complicated for allies to assist
  • PLA mine deployments might even extend as far as Japan
    • Compel Japanese neutrality
    • Make it more complicated for US ships sailing from Japan to assist Taiwan
  • During an invasion, the emphasis would shift from offensive minelaying to defensive mineclearing
    • PLA mine countermeasures (MCM) units would lead the way, clearing mines and enabling other PLA units to reach the invasion beaches
    • Little is known about the capabilities of these units
    • The PLA has acquired new minesweeping vessels and mine hunting remotely operated vehicles (ROVs)

Scenario Factors

• What are some of the Taiwan-specific factors that would be important to China's success in a potential invasion
• Ideology
  • The Chinese government sees reunification with Taiwan as the last chapter of an unfinished civil war
  • As a result, the Chinese government is likely to take a formal, legalistic approach to justifying a war for reunification
    • Use domestic law to legitimize actions
    • Start with law enforcement actions and economic coercion
  • Move slowly in order to not shock public opinion
  • The Chinese government's efforts to shape the ideological battleground could span years
  • I would argue that these efforts began years ago
• Confidence
  • Chinese strategists recognize that air and sea supremacy is vital to enable a cross-strait invasion
  • We do not have access to their internal assessments of the PLA's ability to create these preconditions
  • However, an inventory of the sensors and shooters available to the PLA in a near-term Taiwan conflict scenario indicate that the PLA has moderate confidence in its ability to maintain air supremacy, but high confidence in its ability to establish localized sea control
• Logistics
  • Use the PLA's Operational Logistics Report to assess the challenges that the PLA would face with supplying an invasion force across the strait
    • Materiel (food, petroleum, etc)
    • Medical treatment
    • Infrastructure support
  • In 2017, when the report was published, the authors found weaknesses across a range of logistical functions
    • Inadequate transport capacity
    • Insufficient reserve forces
  • At present it seems that that the PLA's logistics are still insufficient to support an invasion force
• Use of ports for invasion
  • Conventional wisdom holds that the PLA would seek to invade Taiwan across beaches
  • However, there are only a limited number of suitable beaches that could provide access for a substantial invasion force
  • An alternative scenario is that China could mount an amphibious or air assault operation to seize a Taiwanese port, and disembark the bulk of its invasion force through the port
• Commercial vessels
  • The PLA plans to use commercial vessels to support a potential Taiwan invasion
  • China's fleet of commercial cargo vessels is presently insufficient to support an invasion force
  • However, China is making progress towards having sufficient commercial logistical capacity

Implications

• What does all this mean for the US and Taiwanese militaries?
• Chinese and US amphibious warfare doctrines are moving in opposite directions
  • Prior to 2017, the PLAN Marine Corps largely focused on defending PRC-occupied islands and reefs
  • However, with the PLAN's construction of amphibious assault vessels, the PLANMC is embracing an amphibious assault doctrine reminiscent of the US Marine Corps after World War 2
  • Meanwhile, the US Marine Corps is refocusing on defending advanced bases
• The US and Japan should develop specific plans to deconflict their forces during the a potential conflict
• Space-based support will be degraded for all participants in a conflict — the side that prevails will be the one that operates better in a battlespace deprived of space-based support
• Taiwan must make itself harder to attack
  • Use China's own Anti-access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy against it
  • Target specific weaknesses in the Chinese military

Overall Findings

• Taiwan has shockingly little margin for error
• However, there is still time to build up forces to deter an invasion, or defeat an invasion if deterrence fails
• Beijing keeps strengthening relevant capabilities
  • Chinese missile development faces fewer geopolitical constraints than in the US, and might already be more advanced in some areas
  • Chinese sea mine capabilities are clearly superior to those of the US and Taiwan
• However, the Chinese military still faces significant weaknesses
  • Little experience with joint operations
  • Lack of combat experience
  • Although it would be the natural choice to lead an amphibious invasion, the PLANMC doesn't appear to be optimizing itself for that role
  • Instead the lead amphibious elements are still likely to be PLAGF units
  • Logistics remain a significant weakness
  • Air and helicopter also remains a weakness, especially with regards to coordination with ground forces
  • Although China has built large amphibious assault vessels, these appear to be intended to support expeditionary operations overseas, not to facilitate a cross-strait invasion
  • Although the PLA has a lot of weapons platforms, its sensor capabilities remain relatively weak and vulnerable
• Taiwan's terrain, in both land and sea, offer significant advantages to the defender
• Taiwan must redouble its efforts to build a "porcupine" defense

Part 1: Doctrinal Foundations of Chinese Amphibious Warfare

Chapter 1: Shi Lang's Amphibious Conquest of Taiwan in 1683

• In 1683, Qing admiral Shi Lang successfully conquered Taiwan
• Does his successful invasion hold any lessons for the present day?

Shi Lang in Brief

• Born into a prominent family in Fujian
• Became a senior captain with the Zheng clan, initially affiliated with the Ming Dynasty
• Served under Koxinga (Zheng Chenggong)
• However, after Koxinga ignored Shi Lang's advice regarding the defense of Xiamen, Shi Lang snubbed Koxinga, resulting in his imprisonment
• Shi Lang escaped custody and defected to the Qing in 1651
• Defeated on the mainland by the Qing, Koxinga retreated to Taiwan where he established a Ming successor state
• However, in 1683, Shi Lang invaded and extinguished the Ming successor state, unifying all of China under the Qing
• Shi Lang was successful in lobbying the Qing emperor to annex Taiwan to Fujian province, and became governor of the unified entity in 1684
• However, his efforts to resurrect the Zheng trading fleets were less successful
• Shi Lang's legacy has been interpreted in a variety of different ways in modern China
  • Celebrated for his naval competency and unifying the mainland and Taiwan
  • Castigated for his traitorous act of defection

Chinese Ming-Qing Civil War and European Arrivals in East Asia

• During the 17th century the Ming Dynasty, headed by the Zhu family was increasingly pressured by Manchu tribes
• In 1644 the Ming dynasty collapsed when the Manchu occupied Beijing and established the Qing dynasty
• The last Ming emperor, Chongzen, committed suicide just outside the Forbidden City
• Ming partisans retreated to Nanjing, in southern China to consolidate their resistance
• Although the Manchu occupied Nanjing in 1645, one year after their conquest of Beijing, Ming supporters conducted a fighting retreat in southern China and eventually moved offshore to Taiwan
• The Manchu killed the last Ming claimant to the throne in 1662
• However, the final conquest of the Ming would not occur for another 22 years, when Taiwan was finally conquered
• The primary support for the Ming-in-exile in Taiwan came from Koxinga, a powerful leader of the Zheng clan, based on the Fujian coast
• Koxinga led two expeditions to expel the Qing from Nanjing in the 1650s
• Although these expeditions failed, Koxinga was successful in driving the Dutch from Taiwan in the early 1660s — this greatly surprised European observers
• However, after ruling Taiwan for more than 20 years, the last Zheng family loyalists were defeated in a naval battle near the Penghu Islands in the Taiwan Strait, in 1683
• Following this defeat, the last Ming holdouts subjected themselves to Qing rule
• During this time, when China was riven by civil war, new European arrivals sought to gain access to China, Japan and the East Indies
  • Dutch — Jakarta
  • Portuguese — Macao
  • Spanish — Manila
• During the 1590s, Dutch merchants mounted a series of expeditions to the sources of many spices, notably pepper, cutting out Javanese middlemen
• Profits in the spice trade were very high — up to 400% — leading to fierce competition among European powers
  • In 1600, the English set up the East India Company (EIC)
  • In response, the Dutch set up the Vereenigde Oostindische Companigne (VOC) in 1602
  • Both the EIC and the VOC issued shares to the general public, establishing themselves as the forerunners to modern multinational corporations
• These companies possessed quasi-governmental powers
  • Negotiate treaties
  • Maintain armies and forts
  • Wage war
  • Try, imprison, and even execute people for crimes
  • Establish colonies
  • Issue coinage
• During the early 1600s, the Dutch competed primarily with the Portuguese for influence in the East Indies
  • Attacked Macao directly in 1622, which failed to drive the Portuguese from the territory
  • Established a trading center on the Penghu Islands
  • Were forced to move to Taiwan by the Chinese (I'm guessing it was the Ming Dynasty that forced them to move)
  • In 1641 the Dutch displaced the Portuguese from Nagasaki, establishing the only officially authorized European trading post in Japan
  • That same year, the Dutch also displaced the Portuguese from Malacca, establishing themselves firmly as the predominant European power in the seas around China
  • By the latter half of the 17th century, East and Southeast Asia were dominated by the Dutch
  • This dominance over the spice trade made the VOC the richest private organization in the West, and allowed it to nearly bankrupt the English EIC
  • However, during the 18th century, the Netherlands gradually lost sea power to England, and eventually the VOC was displaced by the EIC, before eventually being dissolved in 1799

The Zheng Clan and Koxinga

• Despite the Ming dynasty's overall decline during the 1600s, the Zheng clan of the Fujian coast controlled the maritime trade routes between Java and Japan
• The most successful of these Zheng merchants were Zheng Zhilong and his son Zhen Chenggong (Koxinga)
• The revenues of the Zheng clan were even higher than those of the VOC
• Zheng Zhilong took a Japanese wife, the daughter of a samurai, on one of his visits to Kyushu, and there the couple had a son, Zhen Chenggong
• Zheng Chenggong was trained in the samurai arts before being trained in the Chinese classics
• Longwu, the Ming emperor-in-exile bestowed upon Chenggong the name Koxinga, meaning "he of the royal surname"
• Zheng Zhilong estranged himself from his son by defecting to the Qing in 1646, just after their conquest of Beijing

Koxinga's Naval Expeditions Against the Qing and the Dutch

• Beginning in 1655, Koxinga conducted a series of successful campaigns to control the coastline in northern Fujian and Zhejiang provinces
• In 1658 and 1659, emboldened by these successes, Koxinga led two campaigns to retake Nanjing
• The first attempt failed because of storms
• The second failed because Koxinga failed to press his advantage when besieging Nanjing, allowing Qing reinforcements to arrive and chase him from the city
• As Koxinga retreated before the Qing counterattack, he decided to relocate his headquarters from the Xiamen and Jinmen islands further offshore to Taiwan
• Although his commanders objected, as they felt that Taiwan was too wild and underdeveloped, Koxinga favored Taiwan because of its greater size and the fact that it could only be accessed by sea
• From 1661 to 1662 Koxinga waged a series of sieges on the Dutch forts of Provintia and Zeelandia, eventually driving the Dutch back to Batavia in early 1662
• However, less than 5 months after his success in driving the Dutch from Taiwan, Koxinga died of a sudden illness
• His son Zheng Jing held off repeated counterattacks by the Dutch and the Qing, led by Shi Lang
• After Zheng Jing passed away in 1681, his son, Zheng Keshuang lost to Shi attack in 1683

