Chinese Amphibious Warfare: Prospects For A Cross-Strait Invasion

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Editors:
Andrew S. Erickson
Connor M. Kennedy
Ryan D. Martinson

Foreword

• In August 2022, the PRC conducted a series of military exercises that encircled Taiwan
  • Live-fire drills
  • Air sorties
  • Naval deployments
  • Ballistic missile tests
• These provocations will continue as long as Xi Jinping wishes to send the message that China has the capability and willingness to use the PLA to unify China and Taiwan by force
• However, in order to succeed in this, the PLA will have to accomplish the hardest task a military can undertake: an opposed amphibious landing
• The last time any military accomplished this successfully was the United States, when it landed troops at Inchon in 1950
• The PLA must transport thousands of troops and their equipment approximately 100 miles across the Taiwan Strait
• Must land them on the few beaches that are suitable for such a large body of troops
• Has to move inland into a mountainous island with rugged terrain
• Has to accomplish this task in the face of an American and Taiwanese military that has been preparing for this eventuality for 70 years
  • I think that's overstating the case
  • For the vast majority of those 70 years, neither the US nor Taiwan spared much thought to the prospect of an invasion from the mainland
  • It was clear until very recently that China had neither the military capacity nor political inclination to launch an invasion
  • It's only since the late '90s that China has had an economy that could build up the naval power to make an invasion possible
  • It's only since 2008, with Xi Jinping's ascent to Chinese leadership, that the PRC has actually started working towards building out a military capable of carrying out this task
  • On the other side, I don't think that the Taiwanese government has seriously considered the possibility of an invasion aimed at forcible reunification until recently
  • For much of the last 30 years, Taiwan has increased its economic ties with the mainland, even as the PRC's rhetoric towards Taiwan has sharpened
  • I think Taiwan started taking the prospect of an invasion seriously after two things
    • Suppression of pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong
    • Russian invasion of Ukraine
• Most of the analysis of a potential invasion scenario covers the political, diplomatic, and informational factors leading up to an invasion
• Far less studied is whether the Chinese military actually has the ability to successfully carry the invasion out
• This is because, unlike analyses of political decision making, assessments of warfighting capacity require careful consideration of a wide variety of interacting systems
  • Maritime operations
  • Aerospace operations
  • Cyberwarfare
  • Logistics and supply chains
  • Weather, tides and currents
• From May 4 to May 6, 2021 the US Naval War College's China Maritime Studies Institute assembled a collection specialists for a conference on large-scale amphibious warfare in Chinese military strategy
• This book is the final volume produced by that conference
• Authors look at the key elements needed for a PRC attack on Taiwan to succeed
  • Weapons
  • Technology
  • Doctrine
  • Logistics
• Attempt to answer how ready China is to employ its most advanced military capabilities on a large scale for the first time in its history since 1979
• This volume is timely because the war in Ukraine shows that technological capability does not automatically translate into military might
  • Doctrine matters
  • Logistics matter
  • Morale matters
  • The enemy always gets a vote!
• This volume attempts to provide a baseline evaluation of Chinese amphibious warfare capabilities, from which we can build to incorporate lessons from Ukraine

Introduction: Taking Taiwan By Force? Chinese Amphbious Warfare In the New Era

• Taiwan and mainland China are separated by the Taiwan Strait
  • Approximately 81 miles across at its narrowest point
  • The presence of this sea barrier has prevented an armed resolution to the Chinese Civil War
• Over the past several decades, the Chinese PLA has sought to increase its ability to project power over water
• This presents a major threat to Taiwanese security and threatens to upend peaceful cross-strait relations
• This volume examines 5 different aspects of Chinese readiness to conduct an amphibious operation to take Taiwan
  1. Doctrinal foundations of Chinese amphibious warfare
  2. The "Joint Amphibious Force"
  3. Enablers of Amphibious Warfare
  4. Scenario Factors
  5. Implications

