Chinese Amphibious Warfare: Prospects For A Cross-Strait Invasion

Editors:
Andrew S. Erickson
Connor M. Kennedy
Ryan D. Martinson

Foreword

• In August 2022, the PRC conducted a series of military exercises that encircled Taiwan
  • Live-fire drills
  • Air sorties
  • Naval deployments
  • Ballistic missile tests
• These provocations will continue as long as Xi Jinping wishes to send the message that China has the capability and willingness to use the PLA to unify China and Taiwan by force
• However, in order to succeed in this, the PLA will have to accomplish the hardest task a military can undertake: an opposed amphibious landing
• The last time any military accomplished this successfully was the United States, when it landed troops at Inchon in 1950
• The PLA must transport thousands of troops and their equipment approximately 100 miles across the Taiwan Strait
• Must land them on the few beaches that are suitable for such a large body of troops
• Has to move inland into a mountainous island with rugged terrain
• Has to accomplish this task in the face of an American and Taiwanese military that has been preparing for this eventuality for 70 years
  • I think that's overstating the case
  • For the vast majority of those 70 years, neither the US nor Taiwan spared much thought to the prospect of an invasion from the mainland
  • It was clear until very recently that China had neither the military capacity nor political inclination to launch an invasion
  • It's only since the late '90s that China has had an economy that could build up the naval power to make an invasion possible
  • It's only since 2008, with Xi Jinping's ascent to Chinese leadership, that the PRC has actually started working towards building out a military capable of carrying out this task
  • On the other side, I don't think that the Taiwanese government has seriously considered the possibility of an invasion aimed at forcible reunification until recently
  • For much of the last 30 years, Taiwan has increased its economic ties with the mainland, even as the PRC's rhetoric towards Taiwan has sharpened
  • I think Taiwan started taking the prospect of an invasion seriously after two things
    • Suppression of pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong
    • Russian invasion of Ukraine
• Most of the analysis of a potential invasion scenario covers the political, diplomatic, and informational factors leading up to an invasion
• Far less studied is whether the Chinese military actually has the ability to successfully carry the invasion out
• This is because, unlike analyses of political decision making, assessments of warfighting capacity require careful consideration of a wide variety of interacting systems
  • Maritime operations
  • Aerospace operations
  • Cyberwarfare
  • Logistics and supply chains
  • Weather, tides and currents
• From May 4 to May 6, 2021 the US Naval War College's China Maritime Studies Institute assembled a collection specialists for a conference on large-scale amphibious warfare in Chinese military strategy
• This book is the final volume produced by that conference
• Authors look at the key elements needed for a PRC attack on Taiwan to succeed
  • Weapons
  • Technology
  • Doctrine
  • Logistics
• Attempt to answer how ready China is to employ its most advanced military capabilities on a large scale for the first time in its history since 1979
• This volume is timely because the war in Ukraine shows that technological capability does not automatically translate into military might
  • Doctrine matters
  • Logistics matter
  • Morale matters
  • The enemy always gets a vote!
• This volume attempts to provide a baseline evaluation of Chinese amphibious warfare capabilities, from which we can build to incorporate lessons from Ukraine

Introduction: Taking Taiwan By Force? Chinese Amphibious Warfare In the New Era

• Taiwan and mainland China are separated by the Taiwan Strait
  • Approximately 81 miles across at its narrowest point
  • The presence of this sea barrier has prevented an armed resolution to the Chinese Civil War
• Over the past several decades, the Chinese PLA has sought to increase its ability to project power over water
• This presents a major threat to Taiwanese security and threatens to upend peaceful cross-strait relations
• This volume examines 5 different aspects of Chinese readiness to conduct an amphibious operation to take Taiwan
  1. Doctrinal foundations of Chinese amphibious warfare
  2. The "Joint Amphibious Force"
  3. Enablers of Amphibious Warfare
  4. Scenario Factors
  5. Implications

Doctrinal Foundations of Chinese Amphibious Warfare

• Start with the historical experiences that both Chinese and foreign militaries have had with amphibious warfare
  • Shi Lang's successful conquest of Taiwan during the Qing Dynasty
  • Lang defeated a Ming loyalist commander, Zheng Chenggong who had ruled Taiwan for 20 years after expelling a Dutch colonial presence
  • Shi assembled a force of 300 junks and 21,000 men
  • After defeating Zheng's fleet near the Pengchu Islands, Shi conducted a largely uncontested landing and led a military campaign that subdued Taiwan
  • Although Shi's campaign holds few practical lessons for a modern invasion of Taiwan, the Chinese Communist Party has used it to justify China's historical claims to Taiwan
  • The historical precedent serves to raise morale and remind Chinese audiences that China has invaded Taiwan in the past, and could do so again in the future
• Examine the PLA's existing experiences with amphibious warfare
  • Failed campaign to seize Kinmen Island in 1949
  • Successful attacks on Hainan and Yijiangshan in 1950 and 1955
• How have Western analyses of amphibious landings influenced Chinese thinking
  • Chinese plans for amphibious assault emphasize the following six pillars
    1. Dominance of the air, sea and information domains
    2. Precision strikes on key points
    3. Concentration of "elite strengths"
    4. Rapid and continuous assaults
    5. Integrated and flexible support operations
    6. Psychological warfare
  • All of these have analogs in Western doctrine on amphibious assaults developed during World War 2

The Joint Amphibious Force

• Examine the four main components of the PLA's joint amphibious force
  1. Amphibious units of the PLA's ground forces (PLAGF)
  2. PLA Navy (PLAN) Marine Corps (PLANMC)
  3. PLAN amphibious fleet
  4. Civilian support fleet
• As a result of reforms carried out in 2017, the PLA Ground Force possesses six amphibious combined arms brigades (ACABs)
  • Despite further efforts to modernize, readiness is hampered by conscript-heavy units and lack of combined-arms training above the battalion level
  • While the PLAGF's amphibious brigades could seize contested islands, they are unlikely to be able to carry out an invasion of Taiwan itself
• The PLAGF's amphibious brigades would be supplemented by the PLA Marine Corps
  • The Marine Corps has been designated as an expeditionary force tasked with protecting China's offshore interests
  • Has tripled in size in recent years
  • Consists of 8 brigades
  • Would be expected to participate in any large-scale assault on Taiwan
  • The PLANMC would be tasked with conducting advance operations to create favorable conditions for the main invasion force
  • Focus on smaller-scale landings throughout objective areas
  • The PLANMC includes mechanized ground and air assault battalions, so it might also be tasked with helping follow-on operations in urban areas for example
• The PLAN will support any invasion with its amphibious assault ships
  • Consist of 10 ships total
    • 8 amphibious transport docks (LPDs)
    • 2 helicopter assaults ships (LHAs), with a third under construction
    • 30 tank landing ships (LSTs)
    • 20 medium landing ships (LSMs)
    • Many smaller landing craft
  • Recently the PLAN has prioritized production of larger amphibious assault ships better suited to supporting operations farther overseas
  • Reflects a balanced approach to force modernization that emphasizes creating a naval force capable of addressing a wide range of contingencies across the globe
  • However, China has tremendous shipbuilding capability and could surge production of smaller amphibious assault vessels necessary for a Taiwan invasion
• In addition to its own shipping, the PLA is expected to requisition a substantial number of civilian transport vessels
  • This should not be viewed as a "stopgap" capability
  • The integration of nominally civilian vessels is a key component of the PLA's invasion strategy
  • These ships would likely be operated by China's maritime militia, which consists of reservists whose day jobs are in civilian shipping
  • Chinese sources acknowledge the challenges in using maritime militia to man civilians vessels in support of a military operation
    • Uneven levels of training
    • Incomplete laws and regulations
    • Inadequate data sharing
    • Widespread use of flags of convenience
  • However, they also state that these civilian vessels could fulfill many important supporting roles
    • At-sea support
    • Force delivery
    • Over-the-shore logistical support
    • Helicopter relay stations
    • Early warning
    • Deception and concealment
  • It is possible that the Chinese maritime militia is sufficient to enable a cross-strait invasion

Enablers of Amphibious Warfare

• Consider the other forces that would support a cross-strait invasion
• PLA Airborne Corps
  • Consists of six combined arms brigades and one special operations brigade
  • PLA paratroopers' role would be to land behind enemy lines and seize important terrain
  • Questions remain about the Airborne Corps' ability to coordinate with other invasion forces
• PLA Ground Force helicopter units
  • The PLA has invested heavily in growing its helicopter units
  • However these units are not sufficient to carry out a "lightning invasion" on their own
• Special operation forces
  • Like special operation forces in other nations, these units would infiltrate prior to an invasion
  • Would provide intelligence and targeting data
  • Conduct strikes and raids to disrupt enemy formations and logistics
  • As with the airborne forces, questions exist about the ability of Chinese SOF to coordinate with regular military units
  • There are also questions about the Chinese SOF's proficiency with advanced equipment
• Mine warfare
  • The PLA has a large inventory of sea mines
  • These would be used to block the sea lanes around Taiwan prior to an invasion
    • Isolate Taiwan from international trade
    • Make it more complicated for allies to assist
  • PLA mine deployments might even extend as far as Japan
    • Compel Japanese neutrality
    • Make it more complicated for US ships sailing from Japan to assist Taiwan
  • During an invasion, the emphasis would shift from offensive minelaying to defensive mineclearing
    • PLA mine countermeasures (MCM) units would lead the way, clearing mines and enabling other PLA units to reach the invasion beaches
    • Little is known about the capabilities of these units
    • The PLA has acquired new minesweeping vessels and mine hunting remotely operated vehicles (ROVs)

Scenario Factors

• What are some of the Taiwan-specific factors that would be important to China's success in a potential invasion
• Ideology
  • The Chinese government sees reunification with Taiwan as the last chapter of an unfinished civil war
  • As a result, the Chinese government is likely to take a formal, legalistic approach to justifying a war for reunification
    • Use domestic law to legitimize actions
    • Start with law enforcement actions and economic coercion
  • Move slowly in order to not shock public opinion
  • The Chinese government's efforts to shape the ideological battleground could span years
  • I would argue that these efforts began years ago
• Confidence
  • Chinese strategists recognize that air and sea supremacy is vital to enable a cross-strait invasion
  • We do not have access to their internal assessments of the PLA's ability to create these preconditions
  • However, an inventory of the sensors and shooters available to the PLA in a near-term Taiwan conflict scenario indicate that the PLA has moderate confidence in its ability to maintain air supremacy, but high confidence in its ability to establish localized sea control
• Logistics
  • Use the PLA's Operational Logistics Report to assess the challenges that the PLA would face with supplying an invasion force across the strait
    • Materiel (food, petroleum, etc)
    • Medical treatment
    • Infrastructure support
  • In 2017, when the report was published, the authors found weaknesses across a range of logistical functions
    • Inadequate transport capacity
    • Insufficient reserve forces
  • At present it seems that that the PLA's logistics are still insufficient to support an invasion force
• Use of ports for invasion
  • Conventional wisdom holds that the PLA would seek to invade Taiwan across beaches
  • However, there are only a limited number of suitable beaches that could provide access for a substantial invasion force
  • An alternative scenario is that China could mount an amphibious or air assault operation to seize a Taiwanese port, and disembark the bulk of its invasion force through the port
• Commercial vessels
  • The PLA plans to use commercial vessels to support a potential Taiwan invasion
  • China's fleet of commercial cargo vessels is presently insufficient to support an invasion force
  • However, China is making progress towards having sufficient commercial logistical capacity

Implications

• What does all this mean for the US and Taiwanese militaries?
• Chinese and US amphibious warfare doctrines are moving in opposite directions
  • Prior to 2017, the PLAN Marine Corps largely focused on defending PRC-occupied islands and reefs
  • However, with the PLAN's construction of amphibious assault vessels, the PLANMC is embracing an amphibious assault doctrine reminiscent of the US Marine Corps after World War 2
  • Meanwhile, the US Marine Corps is refocusing on defending advanced bases
• The US and Japan should develop specific plans to deconflict their forces during the a potential conflict
• Space-based support will be degraded for all participants in a conflict — the side that prevails will be the one that operates better in a battlespace deprived of space-based support
• Taiwan must make itself harder to attack
  • Use China's own Anti-access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy against it
  • Target specific weaknesses in the Chinese military

Overall Findings

• Taiwan has shockingly little margin for error
• However, there is still time to build up forces to deter an invasion, or defeat an invasion if deterrence fails
• Beijing keeps strengthening relevant capabilities
  • Chinese missile development faces fewer geopolitical constraints than in the US, and might already be more advanced in some areas
  • Chinese sea mine capabilities are clearly superior to those of the US and Taiwan
• However, the Chinese military still faces significant weaknesses
  • Little experience with joint operations
  • Lack of combat experience
  • Although it would be the natural choice to lead an amphibious invasion, the PLANMC doesn't appear to be optimizing itself for that role
  • Instead the lead amphibious elements are still likely to be PLAGF units
  • Logistics remain a significant weakness
  • Air and helicopter also remains a weakness, especially with regards to coordination with ground forces
  • Although China has built large amphibious assault vessels, these appear to be intended to support expeditionary operations overseas, not to facilitate a cross-strait invasion
  • Although the PLA has a lot of weapons platforms, its sensor capabilities remain relatively weak and vulnerable
• Taiwan's terrain, in both land and sea, offer significant advantages to the defender
• Taiwan must redouble its efforts to build a "porcupine" defense

Part 1: Doctrinal Foundations of Chinese Amphibious Warfare

Chapter 1: Shi Lang's Amphibious Conquest of Taiwan in 1683

• In 1683, Qing admiral Shi Lang successfully conquered Taiwan
• Does his successful invasion hold any lessons for the present day?

Shi Lang in Brief

• Born into a prominent family in Fujian
• Became a senior captain with the Zheng clan, initially affiliated with the Ming Dynasty
• Served under Koxinga (Zheng Chenggong)
• However, after Koxinga ignored Shi Lang's advice regarding the defense of Xiamen, Shi Lang snubbed Koxinga, resulting in his imprisonment
• Shi Lang escaped custody and defected to the Qing in 1651
• Defeated on the mainland by the Qing, Koxinga retreated to Taiwan where he established a Ming successor state
• However, in 1683, Shi Lang invaded and extinguished the Ming successor state, unifying all of China under the Qing
• Shi Lang was successful in lobbying the Qing emperor to annex Taiwan to Fujian province, and became governor of the unified entity in 1684
• However, his efforts to resurrect the Zheng trading fleets were less successful
• Shi Lang's legacy has been interpreted in a variety of different ways in modern China
  • Celebrated for his naval competency and unifying the mainland and Taiwan
  • Castigated for his traitorous act of defection

Chinese Ming-Qing Civil War and European Arrivals in East Asia

• During the 17th century the Ming Dynasty, headed by the Zhu family was increasingly pressured by Manchu tribes
• In 1644 the Ming dynasty collapsed when the Manchu occupied Beijing and established the Qing dynasty
• The last Ming emperor, Chongzen, committed suicide just outside the Forbidden City
• Ming partisans retreated to Nanjing, in southern China to consolidate their resistance
• Although the Manchu occupied Nanjing in 1645, one year after their conquest of Beijing, Ming supporters conducted a fighting retreat in southern China and eventually moved offshore to Taiwan
• The Manchu killed the last Ming claimant to the throne in 1662
• However, the final conquest of the Ming would not occur for another 22 years, when Taiwan was finally conquered
• The primary support for the Ming-in-exile in Taiwan came from Koxinga, a powerful leader of the Zheng clan, based on the Fujian coast
• Koxinga led two expeditions to expel the Qing from Nanjing in the 1650s
• Although these expeditions failed, Koxinga was successful in driving the Dutch from Taiwan in the early 1660s — this greatly surprised European observers
• However, after ruling Taiwan for more than 20 years, the last Zheng family loyalists were defeated in a naval battle near the Penghu Islands in the Taiwan Strait, in 1683
• Following this defeat, the last Ming holdouts subjected themselves to Qing rule
• During this time, when China was riven by civil war, new European arrivals sought to gain access to China, Japan and the East Indies
  • Dutch — Jakarta
  • Portuguese — Macao
  • Spanish — Manila
• During the 1590s, Dutch merchants mounted a series of expeditions to the sources of many spices, notably pepper, cutting out Javanese middlemen
• Profits in the spice trade were very high — up to 400% — leading to fierce competition among European powers
  • In 1600, the English set up the East India Company (EIC)
  • In response, the Dutch set up the Vereenigde Oostindische Companigne (VOC) in 1602
  • Both the EIC and the VOC issued shares to the general public, establishing themselves as the forerunners to modern multinational corporations
• These companies possessed quasi-governmental powers
  • Negotiate treaties
  • Maintain armies and forts
  • Wage war
  • Try, imprison, and even execute people for crimes
  • Establish colonies
  • Issue coinage
• During the early 1600s, the Dutch competed primarily with the Portuguese for influence in the East Indies
  • Attacked Macao directly in 1622, which failed to drive the Portuguese from the territory
  • Established a trading center on the Penghu Islands
  • Were forced to move to Taiwan by the Chinese (I'm guessing it was the Ming Dynasty that forced them to move)
  • In 1641 the Dutch displaced the Portuguese from Nagasaki, establishing the only officially authorized European trading post in Japan
  • That same year, the Dutch also displaced the Portuguese from Malacca, establishing themselves firmly as the predominant European power in the seas around China
  • By the latter half of the 17th century, East and Southeast Asia were dominated by the Dutch
  • This dominance over the spice trade made the VOC the richest private organization in the West, and allowed it to nearly bankrupt the English EIC
  • However, during the 18th century, the Netherlands gradually lost sea power to England, and eventually the VOC was displaced by the EIC, before eventually being dissolved in 1799

