Containing Shiite Militas: The Battle For Stability In Iraq
Contents
Publication details:
Notes
Introduction
- Liberation of Mosul is complete
- Islamic State is unlikely to to govern and control large swaths of territory in the near future
- However, in order to secure a lasting peace, the government of Iraq will have to reconstruct the country and reconcile its communities and factions
- This is likely to be complicated by the ascendancy of Shiite militia groups
Origins and Current State of Shiite Militas
- Mobilized in response to the Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani's fatwa calling on able bodied young men to defend their country after the collapse of the Iraqi army in Mosul
- Formed umbrella organization called "Hashd al-Shaabi" (Popular Mobilization Forces [PMF])
- PMF is a state sanctioned paramilitary organization reporting to the federal government on the surface
- In reality it is dominated by Iran-aligned pre-existing militia groups
- Asaib Ahl al-Haq
- Kataib Hezbollah
- Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada
- Badr Brigade
- Organizations report, in practice to Hadi al-Amiri, head of the Badr Brigade, or his deputy, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis (head of Kataib Hezbollah)
- These organizations have enjoyed considerable autonomy over the past decade, and have the support of Iranian sponsors
- Although these militias have fought with the US and Iraqi armies, they've also been accused of sectarian atrocities and human rights abuses
- Their presence alongside the official military exacerbates sectarian tensions, which has been exploited as a recruiting tool by ISIS
- Militias have also skirmished with Kurdish fighters in disputed territories
- While some politicians (including the Prime Minister, Haidar al-Abadi) have called for the militias to disband, they've threatened to reorganize independently if the PMF institution is banned
- In many places in Iraq, Iran-aligned Shiite militias have established themselves as versions of Hezbollah in Lebanon
- Established socio-cultural movements that have military and social welfare wings
- Operate independently of the state
- Are able to do so because of the relative fragility of the Iraqi state
- However, the relative recency of the establishment of the PMF, combined with the relative weakness of Iraqi Shiite militias (compared with Hezbollah) means that it's not too late to resolve the problem
- Iraq's Shiite had been pushed aside once before
- Post-surge years of 2008-2011
- Shiite militias were seen as lawless and unnnecessary
- Militia allies lost in 2009 and 2010 elections
- Militias aren't invincible - they can be defeated
- Defeating them requires a holistic approach and a greater appreciation of interpersonal and inter-organization links
- What should the US do?
- De-emphasize support for Iraqi state
- Engage Shiite communities more directly
- Empower the full array of state-aligned militias, tribes, and clerical figures whose ideological alignments are characterized by pluralistic values and hostility to Iranian interference
- First, are there any groups worth supporting whose values are pluralistic enough to satisfy Western critics?
- What is the risk of this effort spiraling out of control and resulting in another civil war, like the period from 2004-2007?
- Push international resources towards Iraqi NGOs and civil society actors rather than international organizations
- Iraqi organizations have greater reach and a better understanding of local conditions
- But they're also more corrupt, and are more likely to siphon funds to help militants
- Shiite militias have battlefield experience, but are ill-equipped for governance
- US should help create organizations that will deliver services to local communities should Shiite militias fail in their promises
- More pluralistic, non-sectarian institutions in the federal government
- More outward-looking conciliatory politicians like Prime Minister al-Abadi
- Strengthen Iraq's state-aligned security forces (like the Golden Division)
Yesterday's Shiite Activists Become Today's Militias
- The current generation of Shiite militias formed their collective political consciousness during the brutal waning days of Baath party rule
- Remember regime's brutal suppression of 1991 Shiite uprising
- Tens of thousands of Shiites were killed
- Shiite centers of learning ("hazwat") were decimated
- Uprising followed by extreme poverty and repression
- From this environment, Mohammed Mohammed Sadeq al-Sadr emerges as a Shiite leader
- Established Sadrist political movement, now led by his son Muqtada
- Sadrist movement galvanized Shiite underclass and provided an outlet for grievances
- After the collapse of the Iraqi state in 2003, the Sadrists filled the vacuum
- Sadeq al-Sadr sends emissaries to all Shiite regions to form alliances with other Shiite factions
- Formed Jaysh al-Mahdi ("Mahdi Army", later renamed "Peace Brigade") - a militia devoted to providing protection, services and leadership to Shiite communities, especially in the slums of Sadr City, Baghdad
The Rise of the Militias
- In the immediate aftermath of the 2003 war, Iraq was dominated by 2 major militia organizations