Doctrinal Foundations of Chinese Amphibious Warfare

• Start with the historical experiences that both Chinese and foreign militaries have had with amphibious warfare
  • Shi Lang's successful conquest of Taiwan during the Qing Dynasty
  • Lang defeated a Ming loyalist commander, Zheng Chenggong who had ruled Taiwan for 20 years after expelling a Dutch colonial presence
  • Shi assembled a force of 300 junks and 21,000 men
  • After defeating Zheng's fleet near the Pengchu Islands, Shi conducted a largely uncontested landing and led a military campaign that subdued Taiwan
  • Although Shi's campaign holds few practical lessons for a modern invasion of Taiwan, the Chinese Communist Party has used it to justify China's historical claims to Taiwan
  • The historical precedent serves to raise morale and remind Chinese audiences that China has invaded Taiwan in the past, and could do so again in the future
• Examine the PLA's existing experiences with amphibious warfare
  • Failed campaign to sieze Kinmen Island in 1949
  • Successful attacks on Hainan and Yijiangshan in 1950 and 1955
• How have Western analyses of amphibious landings influenced Chinese thinking
  • Chinese plans for amphibious assault emphasize the following six pillars
    1. Dominance of the air, sea and information domains
    2. Precision strikes on key points
    3. Concentration of "elite strengths"
    4. Rapid and continuous assaults
    5. Integrated and flexible support operations
    6. Psychological warfare
  • All of these have analogs in Western doctrine on amphibious assaults developed during World War 2

The Joint Amphibious Force

• Examine the four main components of the PLA's joint amphibious force
  1. Amphibious units of the PLA's ground forces (PLAGF)
  2. PLA Navy (PLAN) Marine Corps (PLANMC)
  3. PLAN amphibious fleet
  4. Civilian support fleet
• As a result of reforms carried out in 2017, the PLA Ground Force possesses six amphibious combined arms brigades (ACABs)
  • Despite further efforts to modernize, readiness is hampered by conscript-heavy units and lack of combined-arms training above the battalion level
  • While the PLAGF's amphibious brigades could sieze contested islands, they are unlikely to be able to carry out an invasion of Taiwan itself
• The PLAGF's amphibious brigades would be supplemented by the PLA Marine Corps
  • The Marine Corps has been designated as an expeditionary force tasked with protecting China's offshore interests
  • Has tripled in size in recent years
  • Consists of 8 brigades
  • Would be expected to participate in any large-scale assault on Taiwan
  • The PLANMC would be tasked with conducting advance operations to create favorable conditions for the main invasion force
  • Focus on smaller-scale landings throughout objective areas
  • The PLANMC includes mechanized ground and air assault battalions, so it might also be tasked with helping follow-on operations in urban areas for example
• The PLAN will support any invasion with its amphibious assault ships
  • Consist of 10 ships total
    • 8 amphibious transport docks (LPDs)
    • 2 helicopter assaults ships (LHAs), with a third under construction
    • 30 tank landing ships (LSTs)
    • 20 medium landing ships (LSMs)
    • Many smaller landing craft
  • Recently the PLAN has prioritized production of larger amphibious assault ships better suited to supporting operations farther overseas
  • Reflects a balanced approach to force modernization that emphasizes creating a naval force capable of addressing a wide range of contingencies across the globe
  • However, China has tremendous shipbuilding capabilty and could surge production of smaller amphibious assault vessels necessary for a Taiwan invasion
• In addition to its own shipping, the PLA is expected to requisition a substantial number of civilian transport vessels
  • This should not be viewed as a "stopgap" capability
  • The integration of nominally civilian vessels is a key component of the PLA's invasion strategy
  • These ships would likely be operated by China's maritime militia, which consists of reservists whose day jobs are in civilian shipping
  • Chinese sources acknowledge the challenges in using maritime militia to man civilians vessels in support of a military operation
    • Uneven levels of training
    • Incomplete laws and regulations
    • Inadequate data sharing
    • Widespread use of flags of convenience
  • However, they also state that these civilian vessels could fulfill many important supporting roles
    • At-sea support
    • Force delivery
    • Over-the-shore logistical support
    • Helicopter relay stations
    • Early warning
    • Deception and concealment
  • It is possible that the Chinese maritime militia is sufficient to enable a cross-strait invasion