The Zheng Clan and Koxinga

• Despite the Ming dynasty's overall decline during the 1600s, the Zheng clan of the Fujian coast controlled the maritime trade routes between Java and Japan
• The most successful of these Zheng merchants were Zheng Zhilong and his son Zhen Chenggong (Koxinga)
• The revenues of the Zheng clan were even higher than those of the VOC
• Zheng Zhilong took a Japanese wife, the daughter of a samurai, on one of his visits to Kyushu, and there the couple had a son, Zhen Chenggong
• Zheng Chenggong was trained in the samurai arts before being trained in the Chinese classics
• Longwu, the Ming emperor-in-exile bestowed upon Chenggong the name Koxinga, meaning "he of the royal surname"
• Zheng Zhilong estranged himself from his son by defecting to the Qing in 1646, just after their conquest of Beijing

Koxinga's Naval Expeditions Against the Qing and the Dutch

• Beginning in 1655, Koxinga conducted a series of successful campaigns to control the coastline in northern Fujian and Zhejiang provinces
• In 1658 and 1659, emboldened by these successes, Koxinga led two campaigns to retake Nanjing
• The first attempt failed because of storms
• The second failed because Koxinga failed to press his advantage when besieging Nanjing, allowing Qing reinforcements to arrive and chase him from the city
• As Koxinga retreated before the Qing counterattack, he decided to relocate his headquarters from the Xiamen and Jinmen islands further offshore to Taiwan
• Although his commanders objected, as they felt that Taiwan was too wild and underdeveloped, Koxinga favored Taiwan because of its greater size and the fact that it could only be accessed by sea
• From 1661 to 1662 Koxinga waged a series of sieges on the Dutch forts of Provintia and Zeelandia, eventually driving the Dutch back to Batavia in early 1662
• However, less than 5 months after his success in driving the Dutch from Taiwan, Koxinga died of a sudden illness
• His son Zheng Jing held off repeated counterattacks by the Dutch and the Qing, led by Shi Lang
• After Zheng Jing passed away in 1681, his son, Zheng Keshuang lost to Shi attack in 1683

Shi Lang's Amphibious Operations Against the Ming on Taiwan

• After Koxinga captured Taiwan from the Dutch in 1662, the Dutch attempted to ally with the Qing, and asked Shi Lang to retake Taiwan from Zheng Jing
• Shi scheduled two invasion dates, but on both occasions, operations were halted because of the threat of typhoons
• In 1664, the Qing appointed Shi Lang as the commander of the Fujian navy and tasked him with capturing Taiwan for the Qing
• However, this attack too was foiled by a typhoon
• In 1667, Zheng Jing, Koxinga's son, attempted to gain recognition for Taiwan as a separate state by opening negotiations with the Qing
• Simultaneously, he sought an alliance with the Japanese, who were sympathetic to the Zheng, as Koxinga had been half-Japanese and related to Japanese nobility
• At this time, Shi Lang and the other Ming defectors, such as Zheng Zhilong, came under suspicion and were placed under house arrest
• This confinement lasted until Zheng Zhilong's death in 1683, at which point Shi Lang was restored as commander of naval forces in Fujian
• Shi Lang's power increased further when, after a dispute with the governor of Fujian, the Qing emperor Kanxi granted Shi Lang total control over all military decisions and authorized him to conquer Taiwan for the Qing
• On July 7, 1683, Shi Lang sailed from Fujian to attack the Ming fleet stationed at the Penghu Islands
• The Ming fleet was caught unprepared because it thought an attack during typhoon season was unlikely
• Armed with superior cannon provided by the Dutch, Shi Lang secured a decisive victory
• Shi Lang took many prisoners, whom he provided food for, contrasting with the famine faced by Zheng defenders on Taiwan
• After the defeat of the Penghu Island fleet, Zheng military commanders were divided on what to do, with many advocating a further retreat to Manila
• This enabled Shi Lang to sail almost unopposed into Tai Bay, and on August 26 1683, Zheng Keshuang surrendered Emperor Yongli's royal seals and presented himself with a Manchu-style shaved head, signaling unconditional surrender
• In October, Shi Lang proclaimed a general amnesty for all former Ming supporters who recognized the Qing victory, an offer that was accepted by most former Ming loyalists on Taiwan
• In February 1684, seeking to reinforce his own trading monopoly and prevent Taiwan from being used as a base for further insurgency, Shi Lang petitioned the Qing throne to formally annex Taiwan
• In March 1684, this request was granted, and Emperor Kangxi annexed Taiwan to Fujian province
• However, in November 1684, Emperor Kangxi lifted the maritime trading ban on the coast of China, ending Shi Lang's monopoly
• Shi Lang's wealth and influence would decline steadily until his death in 1696
• The geography of the Penghu Islands, Jinmen and Xiamen have been relevant for all invasions of Taiwan
  • The Dutch established a fort on the Penghu Islands in 1622 before being forced onto Taiwan by the Chinese in 1624
  • Koxinga used the Penghus as a staging ground for his attack on the Dutch in Taiwan in 1662
  • Shi Lang attacked the Ming stationed in the Penghu Islands first, in 1683
  • In the 1800s, the French Navy used the Penghus as base from which to attack Taiwan
  • In 1895 the Japanese captured the Penghus in the last battle of the Sino-Japanese War, solidifying their control over Taiwan pursuant to the Treaty of Shimonoseki
  • The Penghus offer a large deep water harbor 30 miles off the coast of Taiwan and 70 miles off the coast of mainland China
  • Capturing the Penghus greatly simplifies the logistics of any power that seeks to invade or isolate Taiwan
  • So, by implication, in order to repel an invasion or blockade, maintaining control of the Penghu Islands is imperative for Taiwan
• Jinmen and Xiamen also play a significant role in controlling the Fujian coast and maintaining control over the Taiwan Strait
  • Although these islands are close together, Jinmen is in Taiwanese hands while Xiamen belongs to the PRC
  • In October 1949, at the Battle of Guningtou, Nationalist forces decisively defeated pursuing Communist forces in their attempt to drive the Nationalists off Jinmen
  • Jinmen also played a key role during the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1958

Parallels Between Seventeenth Century Taiwan and Twenty-First Century Taiwan

• There are parallels to be drawn between the Ming-Qing and Nationalist-Communist civil wars
  • Conflict moved from north to south on the mainland
  • Taiwan became the last refuge of the party that was defeated on the mainland
• Koxinga is celebrated by both Taiwanese and mainland Chinese
  • On the mainland, he is venerated as the hero who liberated Taiwan from the Dutch
  • On Taiwan, he is remembered for his valiant resistance against the mainland Qing
  • Both sides credit Koxinga with making Taiwan part of the Chinese empire
  • Koxinga is seen as preventing Taiwan from becoming a European-ruled island like the Philippines or Indonesia
• Just as Koxinga opposed the Dutch in the 17th Century, Chiang Kai-shek opposed the Japanese in the 20th
  • Chiang is given credit in both Western and Chinese scholarship for his role in defeating the Japanese
  • Then, just like Koxinga, Chiang was driven from the mainland and made Taiwan his refuge
  • Both the PRC and the ROC draw parallels between Chiang's and Koxinga's retreat to Taiwan
  • The PRC in addition emphasizes the eventual capture of Taiwan by Shi Lang
  • Is it possible that Xi Jinping sees himself as a modern-day Shi Lang?

Conclusion

• During the 17th century rising Qing power eclipsed the declining Ming in land-based operations
• Qing occupied Beijing in 1644, and within a year had consolidated control of China north of the Yangzi River
• However, through the Zheng clan, the Ming retained control of the sea, operating from their bases in Xiamen and Jinmen
• This enabled Koxinga's fleet to attack Nanjing in 1659 and the Dutch on Taiwan in 1661
• Following Koxinga's death in 1662, the power of the Ming fleet declined and Taiwan was eventually overrun by the Qing, led by Shi Lang, in 1683
• Today, China's military power, especially in the sea and air domains, is expanding rapidly relatively to Taiwan
• Another parallel between the 17th Century and today is the capability of leadership on the Chinese mainland
  • Qing emperor Kangxi ruled from 1661 to 1722, the longest single reign in Chinese history
  • State grew increasingly powerful and centralized under his rule
  • Took power at the age of 7, with regents and the empress wielding power in his name for the first seven years of his rule
  • Consolidated his rule by the late 1660s
  • Authoritatively directed Shi Lang to retake Taiwan
  • Similarly, Xi Jinping has emerged as a powerful, centralizing ruler in mainland China
• Another lesson from the 17th century is that operational leadership in the field is key
  • Koxinga learned from his campaigns against Nanjing and attacked the Dutch much more aggressively
  • Later, Shi Lang used his extensive knowledge of Zheng naval practices to take the Zheng fleet by surprise in the Penghu Islands
• The Ming defense on Taiwan was hampered by lack of foreign support
  • Sought an alliance with the Japanese
  • However, by this time, the Japanese had committed to an isolationist foreign policy and refused to come to the aid of the Ming on Taiwan
  • Although the Qing sought an alliance with the Dutch to retake Taiwan, in the end Dutch support failed to materialize and was unnecessary
  • Although the US is currently strongly committed to defend Taiwan against aggression from the mainland, this commitment could waver in the future
• The three lessons from the case of Shi Lang and the Qing conquest of China are
  • Relative power matters
  • Leadership matters
  • Alliances matter
• Although there are many differences between 17th China and modern China, the conquest of Taiwan by Shi Lang provides a compelling historical narrative that informs the PRC's thinking about Taiwan

Chapter 2: What Did the PLA Learn From Its Jinmen, Hainan and Yijiangshan Landing Campaigns

• The Chinese Civil War was primarily a land campaign
• However, after gaining control of the mainland, the PLA did conduct several amphibious operations to gain control of offshore islands
• In 1949, the PLA unsuccessfully assaulted Jinmen (a.k.a. Kinmen or Quemoy)
• In 1950, the PLA successfully attacked Hainan
• The PLA also conducted a successful attack on Yijiangshan, which remains the PLA's only successful joint operation during the Cold War

Jinmen: A Failed Landing

• Mao Zedong founded the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949
• At this time there were still over a million Kuomintang (KMT) fighters in southwest China and on Taiwan
• In late 1949, Chiang Kai-shek moved the seat of his government to Taiwan, making Taipei the new capital of the Republic of China (ROC)
• Chiang prepared for Mao's attack by concentrating his forces on four major islands
  • 200,000 troops on Taiwan
  • 100,000 on Hainan
  • 120,000 on the Zhousan island group
  • 60,000 on Jinmen
• Jinmen is a small island group lying just two miles off the coast of mainland China
• Total land area of approximately 60 sq. mi.
• Had a civilian population of approximately 40,000 at that time
• Lies just off the coast of Xiamen, a major seaport on the southeast mainland — not in open ocean
• After capturing Xiamen on October 17, 1949 the 10th Army Group ordered the 28th Army to prepare for a landing operation against Jinmen
• Poor intelligence caused the 28th Army to pay insufficient attention to battle readiness
• The 28th Army launched its attack on Jinmen on October 24, 1949
• First wave consisted of 10,000 troops
• Found itself tightly encircled by the KMT garrison at Guningtou, a small village near the landing site
• The 28th Army could not apply the tactics that had led to success for the Communists in the past
  • Achieving surprise to avoid superior firepower
  • Outnumbering the enemy
  • Engaging in mobile operations
• The next morning, KMT air and naval forces destroyed 200 small fishing junks around Xiamen before they could be used land PLA reinforcements
• Without the ability to send reinforcements, the 10th Army Group could not reinforce the Jinmen landings
• The 28th Army lost 9,086 landing troops, with more than 3,000 of those troops being taken prisoner
• The KMT defenders lost only about a thousand men
• News of the disaster reached Beijing on October 28
• In response, Mao Zedong drafted a circular instructing his commanders to learn a good lesson from the failure at Jinmen
• PLA commanders took away four conclusions from the failed landings at Jinmen
  1. Cross-strait transportation is a key factor
  2. Coordination and communication are crucial
  3. Landing forces must outnumber the enemy defense
  4. Naval and air forces are necessary for large-scale amphibious campaigns
• The Deputy Commander of the Third Field Army, Su Yu, warned his generals that amphibious operations were a "new warfare" that was "different from all the wars we've fought before"
• The KMT came to different conclusions regarding the Communist failure at Jinmen
  • PLA troops had become arrogant after their victory at Xiamen and underestimated the challenge of landing on Jinmen
  • Thought that the landing was successful as soon as they hit the beach, and did not have a plan to deal with counterattacks
  • Had only one landing point
  • Chose to attack in the early morning, allowing defenders to concentrate their firepower during the crucial first 24 hours of the landing
• According to the KMT, the PLA would have had more success in attacking Jinmen if they'd
  • Attacked in two or more places
  • At different times, preferably at night
  • With supporting firepower, especially antitank guns
• Another major factor hampering the Chinese attack was a simple lack of boats — the PLA did not have the boats to launch a second wave or provide major reinforcements to the first wave at Jinmen
• The PLA defeat at Jinmen helped convince the Nationalists that the KMT government could survive on Taiwan, as long as it built up strong defensive forces
• After the disaster at Jinmen, Mao Zedong issued orders changing how the PLA planned and prepared for amphibious landing operations
  1. Centralized national command
     • Landing require coordination across a wide range of military forces
     • Requires a centralized command to coordinate, plan and mobilize the resources needed
     • On October 31, 1949, Mao issued orders halting amphibious operations and instructing his commanders that future amphibious operations could only be authorized by field army headquarters, not local army group commands
  2. Dedicated landing force
     • Mao realized that amphibious operations require the transport of at least an entire field army (40-50,000 men) and supplies for at least three days of operations
     • In 1961 the Central Military Commission (CMC) organized a research group to study past landing campaigns in preparation for another attack on Chiang Kai-shek's forces
     • The conclusion of this group was that attacking forces must be numerically superior to local defenses
  3. More training
     • Su Yu was tasked with developing a training curriculum for large scale amphibious operations
     • In the process of developing this training, Su communicated to Mao that amphibious operations would be extremely difficult without air and sea control
  4. Naval and air support
     • In response to Su's recommendations, Mao created the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)
     • PLAAF was established on November 11, 1949
     • In December 1949, the Twelfth Army Group, Fourth Field Army was reorganized into the PLAN, with its commander, Xiao Jinguang, becoming the PLAN's first commander
• On December 16 1949, Mao visited the Soviet Union
  • Soviets agreed to a loan to arm the Chinese with ships and aircraft
  • Ships worth $150 million
  • $220 million worth of aircraft, with more aircraft requested in follow-up orders
  • Russian military advisers
  • These ships and aircraft would become the first equipment used by the PLAN and PLAAF respectively
  • However, they did not arrive in time for the PLA's landings on Hainan, and, as a result the PLAN and PLAAF were excluded from this operation
• I didn't realize that the PLAAF and PLAN were created specifically because of the failures of the PLA in conducting amphibious operations
• In a very real sense, the entire purpose of the PLA, since the founding of the PRC, has been to recapture Taiwan

The Hainan Landing and the Taiwan Invasion Plan

• In April 1950, having learned the lessons from the failure at Jinmen, the PLA attacked Hainan Island
• Operation was coordinated from PLA's high command
  • Planning started in January, when Mao instructed the CMC to "solve the problem of Hainan Island"
  • In February, the CMC presented a plan that would combine small and large-scale amphibious crossings in order to negate the Chinese Nationalists' air and naval superiority in the Qiongzhou Strait separating Hainan from the mainland
• The PLA concentrated a large invasion force, consisting of approximately 100,000 troops
• Included supporting elements such as artillery and combat engineers
• PLA also established coordination with guerrilla elements on Hainan, consisting of approximately 20,000 men
• Collected over 2,100 fishing vessels and employed more than 6,000 civilian operators to provide cross-strait transportation
• From March 5 to 10, the 15th Army Group, 4th Field Army began small-scale night landings by sending battalion-sized groups across the Qiongzhou Strait
• These vanguard troops made contact with local guerrillas and prepared landing sites for the main invasion force
• On the evening of April 16, the first wave of the main invasion force, consisting of 50,000 troops sailed towards Hainan
• This forces was detected by KMT air patrols and KMT sea and air forces moved to engage
• Through the night of the 16th, KMT warships attacked the PLA landing force, but failed to stop them, losing 1 ship sunk and two damaged in the process
• By the following morning, the PLA's invasion force had landed on Hainan
• The invasion force successfully engaged KMT defenses and secured the landing areas
• By April 22 the KMT's 252nd Division, the primary defensive force on Hainan, had been defeated, with the PLA capturing Haikou, the capital
• On April 23, the PLA sent over a second wave of 50,000 troops
• Hainan was fully captured by May 1
• The success of the operation against Hainan Island encouraged the PLA to prepare for a possible invasion of Taiwan in 1950
• Mao emphasized the training of additional airborne forces and authorized the organization of a further four amphibious divisions
• In late spring, the PLA's Third Field Army began preparations for a major amphibious operation against Taiwan
  • Would use the 7th, 8th and 9th Army Groups along with the nascent PLAN
  • Deploy over a half-million troops
  • A further 300,000 troops from the Fourth Field Army would act as reserve
• In May 1950, the 9th Army Group defeated nationalist forces on the Zhoushan island group
• In June of 1950 the same forces also captured the Dongshan and Wanshan island groups
• By late spring 1950, both the PLA and KMT expected a major attack, first against Jinmen and then later against Taiwan itself
• However, on June 25 1950, the Korean War broke out
• The Korean war took Mao and the Chinese leadership by surprise — neither the Soviets nor the North Koreans had warned them about the upcoming attack
• As a result the PRC was caught by surprise by the US policy shift in East Asia
• On June 27, President Truman announced the 7th Fleet's deployment to the Taiwan Strait as a preventive measure designed to stop Communist attacks on Taiwan
• The presence of the US Navy in the Taiwan Strait, along with US involvement in Korea, caused a significant recalculation on the part of the Chinese Communists
• On June 30, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai formally suspended invasion preparations against Taiwan, and the CMC sent word to the forces preparing for invasion that the invasion had been postponed until at least 1952
• The arrival of US forces in the Taiwan Strait signaled to the PRC that there was an international aspect to their heretofore internal struggle and that future plans against Taiwan would have to account for the actions of the United States