Shi Lang's Amphibious Operations Against the Ming on Taiwan

• After Koxinga captured Taiwan from the Dutch in 1662, the Dutch attempted to ally with the Qing, and asked Shi Lang to retake Taiwan from Zheng Jing
• Shi scheduled two invasion dates, but on both occasions, operations were halted because of the threat of typhoons
• In 1664, the Qing appointed Shi Lang as the commander of the Fujian navy and tasked him with capturing Taiwan for the Qing
• However, this attack too was foiled by a typhoon
• In 1667, Zheng Jing, Koxinga's son, attempted to gain recognition for Taiwan as a separate state by opening negotiations with the Qing
• Simultaneously, he sought an alliance with the Japanese, who were sympathetic to the Zheng, as Koxinga had been half-Japanese and related to Japanese nobility
• At this time, Shi Lang and the other Ming defectors, such as Zheng Zhilong, came under suspicion and were placed under house arrest
• This confinement lasted until Zheng Zhilong's death in 1683, at which point Shi Lang was restored as commander of naval forces in Fujian
• Shi Lang's power increased further when, after a dispute with the governor of Fujian, the Qing emperor Kanxi granted Shi Lang total control over all military decisions and authorized him to conquer Taiwan for the Qing
• On July 7, 1683, Shi Lang sailed from Fujian to attack the Ming fleet stationed at the Penghu Islands
• The Ming fleet was caught unprepared because it thought an attack during typhoon season was unlikely
• Armed with superior cannon provided by the Dutch, Shi Lang secured a decisive victory
• Shi Lang took many prisoners, whom he provided food for, contrasting with the famine faced by Zheng defenders on Taiwan
• After the defeat of the Penghu Island fleet, Zheng military commanders were divided on what to do, with many advocating a further retreat to Manila
• This enabled Shi Lang to sail almost unopposed into Tai Bay, and on August 26 1683, Zheng Keshuang surrendered Emperor Yongli's royal seals and presented himself with a Manchu-style shaved head, signaling unconditional surrender
• In October, Shi Lang proclaimed a general amnesty for all former Ming supporters who recognized the Qing victory, an offer that was accepted by most former Ming loyalists on Taiwan
• In February 1684, seeking to reinforce his own trading monopoly and prevent Taiwan from being used as a base for further insurgency, Shi Lang petitioned the Qing throne to formally annex Taiwan
• In March 1684, this request was granted, and Emperor Kangxi annexed Taiwan to Fujian province
• However, in November 1684, Emperor Kangxi lifted the maritime trading ban on the coast of China, ending Shi Lang's monopoly
• Shi Lang's wealth and influence would decline steadily until his death in 1696
• The geography of the Penghu Islands, Jinmen and Xiamen have been relevant for all invasions of Taiwan
  • The Dutch established a fort on the Penghu Islands in 1622 before being forced onto Taiwan by the Chinese in 1624
  • Koxinga used the Penghus as a staging ground for his attack on the Dutch in Taiwan in 1662
  • Shi Lang attacked the Ming stationed in the Penghu Islands first, in 1683
  • In the 1800s, the French Navy used the Penghus as base from which to attack Taiwan
  • In 1895 the Japanese captured the Penghus in the last battle of the Sino-Japanese War, solidifying their control over Taiwan pursuant to the Treaty of Shimonoseki
  • The Penghus offer a large deep water harbor 30 miles off the coast of Taiwan and 70 miles off the coast of mainland China
  • Capturing the Penghus greatly simplifies the logistics of any power that seeks to invade or isolate Taiwan
  • So, by implication, in order to repel an invasion or blockade, maintaining control of the Penghu Islands is imperative for Taiwan
• Jinmen and Xiamen also play a significant role in controlling the Fujian coast and maintaining control over the Taiwan Strait
  • Although these islands are close together, Jinmen is in Taiwanese hands while Xiamen belongs to the PRC
  • In October 1949, at the Battle of Guningtou, Nationalist forces decisively defeated pursuing Communist forces in their attempt to drive the Nationalists off Jinmen
  • Jinmen also played a key role during the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1958

Parallels Between Seventeenth Century Taiwan and Twenty-First Century Taiwan

• There are parallels to be drawn between the Ming-Qing and Nationalist-Communist civil wars
  • Conflict moved from north to south on the mainland
  • Taiwan became the last refuge of the party that was defeated on the mainland
• Koxinga is celebrated by both Taiwanese and mainland Chinese
  • On the mainland, he is venerated as the hero who liberated Taiwan from the Dutch
  • On Taiwan, he is remembered for his valiant resistance against the mainland Qing
  • Both sides credit Koxinga with making Taiwan part of the Chinese empire
  • Koxinga is seen as preventing Taiwan from becoming a European-ruled island like the Philippines or Indonesia
• Just as Koxinga opposed the Dutch in the 17th Century, Chiang Kai-shek opposed the Japanese in the 20th
  • Chiang is given credit in both Western and Chinese scholarship for his role in defeating the Japanese
  • Then, just like Koxinga, Chiang was driven from the mainland and made Taiwan his refuge
  • Both the PRC and the ROC draw parallels between Chiang's and Koxinga's retreat to Taiwan
  • The PRC in addition emphasizes the eventual capture of Taiwan by Shi Lang
  • Is it possible that Xi Jinping sees himself as a modern-day Shi Lang?

Conclusion

• During the 17th century rising Qing power eclipsed the declining Ming in land-based operations
• Qing occupied Beijing in 1644, and within a year had consolidated control of China north of the Yangzi River
• However, through the Zheng clan, the Ming retained control of the sea, operating from their bases in Xiamen and Jinmen
• This enabled Koxinga's fleet to attack Nanjing in 1659 and the Dutch on Taiwan in 1661
• Following Koxinga's death in 1662, the power of the Ming fleet declined and Taiwan was eventually overrun by the Qing, led by Shi Lang, in 1683
• Today, China's military power, especially in the sea and air domains, is expanding rapidly relatively to Taiwan
• Another parallel between the 17th Century and today is the capability of leadership on the Chinese mainland
  • Qing emperor Kangxi ruled from 1661 to 1722, the longest single reign in Chinese history
  • State grew increasingly powerful and centralized under his rule
  • Took power at the age of 7, with regents and the empress wielding power in his name for the first seven years of his rule
  • Consolidated his rule by the late 1660s
  • Authoritatively directed Shi Lang to retake Taiwan
  • Similarly, Xi Jinping has emerged as a powerful, centralizing ruler in mainland China
• Another lesson from the 17th century is that operational leadership in the field is key
  • Koxinga learned from his campaigns against Nanjing and attacked the Dutch much more aggressively
  • Later, Shi Lang used his extensive knowledge of Zheng naval practices to take the Zheng fleet by surprise in the Penghu Islands
• The Ming defense on Taiwan was hampered by lack of foreign support
  • Sought an alliance with the Japanese
  • However, by this time, the Japanese had committed to an isolationist foreign policy and refused to come to the aid of the Ming on Taiwan
  • Although the Qing sought an alliance with the Dutch to retake Taiwan, in the end Dutch support failed to materialize and was unnecessary
  • Although the US is currently strongly committed to defend Taiwan against aggression from the mainland, this commitment could waver in the future
• The three lessons from the case of Shi Lang and the Qing conquest of China are
  • Relative power matters
  • Leadership matters
  • Alliances matter
• Although there are many differences between 17th China and modern China, the conquest of Taiwan by Shi Lang provides a compelling historical narrative that informs the PRC's thinking about Taiwan

Chapter 2: What Did the PLA Learn From Its Jinmen, Hainan and Yijiangshan Landing Campaigns

• The Chinese Civil War was primarily a land campaign
• However, after gaining control of the mainland, the PLA did conduct several amphibious operations to gain control of offshore islands
• In 1949, the PLA unsuccessfully assaulted Jinmen (a.k.a. Kinmen or Quemoy)
• In 1950, the PLA successfully attacked Hainan
• The PLA also conducted a successful attack on Yijiangshan, which remains the PLA's only successful joint operation during the Cold War

Jinmen: A Failed Landing

• Mao Zedong founded the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949
• At this time there were still over a million Kuomintang (KMT) fighters in southwest China and on Taiwan
• In late 1949, Chiang Kai-shek moved the seat of his government to Taiwan, making Taipei the new capital of the Republic of China (ROC)
• Chiang prepared for Mao's attack by concentrating his forces on four major islands
  • 200,000 troops on Taiwan
  • 100,000 on Hainan
  • 120,000 on the Zhousan island group
  • 60,000 on Jinmen
• Jinmen is a small island group lying just two miles off the coast of mainland China
• Total land area of approximately 60 sq. mi.
• Had a civilian population of approximately 40,000 at that time
• Lies just off the coast of Xiamen, a major seaport on the southeast mainland — not in open ocean
• After capturing Xiamen on October 17, 1949 the 10th Army Group ordered the 28th Army to prepare for a landing operation against Jinmen
• Poor intelligence caused the 28th Army to pay insufficient attention to battle readiness
• The 28th Army launched its attack on Jinmen on October 24, 1949
• First wave consisted of 10,000 troops
• Found itself tightly encircled by the KMT garrison at Guningtou, a small village near the landing site
• The 28th Army could not apply the tactics that had led to success for the Communists in the past
  • Achieving surprise to avoid superior firepower
  • Outnumbering the enemy
  • Engaging in mobile operations
• The next morning, KMT air and naval forces destroyed 200 small fishing junks around Xiamen before they could be used land PLA reinforcements
• Without the ability to send reinforcements, the 10th Army Group could not reinforce the Jinmen landings
• The 28th Army lost 9,086 landing troops, with more than 3,000 of those troops being taken prisoner
• The KMT defenders lost only about a thousand men
• News of the disaster reached Beijing on October 28
• In response, Mao Zedong drafted a circular instructing his commanders to learn a good lesson from the failure at Jinmen
• PLA commanders took away four conclusions from the failed landings at Jinmen
  1. Cross-strait transportation is a key factor
  2. Coordination and communication are crucial
  3. Landing forces must outnumber the enemy defense
  4. Naval and air forces are necessary for large-scale amphibious campaigns
• The Deputy Commander of the Third Field Army, Su Yu, warned his generals that amphibious operations were a "new warfare" that was "different from all the wars we've fought before"
• The KMT came to different conclusions regarding the Communist failure at Jinmen
  • PLA troops had become arrogant after their victory at Xiamen and underestimated the challenge of landing on Jinmen
  • Thought that the landing was successful as soon as they hit the beach, and did not have a plan to deal with counterattacks
  • Had only one landing point
  • Chose to attack in the early morning, allowing defenders to concentrate their firepower during the crucial first 24 hours of the landing
• According to the KMT, the PLA would have had more success in attacking Jinmen if they'd
  • Attacked in two or more places
  • At different times, preferably at night
  • With supporting firepower, especially antitank guns
• Another major factor hampering the Chinese attack was a simple lack of boats — the PLA did not have the boats to launch a second wave or provide major reinforcements to the first wave at Jinmen
• The PLA defeat at Jinmen helped convince the Nationalists that the KMT government could survive on Taiwan, as long as it built up strong defensive forces
• After the disaster at Jinmen, Mao Zedong issued orders changing how the PLA planned and prepared for amphibious landing operations
  1. Centralized national command
     • Landing require coordination across a wide range of military forces
     • Requires a centralized command to coordinate, plan and mobilize the resources needed
     • On October 31, 1949, Mao issued orders halting amphibious operations and instructing his commanders that future amphibious operations could only be authorized by field army headquarters, not local army group commands
  2. Dedicated landing force
     • Mao realized that amphibious operations require the transport of at least an entire field army (40-50,000 men) and supplies for at least three days of operations
     • In 1961 the Central Military Commission (CMC) organized a research group to study past landing campaigns in preparation for another attack on Chiang Kai-shek's forces
     • The conclusion of this group was that attacking forces must be numerically superior to local defenses
  3. More training
     • Su Yu was tasked with developing a training curriculum for large scale amphibious operations
     • In the process of developing this training, Su communicated to Mao that amphibious operations would be extremely difficult without air and sea control
  4. Naval and air support
     • In response to Su's recommendations, Mao created the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)
     • PLAAF was established on November 11, 1949
     • In December 1949, the Twelfth Army Group, Fourth Field Army was reorganized into the PLAN, with its commander, Xiao Jinguang, becoming the PLAN's first commander
• On December 16 1949, Mao visited the Soviet Union
  • Soviets agreed to a loan to arm the Chinese with ships and aircraft
  • Ships worth $150 million
  • $220 million worth of aircraft, with more aircraft requested in follow-up orders
  • Russian military advisers
  • These ships and aircraft would become the first equipment used by the PLAN and PLAAF respectively
  • However, they did not arrive in time for the PLA's landings on Hainan, and, as a result the PLAN and PLAAF were excluded from this operation
• I didn't realize that the PLAAF and PLAN were created specifically because of the failures of the PLA in conducting amphibious operations
• In a very real sense, the entire purpose of the PLA, since the founding of the PRC, has been to recapture Taiwan