Enablers of Amphibious Warfare

• Consider the other forces that would support a cross-strait invasion
• PLA Airborne Corps
  • Consists of six combined arms brigades and one special operations brigade
  • PLA paratroopers' role would be to land behind enemy lines and seize important terrain
  • Questions remain about the Airborne Corps' ability to coordinate with other invasion forces
• PLA Ground Force helicopter units
  • The PLA has invested heavily in growing its helicopter units
  • However these units are not sufficient to carry out a "lightning invasion" on their own
• Special operation forces
  • Like special operation forces in other nations, these units would infiltrate prior to an invasion
  • Would provide intelligence and targeting data
  • Conduct strikes and raids to disrupt enemy formations and logistics
  • As with the airborne forces, questions exist about the ability of Chinese SOF to coordinate with regular military units
  • There are also questions about the Chinese SOF's proficiency with advanced equipment
• Mine warfare
  • The PLA has a large inventory of sea mines
  • These would be used to block the sea lanes around Taiwan prior to an invasion
    • Isolate Taiwan from international trade
    • Make it more complicated for allies to assist
  • PLA mine deployments might even extend as far as Japan
    • Compel Japanese neutrality
    • Make it more complicated for US ships sailing from Japan to assist Taiwan
  • During an invasion, the emphasis would shift from offensive minelaying to defensive mineclearing
    • PLA mine countermeasures (MCM) units would lead the way, clearing mines and enabling other PLA units to reach the invasion beaches
    • Little is known about the capabilities of these units
    • The PLA has acquired new minesweeping vessels and mine hunting remotely operated vehicles (ROVs)

Scenario Factors

• What are some of the Taiwan-specific factors that would be important to China's success in a potential invasion
• Ideology
  • The Chinese government sees reunification with Taiwan as the last chapter of an unfinished civil war
  • As a result, the Chinese government is likely to take a formal, legalistic approach to justifying a war for reunification
    • Use domestic law to legitimize actions
    • Start with law enforcement actions and economic coercion
  • Move slowly in order to not shock public opinion
  • The Chinese government's efforts to shape the ideological battleground could span years
  • I would argue that these efforts began years ago
• Confidence
  • Chinese strategists recognize that air and sea supremacy is vital to enable a cross-strait invasion
  • We do not have access to their internal assessments of the PLA's ability to create these preconditions
  • However, an inventory of the sensors and shooters available to the PLA in a near-term Taiwan conflict scenario indicate that the PLA has moderate confidence in its ability to maintain air supremacy, but high confidence in its ability to establish localized sea control
• Logistics
  • Use the PLA's Operational Logistics Report to assess the challenges that the PLA would face with supplying an invasion force across the strait
    • Materiel (food, petroleum, etc)
    • Medical treatment
    • Infrastructure support
  • In 2017, when the report was published, the authors found weaknesses across a range of logistical functions
    • Inadequate transport capacity
    • Insufficient reserve forces
  • At present it seems tha that the PLA's logistics are still insufficient to support an invasion force
• Use of ports for invasion
  • Conventional wisdom holds that the PLA would seek to invade Taiwan across beaches
  • However, there are only a limited number of suitable beaches that could provide access for a substantial invasion force
  • An alternative scenario is that China could mount an amphibious or air assault operation to seize a Taiwanese port, and disembark the bulk of its invasion force through the port
• Commercial vessels
  • The PLA plans to use commercial vessels to support a potential Taiwan invasion
  • China's fleet of commercial cargo vessels is presently insufficient to support an invasion force
  • However, China is making progress towards having sufficient commercial logistical capacity

