Declawing The Tiger: A Rebuttal of the Decision to Phase Out Marine Tank Battalions

Original Source: Strategy Bridge

In the opening days of the Yom Kippur War, the Egyptian Army shocked Western analysts by stopping the tank forces of the IDF
- Key to this victory were Soviet-supplied anti-tank missiles
- However, the victory was short-lived, as Israeli combined-arms offensives with infantry acting as a screen for tank forces nullified the advantage of Egyptian anti-tank weapons
The Marine Corps today possesses similar doubts about the effectiveness of tanks in amphibious operations
In the 38th Commandant's Planning Guidance Commandant General David H. Berger envisions the future of the Marine Corps as that of a light naval infantry force supported by precision sea, ground and aerial fires
Bet that advances in warfare have nullified many of the advantages that heavy armor would provide
As a result, the Marine Corps has decided to cede heavy ground armor capabilities to the US Army
This appears to have been due to the results of the Syrian Civil War
- Turkish military, using drones, artillery and airstrikes, showed that it could annihilate Syrian armor without retaliation
A secondary consideration is that the Commandant believes the Marine Corps can no longer devote the resources for having specialized units for e.g. arctic warfare or urban operations
- The Marine Corps is transitioning from a more general multi-mission force into a force designed to fight a specific type of war on a specific battlefield
- However this doctrine may be difficult to sustain, given that both the US and the Soviet Union had to deal with insurgencies during the Cold War
In the future, the Marine Corps is going to specialize in expeditionary amphibious operations
Even here, though, there is a role for armor
- During the battle of Tarawa, M4 Shermans embarked from landing craft provided crucial cover for infantry formations as they advanced on Japanese bunkers
- In modern warfare, sustained landing efforts like those seen in World War 2 are untenable, given the existence of shore-based long-range anti-ship missiles
- However, it remains that tanks are a much more flexible and cost-effective source of fire support for infantry than aircraft
The Commandant's Planning Guidance also ignores the possibility of a sustained ground campaign against a nation-state
- In the Korean War, the fact that the Marines had armor and artillery allowed them to rapidly march inland, without having to wait for Army units
- The North Korean T-34s were effectively countered by Marine Corps Pershing tanks, along with air support from Corsair fighter-bombers
- Air support does not have suitable staying power to effectively counter opposition armor
Armored vehicles also provide more effective infantry support in urban warfare
- As the US found out in Vietnam, light armored vehicles can be crucial in providing the direct fire support infantry needs to advance on fortified positions
- The M50 Ontos provided effective fire support for US troops in the battle to recapture Hue City during the Tet Offensive
- In urban operations, tanks do not have the fuel limitations, vulnerability to anti-aircraft weaponry or potential for collateral damage that aircraft have
  - But they are vulnerable to anti-tank weaponry
  - That said, I do agree with the author -- tanks are going to be less vulnerable in a "high-end" conflict than aircraft
  - The reason tanks have fared so poorly in Syria is because the Syrian air-defenses were never really that great to begin with, and defections and capture by rebels degraded them further
  - Simultaneously, while Russia and Iran have given Syria infantry and armor support, they have not extended an air-defense umbrella over Syria, choosing instead to guard specific units and locations
  - As a result, it's possible that we're overestimating the effectiveness of air power against armor on a modern battlefield, simply because the ground forces are not being allowed to shoot back
The Marine Corps cannot rely on the US Army to provide armor support
- US Army logistics is not rapid or flexible enough to support the Marine Corps
- During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Marine Corps had to rely on the Army to provide logistical support for its tanks, with unsatisfactory results
- In addition, the Army is likely to be downsizing its own tank forces, in the face of ongoing budgetary difficulties and increasing maintenance costs of 30-year-old M1s, further decreasing the likelihood of the Marine Corps getting priority in armor support
- During the Gulf War, the Marines' own tank forces allowed them to simultaneously conduct a ground offensive while also conducting amphibious operations to prevent the Iraqis from repositioning
As a result, it makes sense for the Marines to have their own light tank
- Something like the M8 Armored Gun System could be used to ensure that the Marines have adequate ground firepower, without the weight or complexity of a M1
  - So, in other words, the Marines should have tanks, but they should be light tanks
  - I think this makes a certain amount of sense
  - The Chinese have the Type 15 light tank, mainly for operations in the India/China border region, where mountainous terrain precludes the deployment of their primary Type 99 main battle tanks
  - While the Chinese light tanks are primarily intended for use against India, I could see them forming the core of an amphibious armored formation that would be helpful in e.g. an invasion of Taiwan
While it does makes sense for the Marine Corps to refocus on amphibious warfare with a focus on China, it doesn't make sense for it to abandon tanks
A platform like the M8 Armored Gun System can provide a substantial amount of firepower cost effectively
Substantially raises the effectiveness of the Marine Corps in island warfare, urban warfare and in open maneuver
While it is clear that the Marine Corps' armor must downsize, it's not clear that it must be eliminated