The Hainan Landing and the Taiwan Invasion Plan

• In April 1950, having learned the lessons from the failure at Jinmen, the PLA attacked Hainan Island
• Operation was coordinated from PLA's high command
  • Planning started in January, when Mao instructed the CMC to "solve the problem of Hainan Island"
  • In February, the CMC presented a plan that would combine small and large-scale amphibious crossings in order to negate the Chinese Nationalists' air and naval superiority in the Qiongzhou Strait separating Hainan from the mainland
• The PLA concentrated a large invasion force, consisting of approximately 100,000 troops
• Included supporting elements such as artillery and combat engineers
• PLA also established coordination with guerrilla elements on Hainan, consisting of approximately 20,000 men
• Collected over 2,100 fishing vessels and employed more than 6,000 civilian operators to provide cross-strait transportation
• From March 5 to 10, the 15th Army Group, 4th Field Army began small-scale night landings by sending battalion-sized groups across the Qiongzhou Strait
• These vanguard troops made contact with local guerrillas and prepared landing sites for the main invasion force
• On the evening of April 16, the first wave of the main invasion force, consisting of 50,000 troops sailed towards Hainan
• This forces was detected by KMT air patrols and KMT sea and air forces moved to engage
• Through the night of the 16th, KMT warships attacked the PLA landing force, but failed to stop them, losing 1 ship sunk and two damaged in the process
• By the following morning, the PLA's invasion force had landed on Hainan
• The invasion force successfully engaged KMT defenses and secured the landing areas
• By April 22 the KMT's 252nd Division, the primary defensive force on Hainan, had been defeated, with the PLA capturing Haikou, the capital
• On April 23, the PLA sent over a second wave of 50,000 troops
• Hainan was fully captured by May 1
• The success of the operation against Hainan Island encouraged the PLA to prepare for a possible invasion of Taiwan in 1950
• Mao emphasized the training of additional airborne forces and authorized the organization of a further four amphibious divisions
• In late spring, the PLA's Third Field Army began preparations for a major amphibious operation against Taiwan
  • Would use the 7th, 8th and 9th Army Groups along with the nascent PLAN
  • Deploy over a half-million troops
  • A further 300,000 troops from the Fourth Field Army would act as reserve
• In May 1950, the 9th Army Group defeated nationalist forces on the Zhoushan island group
• In June of 1950 the same forces also captured the Dongshan and Wanshan island groups
• By late spring 1950, both the PLA and KMT expected a major attack, first against Jinmen and then later against Taiwan itself
• However, on June 25 1950, the Korean War broke out
• The Korean war took Mao and the Chinese leadership by surprise — neither the Soviets nor the North Koreans had warned them about the upcoming attack
• As a result the PRC was caught by surprise by the US policy shift in East Asia
• On June 27, President Truman announced the 7th Fleet's deployment to the Taiwan Strait as a preventive measure designed to stop Communist attacks on Taiwan
• The presence of the US Navy in the Taiwan Strait, along with US involvement in Korea, caused a significant recalculation on the part of the Chinese Communists
• On June 30, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai formally suspended invasion preparations against Taiwan, and the CMC sent word to the forces preparing for invasion that the invasion had been postponed until at least 1952
• The arrival of US forces in the Taiwan Strait signaled to the PRC that there was an international aspect to their heretofore internal struggle and that future plans against Taiwan would have to account for the actions of the United States

Yijiangshan: The First Joint Operation

• By 1953, the Chinese understood that they were unprepared for a full-scale war against the United States
• Instead, the PLA chose a strategy of "limited wars"
• Limited attacks in the Taiwan Strait to promote PRC interests while attempting to avoid conflict with the United States
• After the Korean armistice in 1953, the PLA planned a new amphibious campaign against KMT-held islands in the Taiwan Strait
• Zhang Aiping, head of the Zhejiang Command (ZC) in the East China Military Region (ECMR) proposed a piecemeal strategy where the PRC would capture offshore islands one at a time, starting with those farthest away from Taiwan and the US 7th Fleet
• Chose to begin with the Dachen Islands
  • Located in the East China Sea
  • Over 100 miles away from the 7th Fleet, which was posted to the South China Sea
  • Over 200 miles away from Taiwan
• After success in the Dachen Islands, Aiping planned to move south and attack larger islands
• In early May 1954, the PLA began preparing for a landing on Dongji, a group of islands north of the Dachens
• On May 15, PLA troops landed on the islands and eliminated the KMT garrison, capturing 60 prisoners in the process
• With this success, the CMC authorized the ECMR to proceed with the main attack on the Dachens
• The PLA used its lessons from Hainan and Jinmen in its attack against the Dachen Islands
  • Zhang established a joint command in the summer of 1954 in Ningbo
  • Command included officers from the air force, army and navy
  • Began detailed planning for the Dachen campaign on August 31, 1954
  • Sent infantry officers to the navy and air force for cross-training
• Zhang decided to attack Yijiangshan, a small islet north of the main Dachen islands, as the first target
• The landing was scheduled for noon of January 18, 1955, weather permitting
• The attack commenced with aerial bombardment at 8:00 am, with coastal artillery following up
• The pre-attack bombardment destroyed or damaged almost all the defenders' fortifications
• The landing occurred at around 12:15 pm, and by 5:30 pm the entire island was under PLA control
• Both sides suffered relatively heavy casualties for such a small engagement
  • The KMT lost its entire garrison of 1,086 men, with 567 killed and 519 taken prisoner
  • The PLA suffered 2,092 casualties, with 893 dead and 1,037 wounded
  • Nearly half of the first wave of PLA landing forces were killed or injured
  • The PLAN lost one landing craft, and suffered damage to 21 other ships
• The Yijiangshan operation was important because it was the first amphibious landing conducted as a joint operation with participation from land, air, and naval forces
• In addition, Yijiangshan showed that the PLA could conduct operations against the KMT without necessarily inviting US intervention
• Performance across PLA units was uneven during the landing
  • PLAAF units performed well
    • Staffed with pilots who had seen combat over Korea
    • Armed with advanced MiG-15 aircraft, which were significantly more capable than the KMT aircraft in the area
    • In six air engagements with KMT forces, the PLAAF shot down six KMT fighters while losing two of its own
  • PLAN units performed poorly
    • The PLAN also fought a number of engagements against KMT naval forces in the area around the Dachen islands
    • Although the PLAN was successful in pushing KMT forces away from the Dachen Islands, it lost the warship Ruijin, and several other ships were damaged
    • Chinese analysts believe that while strategic success was achieved, the PLAN failed operationally as it took unnecessarily high losses during the campaign

Conclusion

• PLAN amphibious doctrine evolved rapidly from 1949 to 1955
• Chinese generals were constantly adjusting to new information and assessing their own performance
• Learned not only from their own successes and failures, but also from observing US forces in Korea
• Demonstrated 4 key capabilities
  1. Planning
  2. Learning
  3. Adapting
  4. Political control
• Centralized preparations and operations and logistics
• Transitioned from army-led attacks to joint operations involving land, naval and air officers working in close collaboration
• However, PLA leadership was frustrated by the technological gap between itself and the United States, which committed itself to preserving Taiwanese independence
• The Korean War demonstrated the disparity between the PLA and the US military, and PLA generals were realistic about their ability to challenge the US Army, Navy and Air Force in a battle for Taiwan
• One lesson PLA leadership has carried forward from historical analysis of the amphibious landings from 1950-1955 is that success is eminently achievable if the US military does not intervene
• As a result, Chinese forces will likely attempt to first deter the US from intervening in a future Taiwan crisis

Chapter 3: The Six Pillars of PLA Amphibious Doctrine

• What are the guiding principles of the PLA's amphibious force?
• How would these principles apply in a potential Taiwan invasion scenario?

The PLAN's Current Amphibious Missions

• The PLAN is charged primarily with executing three missions
  1. Cross-strait invasion of Taiwan
  2. Asserting and defending Chinese maritime claims in the South China Sea
  3. Out-of-area ("far seas") operations in support of the Belt-and-Road Initiative — protecting Chinese national interests and evacuating Chinese citizens in the event of a crisis
• Of these three, by far the highest priority is given to the cross-strait invasion scenario

Core Principles of PLA Amphibious Doctrine

• Since 1949, the PLA has grappled with a set of problems related to amphibious operations
  • How to provide adequate air support
  • How to establish naval superiority
  • How to transport large numbers of troops across the strait
• To solve these problems, the PLA has studied its own history, other amphibious campaigns, and emulated the best practices of other navies
• By 2006, the PLA had adopted the following general doctrinal guidelines regarding amphibious operations
  • Forces must be organized into two distinct components, sea and land, under a single joint command
  • Air support must be provided to protect the landing force
  • Naval gunfire is required to suppress and/or destroy coastal defenses
  • Specialized landing vessels are required to actually put ground forces "on the beach"
  • Balance force composition between assault forces and reserves in order to crack enemy defenses, but also have sufficient follow-on forces to maintain momentum
  • Units must be loaded on transports such that they can disembark and engage in combat immediately
• By 2013, these general doctrinal guidelines had been refined into the following six principles

1. Dominance of the Three Domains

• In order an amphibious landing to be successful, the attacking force must have superiority in the air, on the water and on land at the point of landing
• A challenge in establishing this dominance is demarcating clear lines of authority
• Who is responsible for which domains, at which points during the operation?
• The British, in North Africa, had strong interservice disputes regarding whether command of air support should be centralized in the Royal Air Force, or whether ground forces and the Royal Navy could retain limited command over aircraft for specific operations
• In different theaters, the Allies came to different arrangements regarding the division of labor between sea, air and land domains
• However, over time, it became clear that successful operations established the following preconditions
  • Initial establishment of air superiority
  • Effective dominance by ground forces in land warfare and naval forces in the maritime domain
  • Close coordination between maritime, ground, and air forces
  • Ability to pass control back and forth between domains
• Contemporary PLA doctrine extends this concept of multidomain dominance into the information domain as well
• Emphasizes the need to degrade adversary command and control networks
• It's notable that the PLA is not yet confident in its ability to achieve this multidomain dominance
• PLAN Marine Corps journals have a number of articles discussing invasion scenarios which assume robust enemy capabilities in the air and on sea
  • Series of articles discussing how to best distribute anti-air weaponry on amphibious assault craft
  • Indicates that the PLAN Marine Corps is not confident in the PLAAF or PLAN's ability to keep adversary aircraft away from its ships during a landing operation
  • Or it's just contingency planning — the PLAN MC might be planning for an unlikely scenario because having a plan and not needing it is better than needing an plan and not having it

2. Key Point Strikes

• During World War 2, allied forces focused on using naval gunfire and air strikes to disable key points in enemy defenses
• The PLA has extended this doctrine to encompass attacking all elements of the adversary's defenses
  • Early warning systems
  • Command and control
  • Air defense systems
  • Air bases
  • Harbors
• In order to carry out these strikes, PLA doctrine calls for coordinated strikes using missiles, aircraft, and special forces
• Although the PLA has embraced the doctrine of key point strikes, it doesn't appear to have fully conceptualized how that doctrine would apply in an amphibious invasion scenario
• The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) has contributed personnel to PLA amphibious warfare exercise, suggesting that the PLA is integrating the PLARF's assets into its amphibious warfare plans
• However, studies by PLA researchers have also focused on placing surface attack capabilities on ships, armored vehicles and other more local assets, suggesting a certain lack of confidence in the PLARF's ability to strike and destroy key nodes ahead of an invasion