Yijiangshan: The First Joint Operation

• By 1953, the Chinese understood that they were unprepared for a full-scale war against the United States
• Instead, the PLA chose a strategy of "limited wars"
• Limited attacks in the Taiwan Strait to promote PRC interests while attempting to avoid conflict with the United States
• After the Korean armistice in 1953, the PLA planned a new amphibious campaign against KMT-held islands in the Taiwan Strait
• Zhang Aiping, head of the Zhejiang Command (ZC) in the East China Military Region (ECMR) proposed a piecemeal strategy where the PRC would capture offshore islands one at a time, starting with those farthest away from Taiwan and the US 7th Fleet
• Chose to begin with the Dachen Islands
  • Located in the East China Sea
  • Over 100 miles away from the 7th Fleet, which was posted to the South China Sea
  • Over 200 miles away from Taiwan
• After success in the Dachen Islands, Aiping planned to move south and attack larger islands
• In early May 1954, the PLA began preparing for a landing on Dongji, a group of islands north of the Dachens
• On May 15, PLA troops landed on the islands and eliminated the KMT garrison, capturing 60 prisoners in the process
• With this success, the CMC authorized the ECMR to proceed with the main attack on the Dachens
• The PLA used its lessons from Hainan and Jinmen in its attack against the Dachen Islands
  • Zhang established a joint command in the summer of 1954 in Ningbo
  • Command included officers from the air force, army and navy
  • Began detailed planning for the Dachen campaign on August 31, 1954
  • Sent infantry officers to the navy and air force for cross-training
• Zhang decided to attack Yijiangshan, a small islet north of the main Dachen islands, as the first target
• The landing was scheduled for noon of January 18, 1955, weather permitting
• The attack commenced with aerial bombardment at 8:00 am, with coastal artillery following up
• The pre-attack bombardment destroyed or damaged almost all the defenders' fortifications
• The landing occurred at around 12:15 pm, and by 5:30 pm the entire island was under PLA control
• Both sides suffered relatively heavy casualties for such a small engagement
  • The KMT lost its entire garrison of 1,086 men, with 567 killed and 519 taken prisoner
  • The PLA suffered 2,092 casualties, with 893 dead and 1,037 wounded
  • Nearly half of the first wave of PLA landing forces were killed or injured
  • The PLAN lost one landing craft, and suffered damage to 21 other ships
• The Yijiangshan operation was important because it was the first amphibious landing conducted as a joint operation with participation from land, air, and naval forces
• In addition, Yijiangshan showed that the PLA could conduct operations against the KMT without necessarily inviting US intervention
• Performance across PLA units was uneven during the landing
  • PLAAF units performed well
    • Staffed with pilots who had seen combat over Korea
    • Armed with advanced MiG-15 aircraft, which were significantly more capable than the KMT aircraft in the area
    • In six air engagements with KMT forces, the PLAAF shot down six KMT fighters while losing two of its own
  • PLAN units performed poorly
    • The PLAN also fought a number of engagements against KMT naval forces in the area around the Dachen islands
    • Although the PLAN was successful in pushing KMT forces away from the Dachen Islands, it lost the warship Ruijin, and several other ships were damaged
    • Chinese analysts believe that while strategic success was achieved, the PLAN failed operationally as it took unnecessarily high losses during the campaign

Conclusion

• PLAN amphibious doctrine evolved rapidly from 1949 to 1955
• Chinese generals were constantly adjusting to new information and assessing their own performance
• Learned not only from their own successes and failures, but also from observing US forces in Korea
• Demonstrated 4 key capabilities
  1. Planning
  2. Learning
  3. Adapting
  4. Political control
• Centralized preparations and operations and logistics
• Transitioned from army-led attacks to joint operations involving land, naval and air officers working in close collaboration
• However, PLA leadership was frustrated by the technological gap between itself and the United States, which committed itself to preserving Taiwanese independence
• The Korean War demonstrated the disparity between the PLA and the US military, and PLA generals were realistic about their ability to challenge the US Army, Navy and Air Force in a battle for Taiwan
• One lesson PLA leadership has carried forward from historical analysis of the amphibious landings from 1950-1955 is that success is eminently achievable if the US military does not intervene
• As a result, Chinese forces will likely attempt to first deter the US from intervening in a future Taiwan crisis

Chapter 3: The Six Pillars of PLA Amphibious Doctrine

• What are the guiding principles of the PLA's amphibious force?
• How would these principles apply in a potential Taiwan invasion scenario?

The PLAN's Current Amphibious Missions

• The PLAN is charged primarily with executing three missions
  1. Cross-strait invasion of Taiwan
  2. Asserting and defending Chinese maritime claims in the South China Sea
  3. Out-of-area ("far seas") operations in support of the Belt-and-Road Initiative — protecting Chinese national interests and evacuating Chinese citizens in the event of a crisis
• Of these three, by far the highest priority is given to the cross-strait invasion scenario

Core Principles of PLA Amphibious Doctrine

• Since 1949, the PLA has grappled with a set of problems related to amphibious operations
  • How to provide adequate air support
  • How to establish naval superiority
  • How to transport large numbers of troops across the strait
• To solve these problems, the PLA has studied its own history, other amphibious campaigns, and emulated the best practices of other navies
• By 2006, the PLA had adopted the following general doctrinal guidelines regarding amphibious operations
  • Forces must be organized into two distinct components, sea and land, under a single joint command
  • Air support must be provided to protect the landing force
  • Naval gunfire is required to suppress and/or destroy coastal defenses
  • Specialized landing vessels are required to actually put ground forces "on the beach"
  • Balance force composition between assault forces and reserves in order to crack enemy defenses, but also have sufficient follow-on forces to maintain momentum
  • Units must be loaded on transports such that they can disembark and engage in combat immediately
• By 2013, these general doctrinal guidelines had been refined into the following six principles

1. Dominance of the Three Domains

• In order an amphibious landing to be successful, the attacking force must have superiority in the air, on the water and on land at the point of landing
• A challenge in establishing this dominance is demarcating clear lines of authority
• Who is responsible for which domains, at which points during the operation?
• The British, in North Africa, had strong interservice disputes regarding whether command of air support should be centralized in the Royal Air Force, or whether ground forces and the Royal Navy could retain limited command over aircraft for specific operations
• In different theaters, the Allies came to different arrangements regarding the division of labor between sea, air and land domains
• However, over time, it became clear that successful operations established the following preconditions
  • Initial establishment of air superiority
  • Effective dominance by ground forces in land warfare and naval forces in the maritime domain
  • Close coordination between maritime, ground, and air forces
  • Ability to pass control back and forth between domains
• Contemporary PLA doctrine extends this concept of multidomain dominance into the information domain as well
• Emphasizes the need to degrade adversary command and control networks
• It's notable that the PLA is not yet confident in its ability to achieve this multidomain dominance
• PLAN Marine Corps journals have a number of articles discussing invasion scenarios which assume robust enemy capabilities in the air and on sea
  • Series of articles discussing how to best distribute anti-air weaponry on amphibious assault craft
  • Indicates that the PLAN Marine Corps is not confident in the PLAAF or PLAN's ability to keep adversary aircraft away from its ships during a landing operation
  • Or it's just contingency planning — the PLAN MC might be planning for an unlikely scenario because having a plan and not needing it is better than needing an plan and not having it

2. Key Point Strikes

• During World War 2, allied forces focused on using naval gunfire and air strikes to disable key points in enemy defenses
• The PLA has extended this doctrine to encompass attacking all elements of the adversary's defenses
  • Early warning systems
  • Command and control
  • Air defense systems
  • Air bases
  • Harbors
• In order to carry out these strikes, PLA doctrine calls for coordinated strikes using missiles, aircraft, and special forces
• Although the PLA has embraced the doctrine of key point strikes, it doesn't appear to have fully conceptualized how that doctrine would apply in an amphibious invasion scenario
• The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) has contributed personnel to PLA amphibious warfare exercise, suggesting that the PLA is integrating the PLARF's assets into its amphibious warfare plans
• However, studies by PLA researchers have also focused on placing surface attack capabilities on ships, armored vehicles and other more local assets, suggesting a certain lack of confidence in the PLARF's ability to strike and destroy key nodes ahead of an invasion

3. Concentration of Elite Strengths

• In World War 2, the Allies used both concentrated and dispersed landings
  • In North Africa and Sicily, dispersed landings were used, to better match ground campaign objectives and the geography of the landing areas
  • In the Pacific, the size and limited access paths to many Pacific atolls forced the US to concentrate its forces in order to overwhelm heavy Japanese defenses
• PLA doctrine has traditionally called for local superiority at the point of attack
• Therefore, the PLA's inclination is to concentrate its forces
• This tendency is further reinforced by Taiwan's geography, which offers only a few suitable landing beaches
• Concentrating elite strengths is synthesizing high quality troops, high-tech weaponry, and overwhelming material resources into a focused effort on key points in the attack
• Requires advanced command, control and intelligence gathering capabilities
• The goal is to achieve local overmatch of Taiwan's capabilities in one or more of the few landing areas
• Chinese military exercises have focused on developing these C2 capabilities
• Chinese C2 takes place primarily at the brigade level
  • Receives reconnaissance reports
  • Orders attacks on enemy artillery and missile positions
  • Coordinates the use of unmanned vehicles to break up fixed defenses and minefields
• The PLA is experimenting with computerized planning to optimize troop and weapons allocations across ships
• They are trying to create a modern version of the Normandy model, which centralized C2 of the entire allied force during Operation Overlord

4. Rapid and Continuous Assaults

• One of the primary challenges involved in amphibious landing operations is breaching concentrated enemy defenses and then moving inland rapidly with minimal operational pauses
• The PLA's solution to this challenge is to use an echeloned approach
• First wave will secure the beach and clear defenses
• Second wave will move inland
• The PLA is aware that mines, especially, could pose a significant risk to the second wave's ability to land and rapidly deploy for inland maneuver warfare
• In addition to the traditional defensive approaches that the US pursues (i.e. using trained personnel and unmanned vehicles to detect and disable mines), the PLA has explored offensive mining strategies, such as preemptively dropping mines into enemy harbors in order to limit enemy naval mobility in response to an amphibious invasion

5. Integrated and Flexible Support Operations

• Another major challenge of amphibious operations is supplying landing forces once they start to move inland
• The allies struggled with logistics in Operation Torch, with the initial landing forces unable to move inland because of a lack of trucks to supply them with fuel
• Japanese struggled so much with supplying their troops on Guadalcanal that it was nicknamed "Starvation Island"
• To support the D-Day landings, the allies set up a pipeline running from the Isle of Wight to the invasion beaches (PLUTO — Pipelines Under The Ocean) to supply additional fuel more efficiently
• The Chinese are aware that an invasion force on Taiwan will require a significant amount of logistical support
• To provide this support, the PLA calls for
  • Military-civilian integrated supply and logistical support system
  • Flexible and agile modes of support operations
  • Integration and unified command of the units providing logistical support
• This is an extremely difficult challenge, complicated by the fact that the PLA appears to be counting on integration with civilian organizations
• The PLA must also transition from its traditional warehouse-and-depot approach to combat service support in favor of one centered on just-in-time logistics
• According to most observers, the PLA has not sufficiently completed its logistics reforms
  • A particular point of concern for the PLA is the provision of medical care to a Taiwan invasion force
  • Another concern is supplying petroleum, oil, lubricants and spare parts
• To address these challenges, the PLA is studying the Allies' use of artificial harbors on the Normandy beaches
• Is developing computer models to predict supply and parts needs
• Is also developing computer models to determine how the military can efficiently use civilian sealift to transfer forces

6. Psychological Attacks

• A major component of the preparation for the Normandy landings was deception campaigns aimed at Nazi Germany to convince German generals that the landings would take place either in the Scandinavian countries or at Calais
• This deception campaign was comprehensive, involving the creation of a phantom army, complete with realistic message traffic, fabricated intelligence reports drafted by captured and turned German agents, false movements of troops and the appointment of General Patton as the commander
• After the invasion, Allied psychological operations shifted towards asserting the superiority of allied forces and encouraging local populations in France and Germany to engage in sabotage
• The PLA asserts that successful psychological warfare consists of the following three elements
  • Propaganda to affect the mood, morale and fighting spirit of defending soldiers and adversary citizens
  • Displays of overwhelming force and the willingness to use it, to terrify the opposing army
  • Deception, trickery and sleight-of-hand to fool enemy forces into believing an attack will take place at a different location
• The PLA specifically cites the Allies' Operation Body Guard, which they claim lulled the German defenders into believing that the invasion would not take place in Normandy
• The PLA also treats the use of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) as a means of psychological warfare — PGMs reduce the effect of fighting on the civilian population and make them more likely to surrender

Conclusion

• The PLA has accepted most Western findings related to amphibious warfare
  • The importance of maritime and air superiority
  • Establishing effective command and control
  • Loading ships and troops properly to minimize bottlenecks and ensure that landing forces have the materiel they require
  • Escorting amphibious forces and protecting them against enemy attack
  • Isolating the landing areas
  • Conducting preparatory naval strikes against on-shore targets
  • Splitting forces wisely between the initial assault and follow-on echelons
  • Developing specialized landing craft for amphibious functions
• The above six principles reflect the PLA's current thinking on amphibious warfare and, more specifically, the challenges of conducting an amphibious landing on Taiwan
• These principles reflect aspirations, not necessarily current capabilities

Part 2: The Joint Amphibious Force

Chapter 4: The PLAGF Amphibious Force

• One of the most important missions assigned to the PLA is deterring Taiwan from taking further steps towards independence
• If this deterrence fails, the PLA may be called upon to conduct a joint island landing campaign
• While there is little indication that a traditional over-the-beach landing is the first choice or even the first military choice for Chinese policymakers, the PLA is preparing to execute such an attack should other options fail
• The PLAGF's contribution to the Taiwan deterrence and war-fighting mission consists primarily of six amphibious combined arms brigades (ACABs)
• The three army groups stationed closest to Taiwan in the Eastern and Southern Theater Commands (TCs) have two each of these brigades
• The capabilities of these brigades have been enhanced by reforms that began in 2017
  • Increased capabilities of PLA helicopter units
  • More special-operations forces
  • More air defense
  • More long-range strike, via rocket launchers
• In an invasion scenario, these ACABs will be reinforced by other PLA ground units, as well as units from other services, militia forces and civilian assets
• In peacetime, these supporting forces are dispersed, and, as a result it will take the PLA days, if not weeks to move all necessary forces within striking distance of Taiwan and prepare for an assault
• I think this is still too optimistic — the Russians required the better part of six months to assemble the invasion force for Ukraine
  • That was a far simpler exercise — invading via roads over a land border
  • And it still wasn't enough — the invasion force was not powerful enough to take Kyiv in the opening weeks of the war, and Russia was not able to successfully execute a coup de main against the Ukrainian government
• If the PLA has learned anything from Ukraine, they'll be spending the better part of a year assembling the invasion force
• Once the invasion forces land, they will be faced with Taiwan's inhospitable terrain
  • Only a few beaches along Taiwan's west coast are suitable for an invasion
  • Once inland, the terrain quickly turns mountainous
  • Many rice paddies
  • Lots of urban sprawl
• In order to deal with these challenges, PLA leadership has sought to reform the PLAGF in order to shift the decisive phase of a Taiwan invasion away from an amphibious over-the-beach operation
• Instead they seek to use helicopter and airborne forces to seize key infrastructure ahead of time, paralyzing Taiwan's ability to respond to an amphibious invasion, when it comes
• However, a large scale assault by multiple ACABs may still be necessary

Order of Battle

• Prior to the 2017 reforms, PLAGF amphibious capabilities were concentrated in three units, all stationed on China's east coast
  • 1st Amphibious Mechanized Infantry Division, 1st Group Army (GA) — Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province (Nanjing military region)
  • 14th Amphibious Armored Brigade, 31st GA — Zhangzou, Fujian Province (Nanjing military region)
  • 124th Amphibious Infantry Divison, 42nd GA — Boluo, Guangdong (Guangzhou military region)
• In 2017, these units were disbanded
  • 1st Amphibious Mechanized and 124th Amphibious Infantry were each split into 2 ACABs
  • 14th Amphibious Armored was transformed into a fifth ACAB
  • The sixth ACAB was formed from elements of the former 91st Motorized Infantry Division, also based in Zhangzhou
• These units were transferred to new garrison locations, with the result that 4 ACABs report to the Eastern Theater Command and the remaining 2 report to Southern Theater Command
• The six new ACABs are assigned as follows

  Group Army	Brigade Name	Location
  72nd	5th ACAB	Hangzhou, Zhejiang
  	124th ACAB	Hangzhou, Zhejiang
  73rd	14th ACAB	Zhangzhou, Fujian
  	91st ACAB	Zhangzhou, Fujian
  74th	1st ACAB	Boluo, Guangdong
  	125th ACAB	Bao'an, Guangdong