- Badr Brigade
- Badr Brigade was formed out of Iraqi PoWs from the Iran-Iraq war and from Iraqi refugees who'd fled to Iran
- Initially led by Iranian Revolutionary Guard Council (IRGC)
- Later came under Iraqi leadership, under the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI)
- Benefited from integration into post-2003 political order
- Cooperated with coalition forces
- Controls Iraq's Interior Ministry and Federal Police
- Mahdi Army
- Arose from Sadrist movement
- Spawned a number of ill-disciplined and unaccountable militia groups
- Was not prepared for growing responsibility
- Leaders were not qualified to govern
- The decentralized nature of the Sadrist movement gave its leadership a very limited amount of control over its militia foot soldiers
- As local factions gained resources and confidence from having faced combat, they split from the larger Sadrist organization
- Breakdown of state after February 2006 bombing of al-Askariya Mosque altered lines of authority, leading to the fracturing of the Mahdi Army
Multiple Identities
- Shiite militias are products of their circumstances
- Badr Brigade
- Arguably most powerful of Iraq's Shiite militias
- Commands most front-line fighters
- Deeply integrated into the Iraqi state, but can still operate autonomously
- Engages independently with the US and Iran
- On the other hand, militias such as Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada et. al. are best described as opportunistic actors that have exploited the vacuum created by the fall of the former regime
- Vehemently resist Iraqi state with Iranian support
- Interesting - Iran supports both militias that are quasi-aligned with the Iraqi state and militias that are in direct opposition to it
- Also resist US and coalition allies
- Ideology of Shiite supremacism and combatting Western imperialism
- Splintered from existing militia organizations
- Asaib Ahl al-Haq is an offshoot of the Sadrist movement
- Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada is led by ex-Badr members
- Established, empowered and entrenched by Iran after 2003 to exploit state fragility
- Uncompromisingly aversive to working with the US
- The numbers and diversity of Shiite militias has led to clashes between them
- Muqtada al-Sadr has denounced Asaib Ahl al-Haq for being beholden to Iranian interests
- Sadrist forces stormed the offices of the Dawa Party, ISCI and the Badr Brigade when they protested against the government in May 2016
- On the other hand, Sadrists allied with the ISCI to attack "brazen militias" which did not accept the command of the Iraqi army
- 3 broad categories of militias have aligned themselves under the PMF
- Iran-aligned militias
- State-aligned militias - established only after 2014 fatwa calling for Shiites to take up arms in the service of Iraq
- Also known as "Sistani militias"
- Managed by the holy shrines (controlled by Sistani)
- Include:
- Imam Ali Brigad
- Al al-Akbar Brigade
- Abbas Division
- Oppose Iranian encroachment onto Iraqi affairs
- Refuse to meet with Iranian officials unless Iraqi officials are also present
- "Rebellious" militias - Sadrist Peace Brigades are defined as "rebellious" because of their refusal to submit to either the federal government or Iran
- Almost every militia asserts that it's a socio-cultural movement, rather than a mere militia
- However, most militias struggle to develop beyond criminal gangs
- The challenge for Iraqis and international policymakers is to reduce the space that allows militia gangs and Iranian proxies to make the transition into components of the Iraqi political system
- Populist and violent sectarian discourse makes room for even more extremist groups like ISIS
Recommendations
- Containing rather than eliminating militias
- Shiite militias cannot be militarily defeated
- International intervention would just weaken the Iraqi state further
- There is little choice but to accept and work with the the militias in the short run
- Rely on existing institutions and socio-cultural dynamics to contain malevolent groups
- Use PMF law to regulate militias
- Reframe problem as one of engaging Shiite grassroots rather than confronting Iranian proxies or criminal gangs
- Deal with Iran's influence
- Shiite militias for Iran are both a lever and a buffer
- Lever to use to confront and intimidate actors that threaten its interests
- Buffer to allow Iran to distance itself from proxies when they engage in criminal activities or human-rights abuses
- Though Iran's influence is strong, it is reversible
- Use original Sadrist rhetoric, which was fiercely nationalistic to turn rank-and-file away from Iranian influence
- Where the rank-and-file go, the leaders will be forced to follow
- Focus on communal intra-Shiite dynamics
- Capitalize on difference and divisions within the PMF organization
- Embolden actors whose ideological alignments are grounded in pluralistic values
- Prevent the shift of fighters from state-aligned militias to Iran-aligned groups
- The majority of fighters are actually in state-aligned militias
- Huh? Then how is it that the Iran-aligned militias are seen as more dominant? Is it that the Iran-aligned militias are more disciplined? Better resourced?