3. Concentration of Elite Strengths

• In World War 2, the Allies used both concentrated and dispersed landings
  • In North Africa and Sicily, dispersed landings were used, to better match ground campaign objectives and the geography of the landing areas
  • In the Pacific, the size and limited access paths to many Pacific atolls forced the US to concentrate its forces in order to overwhelm heavy Japanese defenses
• PLA doctrine has traditionally called for local superiority at the point of attack
• Therefore, the PLA's inclination is to concentrate its forces
• This tendency is further reinforced by Taiwan's geography, which offers only a few suitable landing beaches
• Concentrating elite strengths is synthesizing high quality troops, high-tech weaponry, and overwhelming material resources into a focused effort on key points in the attack
• Requires advanced command, control and intelligence gathering capabilities
• The goal is to achieve local overmatch of Taiwan's capabilities in one or more of the few landing areas
• Chinese military exercises have focused on developing these C2 capabilities
• Chinese C2 takes place primarily at the brigade level
  • Receives reconnaissance reports
  • Orders attacks on enemy artillery and missile positions
  • Coordinates the use of unmanned vehicles to break up fixed defenses and minefields
• The PLA is experimenting with computerized planning to optimize troop and weapons allocations across ships
• They are trying to create a modern version of the Normandy model, which centralized C2 of the entire allied force during Operation Overlord

4. Rapid and Continuous Assaults

• One of the primary challenges involved in amphibious landing operations is breaching concentrated enemy defenses and then moving inland rapidly with minimal operational pauses
• The PLA's solution to this challenge is to use an echeloned approach
• First wave will secure the beach and clear defenses
• Second wave will move inland
• The PLA is aware that mines, especially, could pose a significant risk to the second wave's ability to land and rapidly deploy for inland maneuver warfare
• In addition to the traditional defensive approaches that the US pursues (i.e. using trained personnel and unmanned vehicles to detect and disable mines), the PLA has explored offensive mining strategies, such as preemptively dropping mines into enemy harbors in order to limit enemy naval mobility in response to an amphibious invasion

5. Integrated and Flexible Support Operations

• Another major challenge of amphibious operations is supplying landing forces once they start to move inland
• The allies struggled with logistics in Operation Torch, with the initial landing forces unable to move inland because of a lack of trucks to supply them with fuel
• Japanese struggled so much with supplying their troops on Guadalcanal that it was nicknamed "Starvation Island"
• To support the D-Day landings, the allies set up a pipeline running from the Isle of Wight to the invasion beaches (PLUTO — Pipelines Under The Ocean) to supply additional fuel more efficiently
• The Chinese are aware that an invasion force on Taiwan will require a significant amount of logistical support
• To provide this support, the PLA calls for
  • Military-civilian integrated supply and logistical support system
  • Flexible and agile modes of support operations
  • Integration and unified command of the units providing logistical support
• This is an extremely difficult challenge, complicated by the fact that the PLA appears to be counting on integration with civilian organizations
• The PLA must also transition from its traditional warehouse-and-depot approach to combat service support in favor of one centered on just-in-time logistics
• According to most observers, the PLA has not sufficiently completed its logistics reforms
  • A particular point of concern for the PLA is the provision of medical care to a Taiwan invasion force
  • Another concern is supplying petroleum, oil, lubricants and spare parts
• To address these challenges, the PLA is studying the Allies' use of artificial harbors on the Normandy beaches
• Is developing computer models to predict supply and parts needs
• Is also developing computer models to determine how the military can efficiently use civilian sealift to transfer forces

6. Psychological Attacks

• A major component of the preparation for the Normandy landings was deception campaigns aimed at Nazi Germany to convince German generals that the landings would take place either in the Scandinavian countries or at Calais
• This deception campaign was comprehensive, involving the creation of a phantom army, complete with realistic message traffic, fabricated intelligence reports drafted by captured and turned German agents, false movements of troops and the appointment of General Patton as the commander
• After the invasion, Allied psychological operations shifted towards asserting the superiority of allied forces and encouraging local populations in France and Germany to engage in sabotage
• The PLA asserts that successful psychological warfare consists of the following three elements
  • Propaganda to affect the mood, morale and fighting spirit of defending soldiers and adversary citizens
  • Displays of overwhelming force and the willingness to use it, to terrify the opposing army
  • Deception, trickery and sleight-of-hand to fool enemy forces into believing an attack will take place at a different location
• The PLA specifically cites the Allies' Operation Body Guard, which they claim lulled the German defenders into believing that the invasion would not take place in Normandy
• The PLA also treats the use of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) as a means of psychological warfare — PGMs reduce the effect of fighting on the civilian population and make them more likely to surrender

Conclusion

• The PLA has accepted most Western findings related to amphibious warfare
  • The importance of maritime and air superiority
  • Establishing effective command and control
  • Loading ships and troops properly to minimize bottlenecks and ensure that landing forces have the materiel they require
  • Escorting amphibious forces and protecting them against enemy attack
  • Isolating the landing areas
  • Conducting preparatory naval strikes against on-shore targets
  • Splitting forces wisely between the initial assault and follow-on echelons
  • Developing specialized landing craft for amphibious functions
• The above six principles reflect the PLA's current thinking on amphibious warfare and, more specifically, the challenges of conducting an amphibious landing on Taiwan
• These principles reflect aspirations, not necessarily current capabilities

Part 2: The Joint Amphibious Force

Chapter 4: The PLAGF Amphibious Force

• One of the most important missions assigned to the PLA is deterring Taiwan from taking further steps towards independence
• If this deterrence fails, the PLA may be called upon to conduct a joint island landing campaign
• While there is little indication that a traditional over-the-beach landing is the first choice or even the first military choice for Chinese policymakers, the PLA is preparing to execute such an attack should other options fail
• The PLAGF's contribution to the Taiwan deterrence and war-fighting mission consists primarily of six amphibious combined arms brigades (ACABs)
• The three army groups stationed closest to Taiwan in the Eastern and Southern Theater Commands (TCs) have two each of these brigades
• The capabilities of these brigades have been enhanced by reforms that began in 2017
  • Increased capabilities of PLA helicopter units
  • More special-operations forces
  • More air defense
  • More long-range strike, via rocket launchers
• In an invasion scenario, these ACABs will be reinforced by other PLA ground units, as well as units from other services, militia forces and civilian assets
• In peacetime, these supporting forces are dispersed, and, as a result it will take the PLA days, if not weeks to move all necessary forces within striking distance of Taiwan and prepare for an assault
• I think this is still too optimistic — the Russians required the better part of six months to assemble the invasion force for Ukraine
  • That was a far simpler exercise — invading via roads over a land border
  • And it still wasn't enough — the invasion force was not powerful enough to take Kyiv in the opening weeks of the war, and Russia was not able to successfully execute a coup de main against the Ukrainian government
• If the PLA has learned anything from Ukraine, they'll be spending the better part of a year assembling the invasion force
• Once the invasion forces land, they will be faced with Taiwan's inhospitable terrain
  • Only a few beaches along Taiwan's west coast are suitable for an invasion
  • Once inland, the terrain quickly turns mountainous
  • Many rice paddies
  • Lots of urban sprawl
• In order to deal with these challenges, PLA leadership has sought to reform the PLAGF in order to shift the decisive phase of a Taiwan invasion away from an amphibious over-the-beach operation
• Instead they seek to use helicopter and airborne forces to seize key infrastructure ahead of time, paralyzing Taiwan's ability to respond to an amphibious invasion, when it comes
• However, a large scale assault by multiple ACABs may still be necessary

Order of Battle

• Prior to the 2017 reforms, PLAGF amphibious capabilities were concentrated in three units, all stationed on China's east coast
  • 1st Amphibious Mechanized Infantry Division, 1st Group Army (GA) — Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province (Nanjing military region)
  • 14th Amphibious Armored Brigade, 31st GA — Zhangzou, Fujian Province (Nanjing military region)
  • 124th Amphibious Infantry Divison, 42nd GA — Boluo, Guangdong (Guangzhou military region)
• In 2017, these units were disbanded
  • 1st Amphibious Mechanized and 124th Amphibious Infantry were each split into 2 ACABs
  • 14th Amphibious Armored was transformed into a fifth ACAB
  • The sixth ACAB was formed from elements of the former 91st Motorized Infantry Division, also based in Zhangzhou
• These units were transferred to new garrison locations, with the result that 4 ACABs report to the Eastern Theater Command and the remaining 2 report to Southern Theater Command
• The six new ACABs are assigned as follows

  Group Army	Brigade Name	Location
  72nd	5th ACAB	Hangzhou, Zhejiang
  	124th ACAB	Hangzhou, Zhejiang
  73rd	14th ACAB	Zhangzhou, Fujian
  	91st ACAB	Zhangzhou, Fujian
  74th	1st ACAB	Boluo, Guangdong
  	125th ACAB	Bao'an, Guangdong

PLAGF Amphibious Combined Arms Brigades

• Each ACAB is structured similarly to a heavy combined-arms brigade
• Instead of tanks and APCs, they are assigned amphibious assault guns and amphibious IFVs
• Each ACAB is composed of 9 battalions
  • 4 amphibious combined arms battalions
    • 2 amphibious assault gun companies
    • 2 amphibious mechanized infantry companies
    • Firepower company (mortars, man-portable air defense systems)
    • Support company (reconnaissance and combat engineering)
  • Reconnaissance battalion
    • Amphibious reconnaissance vehicles
    • UAVs
  • Artillery battalion
    • Amphibious 122mm howitzers
    • Amphibious rocket launchers
    • Antitank guided missile launchers
  • Air-defense battalion
    • Short-range air defense vehicles
    • Man-portable air-defense systems
  • Operational support battalion
    • Command-and-control vehicles
    • Electronic warfare
    • Engineering support
    • Chemical-warfare protection equipment
    • Military police
  • Service support battalion
    • Medical supplies
    • Repair supplies
    • Maintenance units
• Within each combined-arms battalion, each assault gun and mechanized infantry company is equipped with 14 vehicles at full strength
• Firepower and service support companies add another 15-20 vehicles total
• Overall, once all ancillary vehicles are included, a single combined-arms battalion consists of approximately 80 vehicles and 500-600 soldiers (between six and eight soldiers per vehicle, on average)
• The other five battalions in each brigade are smaller
  • Add approximately 2000 soldiers total
  • Another 100 vehicles, not all of which are capable of crossing deep water
• A full ACAB consists of approximately 5000 personnel and 400 vehicles — this is the baseline number that should be used when analyzing transport needs
• China's six ACABs have 24 amphibious combined arms battalions and six reconnaissance battalions — this is the force that will be "first on the beach" in any amphibious invasion of Taiwan

Group Army Support For Amphibious Operations

• In any major amphibious operation, the ACABs will receive support from other units in their group army
• The 2017 reforms standardized the composition of group armies
  • Six combined-arms brigades
  • Six or seven support brigades
• Combined arms brigades are classified as either "heavy", "medium" or "light"
  • Heavy brigades are equipped with tracked armored vehicles
  • Medium brigades are equipped with wheeled armored vehicles
  • Light brigades are equipped with unarmored trucks for transport
  • Amphibious combined arms brigades are a special type of heavy brigade, in this classification scheme
• Although each group army has six combined-arms brigades, the mix of light, medium and heavy brigades varies from army to army
• Nonamphibious brigades from the Southern, Eastern and Northern TCs have participated in cross-beach landing training, practicing disembarking from PLAGF amphibious landing craft or PLAN landing ships
• This likely simulates the arrival second echelon of a landing force, intended to move inland after the first echelon has secured beachheads and port infrastructure
• The supporting brigades in a group army consist of
  • Artillery
  • Air defense
  • Special-operations forces
  • Army aviation (helicopter) or air assault (helicopters with organic infantry)
  • Engineering
  • Chemical defense
  • Service support
• All of these could be used to support an amphibious operation
  • Artillery brigades would be an important source of fire support for any invasion force
    • All artillery brigades now have a battalion of 300mm PHL03 MLRS
    • This has a range of 70 - 160 km
    • These systems could deliver fire support from the Chinese mainland to the Penghu Islands, or, from select locations, even onto beaches on Taiwan itself
    • More recently, the PLA has begun deploying the even longer range PCH191 370mm MLRS, prioritizing the three group armies with ACABs that are deployed opposite Taiwan
    • The PCH191 expands the area along the mainland coast from which it's feasible to attack Taiwan's west coast
  • Air defense brigades will be expected to coordinate with PLAAF and PLAN assets to protect assembly areas and troops in transit across the Taiwan Strait
  • PLAGF aviation brigades give ground commanders the option of inserting up to a battalion's worth of infantry to seize key terrain, as well as providing attack helicopter support for the actual landing
  • Most aviation brigades would have to pre-deploy to airfields closer to Taiwan
  • Chemical defense units have smokescreen equipment that could be deployed at key moments to obscure the movements of landing forces
  • Service support can provide additional trucks and heavy equipment, as well as UAVs to perform reconnaissance and maintain C2
• Most ACABs are not located in immediate proximity to the assembly and embarkation points for a Taiwan invasion
• Will have to make a road or rail journey to reach those areas
• This means that it's very unlikely that China is capable of conducting a "cold start" surprise attack on Taiwan
• Any attack will require the movement and assembly of 10,000+ troops