Implications

• What does all this mean for the US and Taiwanese militaries?
• Chinese and US amphibious warfare doctrines are moving in opposite directions
  • Prior to 2017, the PLAN Marine Corps largely focused on defending PRC-occupied islands and reefs
  • However, with the PLAN's construction of amphibious assault vessels, the PLANMC is embracing an amphibious assault doctrine reminiscent of the US Marine Corps after World War 2
  • Meanwhile, the US Marine Corps is refocusing on defending advanced bases
• The US and Japan should develop specific plans to deconflict their forces during the a potential conflict
• Space-based support will be degraded for all participants in a conflict — the side that prevails will be the one that operates better in a battlespace deprived of space-based support
• Taiwan must make itself harder to attack
  • Use China's own Anti-access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy against it
  • Target specific weaknesses in the Chinese military

Overall Findings

• Taiwan has shockingly little margin for error
• However, there is still time to build up forces to deter an invasion, or defeat an invasion if deterrence fails
• Beijing keeps strengthening relevant capabilities
  • Chinese missile development faces fewer geopolitical constraints than in the US, and might already be more advanced in some areas
  • Chinese sea mine capabilities are clearly superior to those of the US and Taiwan
• However, the Chinese military still faces significant weaknesses
  • Little experience with joint operations
  • Lack of combat experience
  • Although it would be the natural choice to lead an amphibious invasion, the PLANMC doesn't appear to be optimizing itself for that role
  • Instead the lead amphibious elements are still likely to be PLAGF units
  • Logistics remain a significant weakness
  • Air and helicopter also remains a weakness, especially with regards to coordination with ground forces
  • Although China has built large amphibious assault vessels, these appear to be intended to support expeditionary operations overseas, not to facilitate a cross-strait invasion
  • Although the PLA has a lot of weapons platforms, its sensor capabilities remain relatively weak and vulnerable
• Taiwan's terrain, in both land and sea, offer significant advantages to the defender
• Taiwan must redouble its efforts to build a "porcupine" defense

Part 1: Doctrinal Foundations of Chinese Amphibious Warfare

Chapter 1: Shi Lang's Amphibious Conquest of Taiwan in 1683

• In 1683, Qing admiral Shi Lang successfully conquered Taiwan
• Does his successful invasion hold any lessons for the present day?

Shi Lang in Brief

• Born into a prominent family in Fujian
• Became a senior captain with the Zheng clan, initially affiliated with the Ming Dynasty
• Served under Koxinga (Zheng Chenggong)
• However, after Koxinga ignored Shi Lang's advice regarding the defense of Xiamen, Shi Lang snubbed Koxinga, resulting in his imprisonment
• Shi Lang escaped custody and defected to the Qing in 1651
• Defeated on the mainland by the Qing, Koxinga retreated to Taiwan where he established a Ming successor state
• However, in 1683, Shi Lang invaded and extinguished the Ming successor state, unifying all of China under the Qing
• Shi Lang was successful in lobbying the Qing emperor to annex Taiwan to Fujian province, and became governor of the unified entity in 1684
• However, his efforts to resurrect the Zheng trading fleets were less successful
• Shi Lang's legacy has been interpreted in a variety of different ways in modern China
  • Celebrated for his naval competency and unifying the mainland and Taiwan
  • Castigated for his traitorous act of defection