PLAGF Amphibious Combined Arms Brigades

• Each ACAB is structured similarly to a heavy combined-arms brigade
• Instead of tanks and APCs, they are assigned amphibious assault guns and amphibious IFVs
• Each ACAB is composed of 9 battalions
  • 4 amphibious combined arms battalions
    • 2 amphibious assault gun companies
    • 2 amphibious mechanized infantry companies
    • Firepower company (mortars, man-portable air defense systems)
    • Support company (reconnaissance and combat engineering)
  • Reconnaissance battalion
    • Amphibious reconnaissance vehicles
    • UAVs
  • Artillery battalion
    • Amphibious 122mm howitzers
    • Amphibious rocket launchers
    • Antitank guided missile launchers
  • Air-defense battalion
    • Short-range air defense vehicles
    • Man-portable air-defense systems
  • Operational support battalion
    • Command-and-control vehicles
    • Electronic warfare
    • Engineering support
    • Chemical-warfare protection equipment
    • Military police
  • Service support battalion
    • Medical supplies
    • Repair supplies
    • Maintenance units
• Within each combined-arms battalion, each assault gun and mechanized infantry company is equipped with 14 vehicles at full strength
• Firepower and service support companies add another 15-20 vehicles total
• Overall, once all ancillary vehicles are included, a single combined-arms battalion consists of approximately 80 vehicles and 500-600 soldiers (between six and eight soldiers per vehicle, on average)
• The other five battalions in each brigade are smaller
  • Add approximately 2000 soldiers total
  • Another 100 vehicles, not all of which are capable of crossing deep water
• A full ACAB consists of approximately 5000 personnel and 400 vehicles — this is the baseline number that should be used when analyzing transport needs
• China's six ACABs have 24 amphibious combined arms battalions and six reconnaissance battalions — this is the force that will be "first on the beach" in any amphibious invasion of Taiwan

Group Army Support For Amphibious Operations

• In any major amphibious operation, the ACABs will receive support from other units in their group army
• The 2017 reforms standardized the composition of group armies
  • Six combined-arms brigades
  • Six or seven support brigades
• Combined arms brigades are classified as either "heavy", "medium" or "light"
  • Heavy brigades are equipped with tracked armored vehicles
  • Medium brigades are equipped with wheeled armored vehicles
  • Light brigades are equipped with unarmored trucks for transport
  • Amphibious combined arms brigades are a special type of heavy brigade, in this classification scheme
• Although each group army has six combined-arms brigades, the mix of light, medium and heavy brigades varies from army to army
• Nonamphibious brigades from the Southern, Eastern and Northern TCs have participated in cross-beach landing training, practicing disembarking from PLAGF amphibious landing craft or PLAN landing ships
• This likely simulates the arrival second echelon of a landing force, intended to move inland after the first echelon has secured beachheads and port infrastructure
• The supporting brigades in a group army consist of
  • Artillery
  • Air defense
  • Special-operations forces
  • Army aviation (helicopter) or air assault (helicopters with organic infantry)
  • Engineering
  • Chemical defense
  • Service support
• All of these could be used to support an amphibious operation
  • Artillery brigades would be an important source of fire support for any invasion force
    • All artillery brigades now have a battalion of 300mm PHL03 MLRS
    • This has a range of 70 - 160 km
    • These systems could deliver fire support from the Chinese mainland to the Penghu Islands, or, from select locations, even onto beaches on Taiwan itself
    • More recently, the PLA has begun deploying the even longer range PCH191 370mm MLRS, prioritizing the three group armies with ACABs that are deployed opposite Taiwan
    • The PCH191 expands the area along the mainland coast from which it's feasible to attack Taiwan's west coast
  • Air defense brigades will be expected to coordinate with PLAAF and PLAN assets to protect assembly areas and troops in transit across the Taiwan Strait
  • PLAGF aviation brigades give ground commanders the option of inserting up to a battalion's worth of infantry to seize key terrain, as well as providing attack helicopter support for the actual landing
  • Most aviation brigades would have to pre-deploy to airfields closer to Taiwan
  • Chemical defense units have smokescreen equipment that could be deployed at key moments to obscure the movements of landing forces
  • Service support can provide additional trucks and heavy equipment, as well as UAVs to perform reconnaissance and maintain C2
• Most ACABs are not located in immediate proximity to the assembly and embarkation points for a Taiwan invasion
• Will have to make a road or rail journey to reach those areas
• This means that it's very unlikely that China is capable of conducting a "cold start" surprise attack on Taiwan
• Any attack will require the movement and assembly of 10,000+ troops

The PLA Training Cycle and Amphibious Unit Training

• PLA units create annual plans which include the dates of major training exercises, evaluations, competition, and joint training with foreign forces
• Unit manning levels and training are dependent on the annual conscription cycle
  • Historically the PLA inducted conscripts once a year, for a two-year term of service
  • This would lead to significant reductions in readiness around September of every year as a new batch of soldiers entered and a previous batch left
  • From September to April, a significant portion of training time would go towards teaching new soldiers how to perform as part of a team in addition to training them in their actual role (such as driver or gunner)
  • In 2021, the PLA changed its recruitment policy to induct conscripts in smaller batches twice a year
  • Depending on implementation, this could significantly raise the readiness levels of units with a large number of conscripts

The Annual Training Cycle and Amphibious and Sea-transport Training

• PLAGF amphibious units must develop a set of specialized skills in addition to becoming proficient at the normal combat tasks expected of any ground combat unit
• This appears to require approximately a month of shore-based training
• Every year, amphibious units rotate in and out of a limited number of coastal locations where they can train specialized amphibious warfare skills
• They practice their normal combat tasks at inland training areas closer to their barracks
• Further hampering amphibious warfare units' ability to complete their training is the fact that this training is affected by weather to a much greater extent than regular ground unit training
• Most amphibious movement training occurs between March and September, taking advantage of a limited window of good weather
• The largest permanent amphibious warfare training areas are
  • Dongshan Island — Fujian province
  • Dacheng Bay — Fujian/Guangdong provincial border
  • Shanwei — Guangdong province
• In addition to these three primary training facilities, there are several other facilities located at various points along China's coast
• Of the three training locations, only Dacheng Bay can accommodate a full ACAB
• The rest are suitable for battalion scale or smaller exercises
• Tasks practiced at these amphibious warfare training areas include
  • Swimming
  • Armored amphibious vehicle driving
  • Loading and unloading of AAVs on PLAGF landing craft or PLAN amphibious ships
  • Landing formation practice
  • Gunnery
  • Obstacle clearance
  • Movement inland
• Amphibious warfare training begins with squad and platoon drills and progresses upwards to company and battalion formations
• This training has to be repeated every season in order to prepare new conscripts
• In 2020, the PLA Daily produced a short video highlighting a typical battalion joint-landing exercise
  • Day/night loading of PLAN amphibious ships anchored offshore
  • Small teams conducting reconnaissance of landing beaches, assisted by UAVs
  • Artillery bombardment of landing beaches
    • 122mm howitzers
    • MLRS
  • Attack helicopters firing on targets near the beach
  • Transport helicopters moving troops to targets beyond the immediate shoreline
  • Unmanned surface vessels clearing obstacles and mines
  • Reconnaissance and engineering troops landing in small boats to clear on-shore obstacles
  • Amphibious fighting vehicles and assault guns disembarking from PLAN amphibious landing ships to assault the shore and consolidate beachheads
  • Further insertion of SOF troops inland by helicopter
  • Armored amphibious units driving inland to seize key terrain
  • Small unmanned ground vehicles driving inland
• Although the video was intended for an external audience, the sequence of events shown conforms with PLA amphibious warfare doctrine
• The video shows the culminating exercise acting as a capstone for their coastal training
• Not all joint landing operations need to be practiced in the same area — often events like PLARF strikes will be computer-simulated for planning purposes
• Given the amount of training required to build proficiency conducting landing operations, at least one unit, often more, will be conducting some form of amphibious training throughout the spring and summer
• This training is routinely publicized for propaganda effect
  • However, media reporting often omits the specific units involved, the location of the training exercise and duration of the exercise
  • Further, not all exercise phases will be reported
  • Some exercises are reported on multiple times by different outlets
  • Media outlets often use stock-footage to fill in gaps

Analysis of PLAGF Amphibious and Sea-Movement Training in 2021

• In 2021, open-sources reported on 38 Chinese amphibious training events
  • 32 army amphibious training events
  • 6 sea movement exercises involving civilian roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) vessels
• Ten of these events were covered by multiple Chinese media reports
• 29 events were conducted by units from the Eastern TC
• 7 by units from the Southern TC
• 2 by units from the Northern TC
• The six exercises involving civilian RO/RO ships are significant insofar as four of the brigades involved were not amphibious
• The RO/RO exercises thus represent the PLAGF practicing the landing of a second echelon after first wave amphibious, airborne or air mobile troops have captured port facilities
• In 20 exercises, no landing ships were observed, and amphibious vehicles were only observed swimming to or away from the shore
• These exercises seem to be demonstrations of platoons and companies practicing the basics of amphibious movement to shore
• The training missions support the US DoD conclusion that the Chinese regularly practice company and battalion scale amphibious training exercises
• However, these exercises rarely involve units larger than a battalion
• Open sources have limitations
  • Not possible to determine how many ACABs achieved their targets for operational readiness
  • Not enough data to determine whether the 2021 training tempo represents an increase, decrease or steady level of exercises
• The data demonstrates that the PLA undertakes amphibious training nearly every week from March through October, weather permitting
• The modernization of the PLAGF amphibious units demonstrates that the PLA has the capability to conduct amphibious operations
• Amphibious and combined arms exercises cover most of the skills required to attack Taiwan, despite the ongoing loss of skilled personnel due to the constraints of the conscription system
• However, although the PLAGF have the skills to carry out an amphibious assault, it's not clear that they have the capacity to carry out an amphibious assault large enough to pose a major threat to Taiwan
  • The six amphibious combined arms brigades of the PLAGF represent a small fraction of its total force — 6 out of 83 combined arms brigades, or 7%
  • The PLAN lacks the sealift capability to deliver even the current six brigades
• This suggests that, in the short term, the PLA has the capability to carry out amphibious operations short of a full scale invasion of Taiwan
• Attacks on small Taiwan-controlled islands such as Matsu or Jinmen are possible, as PLAGF amphibious units could "swim" to those islands using their own vehicles, supported by organic artillery from the shore
• These islands are small, so an attack could capture them in one wave, without requiring follow-on forces for an inland push

Chapter 5: The New Chinese Marine Corps

• Amphibious Combined Arms Brigades form only one part of the PLA's amphibious ground combat forces
• The other part is the Chinese Marine Corps, within the PLAN
• For many years, the Marine Corps was a limited force, consisting of one or two brigades
• However, the 2017 military reforms significantly expanded the size of the People's Liberation Army Navy Marine Corps (PLANMC)
• What a ridiculous name
• The PLAN has also acquired a number of large amphibious ships to ferry the Marine Corps
• While the PLANMC prepares of a diverse variety of missions, including overseas operation, its primary focus remains amphibious warfare

The "New" PLANMC

• Prior to 2017, the PLANMC consisted of two brigades that were subordinated to the South Sea Fleet (now Southern Theater Navy [STN])
• Numbered around 12,000
• PLANMC was responsible for guarding Chinese-occupied features in the South China Sea and antipiracy operations
• As a result of the 2017 reforms
  • PLANMC was elevated to corps-leader grade
  • New headquarters was established under the PLAN, rather than a naval theater command
  • Several new brigades, including aviation, were added
• Goal of the reforms with regards to the PLANMC was to give it a greater role in near-seas defense and far-seas protection
• The PLANMC now practices "all domain" operations
• Trains in a wide variety of combat environments (desert, jungle, high-elevation, etc)
• Goal is to deploy, fight, and win without requiring support or extensive preparations
• Seems like the PLANMC is evolving from a limited infantry forces oriented towards maritime security to a rapidly deployable light expeditionary force, much like the US Marine Corps
• In fact, the USMC and PLANMC seem to be evolving in opposite directions — the USMC's latest plans see it discarding some of its more general combat capabilities (e.g. tanks and tube artillery) and refocusing on maritime security
• The PLANMC is increasingly viewed as China's future expeditionary force for responding to global crises in order to secure Chinese national interests
• In keeping with this role, PLANMC forces are routinely deployed to China's overseas base in Djibouti
• Although the PLANMC's reforms are not specifically aimed at making it more effective in a Taiwan landing scenario, a more modern, versatile and effective PLANMC will be better able to support a joint campaign against Taiwan

PLANMC Force Development

• After the 2017 reforms, the PLANMC was upgraded from 2 brigades to 6, split equally among the Southern, Eastern, and Northern Theater Commands
• In addition, an aviation brigade was created, in order to provide organic aviation support for PLANMC forces
• This is air transport, for now, and doesn't include rotary-wing close air support, which the PLANMC is still reliant on the PLAGF to provide
• A special operations brigade was also created
• The internal structure of each brigade was also changed
  • Prior to the reforms, a PLANMC brigade consisted of several infantry battalions and an armor regiment
  • These were reorganized into combined arms battalions, flattening the hierarchy
• The modernized PLANMC brigades consist of 9 battalions
  • 2 amphibious mechanized infantry battalions
  • Medium mechanized infantry battalion
  • Air assault battalion
  • Reconnaissance battalion
  • Artillery battalion
  • Air defense battalion
  • Operational support battalion
  • Service support battalion
• A PLANMC brigade is somewhat similar to an amphibious combined arms brigade
  • Trades one of its amphibious combined arms battalions for an air-assault battalion
  • Trades another for a conventional mechanized infantry battalion
  • Otherwise has the same structure as a PLAGF ACAB
• The amphibious combined arms battalions are structured as follows
  • Four mechanized infantry companies
  • Firepower company
  • Reconnaissance platoon
  • Air-defense element
  • Artillery element
  • Engineer element
  • Repair team
• Once again, this is somewhat different from the PLAGF version
  • "Purely" mechanized infantry, while the PLAGF amphibious combined arms battalion includes assault guns
  • Integrated air defense and artillery — these are provided at the brigade level in the PLAGF ACABs
  • PLANMC battalions are structured as individually deployable fighting forces, whereas PLAGF amphibious battalions are designed to be deployed as part of a brigade
• The four mechanized infantry companies are equipped with 14 vehicles each, consisting of ZBD-05 infantry carriers and ZTD-05 amphibious assault vehicles
• This new structure makes each battalion into a "complete" fighting force, with reconnaissance, firepower, engineering and other support elements built in
• The reform has encountered challenges with ensuring that commanders have sufficient expertise to effectively command the different arms that they are now responsible for
• Initially, in exercises, battalion staff did not make use of reconnaissance elements and displayed a poor grasp of obstacle removal procedures, causing delays
• PLAN media reports indicate that brigades are actively working to improve battalion commander competence and staff training
• The PLANMC's most combat capable brigades are the 1st and 2nd brigades, in the Southern Theater Navy, which existed prior to the 2017 reforms (albeit with a different internal structure)
• The special operations brigade is also maintained at high level of readiness — has poached training staff from other units in order to support its expansion
• By contrast, the PLANMC brigades in the Northern Theater Navy are still in the process of completing their conversion from PLAGF infantry brigades
  • The PLANMC 6th Brigade is the former 77th Motorized Infantry Brigade
    • Has received new ZBL-09 IFVs and ZTL-11 assault vehicles
    • Creation of amphibious mechanized infantry battalions appears complete and they are participating in exercises
  • Unclear as to what the conversion status is of the 5th Brigade
• The Eastern Theater Navy's PLANMC brigades are also in the process of forming up and receiving their equipment
  • Unclear whether they're receiving Type 05 (i.e. ZBD-05 and ZTD-05) vehicles or ZBL-09 and ZTL-11 vehicles
  • Have begun training on amphibious landings and breaching assaults
• A significant addition to the PLANMC's capabilities is the 7th Aviation Brigade
  • For the first time, the PLANMC has organic air transport and support
  • Prior to 2017 — relied on PLAN helicopters
  • Force is expected to conduct vertical landing operations behind enemy lines in order to support landing operations
  • Brigade was started from scratch — in 2017 senior officers admitted they lacked equipment, personnel and training grounds
  • In order to quickly build up the brigade, the PLA transferred helicopter pilots from PLAGF after sending them through a training course on naval helicopter operations
  • PLANMC cadets were also sent through the PLAGF helicopter training course
  • Notable that the PLANMC, despite being part of the PLAN, was not able to recruit any PLAN naval helicopter pilots
  • The 7th Aviation Brigade has been equipped with Z-8 and Z-9 helicopters for air assaults
  • The Z-20 medium-lift helicopter and Z-10 attack helicopter are logical additions, providing a multi-mission platform and fire support capability respectively, but they have not been observed in PLANMC use
  • Just like the US Marine Corps, the PLANMC is hardware-poor
• Overall, the PLANMC's expansion and reform is far from complete
  • Most units selected for conversion into PLANMC brigades come from the provincial military district system rather than PLAGF theater commands
  • Have outdated and less well-trained forces
  • Will require more investment in order to be converted into PLANMC brigades
  • Xi Jinping visited the PLANMC headquarters in October 2020, and signaled his personal support for manning and equipping the PLANMC
• The PLANMC can currently contribute approximately six amphibious mechanized infantry battalions — infantry battalions equipped with vehicles that can swim from off-shore landing craft to a hostile beach
• The final number of battalions that the PLANMC will be able to contribute depends on the final configuration of the newly formed PLANMC brigades
• It is not clear that PLANMC brigades will have a standard configuration, like PLAGF ACABs
• In addition to increasing its size, the PLANMC is taking special effort to improve the quality of its commanders
  • In 2018, the PLANMC held a 10-day collective training session for approximately 100 commanders at different levels
  • Experts were brought in from the PLAGF, PLAN, PLA Strategic Support Force, military academies and civilian organizations
  • Commanders received training on a wide variety of topics
    • Amphibious landing
    • Island and reef capture
    • Embarkation and transit
    • Assault craft formations
    • Resisting enemy counterattacks
  • Participants were reportedly training and studying for 16 hours a day
  • Additional iterations of these training exercises are likely, as the short duration of the first event would not have been enough to make a significant difference in the competence of its participants
• In addition to the PLANMC's own efforts, the PLAN's naval academy launched an effort in 2011 to improve its theoretical understanding of amphibious operations
  • Focus on operations theory and research
  • Research into how to improve equipment for amphibious landings
  • This work has now been merged into PLANMC headquarters
• The PLANMC isn't optimizing itself for an amphibious campaign against Taiwan
  • Lacks "heavy" amphibious combat units as compared with PLAGF ACABs
  • Instead each PLANMC brigade contains a diverse flexible selection of battalions
  • Indicates that PLA intends its Marine Corps to be a lightweight, versatile set of units which can deploy overseas at short notice
  • However, there will still be roles for the PLANMC in any Taiwan invasion scenario

