What The Attack on Saudi Arabia's Oil Facilities Teaches Us
Originally published on ASPI Strategist
Summary
- We take precision for granted in modern warfare, but true precision strike capability requires sophisticated infrastructure
- Targeting and intelligence is even more important than having precise weapons
- Without good targeting data, you get "precision misses" like India's strikes in Balakot
- Weapons precisely hit the coordinates they are give
- However, the coordinates are wrong, due to failures of intelligence and reconnaissance
- The Saudi Air Force, despite being armed with the best in precision-guided munitions that the West can sell, has not mastered precision warfare
- Many of the more egregious instances of mass civilian casualties in Yemen stem from Saudi incompetence, rather than cruelty
- Poor targeting
- Insufficient intelligence
- Lack of training and familiarity with weapons systems
- In contrast, the 9/14/2019 attacks on Saudi Arabia demonstrated greater precision, even though they were carried with less sophisticated weapons
- Precision resulted from much better surveillance and targeting prior to attack
- Attacker did not hit random portions of the oil facility -- components were carefully chosen to maximize the damage inflicted
- Flaring and pipeline fires elsewhere along the Saudi coastline indicated significant second-order effects
- It's possible that the Houthis would have had the necessary expertise to carry out this attack -- Yemen does have some smaller refineries which are under Houthi control
- It's certain that the Iranian government has the necessary expertise to carry out this attack
- Each individual target was hit very precisely -- can see in satellite images that storage tanks hundreds of meters apart were hit in exactly the same way
- Suggests that GPS guidance was used
- Also indicates that the attacker had access to detailed, high-resolution imagery tagged with geospatial metadata
- The imagery was likely provided by an a party with access to sophisticated space-based ISR
- Has to be either Russia or China
- Probably Russia, because China has relatively few incentives to cause a spike in oil prices
- Iran may have reappropriated data that was shared by Russia, without Russian knowledge
- Just as significant as the attack was that Saudi Arabia was completely unable to defend against it
- Saudi Arabia has an entire arm of their military devoted to air defense, yet the attacker was still able to mount a strike against a highly important facility
- The above evidence indicates that the adversary has the following capabilities
- Precision weapons and delivery mechanisms
- Ability to carry out long-term "effects-based" planning -- adversary has enough planning, analysis and intelligence gathering resources to work backwards from desired effects to targets
- Ability to pick and choose weapons systems in order to inflict desired effects on targets
- Stealth, or at least the ability to evade Saudi air defenses
- For all of these reasons, we should think that this attack was carried out by the Iranian state, rather than the Houthis
- We can also posit the (possibly unknowing) backing of another great power (probably Russia)
- This strike provides clear evidence that the gap between Western militaries and second-tier powers like Iran is narrowing when it comes to long-range precision strike
- Western militaries have gotten used to air supremacy -- Western ground units don't worry about being attacked from the air
- While Western aircraft are still superior, it is increasingly feasible to get the same effects as an airstrike using drones, cruise missiles and conventionally armed ballistic missiles
My Thoughts
- I agree with many of the conclusions of the piece, but I think it overstates Saudi competence and understates the possibility of human intelligence
- I think it's more likely that the Iranians got their information from people on the ground (or corporate espionage) than through satellite imagery
- Iran has a long record of using relatively cheaper human intelligence as a way of equalling adversaries superior electronic intelligence capabilities
- As westerners, we need to be careful of the mode of thinking where we say, "This is how we would have done X, therefore it is how our adversaries have accomplished X."
- Overstatement of Saudi competence
- I don't think you need to do anything special to evade Saudi air defenses
- Saudi military has a long and sordid history of being used primarily for prestige, nepotism and sinecures
- Has only been called upon to serve as an actual fighting force very recently, and it shows
- Saudis are well equipped but don't have a coherent doctrine, have relaxed training schedules and rely on Westerners to maintain their equipment (the article itself points this out)
- Saudis are more akin to a Soviet client-state than they are to a "proper" US ally like the UK or Israel
- I do agree that this attack highlights how much convergence has occurred in precision-strike capability between Western armed forces and non-Western armed forces