The PLA Training Cycle and Amphibious Unit Training

• PLA units create annual plans which include the dates of major training exercises, evaluations, competition, and joint training with foreign forces
• Unit manning levels and training are dependent on the annual conscription cycle
  • Historically the PLA inducted conscripts once a year, for a two-year term of service
  • This would lead to significant reductions in readiness around September of every year as a new batch of soldiers entered and a previous batch left
  • From September to April, a significant portion of training time would go towards teaching new soldiers how to perform as part of a team in addition to training them in their actual role (such as driver or gunner)
  • In 2021, the PLA changed its recruitment policy to induct conscripts in smaller batches twice a year
  • Depending on implementation, this could significantly raise the readiness levels of units with a large number of conscripts

The Annual Training Cycle and Amphibious and Sea-transport Training

• PLAGF amphibious units must develop a set of specialized skills in addition to becoming proficient at the normal combat tasks expected of any ground combat unit
• This appears to require approximately a month of shore-based training
• Every year, amphibious units rotate in and out of a limited number of coastal locations where they can train specialized amphibious warfare skills
• They practice their normal combat tasks at inland training areas closer to their barracks
• Further hampering amphibious warfare units' ability to complete their training is the fact that this training is affected by weather to a much greater extent than regular ground unit training
• Most amphibious movement training occurs between March and September, taking advantage of a limited window of good weather
• The largest permanent amphibious warfare training areas are
  • Dongshan Island — Fujian province
  • Dacheng Bay — Fujian/Guangdong provincial border
  • Shanwei — Guangdong province
• In addition to these three primary training facilities, there are several other facilities located at various points along China's coast
• Of the three training locations, only Dacheng Bay can accommodate a full ACAB
• The rest are suitable for battalion scale or smaller exercises
• Tasks practiced at these amphibious warfare training areas include
  • Swimming
  • Armored amphibious vehicle driving
  • Loading and unloading of AAVs on PLAGF landing craft or PLAN amphibious ships
  • Landing formation practice
  • Gunnery
  • Obstacle clearance
  • Movement inland
• Amphibious warfare training begins with squad and platoon drills and progresses upwards to company and battalion formations
• This training has to be repeated every season in order to prepare new conscripts
• In 2020, the PLA Daily produced a short video highlighting a typical battalion joint-landing exercise
  • Day/night loading of PLAN amphibious ships anchored offshore
  • Small teams conducting reconnaissance of landing beaches, assisted by UAVs
  • Artillery bombardment of landing beaches
    • 122mm howitzers
    • MLRS
  • Attack helicopters firing on targets near the beach
  • Transport helicopters moving troops to targets beyond the immediate shoreline
  • Unmanned surface vessels clearing obstacles and mines
  • Reconnaissance and engineering troops landing in small boats to clear on-shore obstacles
  • Amphibious fighting vehicles and assault guns disembarking from PLAN amphibious landing ships to assault the shore and consolidate beachheads
  • Further insertion of SOF troops inland by helicopter
  • Armored amphibious units driving inland to seize key terrain
  • Small unmanned ground vehicles driving inland
• Although the video was intended for an external audience, the sequence of events shown conforms with PLA amphibious warfare doctrine
• The video shows the culminating exercise acting as a capstone for their coastal training
• Not all joint landing operations need to be practiced in the same area — often events like PLARF strikes will be computer-simulated for planning purposes
• Given the amount of training required to build proficiency conducting landing operations, at least one unit, often more, will be conducting some form of amphibious training throughout the spring and summer
• This training is routinely publicized for propaganda effect
  • However, media reporting often omits the specific units involved, the location of the training exercise and duration of the exercise
  • Further, not all exercise phases will be reported
  • Some exercises are reported on multiple times by different outlets
  • Media outlets often use stock-footage to fill in gaps

Analysis of PLAGF Amphibious and Sea-Movement Training in 2021

• In 2021, open-sources reported on 38 Chinese amphibious training events
  • 32 army amphibious training events
  • 6 sea movement exercises involving civilian roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) vessels
• Ten of these events were covered by multiple Chinese media reports
• 29 events were conducted by units from the Eastern TC
• 7 by units from the Southern TC
• 2 by units from the Northern TC
• The six exercises involving civilian RO/RO ships are significant insofar as four of the brigades involved were not amphibious
• The RO/RO exercises thus represent the PLAGF practicing the landing of a second echelon after first wave amphibious, airborne or air mobile troops have captured port facilities
• In 20 exercises, no landing ships were observed, and amphibious vehicles were only observed swimming to or away from the shore
• These exercises seem to be demonstrations of platoons and companies practicing the basics of amphibious movement to shore
• The training missions support the US DoD conclusion that the Chinese regularly practice company and battalion scale amphibious training exercises
• However, these exercises rarely involve units larger than a battalion
• Open sources have limitations
  • Not possible to determine how many ACABs achieved their targets for operational readiness
  • Not enough data to determine whether the 2021 training tempo represents an increase, decrease or steady level of exercises
• The data demonstrates that the PLA undertakes amphibious training nearly every week from March through October, weather permitting
• The modernization of the PLAGF amphibious units demonstrates that the PLA has the capability to conduct amphibious operations
• Amphibious and combined arms exercises cover most of the skills required to attack Taiwan, despite the ongoing loss of skilled personnel due to the constraints of the conscription system
• However, although the PLAGF have the skills to carry out an amphibious assault, it's not clear that they have the capacity to carry out an amphibious assault large enough to pose a major threat to Taiwan
  • The six amphibious combined arms brigades of the PLAGF represent a small fraction of its total force — 6 out of 83 combined arms brigades, or 7%
  • The PLAN lacks the sealift capability to deliver even the current six brigades
• This suggests that, in the short term, the PLA has the capability to carry out amphibious operations short of a full scale invasion of Taiwan
• Attacks on small Taiwan-controlled islands such as Matsu or Jinmen are possible, as PLAGF amphibious units could "swim" to those islands using their own vehicles, supported by organic artillery from the shore
• These islands are small, so an attack could capture them in one wave, without requiring follow-on forces for an inland push

Chapter 5: The New Chinese Marine Corps

• Amphibious Combined Arms Brigades form only one part of the PLA's amphibious ground combat forces
• The other part is the Chinese Marine Corps, within the PLAN
• For many years, the Marine Corps was a limited force, consisting of one or two brigades
• However, the 2017 military reforms significantly expanded the size of the People's Liberation Army Navy Marine Corps (PLANMC)
• What a ridiculous name
• The PLAN has also acquired a number of large amphibious ships to ferry the Marine Corps
• While the PLANMC prepares of a diverse variety of missions, including overseas operation, its primary focus remains amphibious warfare

The "New" PLANMC

• Prior to 2017, the PLANMC consisted of two brigades that were subordinated to the South Sea Fleet (now Southern Theater Navy [STN])
• Numbered around 12,000
• PLANMC was responsible for guarding Chinese-occupied features in the South China Sea and antipiracy operations
• As a result of the 2017 reforms
  • PLANMC was elevated to corps-leader grade
  • New headquarters was established under the PLAN, rather than a naval theater command
  • Several new brigades, including aviation, were added
• Goal of the reforms with regards to the PLANMC was to give it a greater role in near-seas defense and far-seas protection
• The PLANMC now practices "all domain" operations
• Trains in a wide variety of combat environments (desert, jungle, high-elevation, etc)
• Goal is to deploy, fight, and win without requiring support or extensive preparations
• Seems like the PLANMC is evolving from a limited infantry forces oriented towards maritime security to a rapidly deployable light expeditionary force, much like the US Marine Corps
• In fact, the USMC and PLANMC seem to be evolving in opposite directions — the USMC's latest plans see it discarding some of its more general combat capabilities (e.g. tanks and tube artillery) and refocusing on maritime security
• The PLANMC is increasingly viewed as China's future expeditionary force for responding to global crises in order to secure Chinese national interests
• In keeping with this role, PLANMC forces are routinely deployed to China's overseas base in Djibouti
• Although the PLANMC's reforms are not specifically aimed at making it more effective in a Taiwan landing scenario, a more modern, versatile and effective PLANMC will be better able to support a joint campaign against Taiwan