Chinese Ming-Qing Civil War and European Arrivals in East Asia

• During the 17th century the Ming Dynasty, headed by the Zhu family was increasingly pressured by Manchu tribes
• In 1644 the Ming dynasty collapsed when the Manchu occupied Beijing and established the Qing dynasty
• The last Ming emperor, Chongzen, committed suicide just outside the Forbidden City
• Ming partisans retreated to Nanjing, in southern China to consolidate their resistance
• Although the Manchu occupied Nanjing in 1645, one year after their conquest of Beijing, Ming supporters conducted a fighting retreat in southern China and eventually moved offshore to Taiwan
• The Manchu killed the last Ming claimant to the throne in 1662
• However, the final conquest of the Ming would not occur for another 22 years, when Taiwan was finally conquered
• The primary support for the Ming-in-exile in Taiwan came from Koxinga, a powerful leader of the Zheng clan, based on the Fujian coast
• Koxinga led two expeditions to expel the Qing from Nanjing in the 1650s
• Although these expeditions failed, Koxinga was successful in driving the Dutch from Taiwan in the early 1660s — this greatly suprised European observers
• However, after ruling Taiwan for more than 20 years, the last Zheng family loyalists were defeated in a naval battle near the Penghu Islands in the Taiwan Strait, in 1683
• Following this defeat, the last Ming holdouts subjected themselves to Qing rule
• During this time, when China was riven by civil war, new European arrivals sought to gain access to China, Japan and the East Indies
  • Dutch — Jakarta
  • Portuguese — Macao
  • Spanish — Manila
• During the 1590s, Dutch merchants mounted a series of expeditions to the sources of many spices, notably pepper, cutting out Javanese middlemen
• Profits in the spice trade were very high — up to 400% — leading to fierce competition among European powers
  • In 1600, the English set up the East India Company (EIC)
  • In response, the Dutch set up the Vereenigde Oostindische Companigne (VOC) in 1602
  • Both the EIC and the VOC issued shares to the general public, establishing themselves as the forerunners to modern multinational corporations
• These companies possessed quasi-governmental powers
  • Negotiate treaties
  • Maintain armies and forts
  • Wage war
  • Try, imprison, and even execute people for crimes
  • Establish colonies
  • Issue coinage
• During the early 1600s, the Dutch competed primarily with the Portuguese for influence in the East Indies
  • Attacked Macao directly in 1622, which failed to drive the Portuguese from the territory
  • Established a trading center on the Penghu Islands
  • Were forced to move to Taiwan by the Chinese (I'm guessing it was the Ming Dynasty that forced them to move)
  • In 1641 the Dutch displaced the Portuguese from Nagasaki, establishing the only officially authorized European trading post in Japan
  • That same year, the Dutch also displaced the Portuguese from Malacca, establishing themselves firmly as the predominant European power in the seas around China
  • By the latter half of the 17th century, East and Southeast Asia were dominated by the Dutch
  • This dominance over the spice trade made the VOC the richest private organization in the West, and allowed it to nearly bankrupt the English EIC
  • However, during the 18th century, the Netherlands gradually lost sea power to England, and eventually the VOC was displaced by the EIC, before eventually being dissolved in 1799

The Zheng Clan and Koxinga

• Despite the Ming dynasty's overall decline during the 1600s, the Zheng clan of the Fujian coast controlled the maritime trade routes between Java and Japan
• The most successful of these Zheng merchants were Zheng Zhilong and his son Zhen Chenggong (Koxinga)
• The revenues of the Zheng clan were even higher than those of the VOC
• Zheng Zhilong took a Japanese wife, the daughter of a samurai, on one of his visits to Kyushu, and there the couple had a son, Zhen Chenggong
• Zheng Chenggong was trained in the samurai arts before being trained in the Chinese classics
• Longwu, the Ming emperor-in-exile bestowed upon Chenggong the name Koxinga, meaning "he of the royal surname"
• Zheng Zhilong estranged himself from his son by defecting to the Qing in 1646, just after their conquest of Beijing

Koxinga's Naval Expeditions Against the Qing and the Dutch

• Beginning in 1655, Koxinga conducted a series of successful campaigns to control the coastline in northern Fujian and Zheijang provinces
• In 1658 and 1659, emboldened by these successes, Koxinga led two campaigns to retake Nanjing
• The first attempt failed because of storms
• The second failed because Koxinga failed to press his advantage when beseiging Nanjing, allowing Qing reinforcements to arrive and chase him from the city
• As Koxinga retreated before the Qing counterattack, he decided to relocate his headquarters from the Xiamen and Jinmen islands further offshore to Taiwan
• Although his commanders objected, as they felt that Taiwan was too wild and underdeveloped, Koxinga favored Taiwan because of its greater size and the fact that it could only be accessed by sea
• From 1661 to 1662 Koxinga waged a series of sieges on the Dutch forts of Provintia and Zeelandia, eventually driving the Dutch back to Batavia in early 1662
• However, less than 5 months after his success in driving the Dutch from Taiwan, Koxinga died of a sudden illness
• His son Zheng Jing held off repeated counterattacks by the Dutch and the Qing, led by Shi Lang
• After Zheng Jing passed away in 1681, his son, Zheng Keshuang lost to Shi attack in 1683