Joint Island Landing Campaign

• The main operational concept for a Taiwan invasion is the Joint Island Landing Campaign (JILC)
• Objectives
  • Break through coastal defenses
  • Establish a beachhead
  • Seize and occupy key targets
• 3 phase operation
  1. Preliminary operations
  2. Assembly, embarkation and transit
  3. Assault landing and establishment of beachhead
• This section focuses on the role that the PLANMC could have in an operation to seize Taiwan itself, not including operations to seize offshore islands
• The PLAGF's ACABs will likely constitute the main force for such a landing, with the PLANMC taking a supporting role

Preliminary operations

• Prior to the amphibious assault, the PLANMC will be tasked with carrying out advance operations to paralyze the enemy's forces and create favorable conditions for the landing
  • Beach reconnaissance
  • Sabotage raids
  • Mine clearance and obstacle destruction
• PLANMC reconnaissance battalions, and even potentially the reconnaissance elements of combined arms battalions will be tasked with covertly approaching landing beaches and gathering information
  • Beach gradients
  • Tide depths
  • Routes of enemy approach
  • Potential landing zones for helicopters
• Engineering elements will take part in the actual landing, using amphibious breaching craft to conduct mine and obstacle clearance
  • An amphibious breaching craft (archive, translation) is yet another variant of the Type 05 chassis used for the ZBD-05 infantry carrier and the ZTD-05 assault gun
  • Instead of a gun, it has a rocket launcher which can fire mine clearing line charges
  • Is also equipped with a mine clearing plow in front
  • Can drop LED markers indicating cleared paths for following vehicles
  • Roughly speaking, it's an amphibious combat engineering vehicle
• Special forces will conduct underwater demolition, target designation, and sabotage raids
• When employing amphibious forces, commanders must balance the need to attack specific areas versus maintaining tactical surprise
• Although strategic surprise will be hard to achieve, given the need to mobilize a large number of troops for a potential invasion, tactical surprise might still be possible by, e.g. using PLANMC troops for diversionary attacks

Assembly, Embarkation and Transit

• China's ability to deploy the PLANMC in support of a Taiwan landing will be complicated by the relatively limited number of amphibious transports that the PLAN current possesses
• Chinese plans call for the mobilization of numerous merchant vessels to support a Taiwan invasion — some of these may carry PLANMC forces
• PLANMC regional training exercises have sought to accurately simulate the challenges of mobilization
  • Use multiple modes of transportation to convey troops to training bases
  • Respond to simulated air threats
  • Carry out troop dispersal and concealment
• All PLANMC brigades are based close to major ports
• The 1st and 2nd Brigades can rapidly deploy to the Southern Theater Navy's 6th Landing Ship Flotilla, in Zhanjiang, Guandong
• However, the other brigades may have to compete with the six amphibious combined arms brigades for amphibious lift
• The PLANMC is unlikely to be the main landing force, so it's likely that at least some of its forces will need to use alternative means to reach landing areas, such as civilian RO/RO ships
• It's likely that PLANMC forces will be split up, with assault forces accompanying PLAGF amphibious forces on their ships, while support units are carried to the landing zone in conscripted civilian vessels
• This capability was demonstrated in 2019, when the PLANMC's 6th Brigade embarked forces simultaneously onto a Northern Theater Navy landing ship and civilian RO/RO vessels
• In addition, PLANMC forces have practiced embarking using their amphibious vehicles and linking up with amphibious transports at sea
• This could relieve port congestion and disperse forces, making them less vulnerable to air attack
• The PLANMC's greatest vulnerability is from the air
  • Air defense forces consist solely of MANPADs
  • Don't appear to have any kind of vehicle-based surface-to-air missile systems
  • However, the PLANMC appears to rely on "jointness" to address this vulnerability
    • Access PLAN early warning networks
    • Trains with air-defense battalions assigned to coastal defense units
    • Those units may provide air defense while the PLANMC is embarking
  • While in transit, the PLANMC will likely be shielded by PLAAF and PLAN air cover and air defenses

Assault Landing and Establishment of a Beachhead

• Existing PLANMC forces can contribute only approximately 6 battalions to an amphibious landing
• Each battalion will likely be tasked with securing a 1-2 km section of beach
• This implies that the two combined arms battalions of a PLANMC brigade can cover between 2 and 4km of beach
• Prior to the assault commencing, PLANMC special forces will have infiltrated the beach and have attempted sabotage operations against observation posts, command posts, airfields and other key sites
• PLANMC assault formations are primarily equipped with Type 05 amphibious vehicles
  • Relatively fast in the water — capable of reaching 45 km/h
  • Armored against small arms fire up to 12.7mm
  • Variants include assault guns, IFVs and 122mm self-propelled howitzer (and the combat engineering variant discussed above)
• Vehicles are equipped with the Beidou satellite positioning system for navigation and fire-control
• PLANMC training for amphibious assault is becoming more realistic
  • Training to assault a beach under radio-silence conditions
  • Using data from training to address potential bottlenecks and problems
• As the PLANMC will be unable to bring as much combat power to bear as PLAGF amphibious formations, it will likely be assigned to secondary landing areas in support of the PLAGF ACABs
• However, this will require close coordination between PLANMC and PLAGF formations
• An exercise in 2018 noted problems in coordination, with a PLAGF formation taking heavy simulated losses because it advanced before a PLANMC formation had been able to conduct an attack against enemy rear areas
• PLANMC will be heavily reliant on PLAGF helicopters for close-air support (as the PLANMC doesn't have any dedicated attack helicopters of its own)
• PLAGF rotary-wing exercises appear to be largely focused on supporting PLAGF amphibious units from PLAN landing craft

Beyond the Beachhead

• The PLANMC's reforms are intended to turn it into an all-domain fighting force
• This will give it a role in any attack beyond the initial establishment of a beachhead
• The inclusion of air-assault battalions and the aviation brigade improves the PLANMC's ability to conduct "multidimensional landing operations"
  • These heli-borne battalions will be delivered to locations between 15 and 60 km behind enemy lines in order to support landing operations
  • PLANMC aviation units have been training low elevation flights to avoid enemy air defenses and landing under adversarial conditions
  • However, it is unclear whether PLANMC aviation units have received their full complement of transport helicopters
  • In addition the lack of attack helicopters means that the PLANMC will either have to leave helicopter routes unguarded or rely on other forces to provide escorts
• The inclusion of medium mechanized infantry improves the PLANMC's ability to operate inland
  • These battalions are equipped with ZBL-09 and ZTL-11 vehicles
  • Not as capable in amphibious combat as the Type 05 variants, but faster on land
  • Are capable of swimming, which means that PLANMC medium infantry could come ashore without having to rely on further infrastructure
  • The PLANMC's medium infantry has also recently added the ZTQ-15 light tank
  • However the ZTQ-15 is not amphibious, and would require a ship-to-shore connector
  • These medium infantry battalions would likely be used to push rapidly inland and link up with air-mobile or special-operations forces
  • Would also be of use in potential urban fighting if Taiwanese forces are forced to defend inland — the PLANMC's infantry units practice urban combat specifically in mock-ups of Taiwanese cities
• The PLANMC's lack of organic close-air support will mean that they will be reliant on artillery (both rocket and tube) for firepower as they advance
  • PLZ-07B self-propelled howitzers
  • Towed howitzers
  • FJH-02 62 mm mini-MRL
• The PLANMC does not formally include any self-propelled MRL systems in its inventory, but units have been seen with Type 81 122 mm MRLs — unclear if these are just holdovers reflecting PLANMC brigades' origins as coastal defense units

Conclusion

• The PLANMC does not appear to optimizing itself specifically for a Taiwan landing scenario
• Much smaller force than PLAGF units trained for amphibious landings
• Designed as a versatile force, not specifically optimized for opposed landings
• Aviation is a particular limitation
  • No close air support
  • Single brigade for the entire corps — limited transport capacity
• The PLANMC, on its own, does not pose a significant threat to Taiwan
• However, if an invasion does occur, the PLANMC will be expected to play a role
• Might carry out smaller scale diversionary or harassing landing operations
• Will be responsible for special-forces operations and reconnaissance

Chapter 6: Civilian Shipping and Maritime Militia

• Discussion of a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan inevitably focuses on logistics
• Does the PLA have enough lift capacity to to deliver invasion forces across the Taiwan Strait?
• Does the PLA have enough transport capacity to sustain forces once delivered?
• Most observers note that the PLAN has not built enough amphibious transport ships, so therefore the PLA cannot (yet) carry out an invasion of Taiwan
• However, the PLA has plans to rely on mobilized civilian shipping as the logistical backbone of a cross-strait invasion
• Includes both the delivery of PLA forces and their logistical sustainment
• These plans are not a stopgap — PLA prefers to include civilian vessels in its mission planning

The Scope of the Problem

• Most authors looking at the Taiwan invasion problem conclude that the PLA cannot land sufficient forces on Taiwan unless it builds many more amphibious landing ships, a process which will take several years
• The PLA will require the capacity to land at least 300,000 troops
• Current PLAN amphibious fleet can only land about 1 division at a time — 20,000 troops
• This suggests a conclusion that the PLA must judge itself not capable of invading Taiwan
• These challenges get worse when sustainment is considered
• The PLAN's auxiliary fleet is undersized, even for conflicts taking place close to Chinese territory
• PLAN enlists hundreds of civilian vessels for tasks such as
  • Over-the-shore logistics
  • At-sea replenishment
  • Emergency repair and towing
  • Casualty evacuation
  • Search-and-rescue
• While it is tempting to conclude that this indicates that the PLAN doesn't take the Taiwan invasion scenario seriously, an alternative interpretation is that the PLAN intends to rely on civilian support even for a large scale operation such as a Taiwan invasion
• Over the past 10 years, many Western scholars have examined the Chinese Maritime Militia's role in supporting Chinese claims in the South and East China Seas
• However, the role of the Maritime Militia in a Taiwan invasion scenario has received much less attention, even though Chinese analysts have written extensively about the topic
• As far back as 2004, PLA mobilization officials were writing about the need to reform the civilian mobilization system in order to allow the PLA to retrofit civilian vessels to allow them to embark military formations

Operational Roles for the Maritime Militia in a Taiwan Invasion

• While much attention has been played to the role of Chinese fishing boats in asserting Chinese territorial claims in the South and East China Seas, the Chinese maritime militia isn't just fishing boats
• Includes a wide variety of civilian transport ships
  • Container ships
  • Bulk carriers
  • RO/RO ferries
  • Tugboats
  • Barges
• Consists of over 5,000 ships
• Organized into
  • 89 transport units
  • 53 waterway-engineering units
  • 143 units with other specializations
• Unlike the US merchant marine model, the ships of the Chinese Maritime Militia will retain their civilian crews during wartime
• The induction process by which the PLAN selects ships for the Maritime Militia is opaque
• Several articles note that commercial ship crews aren't always happy to be selected for the Maritime Militia
• PLA sources cite a number of roles for the Maritime Militia during wartime
  • Delivery of forces
    • PLA writings emphasize the importance of first-echelon troops capturing ports in order to allow civilian shipping to bring follow-on forces through existing infrastructure
    • Civilian shallow-draft ships could also deliver landing craft close to shore
  • At-sea support
    • The PLAN doesn't have the replenishment ships it needs to sustain an invasion fleet
    • While the relatively short distances involved for a Taiwan invasion means that many ships could rely on shore-based support, a substantial amount of at-sea replenishment would still be required
    • Civilian fuel tankers and cargo ships could be fitted with equipment for alongside and vertical replenishment
    • Civilian ships would also provide services such as towing, firefighting and repair
  • Over-the-shore logistical support
    • Pipelines from Maritime Militia fuel tankers would play a key role in supplying invasion forces once ashore
    • Civilian cargo ships will be important for ferrying necessary supplies to sustain invading forces
  • Medical support — containerized medical clinics aboard civilian ships would augment the PLAN's hospital ships in dealing with the casualties from an invasion
  • Obstacle emplacement and clearing — Chinese sources mention that civilian ships can aid with emplacing and clearing mines without going into much detail
    • Any ship can be a minesweeper, once
  • Engineering support — Civilian tugboats, barge mounted cranes, and dredging equipment will be called upon to help clear blocked ports
  • Reconnaissance, surveillance and early warning — Maritime Militia fishing vessels would serve as cheap eyes and ears across the theater
  • Deception and concealment
    • The vast number of civilian vessels will allow the PLAN to hide its most valuable assets
    • The PLAN has plans to equip civilian ships with radar reflectors, heat sources, etc to make civilian ships resemble military vessels at a distance, further complicating a potential attacker's targeting plans
  • Helicopter relay platform
    • Although the Taiwan strait is relatively narrow, it's still wide enough for helicopters to struggle with a round-trip across it
    • In order to relieve the strain, the PLA envisions civilian ships acting as "floating FARPs", equipped with fuel bladders, ammunition storage and limited repair equipment

Maritime Militia Force Development

The NMDC System

• The Maritime Militia is coordinated through a system of national defense mobilization committees (NMDCs) at the national, state, provincial, municipal and county levels
• The highest level NMDC is the national body, the State Commission for National Defense Mobilization (SCNDM)
• The SCNDM has representatives from all parts of government
• Lower level NMDCs reflect the structure of the SCNDM, localized for their specific region of responsibility
• The broad membership of NMDCs highlights two important facts
  • National defense mobilization is primarily a civilian, not military process
    • The military, represented at the national level by the Central Military Commission (CMC) is the customer for mobilized resources
    • The CMC establishes requirements and needs, which are fulfilled by civilian departments
  • NMDCs are primarily coordinating bodies
    • Have little formal authority of their own
    • Are responsible for relaying military requests to other departments
    • However, the actual implementation of mobilization requests is up to individual departments
    • A 2013 article indicated that it was difficult for the military to ensure that mobilization plans were kept up to date because mobilization fell under the purview of the National Planning Commission system, rather than the military
• For civilian ship mobilization, the two relevant structures in the NMDC system are
  • Transportation war-preparedness office
  • Transportation mobilization offices
• These work with provincial and local governments to
  • Develop an overall approach to mobilization
  • Identify specific ships that would be mobilized
  • Draft plans on retrofitting ships to make them more suitable for military needs
  • Develop personnel and training requirements

The Provincial Military District System

• The PLA's departments most concerned with civilian mobilization are provincial military districts
• Although the PMD system has not received much attention from Western scholars it is the PLA's primary interface with civilian support agencies
• Serves a wide range of functions
  • Recruitment
  • Civil defense
  • Representing PLA interests within industry
• The primary purpose of the PMD system, however, is national mobilization
  • PMD mobilization departments represent the PLA in NMDCs
  • Serve as the conduit by which the PLA expresses its force requirements to non-defense agencies
  • PMDs train and equip militia forces and exercise direct control of the militia in peacetime
• At the local level, PMDs and provincial governments share authority over People's Armed Forces Departments (PAFDs)

Maritime Militia Training

• In order to successfully participate in combat operations, civilian shipping crews need to learn a range of military skills
  • PLA command and coordination processes
  • Marshaling and sailing in formation
  • Self-defense and mutual defense
  • Rescue and first-aid
  • Military loading and unloading procedures
  • Operation of military equipment
  • Anticipate enemy threats
  • Wartime-specific skills such as "dockless unloading"
• In 2015 the National Transport War-Preparedness Office issued a document: Outline For Training and Evaluation of National Defense Transportation Specialized Support Teams which specified training requirements for civilian transportation support units
• Covered highway, rail and maritime transportation support
• However this document does not appear to be publicly available

Construction, Retrofitting and Conversion

• Outfitting civilian ships for military units can be an involved process
• Ships need
  • Specialized military equipment, such as radios and underway replenishment gear
  • Quarters and life support for soldiers
  • Strengthened decks and tie-down points for military vehicles
  • Upgraded repair and firefighting gear
  • Medical equipment
• The most efficient way to ensure that ships meet these requirements is to design ships to be dual-use from the outset — China has been building RO/RO transports to military specifications since 1997
• In addition, the National Transportation War-Preparedness Office issued regulatory guidance for retrofitting ships with the necessary equipment to support military units
• The retrofit process is managed by "civilian ship retrofitting and conversion centers" run jointly by local maritime affairs departments and PAFDs

Command and Control

• In peacetime, maritime militia units fall under the authority of the PMD system
• In wartime, these units would be transferred to PLA — "whoever uses, commands"
• Many authors highlight issues in the PLA's ability to exercise authority over maritime militia units
  • "Weak" command structures
  • Slow processes
  • Cumbersome communication protocols
• One major problem is that the commanders of maritime militia units are themselves militiamen
  • Part-time soldiers
  • Lack specialized training
• According to PLA authors, maritime militia training does not spend enough time on military-relevant skills, such as sailing in formation, dockless unloading or military communications
• The PLA is aware of this shortcoming — an official assessment of the failure of the 1949 Jinmen landing highlighted failures in command and control of civilian shipping