PLANMC Force Development

• After the 2017 reforms, the PLANMC was upgraded from 2 brigades to 6, split equally among the Southern, Eastern, and Northern Theater Commands
• In addition, an aviation brigade was created, in order to provide organic aviation support for PLANMC forces
• This is air transport, for now, and doesn't include rotary-wing close air support, which the PLANMC is still reliant on the PLAGF to provide
• A special operations brigade was also created
• The internal structure of each brigade was also changed
  • Prior to the reforms, a PLANMC brigade consisted of several infantry battalions and an armor regiment
  • These were reorganized into combined arms battalions, flattening the hierarchy
• The modernized PLANMC brigades consist of 9 battalions
  • 2 amphibious mechanized infantry battalions
  • Medium mechanized infantry battalion
  • Air assault battalion
  • Reconnaissance battalion
  • Artillery battalion
  • Air defense battalion
  • Operational support battalion
  • Service support battalion
• A PLANMC brigade is somewhat similar to an amphibious combined arms brigade
  • Trades one of its amphibious combined arms battalions for an air-assault battalion
  • Trades another for a conventional mechanized infantry battalion
  • Otherwise has the same structure as a PLAGF ACAB
• The amphibious combined arms battalions are structured as follows
  • Four mechanized infantry companies
  • Firepower company
  • Reconnaissance platoon
  • Air-defense element
  • Artillery element
  • Engineer element
  • Repair team
• Once again, this is somewhat different from the PLAGF version
  • "Purely" mechanized infantry, while the PLAGF amphibious combined arms battalion includes assault guns
  • Integrated air defense and artillery — these are provided at the brigade level in the PLAGF ACABs
  • PLANMC battalions are structured as individually deployable fighting forces, whereas PLAGF amphibious battalions are designed to be deployed as part of a brigade
• The four mechanized infantry companies are equipped with 14 vehicles each, consisting of ZBD-05 infantry carriers and ZTD-05 amphibious assault vehicles
• This new structure makes each battalion into a "complete" fighting force, with reconnaissance, firepower, engineering and other support elements built in
• The reform has encountered challenges with ensuring that commanders have sufficient expertise to effectively command the different arms that they are now responsible for
• Initially, in exercises, battalion staff did not make use of reconnaissance elements and displayed a poor grasp of obstacle removal procedures, causing delays
• PLAN media reports indicate that brigades are actively working to improve battalion commander competence and staff training
• The PLANMC's most combat capable brigades are the 1st and 2nd brigades, in the Southern Theater Navy, which existed prior to the 2017 reforms (albeit with a different internal structure)
• The special operations brigade is also maintained at high level of readiness — has poached training staff from other units in order to support its expansion
• By contrast, the PLANMC brigades in the Northern Theater Navy are still in the process of completing their conversion from PLAGF infantry brigades
  • The PLANMC 6th Brigade is the former 77th Motorized Infantry Brigade
    • Has received new ZBL-09 IFVs and ZTL-11 assault vehicles
    • Creation of amphibious mechanized infantry battalions appears complete and they are participating in exercises
  • Unclear as to what the conversion status is of the 5th Brigade
• The Eastern Theater Navy's PLANMC brigades are also in the process of forming up and receiving their equipment
  • Unclear whether they're receiving Type 05 (i.e. ZBD-05 and ZTD-05) vehicles or ZBL-09 and ZTL-11 vehicles
  • Have begun training on amphibious landings and breaching assaults
• A significant addition to the PLANMC's capabilities is the 7th Aviation Brigade
  • For the first time, the PLANMC has organic air transport and support
  • Prior to 2017 — relied on PLAN helicopters
  • Force is expected to conduct vertical landing operations behind enemy lines in order to support landing operations
  • Brigade was started from scratch — in 2017 senior officers admitted they lacked equipment, personnel and training grounds
  • In order to quickly build up the brigade, the PLA transferred helicopter pilots from PLAGF after sending them through a training course on naval helicopter operations
  • PLANMC cadets were also sent through the PLAGF helicopter training course
  • Notable that the PLANMC, despite being part of the PLAN, was not able to recruit any PLAN naval helicopter pilots
  • The 7th Aviation Brigade has been equipped with Z-8 and Z-9 helicopters for air assaults
  • The Z-20 medium-lift helicopter and Z-10 attack helicopter are logical additions, providing a multi-mission platform and fire support capability respectively, but they have not been observed in PLANMC use
  • Just like the US Marine Corps, the PLANMC is hardware-poor
• Overall, the PLANMC's expansion and reform is far from complete
  • Most units selected for conversion into PLANMC brigades come from the provincial military district system rather than PLAGF theater commands
  • Have outdated and less well-trained forces
  • Will require more investment in order to be converted into PLANMC brigades
  • Xi Jinping visited the PLANMC headquarters in October 2020, and signaled his personal support for manning and equipping the PLANMC
• The PLANMC can currently contribute approximately six amphibious mechanized infantry battalions — infantry battalions equipped with vehicles that can swim from off-shore landing craft to a hostile beach
• The final number of battalions that the PLANMC will be able to contribute depends on the final configuration of the newly formed PLANMC brigades
• It is not clear that PLANMC brigades will have a standard configuration, like PLAGF ACABs
• In addition to increasing its size, the PLANMC is taking special effort to improve the quality of its commanders
  • In 2018, the PLANMC held a 10-day collective training session for approximately 100 commanders at different levels
  • Experts were brought in from the PLAGF, PLAN, PLA Strategic Support Force, military academies and civilian organizations
  • Commanders received training on a wide variety of topics
    • Amphibious landing
    • Island and reef capture
    • Embarkation and transit
    • Assault craft formations
    • Resisting enemy counterattacks
  • Participants were reportedly training and studying for 16 hours a day
  • Additional iterations of these training exercises are likely, as the short duration of the first event would not have been enough to make a significant difference in the competence of its participants
• In addition to the PLANMC's own efforts, the PLAN's naval academy launched an effort in 2011 to improve its theoretical understanding of amphibious operations
  • Focus on operations theory and research
  • Research into how to improve equipment for amphibious landings
  • This work has now been merged into PLANMC headquarters
• The PLANMC isn't optimizing itself for an amphibious campaign against Taiwan
  • Lacks "heavy" amphibious combat units as compared with PLAGF ACABs
  • Instead each PLANMC brigade contains a diverse flexible selection of battalions
  • Indicates that PLA intends its Marine Corps to be a lightweight, versatile set of units which can deploy overseas at short notice
  • However, there will still be roles for the PLANMC in any Taiwan invasion scenario

Joint Island Landing Campaign

• The main operational concept for a Taiwan invasion is the Joint Island Landing Campaign (JILC)
• Objectives
  • Break through coastal defenses
  • Establish a beachhead
  • Seize and occupy key targets
• 3 phase operation
  1. Preliminary operations
  2. Assembly, embarkation and transit
  3. Assault landing and establishment of beachhead
• This section focuses on the role that the PLANMC could have in an operation to seize Taiwan itself, not including operations to seize offshore islands
• The PLAGF's ACABs will likely constitute the main force for such a landing, with the PLANMC taking a supporting role

Preliminary operations

• Prior to the amphibious assault, the PLANMC will be tasked with carrying out advance operations to paralyze the enemy's forces and create favorable conditions for the landing
  • Beach reconnaissance
  • Sabotage raids
  • Mine clearance and obstacle destruction
• PLANMC reconnaissance battalions, and even potentially the reconnaissance elements of combined arms battalions will be tasked with covertly approaching landing beaches and gathering information
  • Beach gradients
  • Tide depths
  • Routes of enemy approach
  • Potential landing zones for helicopters
• Engineering elements will take part in the actual landing, using amphibious breaching craft to conduct mine and obstacle clearance
  • An amphibious breaching craft (archive, translation) is yet another variant of the Type 05 chassis used for the ZBD-05 infantry carrier and the ZTD-05 assault gun
  • Instead of a gun, it has a rocket launcher which can fire mine clearing line charges
  • Is also equipped with a mine clearing plow in front
  • Can drop LED markers indicating cleared paths for following vehicles
  • Roughly speaking, it's an amphibious combat engineering vehicle
• Special forces will conduct underwater demolition, target designation, and sabotage raids
• When employing amphibious forces, commanders must balance the need to attack specific areas versus maintaining tactical surprise
• Although strategic surprise will be hard to achieve, given the need to mobilize a large number of troops for a potential invasion, tactical surprise might still be possible by, e.g. using PLANMC troops for diversionary attacks

Assembly, Embarkation and Transit

• China's ability to deploy the PLANMC in support of a Taiwan landing will be complicated by the relatively limited number of amphibious transports that the PLAN current possesses
• Chinese plans call for the mobilization of numerous merchant vessels to support a Taiwan invasion — some of these may carry PLANMC forces
• PLANMC regional training exercises have sought to accurately simulate the challenges of mobilization
  • Use multiple modes of transportation to convey troops to training bases
  • Respond to simulated air threats
  • Carry out troop dispersal and concealment
• All PLANMC brigades are based close to major ports
• The 1st and 2nd Brigades can rapidly deploy to the Southern Theater Navy's 6th Landing Ship Flotilla, in Zhanjiang, Guandong
• However, the other brigades may have to compete with the six amphibious combined arms brigades for amphibious lift
• The PLANMC is unlikely to be the main landing force, so it's likely that at least some of its forces will need to use alternative means to reach landing areas, such as civilian RO/RO ships
• It's likely that PLANMC forces will be split up, with assault forces accompanying PLAGF amphibious forces on their ships, while support units are carried to the landing zone in conscripted civilian vessels
• This capability was demonstrated in 2019, when the PLANMC's 6th Brigade embarked forces simultaneously onto a Northern Theater Navy landing ship and civilian RO/RO vessels
• In addition, PLANMC forces have practiced embarking using their amphibious vehicles and linking up with amphibious transports at sea
• This could relieve port congestion and disperse forces, making them less vulnerable to air attack
• The PLANMC's greatest vulnerability is from the air
  • Air defense forces consist solely of MANPADs
  • Don't appear to have any kind of vehicle-based surface-to-air missile systems
  • However, the PLANMC appears to rely on "jointness" to address this vulnerability
    • Access PLAN early warning networks
    • Trains with air-defense battalions assigned to coastal defense units
    • Those units may provide air defense while the PLANMC is embarking
  • While in transit, the PLANMC will likely be shielded by PLAAF and PLAN air cover and air defenses

Assault Landing and Establishment of a Beachhead

• Existing PLANMC forces can contribute only approximately 6 battalions to an amphibious landing
• Each battalion will likely be tasked with securing a 1-2 km section of beach
• This implies that the two combined arms battalions of a PLANMC brigade can cover between 2 and 4km of beach
• Prior to the assault commencing, PLANMC special forces will have infiltrated the beach and have attempted sabotage operations against observation posts, command posts, airfields and other key sites
• PLANMC assault formations are primarily equipped with Type 05 amphibious vehicles
  • Relatively fast in the water — capable of reaching 45 km/h
  • Armored against small arms fire up to 12.7mm
  • Variants include assault guns, IFVs and 122mm self-propelled howitzer (and the combat engineering variant discussed above)
• Vehicles are equipped with the Beidou satellite positioning system for navigation and fire-control
• PLANMC training for amphibious assault is becoming more realistic
  • Training to assault a beach under radio-silence conditions
  • Using data from training to address potential bottlenecks and problems
• As the PLANMC will be unable to bring as much combat power to bear as PLAGF amphibious formations, it will likely be assigned to secondary landing areas in support of the PLAGF ACABs
• However, this will require close coordination between PLANMC and PLAGF formations
• An exercise in 2018 noted problems in coordination, with a PLAGF formation taking heavy simulated losses because it advanced before a PLANMC formation had been able to conduct an attack against enemy rear areas
• PLANMC will be heavily reliant on PLAGF helicopters for close-air support (as the PLANMC doesn't have any dedicated attack helicopters of its own)
• PLAGF rotary-wing exercises appear to be largely focused on supporting PLAGF amphibious units from PLAN landing craft

Beyond the Beachhead

• The PLANMC's reforms are intended to turn it into an all-domain fighting force
• This will give it a role in any attack beyond the initial establishment of a beachhead
• The inclusion of air-assault battalions and the aviation brigade improves the PLANMC's ability to conduct "multidimensional landing operations"
  • These heli-borne battalions will be delivered to locations between 15 and 60 km behind enemy lines in order to support landing operations
  • PLANMC aviation units have been training low elevation flights to avoid enemy air defenses and landing under adversarial conditions
  • However, it is unclear whether PLANMC aviation units have received their full complement of transport helicopters
  • In addition the lack of attack helicopters means that the PLANMC will either have to leave helicopter routes unguarded or rely on other forces to provide escorts
• The inclusion of medium mechanized infantry improves the PLANMC's ability to operate inland
  • These battalions are equipped with ZBL-09 and ZTL-11 vehicles
  • Not as capable in amphibious combat as the Type 05 variants, but faster on land
  • Are capable of swimming, which means that PLANMC medium infantry could come ashore without having to rely on further infrastructure
  • The PLANMC's medium infantry has also recently added the ZTQ-15 light tank
  • However the ZTQ-15 is not amphibious, and would require a ship-to-shore connector
  • These medium infantry battalions would likely be used to push rapidly inland and link up with air-mobile or special-operations forces
  • Would also be of use in potential urban fighting if Taiwanese forces are forced to defend inland — the PLANMC's infantry units practice urban combat specifically in mock-ups of Taiwanese cities
• The PLANMC's lack of organic close-air support will mean that they will be reliant on artillery (both rocket and tube) for firepower as they advance
  • PLZ-07B self-propelled howitzers
  • Towed howitzers
  • FJH-02 62 mm mini-MRL
• The PLANMC does not formally include any self-propelled MRL systems in its inventory, but units have been seen with Type 81 122 mm MRLs — unclear if these are just holdovers reflecting PLANMC brigades' origins as coastal defense units

Conclusion

• The PLANMC does not appear to optimizing itself specifically for a Taiwan landing scenario
• Much smaller force than PLAGF units trained for amphibious landings
• Designed as a versatile force, not specifically optimized for opposed landings
• Aviation is a particular limitation
  • No close air support
  • Single brigade for the entire corps — limited transport capacity
• The PLANMC, on its own, does not pose a significant threat to Taiwan
• However, if an invasion does occur, the PLANMC will be expected to play a role
• Might carry out smaller scale diversionary or harassing landing operations
• Will be responsible for special-forces operations and reconnaissance