Shi Lang's Amphibious Operations Against the Ming on Taiwan

• After Koxinga captured Taiwan from the Dutch in 1662, the Dutch attempted to ally with the Qing, and asked Shi Lang to retake Taiwan from Zheng Jing
• Shi scheduled two invasion dates, but on both occasions, operations were halted because of the threat of typhoons
• In 1664, the Qing appointed Shi Lang as the commander of the Fujian navy and tasked him with capturing Taiwan for the Qing
• However, this attack too was foiled by a typhoon
• In 1667, Zheng Jing, Koxinga's son, attempted to gain recognition for Taiwan as a separate state by opening negotiations with the Qing
• Simultaneously, he sought an alliance with the Japanese, who were sympathetic to the Zheng, as Koxinga had been half-Japanese and related to Japanese nobility
• At this time, Shi Lang and the other Ming defectors, such as Zheng Zhilong, came under suspicion and were placed under house arrest
• This confinement lasted until Zheng Zhilong's death in 1683, at which point Shi Lang was restored as commander of naval forces in Fujian
• Shi Lang's power increased further when, after a dispute with the governor of Fujian, the Qing emperor Kanxi granted Shi Lang total control over all military decisions and authorized him to conquer Taiwan for the Qing
• On July 7, 1683, Shi Lang sailed from Fujian to attack the Ming fleet stationed at the Penghu Islands
• The Ming fleet was caught unprepared because it thought an attack during typhoon season was unlikely
• Armed with superior cannon provided by the Dutch, Shi Lang secured a decisive victory
• Shi Lang took many prisoners, whom he provided food for, contrasting with the famine faced by Zheng defenders on Taiwan
• After the defeat of the Penghu Island fleet, Zheng military commanders were divided on what to do, with many advocating a further retreat to Manila
• This enabled Shi Lang to sail almost unopposed into Tai Bay, and on August 26 1683, Zheng Keshuang surrendered Emperor Yongli's royal seals and presented himself with a Manchu-style shaved head, signaling unconditional surrender
• In October, Shi Lang proclaimed a general amnesty for all former Ming supporters who recognized the Qing victory, an offer that was accepted by most former Ming loyalists on Taiwan
• In February 1684, seeking to reinforce his own trading monopoly and prevent Taiwan from being used as a base for further insurgency, Shih Lang petitioned the Qing throne to formally annex Taiwan
• In March 1684, this request was granted, and Emperor Kangxi annexed Taiwan to Fujian province
• However, in November 1684, Emperor Kangxi lifted the maritime trading ban on the coast of China, ending Shi Lang's monopoly
• Shi Lang's wealth and influence would decline steadily until his death in 1696
• The geography of the Penghu Islands, Jinmen and Xiamen have been relevant for all invasions of Taiwan
  • The Dutch established a fort on the Penghu Islands in 1622 before being forced onto Taiwan by the Chinese in 1624
  • Koxinga used the Penghus as a staging ground for his attack on the Dutch in Taiwan in 1662
  • Shi Lang attacked the Ming stationed in the Penghu Islands first, in 1683
  • In the 1800s, the French Navy used the Penghus as base from which to attack Taiwan
  • In 1895 the Japanese captured the Penghus in the last battle of the Sino-Japanese War, solidifying their control over Taiwan pursuant to the Treaty of Shimonoseki
  • The Penghus offer a large deep water harbor 30 miles off the coast of Taiwan and 70 miles off the coast of mainland China
  • Capturing the Penghus greatly simplifies the logistics of any power that seeks to invade or isolate Taiwan
  • So, by implication, in order to repel an invasion or blockade, maintaining control of the Penghu Islands is imperative for Taiwan
• Jinmen and Xiamen also play a significant role in controlling the Fujian coast and maintaining control over the Taiwan Strait
  • Although these islands are close together, Jinmen is in Taiwanese hands while Xiamen belongs to the PRC
  • In October 1949, at the Battle of Guningtou, Nationalist forces decisively defeated pursuing Communist forces in their attempt to drive the Nationalists off Jinmen
  • Jinmen also played a key role during the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1958