- Provide political and financial support to religious establishment and state-aligned militia groups
- Can we do that, Constitutionally?
- Even if we can, should we? This could be very risky for PR if we end up funding a militia that hurts Westerners
- Provide training and support to allow state-aligned militias to match the discipline and propaganda efforts of Iran-backed rivals
- Strengthening state-aligned militias should prevent Iran-aligned militias from being able to reshape Iraqi society
- Try to re-engage with Muqtada Al-Sadr
- While Sadr has been hostile to the US in the past, he has ties to US allies in the region
- Is seen as a bulwark against rising Iranian influence
- Help Sadrists via capacity-building initiatives to help them counter malevolent actors
- Nudge them towards accepting greater international norms and acceptance of human rights
- I'm really not a fan of dealing with the Sadrists. I don't think it's fruitful to try to convert them into a part of the government. We should focus on the Badr Brigade first and try to make a regular part of the Iraqi state.
- Identify and Empower Agents of Change
- Invest in bottom-up politics to limit the ability of corrupt elites and militant groups to use civil society as a patronage network
- The battle for Iraq remains rooted among Shiite communal networks, which collectively control economies worth hundreds of millions of dollars
- Empower Civil Society
- Iraq has a civil society
- Civil society has been effective in mobilizing people to protest against the government
- Civil society actors that are disconnected from political parties or religious or family networks face interference, intimidation, and have weak fundraising abilities
- Civil society groups are capable of creating social and cultural norms that can restrain armed groups
- Focus on effective, rather than symbolic, assistance
- Help international organizations be more effective
- Make aid conditional on cooperation with international organizations, including NGOs
- Establish partnerships between international and local security forces to provide security for international organizations
- Religious Mobilization
- Shiite activism has historically been wedded to the Shiite clerical establishment
- While the ability of the West to influence the Shiite clerics is limited, it is still important to engage with the clerical community
- View Shiite religious organizations as agents of civil development
- Unlike in the West, politics and religion have significant overlap in Iraq, so religious actors cannot be ignored in politics
- Revitalizing Iraq's Institutions
- The notion that the solution to Iraq's problems lies in further decentralization is a common misperception both in the West and among Iraqis
- However, decentralization requires a capable government to ensure it takes place in a regulated and meaningful manner
- Local actors must have legitimacy and capability to govern
- Even Shiite militias recognize the supremacy of the Iraqi state - they seek to coopt the state, not overthrow it
- The Iraqi state can supplant the Shiite militias if it becomes better at providing security and economic benefits
- Resist Maliki's Return
- In the wake of the military's collapse in 2013, Maliki empowered Shiite militias to provide basic security in and around Baghdad in lieu of the Iraqi military
- This resulted in sectarian attacks, raising civil tensions at a time when the country was under threat
- Maliki's polarizing, sectarian approach to governance must be resisted by the Shiite political class
- Oh yeah? And who's going to make them?
- Presence Equals Power
- The US must maintain a presence in Iraq in order to make Iran and Iran-aligned militias consider America's position before making their moves
- American presence reassures Iran-hostile elements in Iraq that there is a countervailing force willing to support them
- In addition to maintaining a limited presence, the US should invest more in bolstering Iraq's elite counterterrorism unit, the Golden Division
- The Golden Division has emerged as a symbol of national unity, and greater investment would alleviate ethnic and sectarian tensions
Conclusion
- Shift focus to bottom-up grassroots governance and capacity building
- Look for actors that envisage pluralistic non-sectarian institutions
- Support Prime Minister al-Abadi
- Reducing support for Iraq would be a grave mistake
- Iraq will face the twin threat of ISIS and Iran-aligned militias for a long time
- The US does have friends in Iraq, and with time, it can cultivate an Iraqi state that is a bulwark against Iranian influence