Chapter 6: Civilian Shipping and Maritime Militia

• Discussion of a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan inevitably focuses on logistics
• Does the PLA have enough lift capacity to to deliver invasion forces across the Taiwan Strait?
• Does the PLA have enough transport capacity to sustain forces once delivered?
• Most observers note that the PLAN has not built enough amphibious transport ships, so therefore the PLA cannot (yet) carry out an invasion of Taiwan
• However, the PLA has plans to rely on mobilized civilian shipping as the logistical backbone of a cross-strait invasion
• Includes both the delivery of PLA forces and their logistical sustainment
• These plans are not a stopgap — PLA prefers to include civilian vessels in its mission planning

The Scope of the Problem

• Most authors looking at the Taiwan invasion problem conclude that the PLA cannot land sufficient forces on Taiwan unless it builds many more amphibious landing ships, a process which will take several years
• The PLA will require the capacity to land at least 300,000 troops
• Current PLAN amphibious fleet can only land about 1 division at a time — 20,000 troops
• This suggests a conclusion that the PLA must judge itself not capable of invading Taiwan
• These challenges get worse when sustainment is considered
• The PLAN's auxiliary fleet is undersized, even for conflicts taking place close to Chinese territory
• PLAN enlists hundreds of civilian vessels for tasks such as
  • Over-the-shore logistics
  • At-sea replenishment
  • Emergency repair and towing
  • Casualty evacuation
  • Search-and-rescue
• While it is tempting to conclude that this indicates that the PLAN doesn't take the Taiwan invasion scenario seriously, an alternative interpretation is that the PLAN intends to rely on civilian support even for a large scale operation such as a Taiwan invasion
• Over the past 10 years, many Western scholars have examined the Chinese Maritime Militia's role in supporting Chinese claims in the South and East China Seas
• However, the role of the Maritime Militia in a Taiwan invasion scenario has received much less attention, even though Chinese analysts have written extensively about the topic
• As far back as 2004, PLA mobilization officials were writing about the need to reform the civilian mobilization system in order to allow the PLA to retrofit civilian vessels to allow them to embark military formations

Operational Roles for the Maritime Militia in a Taiwan Invasion

• While much attention has been played to the role of Chinese fishing boats in asserting Chinese territorial claims in the South and East China Seas, the Chinese maritime militia isn't just fishing boats
• Includes a wide variety of civilian transport ships
  • Container ships
  • Bulk carriers
  • RO/RO ferries
  • Tugboats
  • Barges
• Consists of over 5,000 ships
• Organized into
  • 89 transport units
  • 53 waterway-engineering units
  • 143 units with other specializations
• Unlike the US merchant marine model, the ships of the Chinese Maritime Militia will retain their civilian crews during wartime
• The induction process by which the PLAN selects ships for the Maritime Militia is opaque
• Several articles note that commercial ship crews aren't always happy to be selected for the Maritime Militia
• PLA sources cite a number of roles for the Maritime Militia during wartime
  • Delivery of forces
    • PLA writings emphasize the importance of first-echelon troops capturing ports in order to allow civilian shipping to bring follow-on forces through existing infrastructure
    • Civilian shallow-draft ships could also deliver landing craft close to shore
  • At-sea support
    • The PLAN doesn't have the replenishment ships it needs to sustain an invasion fleet
    • While the relatively short distances involved for a Taiwan invasion means that many ships could rely on shore-based support, a substantial amount of at-sea replenishment would still be required
    • Civilian fuel tankers and cargo ships could be fitted with equipment for alongside and vertical replenishment
    • Civilian ships would also provide services such as towing, firefighting and repair
  • Over-the-shore logistical support
    • Pipelines from Maritime Militia fuel tankers would play a key role in supplying invasion forces once ashore
    • Civilian cargo ships will be important for ferrying necessary supplies to sustain invading forces
  • Medical support — containerized medical clinics aboard civilian ships would augment the PLAN's hospital ships in dealing with the casualties from an invasion
  • Obstacle emplacement and clearing — Chinese sources mention that civilian ships can aid with emplacing and clearing mines without going into much detail
    • Any ship can be a minesweeper, once
  • Engineering support — Civilian tugboats, barge mounted cranes, and dredging equipment will be called upon to help clear blocked ports
  • Reconnaissance, surveillance and early warning — Maritime Militia fishing vessels would serve as cheap eyes and ears across the theater
  • Deception and concealment
    • The vast number of civilian vessels will allow the PLAN to hide its most valuable assets
    • The PLAN has plans to equip civilian ships with radar reflectors, heat sources, etc to make civilian ships resemble military vessels at a distance, further complicating a potential attacker's targeting plans
  • Helicopter relay platform
    • Although the Taiwan strait is relatively narrow, it's still wide enough for helicopters to struggle with a round-trip across it
    • In order to relieve the strain, the PLA envisions civilian ships acting as "floating FARPs", equipped with fuel bladders, ammunition storage and limited repair equipment

Maritime Militia Force Development

The NMDC System

• The Maritime Militia is coordinated through a system of national defense mobilization committees (NMDCs) at the national, state, provincial, municipal and county levels
• The highest level NMDC is the national body, the State Commission for National Defense Mobilization (SCNDM)
• The SCNDM has representatives from all parts of government
• Lower level NMDCs reflect the structure of the SCNDM, localized for their specific region of responsibility
• The broad membership of NMDCs highlights two important facts
  • National defense mobilization is primarily a civilian, not military process
    • The military, represented at the national level by the Central Military Commission (CMC) is the customer for mobilized resources
    • The CMC establishes requirements and needs, which are fulfilled by civilian departments
  • NMDCs are primarily coordinating bodies
    • Have little formal authority of their own
    • Are responsible for relaying military requests to other departments
    • However, the actual implementation of mobilization requests is up to individual departments
    • A 2013 article indicated that it was difficult for the military to ensure that mobilization plans were kept up to date because mobilization fell under the purview of the National Planning Commission system, rather than the military
• For civilian ship mobilization, the two relevant structures in the NMDC system are
  • Transportation war-preparedness office
  • Transportation mobilization offices
• These work with provincial and local governments to
  • Develop an overall approach to mobilization
  • Identify specific ships that would be mobilized
  • Draft plans on retrofitting ships to make them more suitable for military needs
  • Develop personnel and training requirements

The Provincial Military District System

• The PLA's departments most concerned with civilian mobilization are provincial military districts
• Although the PMD system has not received much attention from Western scholars it is the PLA's primary interface with civilian support agencies
• Serves a wide range of functions
  • Recruitment
  • Civil defense
  • Representing PLA interests within industry
• The primary purpose of the PMD system, however, is national mobilization
  • PMD mobilization departments represent the PLA in NMDCs
  • Serve as the conduit by which the PLA expresses its force requirements to non-defense agencies
  • PMDs train and equip militia forces and exercise direct control of the militia in peacetime
• At the local level, PMDs and provincial governments share authority over People's Armed Forces Departments (PAFDs)

Maritime Militia Training

• In order to successfully participate in combat operations, civilian shipping crews need to learn a range of military skills
  • PLA command and coordination processes
  • Marshaling and sailing in formation
  • Self-defense and mutual defense
  • Rescue and first-aid
  • Military loading and unloading procedures
  • Operation of military equipment
  • Anticipate enemy threats
  • Wartime-specific skills such as "dockless unloading"
• In 2015 the National Transport War-Preparedness Office issued a document: Outline For Training and Evaluation of National Defense Transportation Specialized Support Teams which specified training requirements for civilian transportation support units
• Covered highway, rail and maritime transportation support
• However this document does not appear to be publicly available

Construction, Retrofitting and Conversion

• Outfitting civilian ships for military units can be an involved process
• Ships need
  • Specialized military equipment, such as radios and underway replenishment gear
  • Quarters and life support for soldiers
  • Strengthened decks and tie-down points for military vehicles
  • Upgraded repair and firefighting gear
  • Medical equipment
• The most efficient way to ensure that ships meet these requirements is to design ships to be dual-use from the outset — China has been building RO/RO transports to military specifications since 1997
• In addition, the National Transportation War-Preparedness Office issued regulatory guidance for retrofitting ships with the necessary equipment to support military units
• The retrofit process is managed by "civilian ship retrofitting and conversion centers" run jointly by local maritime affairs departments and PAFDs

Command and Control

• In peacetime, maritime militia units fall under the authority of the PMD system
• In wartime, these units would be transferred to PLA — "whoever uses, commands"
• Many authors highlight issues in the PLA's ability to exercise authority over maritime militia units
  • "Weak" command structures
  • Slow processes
  • Cumbersome communication protocols
• One major problem is that the commanders of maritime militia units are themselves militiamen
  • Part-time soldiers
  • Lack specialized training
• According to PLA authors, maritime militia training does not spend enough time on military-relevant skills, such as sailing in formation, dockless unloading or military communications
• The PLA is aware of this shortcoming — an official assessment of the failure of the 1949 Jinmen landing highlighted failures in command and control of civilian shipping

Challenges and Known Problems

• Many PLA articles on the maritime militia have a "problem/solution" format
• While the solutions may be unworkable, outside observers can look at the problem sections in order to gain insight into what the PLA itself thinks are the primary challenges with the maritime militia
• Data management
  • The PLA struggles to maintain accurate records for maritime militia personnel and ships
  • Requires the PLA to maintain up-to-date information on tens of thousands of people and thousands of ships
  • Keeping track of where ships are and which ships are close enough to China to be mobilized in case of emergency is also a major challenge
  • Tracking changes of ownership is also a problem — when ships are bought or sold, often the local PAFD is last to be notified, if it is notified at all
  • Similarly, the PAFD struggles to keep track of crewmen as they retire or change careers
• Training quality
  • Crewmen are often away from their home ports for much of the year, along with their ships
  • When they are at home, they are often taking second jobs
  • As a result it is very difficult to ensure that commercial crew have enough training time to be effective in a military environment
  • Compounding this is the fact that many PAFDs have outdated training material and inadequate facilities
  • Crew also lack specific training time with the PLA units they will be transporting or the PLAN commanders they will be subordinated to
• Finance and Law
  • The mobilization system is still struggling with China's transition to a market economy
  • Unclear how shipowners and crews will be compensated if their ships are mobilized for war
  • No mechanism for adjudicating disputes over compensation
  • Laws relating to mobilization are often vague and contradictory
    • The Military Service Law indicates that militia veterans have priority when applying to civil service positions, but the Civil Service Law does not indicate any such priority
    • Military Service Law does not indicate any penalties for people who join the militia but refuse military training
    • I wonder if part of this is because "excessive legalism" is itself considered a crime in Communist China
    • Laws in China are treated more as guidelines established by the Communist Party — unlike in the West, the laws serve the Party, the Party does not serve the laws
• Foreign-flag ships
  • Following the norms of the global shipping industry, increasing numbers of Chinese ships are sailing under flags of convenience
  • Although the government is confident that it can requisition these ships in case of a national emergency, tracking them and ensuring their ongoing readiness remains a challenge

Conclusion

• The PLA's concept for a cross-strait invasion relies heavily on the participation of civilian ships
• Has spent over 20 years developing rules and bureaucracy to organize, train and manage this force
• This is not intended to be a stopgap measure — the PLA's writings and history suggest that civilian forces will be expected to participate in any major military action
• This effort will likely not go as well as planned during an actual conflict
• However, it might still be sufficient to ensure that adequate supplies reach PLA forces on Taiwan
• The key factor will be whether first-echelon troops capture ports
• The mobilization of Chinese civilian shipping for a Taiwan invasion will be the largest such mobilization in history
  • Far larger than Dunkirk in terms of numbers of ships
  • Far larger than the Falklands War in terms of tonnage mobilized

Chapter 7: The PLA Navy's Amphibious Fleet

• China has been modernizing its amphibious fleet
• The addition of the Type 071 (Yuzhao-class) amphibious transport dock (LPD) and Type 075 (Yushen-class) landing-helicopter assault (LHA) expands the scope and capabilities of China's amphibious forces
• However, the PLAN does not appear to be focused on Taiwan as it develops amphibious warfare capabilities
  • Removing older landing ships from service, reducing the total amount of amphibious lift available
  • Missing opportunities to maximize traditional naval lift
• It appears that the PLAN is taking a balanced approach with its development of amphibious capabilities, prioritizing expeditionary capabilities at the expense of cross-strait warfare