Challenges and Known Problems

• Many PLA articles on the maritime militia have a "problem/solution" format
• While the solutions may be unworkable, outside observers can look at the problem sections in order to gain insight into what the PLA itself thinks are the primary challenges with the maritime militia
• Data management
  • The PLA struggles to maintain accurate records for maritime militia personnel and ships
  • Requires the PLA to maintain up-to-date information on tens of thousands of people and thousands of ships
  • Keeping track of where ships are and which ships are close enough to China to be mobilized in case of emergency is also a major challenge
  • Tracking changes of ownership is also a problem — when ships are bought or sold, often the local PAFD is last to be notified, if it is notified at all
  • Similarly, the PAFD struggles to keep track of crewmen as they retire or change careers
• Training quality
  • Crewmen are often away from their home ports for much of the year, along with their ships
  • When they are at home, they are often taking second jobs
  • As a result it is very difficult to ensure that commercial crew have enough training time to be effective in a military environment
  • Compounding this is the fact that many PAFDs have outdated training material and inadequate facilities
  • Crew also lack specific training time with the PLA units they will be transporting or the PLAN commanders they will be subordinated to
• Finance and Law
  • The mobilization system is still struggling with China's transition to a market economy
  • Unclear how shipowners and crews will be compensated if their ships are mobilized for war
  • No mechanism for adjudicating disputes over compensation
  • Laws relating to mobilization are often vague and contradictory
    • The Military Service Law indicates that militia veterans have priority when applying to civil service positions, but the Civil Service Law does not indicate any such priority
    • Military Service Law does not indicate any penalties for people who join the militia but refuse military training
    • I wonder if part of this is because "excessive legalism" is itself considered a crime in Communist China
    • Laws in China are treated more as guidelines established by the Communist Party — unlike in the West, the laws serve the Party, the Party does not serve the laws
• Foreign-flag ships
  • Following the norms of the global shipping industry, increasing numbers of Chinese ships are sailing under flags of convenience
  • Although the government is confident that it can requisition these ships in case of a national emergency, tracking them and ensuring their ongoing readiness remains a challenge

Conclusion

• The PLA's concept for a cross-strait invasion relies heavily on the participation of civilian ships
• Has spent over 20 years developing rules and bureaucracy to organize, train and manage this force
• This is not intended to be a stopgap measure — the PLA's writings and history suggest that civilian forces will be expected to participate in any major military action
• This effort will likely not go as well as planned during an actual conflict
• However, it might still be sufficient to ensure that adequate supplies reach PLA forces on Taiwan
• The key factor will be whether first-echelon troops capture ports
• The mobilization of Chinese civilian shipping for a Taiwan invasion will be the largest such mobilization in history
  • Far larger than Dunkirk in terms of numbers of ships
  • Far larger than the Falklands War in terms of tonnage mobilized

Chapter 7: The PLA Navy's Amphibious Fleet

• China has been modernizing its amphibious fleet
• The addition of the Type 071 (Yuzhao-class) amphibious transport dock (LPD) and Type 075 (Yushen-class) landing-helicopter assault (LHA) expands the scope and capabilities of China's amphibious forces
• However, the PLAN does not appear to be focused on Taiwan as it develops amphibious warfare capabilities
  • Removing older landing ships from service, reducing the total amount of amphibious lift available
  • Missing opportunities to maximize traditional naval lift
• It appears that the PLAN is taking a balanced approach with its development of amphibious capabilities, prioritizing expeditionary capabilities at the expense of cross-strait warfare

Strategic Transitions Driving The Development of the PLAN's Amphibious Force

• Since the PLAN's founding, China's naval strategy has transitioned from "near-coast defense" to "near-seas defense, far-seas protection"
• The original mission, near-coast defense, reflected the PLAN's origin as the maritime arm of the PLA
• During this time, the PLAN's amphibious ships consisted largely of smaller utility landing craft along with some tank landing ships (LSTs)
• In the 1980s, the PLAN's mission evolved from near-coast to near-seas protection
• Emphasized establishing Chinese sovereignty within the first island chain
• This lead to a new wave of amphibious ship construction in the 1990s — new large LSTs with helicopter decks and greater lift capacity
• This was followed in the early 2000s with the Type 072A (Yuting II-class) LSTs, Type 073A (Yunshu-class) medium landing ships (LSMs) and Type 074A (Yubei-class) utility landing craft (LCUs)
• In 2007, the PLAN commissioned its first Yuzhao-class LPD
• Although the ship was commissioned while the PLAN was still officially focused on near-seas missions, the ship anticipated an expansion in naval strategy in 2015 to include safeguarding Chinese economic interests and protecting Chinese citizens globally
• The Yuzhao-class LPD and Yushen-class LHA can support traditional amphibious combat operations, but are also capable of supporting global missions

The PLAN's Amphibious Force

• The PLAN currently operates 9 amphibious assault ships, 30 LSTs, 20 LSMs and several dozen smaller landing craft
• Over the past decade, the PLAN has concentrated on acquiring new Yuzhao-class LPDs and Yushen-class LHAs
• Has also launched new landing craft to operate in conjunction with the LPDs and LHAs
• Maintains its fleet of LSTs and LSMs by replacing ships one-for-one with new models as old ones are decommissioned
• The primary LST operated by the PLAN is the Yuting II-class
  • 10 light tanks
  • 250 troops
  • Has a helicopter deck to augment logistics
  • 3000 nm operating range
  • Top sustained speed of 17 kts
• The Yuting and Yuting-II classes represent an improvement over the older Type 072 (Yukan-class) LSTs, which lack the helicopter deck
• However the PLAN continues to operate a small number of Yukan-class LSTs
• The primary LSMs operated by the PLAN are the Type 074/074B (Yuhai-class) and the Yunshu-class
  • Yuhai-class
    • Built in two waves, first in the '90s, and then again in 2017-18
    • Lower lift capability than LSTs
    • Roughly half the operational range of the Yuting II-class
    • Top speed of approximately 14 kts
    • Can carry two light tanks and some accompanying troops
  • Yunshu-class
    • Slightly larger than the Yuhai-class
    • Commissioned in 2004
    • Can carry up to six light tanks
• Yubei-class LCUs
  • Commissioned in 2004-2005
  • Can carry up to 3 light tanks or 250 troops
• In addition to the ships above, the PLAN has some air-cushion landing craft
  • Acquired two Pomornik (Type 958) air-cushion landing craft from Russia
  • Built two more under license in
  • Fast — top speed of greater than 60 kts
  • 300 nm range at slower speeds
  • Can lift several tanks or light vehicles plus troops
  • Has difficulty operating in high sea states
  • Unreliable
  • High maintenance requirements
  • Does not appear to be fully integrated into the PLAN's operations
    • No additional construction beyond the initial 4 units
    • Relatively infrequent mentions in press releases or briefings regarding training
• The PLAN also operates its own, smaller, Yuyi-class (Type 726A) air-cushion landing craft (LCMA)
  • Designed to operate from the well decks of the Yuzhao-class LPDs and Yushen-class LHAs
  • Each Yuzhao-class can accommodate 4 Yuyis
  • Each Yushen-class can accommodate 2 Yuyis
  • 40 kt sustained transit speed
  • 200 nm range
• The Yuzhao-class LPD substantively expands the PLAN's amphibious capabilities
  • In addition to carrying Yuyi-class LCMAs, it can hold up to 4 helicopters in hangars and 8 amphibious vehicles on a dedicated vehicle deck
  • Can carry between 600 and 800 troops
  • If not carrying Yuyi-class LCMAs, another 24 amphibious assault vehicles can be carried in the well deck
  • The Yuzhao-class can operate at higher speeds than traditional landing ships
  • 10,000 nm range at cruising speed
  • The Yuzhao-class' range, speed and transport capacity enable the PLAN to conduct global expeditionary operations for the first time in its history
• The Yushen-class LHA offers similar capabilities to the Yuzhao-class
  • Larger than the Yuzhao (but smaller than its US counterparts, the Wasp and America-class)
  • Can embark up to 30 medium-lift utility helicopters
  • Has 6 landing spots on its flight deck
  • Has a well deck to support multidimensional landing operations
  • The first Yushen-class was commissioned in April 2021
  • Another two are under construction or undergoing sea trials
• The Yuzhao and Yushen-classes can support traditional amphibious operations, but also offer options for global expeditionary operations

Mixed Messages: Trends That Reduce the PLAN's Cross-Strait Capabilities

• Even as the PLAN is acquiring new amphibious craft, it is removing older amphibious hulls from service
• Indicates that increasing amphibious lift capacity is not a priority
• Has reduced its amphibious lift capacity in three ways
  • Decommissioning hulls
  • Transferring hulls to non-military services
  • Reallocating hulls to experimental purposes
• From 2019 to 2021 the PLAN decommissioned at least 5 landing ships
  • 2 Yukan-class LSTs
  • 3 Yuhai-class LSMs
• The Yukan-class hulls were originally commissioned in the late 1970s, and had exceeded their useful life
• However the Yuhai-class LSMs had been commissioned in the 1990s — had served for less than 25 years before being retired
• The condition of these ships is unknown
• If preserving amphibious lift capacity were a priority these ships could have been overhauled or mothballed rather than decommissioned
• In 2015 the PLAN transferred 5 Yukan-class LSTs to the Chinese Coast Guard
• Were used to aid with logistics for Chinese reef-construction ("artificial island") projects in the South China Sea
• Two of these ships were returned with modifications, such as deck cranes, that increased flexibility but reduced total amphibious lift capacity
• In 2018, the PLAN heavily modified one Yuting I-class LST in order to use it as a testbed for experimental weapons
  • Welded bow doors shut
  • Used as a testbed for an experimental electromagnetic railgun
  • While weapons development is a necessary task for any navy, allocating an LST to this role reduced the PLAN's amphibious lift capacity
• Although Chinese leaders have public committed to reunifying Taiwan, they have many incentives to avoid overinvesting in the Taiwan mission
  • A surge in ship construction aimed specifically at the Taiwan scenario risks drawing undue attention to Chinese intentions
  • The burden of supporting and maintaining ships useful for only one contingency could detract from other requirements

Opportunities to Bolster Amphibious Lift

• If Chinese leaders determine to use force to reunify Taiwan in the short to medium term, the PLAN has several options to surge amphibious lift capacity
  • Surge production of additional hulls
    • China's shipbuilding industry is the largest in the world
    • The Chinese government has the capability to produce all types of ships it uses
    • Has home-growns supply chains for sensors and weapons
    • Has demonstrated surge capacity in the past — built 30 new amphibious ships from 2003 to 2005
  • Requisition civilian logistics and transportation ships
    • See the previous chapter
    • In June 2020 the civilian RO/RO car carrier Changdalong participated in a military exercise centered on embarking and off-loading a PLAGF heavy combined arms brigade
    • In 2015, the Chinese government instructed private shipbuilders to ensure that their ships had the capability to carry military cargoes
    • Guidelines cover
      • Container ships
      • RO/RO car carriers
      • Multipurpose ships
      • Bulk freighters
    • Even before these guidelines were issued, the Chinese government was working with civilian ship builders to ensure that civilian ships could be dual-use
    • In 2012 China launched the world's largest RO/RO ferry
      • 36,000 ton displacement
      • Primary role is civilian car transport
      • However can also be used as a strategic lift platform
        • 2000 troops
        • 300 vehicles
        • Helipad
    • Civilian logistics ships require deep-draft ports, and cannot be used for an amphibious assault

PLAN Amphibious Training, Operations, and Support Exercises

• Each year, forces from the PLAN's landing ship flotillas, PLANMC units and units from the PLAGF's amphibious combined arms brigades conduct joint amphibious combined arms training
• Training exercises are usually carried out in facilities hosted by the Eastern and Southern Theater Commands
• Often takes place near the Taiwan Strait, to serve as a message to the Taiwanese
• Focuses on joint maneuvers with army, navy, air force, rocket force and strategic support force elements experimenting with different tactics and operations
• Beach assaults with amphibious forces
  • Armored vehicles swimming from LSTs and LSMs stationed offshore
  • Live fire drills
  • At sea maneuvers
  • Obstacle clearing drills
• Simulates cross-strait landings, with press reports indicating 3-d dioramas of Taiwanese landing beaches in unit training camps
• The PLAN's larger amphibious combatants also participate in these training exercises
  • Frequently exercise embarking and launching Yuyi-class LCMAs
  • Carry out live-fire beach landing exercises similar to LSTs and LSMs
• One activity that may reduce the PLAN's readiness to carry out a cross-strait amphibious assault is the use of its LSTs as supply ships for its outposts in the Spratly Islands
• In addition to practicing landing operations, the Yuzhao-class LPDs routinely deploy to the Pacific and Indian Oceans to practice long-range expeditionary deployments

The Future of Amphibious Missions: Global Expeditionary Operations

• The PLAN's current naval strategy indicates that the Chinese military intends to operate globally to safeguard Chinese interests
• Regional turmoil, terrorism and piracy are used as justifications to develop a quick-reaction expeditionary force
• In order to have more influence in global norms, the PLAN participates in anti-piracy missions and provides international humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
  • 2010 — Yuzhao-class LPDs deployed to Yemen to provide anti-piracy patrols
    • Escorted approximately 600 vessels during a 6-month deployment
    • Conducted goodwill port visits in Bahrain and Indonesia during return transit
    • Allowed China to experiment with new models for escorting ships, including using landing craft as escorts
  • Since that time, Yuzhao-class LPDs have participated in three additional escort task forces
  • In April 2014 these ships assisted in the search for Malaysian Airlines flight MH-370
• The Yuzhao-class LPDs are also increasingly used for diplomacy
  • Engage foreign partners in bilateral and multilateral exercises
  • Military exercises with Russia
  • ASEAN disaster relief exercise
  • Humanitarian relief exercise with the Thai navy
• China's large amphibious ships will also likely be tasked with providing logistical support to China's overseas bases
• Right now, China has just one such base, in Djibouti, but it is likely planning more, notably one in Cambodia

Conclusion

• The PLA's amphibious warfare acquisitions do not indicate a sense of urgency with respect to Taiwan
• While the PLAN currently has the capacity to conduct operations to take smaller Taiwan-held islands, it does not currently have the amphibious lift capacity to invade Taiwan itself
• Instead the PLAN appears to be taking a balanced approach
  • Build up a modern navy capable of projecting power abroad
  • Have enough amphibious warfare capacity to provide value for cross-strait operations
• This balanced approach can be interpreted in multiple ways
• Perhaps China's timeline for unification is longer than anticipated
• Alternatively, China's plan for invading Taiwan doesn't rely as much on direct beach assault and traditional amphibious lift
• The primary conclusion from examining China's development of amphibious warfare capabilities is that the Chinese navy is developing into a multimission force, much like the American navy
• This multimission capability will likely expand further with the Type 076, a successor to the Yushen-class
• While Beijing keeps the rhetorical focus on Taiwan, its naval investments point towards building a more versatile force capable of advancing Chinese interests globally

Part 3: Enablers of Amphbious Warfare

Chapter 8: The PLA Airborne Corps in a Joint Island Landing Campaign

• The PLA's Airborne Corps has received little attention, despite its obvious utility in a cross-strait landing scenario
• This lack of attention has been due to the fact that, historically, the PLAAF did not have the capacity to move significant numbers of soldiers
• However, in recent years, the Airborne Corps has reorganized and modernized
• Increased training on combined-arms warfare
• However, like the rest of China's military, the PLA suffers from a lack of combat experience
• Prior missions have been suppression of domestic unrest and disaster relief operations
• Questions remain about the airborne corps' ability to coordinate with other branches
• The PLA Airborne Corps will only be able to deploy of the PLAAF can secure control of the air over Taiwan, which is itself an open question

History and Force Structure

• Unlike in the US, the PLA's Airborne Corps is a part of the PLAAF, rather than the PLAGF
• Started in the 1950s, when the PLA started an "air force marine" brigade
• Composition
  • Six airborne combined-arms brigades
    • 3 light motorized brigades
    • 2 mechanized brigades
    • 1 air assault brigade
  • Transport aviation brigade
  • Special operations brigade
  • Combat support brigade
  • Training base and support staff
  • Training brigade
• Equipment
  • 40 transport aircraft
    • 6 Y-8 medium transports
    • 34 light transports
      • 20 Y-5
      • 2 Y-7
      • 12 Y-12D
  • 28 helicopters
    • 8 WZ-10K attack helicopters
    • 8 Z-8KA search and rescue helicopters
    • 12 Z-9WZ multirole helicopters
  • Armored fighting vehicles
    • 180 ZBD-03 airborne combat vehicles
    • 4 ZZZ-03 armored personnel carriers (used as command posts)
    • Modified CS/VN3 armored utility vehicles (indeterminate number)
  • Anti-tank capabilities
    • HJ-9 launchers mounted on vehicles (unknown number)
  • Artillery
    • 54 (estimated) PL-96 (D-30) 122mm towed howitzers
    • 54 (estimated) PH-63 107mm MLRS
    • 82mm and 100mm mortars
  • Air Defense
    • QW-1 point-defense missiles
    • PG-87 25mm towed anti-aircraft guns
• In addition to its organic transport capabilities listed above, the Airborne Corps relies on PLA transport units
  • 1 Il-76MD/TD regiment
  • 1 Il-76MD & Il-78 regiment
  • 1 Y-7 regiment
  • 2 Y-9 regiments
  • 2 Y-20/Y-20U regiments
• In addition to the above, the PLA's Airborne Corps is also responsible for operating CH-802 small drones

The Role of the PLA Airborne Corps in a Cross-Strait Invasion

• The primary role of the PLA Airborne during a Joint Island Landing Campaign would be to
  • Conduct sabotage raids during preliminary operations
  • Aid in the actual landing and establishment of the beachhead by attacking enemy forces as they attempted to repel the invasion
• The PLAAF envisions a 4-stage strategy for a campaign against Taiwan
  1. Seize information superiority and command of the air
  2. Conduct preparatory fires
  3. Transport troops across the Taiwan strait and either conduct paradrops or landings in selected locations
  4. Conduct a ground offensive to secure objectives and make it easier for ground forces to invade
• PLAAF aviation forces are a key enabler
  • Seize command of the air
  • Defend vulnerable transport aircraft
  • Maintain situational awareness
• PLA doctrine emphasize that airborne troops should be dropped en masse in a single flight

