2023-01-18: Company Command In Babil, Part 1
- Podcast link
- Col. Matt Hardman — Commander of the Operations Group at Ft. Polk
- Grew up in a military community and in a military family
- ROTC scholarship
- Thought he was going to do 4 years and then go to law school, but ended up staying a lot longer
- What changed his view on leaving the military was the experience of losing people in Iraq — didn't feel like it was fair to leave people that he'd shared this experience with
- Taught at West Point
- Commanded the 10th Mountain Division
- Multiple tours of duty in Iraq
- Joined the Army prior to 9/11
- Was a platoon leader by the time of the Iraq War
- First deployment was to Afghanistan in 2003
- At that time Afghanistan was a much different operating environment
- Company and battalion-sized air assaults
- Similar to the large-scale training operations that he'd participated in
- 2004 Iraq was his first introduction to counterinsurgency
- Subordinated to a Military Police (MP) brigade
- Had to patrol a large area (800 km2) with a light formation
- The experience of doing this was crucial in teaching him the value of discipline and consistency
- Deployed to Iraq on short notice — only 90 days after the unit's return from Afghanistan
- Only had approximately 10 days of formal preparation time
- Lost soldiers within the first week of being deployed to Iraq
- Regrets the loss of life, but, at the same time, felt like the company handled the loss well and continued "putting in the work" for the mission
- "The fundamental determinant of success in combat is how a soldier feels about his or her peers and immediate leader"
- When he took command, the company was in a good place, thanks to good discipline and practices put in place by his immediate predecessor
- How did soldiers and families react to the short notice deployment
- Hard for the families
- Had one soldier lose his marriage because of the rapid turnaround
- However, most of the soldiers themselves were enthusiastic
- Many soldiers were new to the company, as there had been significant turnover since the company's return from Afghanistan
- Battalion commander and battalion sergeant major did a good job not just with the soldiers but also with their families
- Another thing that mitigated the shock of the sudden deployment was the fact that this was the 82nd Airborne
- Traditionally high readiness unit
- Trained to deploy at short notice
- Mission was unclear when the arrived in Iraq
- Was not given a mission statement or objective by his commander prior to deployment — had to write it himself with assistance from the battalion commander
- No intelligence briefings describing the situation that they would be entering
- Mission ended up being keeping the ground lines of communication open in their area of operations
- Provide a way station and casualty evacuation point for other units
- Patrol to address the IED threat on MSR Tampa, one of the most targeted routes in southern Iraq for IEDs
- How were operations in Iraq different from Afghanistan?
- In Afghanistan, the company was moving together, on foot, in large operations that lasted 4-7 days
- In Iraq, there was much more vehicle mounted patrolling due to the size of the area of operations
- Company was split more often into platoon sized units
- Much more use of sniper units
- Mortar platoon was a new addition to the team, and a much appreciated one
- Hardman was impressed with the professionalism with which his soldiers conducted after-action reviews of missions in which they took casualties
- No talk of revenge
- Heavy focus on what they could do better next time
- Fundamentals matter! Even when support is inadequate, having good discipline about the fundamentals of soldiering can help stack the deck in your unit's favor
- Learned, via involvement in the Iraq War History Project that the lack of understanding re: the situation in Iraq in 2004 was pervasive
- It's no surprise that he didn't know what was going on, because no one knew what was going on
- The patrol that led to the first deaths his unit experienced in Iraq was a routine one
- Company was new in its area of operations
- Platoon had a new platoon leader, but was an otherwise experienced platoon
- Purpose of patrol was to help familiarize that platoon with the area of operations
- Platoon leader's gunner noticed something in the oncoming lane as they were driving
- Their vehicle turned around to investigate
- As they realized it was an IED, the IED detonated, killing the platoon leader and two others, and wounding three more, two of them severely
- Squad leader and senior NCOs did a good job of collecting the casualties and organizing the evacuation
- The company had recently conducted a casualty handling drill, and that training was put to good use — wounded were stabilized, treated, and evacuated in under 30 minutes
- One thing that lulled the platoon into a false sense of security was the fact that the IEDs they'd encountered in Afghanistan all had command wires
- Thought that the IED was incomplete or abandoned
- Didn't know that, by 2004, the insurgency in Iraq had more sophisticated radio controlled IEDs that did not require a command wire
- Had to compartmentalize the emotional impact of losing a platoon leader, because this occurred at the start of their deployment
- Needed to work to project outward calm, in order to provide leadership for the remaining troops
- Fortunate to receive a lot of support from higher headquarters (both brigade and division)
- Credits his wife with providing support to the families of the wounded and killed soldiers
- The hurt of losing someone under your command never goes away, but with time, you learn to carry it