Strategic Transitions Driving The Development of the PLAN's Amphibious Force

• Since the PLAN's founding, China's naval strategy has transitioned from "near-coast defense" to "near-seas defense, far-seas protection"
• The original mission, near-coast defense, reflected the PLAN's origin as the maritime arm of the PLA
• During this time, the PLAN's amphibious ships consisted largely of smaller utility landing craft along with some tank landing ships (LSTs)
• In the 1980s, the PLAN's mission evolved from near-coast to near-seas protection
• Emphasized establishing Chinese sovereignty within the first island chain
• This lead to a new wave of amphibious ship construction in the 1990s — new large LSTs with helicopter decks and greater lift capacity
• This was followed in the early 2000s with the Type 072A (Yuting II-class) LSTs, Type 073A (Yunshu-class) medium landing ships (LSMs) and Type 074A (Yubei-class) utility landing craft (LCUs)
• In 2007, the PLAN commissioned its first Yuzhao-class LPD
• Although the ship was commissioned while the PLAN was still officially focused on near-seas missions, the ship anticipated an expansion in naval strategy in 2015 to include safeguarding Chinese economic interests and protecting Chinese citizens globally
• The Yuzhao-class LPD and Yushen-class LHA can support traditional amphibious combat operations, but are also capable of supporting global missions

The PLAN's Amphibious Force

• The PLAN currently operates 9 amphibious assault ships, 30 LSTs, 20 LSMs and several dozen smaller landing craft
• Over the past decade, the PLAN has concentrated on acquiring new Yuzhao-class LPDs and Yushen-class LHAs
• Has also launched new landing craft to operate in conjunction with the LPDs and LHAs
• Maintains its fleet of LSTs and LSMs by replacing ships one-for-one with new models as old ones are decommissioned
• The primary LST operated by the PLAN is the Yuting II-class
  • 10 light tanks
  • 250 troops
  • Has a helicopter deck to augment logistics
  • 3000 nm operating range
  • Top sustained speed of 17 kts
• The Yuting and Yuting-II classes represent an improvement over the older Type 072 (Yukan-class) LSTs, which lack the helicopter deck
• However the PLAN continues to operate a small number of Yukan-class LSTs
• The primary LSMs operated by the PLAN are the Type 074/074B (Yuhai-class) and the Yunshu-class
  • Yuhai-class
    • Built in two waves, first in the '90s, and then again in 2017-18
    • Lower lift capability than LSTs
    • Roughly half the operational range of the Yuting II-class
    • Top speed of approximately 14 kts
    • Can carry two light tanks and some accompanying troops
  • Yunshu-class
    • Slightly larger than the Yuhai-class
    • Commissioned in 2004
    • Can carry up to six light tanks
• Yubei-class LCUs
  • Commissioned in 2004-2005
  • Can carry up to 3 light tanks or 250 troops
• In addition to the ships above, the PLAN has some air-cushion landing craft
  • Acquired two Pomornik (Type 958) air-cushion landing craft from Russia
  • Built two more under license in
  • Fast — top speed of greater than 60 kts
  • 300 nm range at slower speeds
  • Can lift several tanks or light vehicles plus troops
  • Has difficulty operating in high sea states
  • Unreliable
  • High maintenance requirements
  • Does not appear to be fully integrated into the PLAN's operations
    • No additional construction beyond the initial 4 units
    • Relatively infrequent mentions in press releases or briefings regarding training
• The PLAN also operates its own, smaller, Yuyi-class (Type 726A) air-cushion landing craft (LCMA)
  • Designed to operate from the well decks of the Yuzhao-class LPDs and Yushen-class LHAs
  • Each Yuzhao-class can accommodate 4 Yuyis
  • Each Yushen-class can accommodate 2 Yuyis
  • 40 kt sustained transit speed
  • 200 nm range
• The Yuzhao-class LPD substantively expands the PLAN's amphibious capabilities
  • In addition to carrying Yuyi-class LCMAs, it can hold up to 4 helicopters in hangars and 8 amphibious vehicles on a dedicated vehicle deck
  • Can carry between 600 and 800 troops
  • If not carrying Yuyi-class LCMAs, another 24 amphibious assault vehicles can be carried in the well deck
  • The Yuzhao-class can operate at higher speeds than traditional landing ships
  • 10,000 nm range at cruising speed
  • The Yuzhao-class' range, speed and transport capacity enable the PLAN to conduct global expeditionary operations for the first time in its history
• The Yushen-class LHA offers similar capabilities to the Yuzhao-class
  • Larger than the Yuzhao (but smaller than its US counterparts, the Wasp and America-class)
  • Can embark up to 30 medium-lift utility helicopters
  • Has 6 landing spots on its flight deck
  • Has a well deck to support multidimensional landing operations
  • The first Yushen-class was commissioned in April 2021
  • Another two are under construction or undergoing sea trials
• The Yuzhao and Yushen-classes can support traditional amphibious operations, but also offer options for global expeditionary operations

Mixed Messages: Trends That Reduce the PLAN's Cross-Strait Capabilities

• Even as the PLAN is acquiring new amphibious craft, it is removing older amphibious hulls from service
• Indicates that increasing amphibious lift capacity is not a priority
• Has reduced its amphibious lift capacity in three ways
  • Decommissioning hulls
  • Transferring hulls to non-military services
  • Reallocating hulls to experimental purposes
• From 2019 to 2021 the PLAN decommissioned at least 5 landing ships
  • 2 Yukan-class LSTs
  • 3 Yuhai-class LSMs
• The Yukan-class hulls were originally commissioned in the late 1970s, and had exceeded their useful life
• However the Yuhai-class LSMs had been commissioned in the 1990s — had served for less than 25 years before being retired
• The condition of these ships is unknown
• If preserving amphibious lift capacity were a priority these ships could have been overhauled or mothballed rather than decommissioned
• In 2015 the PLAN transferred 5 Yukan-class LSTs to the Chinese Coast Guard
• Were used to aid with logistics for Chinese reef-construction ("artificial island") projects in the South China Sea
• Two of these ships were returned with modifications, such as deck cranes, that increased flexibility but reduced total amphibious lift capacity
• In 2018, the PLAN heavily modified one Yuting I-class LST in order to use it as a testbed for experimental weapons
  • Welded bow doors shut
  • Used as a testbed for an experimental electromagnetic railgun
  • While weapons development is a necessary task for any navy, allocating an LST to this role reduced the PLAN's amphibious lift capacity
• Although Chinese leaders have public committed to reunifying Taiwan, they have many incentives to avoid overinvesting in the Taiwan mission
  • A surge in ship construction aimed specifically at the Taiwan scenario risks drawing undue attention to Chinese intentions
  • The burden of supporting and maintaining ships useful for only one contingency could detract from other requirements

Opportunities to Bolster Amphibious Lift

• If Chinese leaders determine to use force to reunify Taiwan in the short to medium term, the PLAN has several options to surge amphibious lift capacity
  • Surge production of additional hulls
    • China's shipbuilding industry is the largest in the world
    • The Chinese government has the capability to produce all types of ships it uses
    • Has home-growns supply chains for sensors and weapons
    • Has demonstrated surge capacity in the past — built 30 new amphibious ships from 2003 to 2005
  • Requisition civilian logistics and transportation ships
    • See the previous chapter
    • In June 2020 the civilian RO/RO car carrier Changdalong participated in a military exercise centered on embarking and off-loading a PLAGF heavy combined arms brigade
    • In 2015, the Chinese government instructed private shipbuilders to ensure that their ships had the capability to carry military cargoes
    • Guidelines cover
      • Container ships
      • RO/RO car carriers
      • Multipurpose ships
      • Bulk freighters
    • Even before these guidelines were issued, the Chinese government was working with civilian ship builders to ensure that civilian ships could be dual-use
    • In 2012 China launched the world's largest RO/RO ferry
      • 36,000 ton displacement
      • Primary role is civilian car transport
      • However can also be used as a strategic lift platform
        • 2000 troops
        • 300 vehicles
        • Helipad
    • Civilian logistics ships require deep-draft ports, and cannot be used for an amphibious assault

PLAN Amphibious Training, Operations, and Support Exercises

• Each year, forces from the PLAN's landing ship flotillas, PLANMC units and units from the PLAGF's amphibious combined arms brigades conduct joint amphibious combined arms training
• Training exercises are usually carried out in facilities hosted by the Eastern and Southern Theater Commands
• Often takes place near the Taiwan Strait, to serve as a message to the Taiwanese
• Focuses on joint maneuvers with army, navy, air force, rocket force and strategic support force elements experimenting with different tactics and operations
• Beach assaults with amphibious forces
  • Armored vehicles swimming from LSTs and LSMs stationed offshore
  • Live fire drills
  • At sea maneuvers
  • Obstacle clearing drills
• Simulates cross-strait landings, with press reports indicating 3-d dioramas of Taiwanese landing beaches in unit training camps
• The PLAN's larger amphibious combatants also participate in these training exercises
  • Frequently exercise embarking and launching Yuyi-class LCMAs
  • Carry out live-fire beach landing exercises similar to LSTs and LSMs
• One activity that may reduce the PLAN's readiness to carry out a cross-strait amphibious assault is the use of its LSTs as supply ships for its outposts in the Spratly Islands
• In addition to practicing landing operations, the Yuzhao-class LPDs routinely deploy to the Pacific and Indian Oceans to practice long-range expeditionary deployments

The Future of Amphibious Missions: Global Expeditionary Operations

• The PLAN's current naval strategy indicates that the Chinese military intends to operate globally to safeguard Chinese interests
• Regional turmoil, terrorism and piracy are used as justifications to develop a quick-reaction expeditionary force
• In order to have more influence in global norms, the PLAN participates in anti-piracy missions and provides international humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
  • 2010 — Yuzhao-class LPDs deployed to Yemen to provide anti-piracy patrols
    • Escorted approximately 600 vessels during a 6-month deployment
    • Conducted goodwill port visits in Bahrain and Indonesia during return transit
    • Allowed China to experiment with new models for escorting ships, including using landing craft as escorts
  • Since that time, Yuzhao-class LPDs have participated in three additional escort task forces
  • In April 2014 these ships assisted in the search for Malaysian Airlines flight MH-370
• The Yuzhao-class LPDs are also increasingly used for diplomacy
  • Engage foreign partners in bilateral and multilateral exercises
  • Military exercises with Russia
  • ASEAN disaster relief exercise
  • Humanitarian relief exercise with the Thai navy
• China's large amphibious ships will also likely be tasked with providing logistical support to China's overseas bases
• Right now, China has just one such base, in Djibouti, but it is likely planning more, notably one in Cambodia

Conclusion

• The PLA's amphibious warfare acquisitions do not indicate a sense of urgency with respect to Taiwan
• While the PLAN currently has the capacity to conduct operations to take smaller Taiwan-held islands, it does not currently have the amphibious lift capacity to invade Taiwan itself
• Instead the PLAN appears to be taking a balanced approach
  • Build up a modern navy capable of projecting power abroad
  • Have enough amphibious warfare capacity to provide value for cross-strait operations
• This balanced approach can be interpreted in multiple ways
• Perhaps China's timeline for unification is longer than anticipated
• Alternatively, China's plan for invading Taiwan doesn't rely as much on direct beach assault and traditional amphibious lift
• The primary conclusion from examining China's development of amphibious warfare capabilities is that the Chinese navy is developing into a multimission force, much like the American navy
• This multimission capability will likely expand further with the Type 076, a successor to the Yushen-class
• While Beijing keeps the rhetorical focus on Taiwan, its naval investments point towards building a more versatile force capable of advancing Chinese interests globally

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