Building New Capabilities Relevant for a Cross-Strait Invasion

• The PLA Airborne Corps is reorganizing itself to be more suitable for a Taiwan invasion scenario
• Increasing the complexity of its training and learning from foreign militaries

Reorganizing To Improve Capability for Mechanized Maneuver and Assault

• The PLA Airborne Corps has steadily improved its ability to conduct mechanized operations
• Have added a mechanized battalion equipped with IFVs that can be air-dropped
• Airborne-special operations forces for conducting sabotage and harassment attacks
• In 2018, the PLA Airborne Corps was reorganized to include combined-arms at the brigade level
• At least one of these new brigades has been equipped with the ZBD-03 infantry fighting vehicle

Leveraging Growing Airlift Capacity

• One ongoing constraint for the PLAAF has been limited airlift capacity
• The PLA's Airborne Corps does not have enough organic airlift support mobility requirements
• The PLAAF's numbers of medium and heavy transports have increased dramatically recently, enhancing the Airborne Corps' ability to deploy
• Inventories of key heavy-lift transport aircraft, such as the Y-20, have more than doubled in the last 5 years

Improving the Sophsitication of Training At Home

• Since 2018, the Airborne Corps has revised its training, placing particular focus on realism
  • Operations with greater numbers of troops and equipment
  • More night-time operations
  • Training on new indigenous transport aircraft
  • Coordination with the PLAN
• 2018 saw the Airborne Corps participate for the first time in RED SWORD — one of the PLA's major annual joint training exercises
• PLAAF leaders have pushed for a greater role for the Airborne Corps in overseas operations

Learning From Foreign Militaries

• Since 2005 the PLA's Airborne Corps has conducted training exercises with foreign militaries
  • Support Chinese diplomatic initiatives
  • Gain understanding of foreign practices
• Cooperation has been mostly with Russia and Russia-aligned nations, such as Belarus and Venezuela
• PLA propaganda says that the Airborne Corps have learned much from their training with foreign forces
• How much they're learning from training with Russia, Belarus, Venezuela and Indonesia is up for debate, however

Key Questions Regarding Capabilities Needed For a Cross-Strait Invasion

Unity of Effort? Integrating Operations by Similar Units

• The PLA Airborne Corps has to integrate its operations with those conducted by other units with similar capabilities, such as the PLANMC
• The PLA's documents call for the PLAGF and PLANMC to develop their own airborne capabilities, independent of the Airborne Corps
• Ground Force air-assault brigades equipped with helicopter transports can supplement the PLA Airborne Corps for some missions
• Recent training exercises suggest that certain PLAAF air transport units have been seconded to the Ground Force (potentially reducing the amount of transport capacity available to the Airborne Corps)
• PLAAF leaders are also coordinating with the PLANMC to perform "vertical amphibious landings"
• It's not clear how the PLA Airborne Corps will coordinate with PLAGF and PLANMC leadership during a campaign — further research is required here

Operating In Complex or Degraded Conditions

• PLA discussions on Airborne Corps training emphasize increasing the AC's ability to operate in night and bad weather
• However, it's unclear to what extent airborne troops can operate in a degraded informational environment — Airborne Corps pilots have stated that missing information regarding weather and flight routes would lead to "mission failure"
• Further research is necessary to assess the preparedness of China's Airborne Corps to operate in a degraded electromagnetic and informational environment

Lack of Relevant Experience

• The PLA, as a whole, has not seen any large-scale combat since the Chinese invasion of Vietnam
• The PLAAF has not conducted any combat operations since the second Taiwan Strait crisis, in 1958
• The deployment of Chinese airborne forces has historically only been to curtail domestic dissent
  • Helped put down a regional uprising in Wuhan in 1967
  • Helped suppress the Tiananmen Square protests in 1987
• In more recent years, the Airborne Corps has taken the lead on domestic humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions
  • Airborne troops conducted paradrops into earthquake afflicted areas to help clear roads
  • Helped with COVID-19 relief efforts
• The additional responsibility the Airborne Corps has for regime preservation could hamper its use in a Taiwan invasion scenario — at least a portion of the Aviation Corps will likely be held back to suppress dissent

Heavily Reliant on Support from Another Service Arm — Aviation Forces

• The PLA Airborne Corps is entirely reliant on the PLAAF to suppress enemy air defenses
• Further research is necessary to examine the PLAAF's ability to defend drop packages in contested airspace
• In addition, it's unclear to what extent the PLAAF can maintain the high operational tempo that would be required to support Airborne Corps troops after they've landed

Conclusion

• The PLA's Airborne Corps is expected to support a cross-strait invasion by landing behind enemy lines
• In recent years the Airborne Corps has reorganized itself to take advantage of growing PLAAF transport capabilities in order to conduct mechanized maneuver and assault
• Questions remain, however about
  • Integration with similar ground-force and marine corps units
  • Ability to operate in complex or degraded informational environments
  • Lack of combat experience
  • The PLAAF's ability to escort drops in contest airspace
• Historically airborne drops in highly contested environments have resulted in high casualties
• The threat to airborne troops have only grown
• The opportunity cost of deploying airborne troops may be high, especially given that any large-scale airborne drop would be risking large numbers of valuable heavy transport aircraft
• As a result PLA commentary increasingly talks about the airborne corps as being suitable for operations abroad in less contested environments

Chapter 9: The PLA Ground Forces' New Helicopters

• While much has been made of the PLA's modernization of its high-end capabilities such as naval forces and fixed wing aircraft, the PLA's modernization of its rotary-wing capabilities has been less studied
  • Purchased advanced helicopters from abroad
  • Begun to manufacture its own advanced helicopters
• Raises new questions about how these advanced helicopters might help with a Taiwan invasion
• The bulk of the changes in the PLA's rotary-wing capabilities have occurred within the PLAGF
• However the PLAN has improved its helicopters somewhat as well

The PLAGF's Helicopters, Aviation Units and New Air Assault Capabilities

• The PLA has developed a robust helicopter force over the past decade
  • Significantly increased numbers of both attack, reconnaissance and transport helicopters
  • Deployment of new helicopter models
• However the rapid fielding of new helicopter models means that pilot proficiency is still likely developing
• Unclear how many of the latest Z-20 helicopters have been ordered — will it supplement or replace the existing fleet of Mi-17s and Z-9 helicopters
• A 2020 article in China Military Online implied that the Z-20 would replace the Mi-17 completely
• However this replacement process has taken place slowly
• The latest Chinese helicopters, especially the Z-20 which is a near copy of the US Blackhawk, likely compare favorably with their Western counterparts
  • All helicopters are limited by physics
  • Western helicopters had a head start over Chinese designs and reached physical limits of their designs more quickly
  • However, lately, China has put concerted effort into catching up, including using espionage to steal Western designs
• A larger and more interesting question is whether Chinese helicopter operations can match those of Western militaries
• The PLAGF's recent reorganizations have integrated helicopter brigades into group armies — mirrors US practice of embedding a Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) in each of its divisions
• In addition to the brigades assigned to each group army, standalone brigades are assigned to the Xinjiang and Tibet military districts
• PLAGF aviation brigades generally follow the same structure
  • 4 transport battalions
  • 2 attack battalions
  • 1 reconnaissance squadron
  • Headquarters
  • Maintenance-and-support battalion
• Two exceptions to this structure are the specialized air-assault brigades
• These have two or three permanently assigned infantry battalions, allowing them to focus narrowly on training for air assaults
• It is difficult to determine how many and what type of helicopters each battalion has, owing to the growth of PLA's helicopter force and the efforts the PLA has made to modernize it
• One estimate puts each battalion at approximately 80 helicopters — however these battalions may be under-strength
• The US Army has a much higher helicopter-to-soldier ratio
  • An Army CAB has approximately 110 helicopters
  • Assigned to a division that has 10-15,000 soldiers
  • The PLA, by comparison, assigns an aviation brigade to a group army consisting of 50-60,000 soldiers
• There are some indications, however, that the PLA is expanding its helicopter force to have a higher helicopter-to-soldier ratio
• The PLAGF recognizes that helicopters provide unmatched mobility on the modern battlefield
• In 2018, the PLA Daily published an article titled "Winning The Ground War from the Air"
  • Cites lessons learned from air assaults in
    • Vietnam
    • Gulf War
    • Iraq
    • Afghanistan
  • Introduces 6 types of helicopter operations
    • Attack-in-depth
    • Leapfrog-combat
    • Vertical-landing
    • Point-seizure
    • Special-air-raid
    • Crisis-control
• All six types of helicopter operations are relevant to a Taiwan landing scenario, but the the first three (attack-in-depth, leapfrog-combat and vertical-landing) are the most dangerous
• PLA views on air assault share similarities with US doctrine
• Describe air assaults as a "new combat force" that combines infantry and aviation
• Parallels US military theories that view air assaults as "more than the helicopter movement of rifle companies"
• This is not a coincidence, as the PLA has sought to explicitly learn from foreign forces' use of helicopters and the US Army has had the most extensive use of helicopters in recent memory
• The quality of the PLA's air assault brigades is unclear
  • Chinese state media has shown large formations of helicopters taking off for preplanned exercises
  • However, this doesn't necessarily indicate a high level of operational readiness, as preplanned exercises are known for months in advance, allowing ample time for maintenance to be performed
  • State media shows helicopters operating in loose formations at relatively high altitudes — implies that Taiwanese defenders will have ample opportunity to detect an incoming PLA helicopter assault
  • Video of training exercise exhibits lapses in ground troops' ability to coordinate fires from helicopters after they've deployed
  • PLAGF air assault brigades also have not demonstrated the ability to coordinate in real time with PLAAF platforms (i.e. they can't coordinate helicopters and fast-movers)
  • However the PLAGF is aware of these shortcomings and is developing training scenarios to exercise them

Developing Scenarios for Air Assaults across the Strait

• While the PLAGF's helicopter forces seek to mirror US best practices for helicopter operations, they also have to contend with something the US has never had to face — 100 miles of water separating the helicopters from their objectives
• There are two primary scenarios for how the PLAGF could use its helicopters to rapidly secure victory in a Taiwan invasion scenario
• Reflect the fact that it doesn't appear as if the the PLAGF is outfitting itself for a massive Normandy-style amphibious invasion
• Both scenarios assume
  • Extensive preparatory bombardment, with a follow-up amphibious landing
  • Moderately robust defense of Taiwan by the Taiwanese armed forces
  • Assume that the rapid nature of helicopter operations doesn't give the US a chance to respond
• As such, these should be viewed as "best case scenarios" for Chinese helicopter assaults on Taiwan

Scenario 1: Conventional Air-Assault Overmatch for Rapid Victory

• Massive air-assault operation that seeks to maximize the number of soldiers on the ground within the shortest period of time
• PLA would use its rotary-winged assets to overwhelm Taiwan's defenses and convince Taiwanese political leadership that surrender is the best course of action
• PLA amphibious assaults, in this scenario, are feints designed to pull Taiwanese defenders away from decisive airfields and population centers
• Requires PLAAF air superiority for at least 24 hours
• PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) would play a significant role in suppressing or destroying Taiwanese defenses
• Highly complex operation requiring joint integration down to the tactical level
• The primary objective would be to secure airfields and ports in order to allow follow-on forces to flood in
• Chief among these would be
  • Taipei Songshan Airport
  • Kaohsiung Airport and Harbor
• Other objectives include
  • Taoyuan Airport
  • Taichung Airport
  • Military bases and airfields
  • Key terrain in support of amphibious landings
• The PLA would likely leave three brigades in reserve for other contingencies, allowing for up to 10 brigades to take part in this helicopter offensive
• Assembling this force would require 5 out-of-area brigades to more to assembly areas on or near the coast
• This assembly process would be impossible to conceal
  • Large numbers of helicopters flying overhead
  • Large troop and vehicle movements by road and rail
  • These movements would be remarked upon by Chinese civilians and would be observable by intelligence services
• Assuming a successful assembly, the next problem would be transiting the strait
  • Managing the airspace for hundreds of helicopters converging on Taiwan simultaneously would be a challenge
  • No room for error in deconflicting entry and egress routes
  • Although helicopter pilots prefer to remain closer to the ground in order to avoid radar detection and missile threats, successful SEAD operations by the PLAAF could open up alternate flight profiles
  • One advantage that the PLA has is time — the terrain and critical infrastructure is static
  • Allows for extensive reconnaissance, both via technical means and human agents disguised as tourists
  • Means the PLA can create realistic training simulations for approaches to Taiwan
• Another challenge would be managing the large numbers of attack helicopters that would be accompanying the transports
• These helicopters would need to coordinate not only with transport helicopters but also with PLAAF aircraft, as close air support would be jointly conducted by PLAGF helicopters and PLAAF fast movers
• Another wrinkle would be possible airborne operations
  • It's reasonable to assume that the PLA would also employ its airborne units (see previous chapter)
  • This would require further deconfliction and support from PLAGF helicopters
    • PLAAF heavy transports would have to deconflict with PLAGF helicopters as they conduct their drops
    • Airborne troops would represent another source of demand for close air support by PLAGF helicopters
• While the PLA has increased joint exercises, it is still a long way away from being able to conduct this kind of coordinated massive air assault
• Although PLA special forces have practiced assaults on the Taiwanese presidential residence, Taiwan knows that its political leaders would be prime targets in an attack and has contingency plans to ensure their safety in the event of an attack
• This massive helicopter assault would place great strain on rotary assets
• A substantial number of helicopters would need to keep flying for 20 hours at a time
• This is an unsustainable operations tempo for all but the briefest of windows
• By the authors' own admission, this is intended to be a "best case" scenario
• In reality, the Russian tried a much easier, much more limited version of this operation when they tried to capture Hostomel Airfield outside Kyiv on the first day of the conflict
• The outcome of that was a large number of VDV ambushed and killed by the Ukrainian mechanized forces that were guarding the airfield
• As with the Ukraine War, strategic surprise will be nearly impossible for China
• Taiwan too, will place its strongest units around its airfields and beaches, knowing full well that they'll be choice targets for an assault

Scenario 2: Unconventional Air Assault for the Long Haul

• This scenario is similar to the first scenario except that prior to the main assault, the Chinese conduct a suicide charge with the Mi-17s they're retiring
• More distant staging of first wave would increase the possibility for operational surprise
• Would require China to accept a higher level of risk with the first wave, as they would be attacking without the benefit of preparatory fires
• First wave would force Taiwan to show its hand with regards to the position and nature of anti-air resources
• In other words, the first wave is bait, pure and simple
• This would diminish the risk for the second wave of helicopters, ensuring that a greater number survived to conduct stability and counterinsurgency operations
• The primary obstacle to this scenario would the morale problems caused by expected high attrition among the first wave
• The PLA would have to convince helicopter pilots to be even more bait for SAMs than they normally are

Assessing PLA Readiness For Cross-Strait Air Assaults

• By current estimates of trend-lines, the PLA is at least a decade away from having sufficient mass and operational readiness to conduct the kinds of cross-strait assaults described in the above scenarios
• This study came out in 2024, so that means that the author estimates that it will be 2034 by the time the PLA has sufficient helicopters and skilled pilots to make a major air assault against Taiwan possible
• But what if AI significantly improves and it becomes possible to build autonomous transport helicopters much more cheaply?
• Key indicators of PLA progress can be determined from coverage of PLA helicopter exercises
  • Scale — until now, the PLA has not conducted multi-brigade rotary wing exercises
  • Complexity — exercises should indicate cooperation between PLAGF, PLAAF and PLARF units
  • Frequency — frequent exercises indicate that cooperation between PLA branches has become routine and special coordination is no longer required to schedule exercises
• One caution with regards to using footage of military exercises to assess readiness is that exercises tend to emphasize showy formations and large scale activities that may not contribute to operational readiness
• Further complicating assessements of PLA readiness to conduct air assaults is the ever-evolving state of defensive weaponry
• The primary threats to helicopters are
  • Surface to air missiles — fixed, vehicle mounted, and portable
  • Guns — even light machine guns can present a real threat to helicopters if they're set up in such a way as to cover the LZ in interlocking fields of fire
• While helicopters can be equipped with countermeasures against surface-to-air missiles, the primary means for aircraft to escape surface to air missiles are speed and stealth — helicopters lack both
• The biggest question is how does the PLA assess these known risks and does it accept the low probability of success that a heliborne assault would have?
• Everything we know about the PLA thus far indicates that it's a risk-averse organization
• However, air assault does present the PLA with an unpredictable option that would complicate Taiwan's defensive preparations, so it's unwise to assume that the PLA has completely ruled out the tactic

Takeaways For Taiwan

• Taiwan can take relatively simple steps to make the air assault challenge even more difficult
• Invest in large numbers of mobile high-caliber machine guns and significant ammunition stores
• Pursue development of anti-helicopter mines
• Make it clear to the PRC that carrying out a helicopter assault is an extremely high-risk tactic
  • Explicitly train its military for defending against helicopter assaults
  • Include civilian volunteers in this training — complicates PLA planning by making it less obvious which targets will be heavily defended while demonstrating Taiwanese will to resist

Not An "Easy Button" — Yet

• The PLA has steadily grown its rotary-wing capabilities over the past decade
• However, its helicopter force is still nowhere near mature
• While it's unlikely that they would conduct a surprise raid against Taiwan, helicopter assault capabilities might be tested against softer targets, such as Kinmen or the Matsu Islands
• Air assault is something that Taiwan has to plan against, but it's not an especially difficult threat to counter
• A true determination of the likelihood of an air assault depends on the risk tolerance of PRC leadership — difficult/impossible to assess

Chapter 10: PLA Special Operations Forces

• Chinese Special Operations Forces (SOF) are an underappreciated component of the Joint Island Landing Campaign (JILC)
• The PLA has worked steadily to upgrade its SOF's capabilities
• However, there are several factors that will influence SOF performance
  • Use of unmanned systems — unmanned systems can replace humans in some roles, but demand greater technical proficiency from SOF operators
  • Joint coordination capabilities — how do SOF units integrate with regular PLA units
  • Micromanagement — will PLA commanders try to micromanage SOF activities, leading to hesitation on the battlefield

Doctrine

• PLA sources have noted the increasing importance of SOF units in modern warfare
• The PLA has paid special attention to the role that British SOF played during the Falklands campaign, noting how British SOF gathered intelligence and conducted raids, allowing the Royal Marines to land with little resistance
• The Chinese envision using SOF in a number of ways during a landing operation
  • Reconnaissance and targeting
    • Monitoring weather and hydrological conditions at the landing beaches
    • Surveying enemy obstructions
    • Tracking high-value targets
    • Illuminating targets for precision strike
    • Conducting battle damage assessments
    • Note how British SOF landed on the Falklands three weeks prior to the Royal Marines and provided important information on hydrological conditions, fortifications and enemy troop movements
  • Strikes and raids
    • Sabotaging airfields, command posts, ports and ships, etc
    • Raids to rescue captured personnel
    • Cite how US SOF captured the governor general's residence, television stations, and key roads during the US invasion
  • Psychological warfare
    • Infiltrating enemy networks and enemy broadcast infrastructure to disseminate propaganda
    • Failing that, destroying enemy broadcast infrastructure in order to sow chaos and panic
• Chinese sources don't discuss the role of SOF beyond the initial landing
• Perhaps this is because the Chinese feel that enemy resolve would collapse following a successful decapitation strike, preventing an insurgency from arising
• They might be right — in Ukraine, for example, there has been a notable lack of insurgency in occupied areas
• The Chinese recognize that a high degree of integration is required between SOF and regular units
• Xi Jinping has implemented reforms that give theater commanders greater authority over all units within their respective districts, including SOF
• This encourages joint training and operations
• However the Chinese still lack joint task forces to coordinate peacetime operations
• Some special forces, notably those belonging to the People's Armed Police and the Airborne Corps, remain outside the joint command structure

Force Structure and Capabilities

• Most PLA SOF are organized into brigades and assigned to theater commands
• Each of the PLA's 13 group armies has one SOF brigade
• In addition, the PLAAF Airborne Corps, the PLANMC and the PLA Rocket Force each have one SOF brigade
• What does the PLARF need a SOF brigade for?
• The SOF units most likely to participate in a Taiwan invasion are the 5 SOF brigades of the Eastern and Southern Theater Commands, along with the PLANMC's "Sea Dragons" SOF and the PLAAF's "Thunder Gods" SOF
• In addition, reconnaissance elements assigned to PLAGF units, while not explicitly classified as SOF, may carry out similar tasks to the SOF brigades
• The PLAGF's SOF brigades follow a brigade-battalion-company-team hierarchy
• Structure resembles the US Army's Ranger Battalions more than SEALs or Delta Force
• It's unclear whether Chinese SOF brigades can operate independently on the battlefield
  • Have organic UAV and reconnaissance elements, along with truck mounted cannon and heavy mortars for firepower support
  • However it is unclear whether these SOF brigades have the staff officers required to manage all of these elements and coordinate with other branches
• Another problem may be the command style of Chinese SOF
  • Chinese SOF emphasizes a centralized command style, more akin to that of conventional units
  • Facilitated by radio and satellite communications, which might be disrupted in combat
  • Brigade, battalion and company commanders do not have datalinks with each other, only their superiors
  • SOF units have unreliable access to the PLA's integrated command platform
• There is some evidence that SOF brigades have set up arrangements for tactical and operational coordination with other services
  • Liaison officers from other services can set priorities for SOF units
  • Follows Chinese doctrine that emphasizes SOF units as functioning in a support role for the main PLA
• PLA SOF troops likely have priority access to modern equipment
  • Night-vision equipment
  • Communication systems
  • Micro-UAVs for reconnaissance
  • Laser designators and electronic reconnaissance equipment
• The most advanced Chinese SOF equipment likely has to do with undersea operations
  • Sensors
  • Diver propulsion vehicles
  • Undersea personnel delivery systems
  • Radios, navigation aids, and direction-finding sonars
• Beyond the PLA, the Chinese paramilitary People's Armed Police also has a few elite commando units that could be deployed in a Taiwan invasion
  • After a recent restructuring, these units were assigned to national-level "mobile contingents" that do not have a fixed area of operations
  • These commando units are large rapid-reaction forces that can be employed in a wide range of scenarios
  • The PAP SOF units would be useful for protecting critical infrastructure within China and conducting "political rendition" operations to capture key Taiwanese personnel

Training

• Chinese SOF units practice a number of skills that would be relevant in a Taiwanese invasion
  • Obstacle clearing
  • Direction-finding
  • Nighttime reconnaissance
  • Blocking maneuvers
  • Survival behind enemy lines
  • Demolition
  • etc
  • They practice the same sorts of stuff that SOF all over the world practice
• Chinese government sources describe their SOF as "triphibious" or "quadphibious", referring to their ability to operate on land, at sea, from the air, and underwater
• SOF have demonstrated rapid extraction capabilities
  • Grabbing onto passing motorized inflatable boats
  • Rope-based helicopter extraction
• PAP SOF practice many of the same skills as PLA SOF, and also subject their recruits to stringent admission requirements
• However, for the PAP retention appears to be a problem — have fewer long-serving participants than similar elite paramilitary units in other countries
• The PLA's special operation training mostly involves squad-size or smaller elements — sometimes as few as one or two individual operators
• The small scale allows training to be more involved and realistic
• SOF have also practiced emplacing navigational beacons and providing survey data to a PLA command-post, demonstrating integration with higher-echelon command
• Although Chinese SOF training has improved, Chinese sources have identified a number of ongoing limitations and deficiencies
  • Special mission equipment has often proved inadequate in practice
    • For example, the main diver delivery vehicle has struggled with a limited oxygen supply, heavy weight, and excessive cavitation
    • This has limited its operation to waters that have been pre-cleared of obstacles
    • It's unclear whether recent improvements have led to a lifting of those restrictions
  • Inadequate attention to technical reconnaissance
    • SOF train primarily for armed reconnaissance
    • As a result, some PLAGF scholars have complained about the SOF's inadequate ability to recognize targets and interpret aerial imagery
    • According to them, PLA SOF have a "comparatively weak ability to obtain and handle intelligence"
    • In other words, they need more people like these
  • Lack of training for information warfare
    • No mention of training with broadcast equipment or psychological warfare aircraft
    • As a result, the only use of special forces would be to conduct kinetic raids against broadcast equipment, network communication nodes, underwater cables and data centers
    • These raids might also leave behind devices that would allow information warfare specialists on the mainland to access enemy networks
  • Limited cross-service integration
    • There has been little evidence of special operations forces from different branches training with each other or with non-SOF units
    • PAP special operations forces don't exercise with those from the PLA
    • This is a big problem for using special operations forces in a Taiwan landing scenario
    • These forces will be providing support for the main landing effort
    • This will require close coordination, something that they're not practicing yet

Conclusion

• SOF would likely play an important supporting role in any Taiwan landing scenario
• Doctrine is geared towards tasks that would be necessary in preparation for a major landing operation
• Need to improve equipment and training to enable SOF units to meet their doctrinal requirements
• The PLA lacks permanent joint coordination structures below the theater command level
  • Some of the PLA's special operations forces exist outside the theater command system entirely, like the Airborne Corps SOF
  • This could result in catastrophe for SOF — a similar failing in the US led to the Operation Eagle Claw disaster
• There is a tension between the Leninist emphasis on central control and the autonomy and risk-taking required to conduct special operations successfully
• However, even partially successful SOF attacks could reduce the effectiveness of Taiwan's defenses
• Taiwan should make preparations of handle SOF incursions as part of an invasion scenario
• The Tawianese military should work with US SOF to find defensive tactics to repel Chinese SOF assaults

Chapter 11: Mine Warfare in a Cross-Strait Invasion

• Mine warfare comprises two key elements
  • Deployment of mines offensively
  • Mine countermeasures
    • Destroying mines in land-based inventories before they have a chance to be deployed
    • Defeating minelayers
    • Rendering safe mines that have been deployed
• The major questions regarding Chinese employment of mines in a cross-channel invasion scenario are
  • What are the objectives of Chinese employment of mines in an invasion of Taiwan
  • Does the PLA have the capabilities to achieve these objectives
  • What mine warfare capabilities do Taiwan and the United States which might help deter an attack
  • What countermeasures could the USA and Taiwan take to reduce the effectiveness of PRC mine warfare
  • What asymmetries exist between the two sides and how might they be exploited
• Certainty in the answers to the above questions will be difficult to find
• There is little open-source information about the PLA's mine warfare capabilities
  • Estimates of the PLA's naval mine inventory range between 50 and 100 thousand
  • Little information on the specific systems mounted by mine countermeasures vehicles and what their effectiveness would be
• However, what open source information there is does highlight some points of asymmetry between the two sides that might be exploited by the PRC
• The scenario assumed in this chapter is a "full-blown" invasion of Taiwan that would involve the US, Japan and other allied military forces

The Mine Warfare Military Balance

China

• China has a wide variety of sea mines of various types
• Is continuing to develop new mine types, such as anti-helicopter mines, range-propelled warhead mines and bottom-influence mines
• China can deliver mines via surface ships, various aircraft, helicopters, submarines and maritime militia vessels
• China has also developed robust mine countermeasures capabilities
  • Built new dedicated minesweeping ships
  • Invested in unmanned minehunting drones
• Regularly and publicly conducts mine warfare exercises involving both mine laying and mine sweeping
• Chinese analysts have also written about using maritime militia vessels for mine clearing, however the exact nature of this civil-military cooperation remains unclear

Taiwan

• Taiwan has recently begun investing in mine warfare as part of its asymmetric defense concept
• Details on Taiwan's minelayers remain sparse
  • Recently introduced four "fast minelayers"
  • Working on smart mines of its own
  • Although Taiwan does not currently have any mines capable of being laid by aircraft or submarines, it has requested to purchase these mines from the US
• Minesweeping capabilities are limited
  • Only six dedicated minesweepers — 2 Osprey-class minsweepers purchased from the US and 4 smaller German coastal minsweepers
  • An effort to build to build indigenous minehunting ships resulted in fraud, leading to the imprisoning of the owner of one of Taiwan's main shipbuilding companies

United States

• The US's mine countermeasures capabilities are likely to be inadequate in a high-end conflict
• The US plan was to transition from the Avenger-class mine countermeasures vessels and MH-53s helicopters equipped with minesweeping gear to Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) equipped with the mine countermeasures module
• However, ongoing problems with the LCS hulls and the mine countermeasures modules have led to repeated delays, delaying the retirement of the aging Avenger-class and the MH-53s
• US minelaying capabilities are similarly limited until several development programs reach fruition
  • Currently has minimal capabilities for mining in a contested environment
    • A number of submarine-launched mobile mines remain in storage in Guam; however these are aging and are not compatible with the latest Virgina-class submarines
    • The QuickStrike air-launched mine requires aircraft to be in close proximity to where the mine will be laid (potentially placing them within range of enemy air defenses)
  • However, there are a number of development programs ongoing to improve US minelaying ability
    • Quickstrike-ER — winged variant of the QuickStrike mine capable of gliding in from a remote launch point
    • MEDUSA — an expendable submarine launched minelaying UUV
    • Autonomous minelaying UUVs
  • These programs are years away from achieving full-rate production

Regional Allies

• Japan and Australia both maintain independent minsweeping forces
• However neither is likely to be of much help during a conflict
• Japan's minesweepers will likely be tasked with ensuring Japan's own sea lanes remain clear
• Australia's minsweepers will take too long to arrive to be of help

Mine Warfare in PRC Strategic Thinking

PRC Campaign Plans in a Taiwan Invasion Scenario

• Mine warfare is integrated into the broader campaign plan that the PRC will use for the invasion of Taiwan
• The use of mines is called for by a number of contingency plans set forth by the PLA as part of the overall effort to capture Taiwan
• Mines are included with "missiles" and "smart torpedoes" and other "informationized weapons" that will be used to exert sea control over the Taiwan Strait

Mine Warfare Doctrine in China's Joint Campaign Plans

• Mine warfare will likely be used at the outset of a Taiwan invasion in order to reduce Taiwan's shipping capacity and hinder resupply
• PLA writings focus on a multi-layer blockade consisting of drifting, bottom and moored mines delivered by multiple vectors, including submarines, aircraft and ships
• After these blockading mines are set, PLA doctrine calls for surveillance of mined areas in order to detect and target minsweeping vessels
• Several PLA writers have argued for the placement of mines along the first island chain in order to deter US submarines from entering the Yellow, East China and South China Seas during a Taiwan conflict
• In addition, PLA texts have discussed the following with regards to mine warfare
  • Little-discussed — mine warfare tends to receive much less attention and analysis compared with other PLA capabilities
  • Strategic effects beyond inflicted losses — the mere suspicion of the presence of mines can be sufficient to shut down a port, even if no mines are actually laid
  • Surprise — Offensive mines can be laid pre-emptively to give the advantage of surprise
  • Anti-submarine capabilities — anti-submarine mines can be used to augment the PLAN's limited ability to detect and hunt US nuclear submarines
  • Precision — Satellite navigation can enhance the precision of minelaying, reducing the risk of friendly vessels falling prey to mines
• Following the establishment of a blockade, the PLA plans to shift to minsweeping operations in order to clear hostile mines in order to enable amphibious warfare craft to maneuver close to Taiwan
• As part of this effort they would strike at enemy minelayers, anti-minesweeping systems and coastal defenses
• Would also conduct ongoing surveillance to ensure that approach routes remain clear of mines
• Chinese doctrine also calls for offensive minelaying as a means of gaining sea control
  • Blockade ports and naval bases using a combination of air strikes, missiles, submarines and mines
  • I'm guessing this means that the Chinese aren't just thinking about mining Taiwanese ports, but also e.g. Guam and Japan
  • Mine routes of travel to present additional risk to any enemy naval assets that do make it out to sea
• The Chinese emphasis on mine warfare appears to stem from their observations of the Korean War and Desert Storm
  • North Korean minelaying efforts delayed UN forces from landing at Wonsan
  • Iraqi mines caused issues for the US Navy in the Persian Gulf, despite Iraq's minelaying efforts having started late

US Mine Warfare: Contrasting Priorities

• In comparison with the PLAN, the US Navy considers mine warfare relatively unimportant
• Mine warfare capabilities represent less than 1% of US Navy funding
• In 2021, QuickStrike was on the Navy's "unfunded priorities" list
• The US is getting what it's paid for with regards to mine warfare capabilities

PRC Execution of Mine Warfare in a Taiwan Invasion Scenario

• How might China employ sea mines to support an invasion of Taiwan?
• Scenario assumes an invasion of Taiwan in the near term, with the US and Japan as co-belligerents
  • US would be assisting comprehensively
  • Japan would be supporting the US and defending its own waters
• The Chinese objective with mines would be to
  • Isolate the Taiwan Strait, especially from US submarines
  • Trap the Taiwanese navy within its ports
  • Blockade Taiwan's civilian shipping in order to prevent resupply and isolate Taiwan's economy
• To accomplish this
  • Lay mines on the northern and southern ends of the Taiwan Strait to channel naval traffic close to the mainland coast, making it easier to interdict
  • Mines would also be laid down near Taiwan's main ports
  • These mines would likely be submarine-laid mines that could be activated with remote control
  • The bathymetric data in the report indicates that the ports on Taiwan's east coast would be difficult to mine, owing to the steep drop-off in the sea floor
• In addition to the minefields around Taiwan, the PRC would likely lay some minefields among the Ryuku Islands, in order to slow down US vessels coming to assist
  • These minefields would have to be laid by submarine prior to the commencement of hostilities
  • After the conflict starts, they could be reinforced by aircraft
  • Although the gaps between the islands are too large to permit the minefields forming a barrier, a large number of mines in this area would slow down US forces
  • If the PRC were willing to be even more aggressive, it could use minefields outside of Japan's major ports, or even the threat thereof to put pressure on Japan to stay neutral in a conflict
  • It wouldn't work — I think the Japanese leadership realizes that allowing Taiwan to be invaded would inevitably lead to greater pressure on Japan
  • Thus staying neutral in a Taiwan conflict makes it more difficult for the Japanese to resist Chinese aggression in the future
• Taiwan, for its part would attempt to lay mines along the approaches to the most likely invasion beaches along its west coast
  • These efforts would have to begin before overt hostilities commenced
  • Taiwan's minelaying efforts would likely face interference from the PRC Coast Guard and maritime militia

Assessment and Asymmetries

• Assessments of US Navy mine countermeasures in 2009 and 2012 found that the US Navy was ill equipped to cope with the prospect of dense Chinese minefields
• Since then the situation has not improved
• The mine countermeasures module for the LCS remains immature
• The LCS program itself has been curtailed
• China's ability to interfere with mine-clearing operations has only grown with its development of anti-ship ballistic missiles
• The PLAAF is now much more likely to have air superiority over Taiwan
  • Enables air-dropped minefields
  • Provides cover for PLAN mine layers
  • Allows for strikes against Taiwanese and US minesweepers
• In addition the Chinese maritime militia provides the PLAN with a large number of difficult-to-detect mine layers

Conclusion

• The US needs to invest more in mine countermeasures
• Taiwan should focus on building resilience
  • Stockpile critical weapons and supplies
  • Prepare the population for wartime shortages
• The US and Taiwan should be prepared to take greater risks to challenge and disrupt potential Chinese mining operations in the days or weeks before the commencement of hostilities

• HomePage
• WikiSandbox

PmWiki

• Initial Setup Tasks
• Basic Editing
• Documentation Index
• PmWiki FAQ
• PmWikiPhilosophy
• Release Notes
• ChangeLog

pmwiki.org

• Cookbook (addons)
• Skins (themes)
• PITS (issue tracking)
• Mailing Lists

edit SideBar