Parallels Between Seventeenth Century Taiwan and Twenty-First Century Taiwan

• There are parallels to be drawn between the Ming-Qing and Nationalist-Communist civil wars
  • Conflict moved from north to south on the mainland
  • Taiwan became the last refuge of the party that was defeated on the mainland
• Koxinga is celebrated by both Taiwanese and mainland Chinese
  • On the mainland, he is venerated as the hero who liberated Taiwan from the Dutch
  • On Taiwan, he is remembered for his valiant resistance against the mainland Qing
  • Both sides credit Koxinga with making Taiwan part of the Chinese empire
  • Koxinga is seen as preventing Taiwan from becoming a European-ruled island like the Philippines or Indonesia
• Just as Koxinga opposed the Dutch in the 17th Century, Chiang Kai-shek opposed the Japanese in the 20th
  • Chiang is given credit in both Western and Chinese scholarship for his role in defeating the Japanese
  • Then, just like Koxinga, Chiang was driven from the mainland and made Taiwan his refuge
  • Both the PRC and the ROC draw parallels between Chiang's and Koxinga's retreat to Taiwan
  • The PRC in addition emphasizes the eventual capture of Taiwan by Shi Lang
  • Is it possible that Xi Jinping sees himself as a modern-day Shi Lang?

Conclusion

• During the 17th century rising Qing power eclipsed the declining Ming in land-based operations
• Qing occupied Beijing in 1644, and within a year had consolidated control of China north of the Yangzi River
• However, through the Zheng clan, the Ming retained control of the sea, operating from their bases in Xiamen and Jinmen
• This enabled Koxinga's fleet to attack Nanjing in 1659 and the Dutch on Taiwan in 1661
• Following Koxinga's death in 1662, the power of the Ming fleet declined and Taiwan was eventually overrun by the Qing, led by Shi Lang, in 1683
• Today, China's military power, especially in the sea and air domains, is expanding rapidly relatively to Taiwan
• Another parallel between the 17th Century and today is the capability of leadership on the Chinese mainland
  • Qing emperor Kangxi ruled from 1661 to 1722, the longest single reign in Chinese history
  • State grew increasingly powerful and centralized under his rule
  • Took power at the age of 7, with regents and the empress wielding power in his name for the first seven years of his rule
  • Consolidated his rule by the late 1660s
  • Authoritatively directed Shi Lang to retake Taiwan
  • Similarly, Xi Jinping has emerged as a powerful, centralizing ruler in mainland China
• Another lesson from the 17th century is that operational leadership in the field is key
  • Koxinga learned from his campaigns against Nanjing and attacked the Dutch much more aggressively
  • Later, Shi Lang used his extensive knowledge of Zheng naval practices to take the Zheng fleet by surprise in the Penghu Islands
• The Ming defense on Taiwan was hampered by lack of foreign support
  • Sought an alliance with the Japanese
  • However, by this time, the Japanese had committed to an isolationist foreign policy and refused to come to the aid of the Ming on Taiwan
  • Although the Qing sought an alliance with the Dutch to retake Taiwan, in the end Dutch support failed to materialize and was unnecessary
  • Although the US is currently strongly committed to defend Taiwan against aggression from the mainland, this commitment could waver in the future
• The three lessons from the case of Shi Lang and the Qing conquest of China are
  • Relative power matters
  • Leadership matters
  • Alliances matter
• Although there are many differences between 17th China and modern China, the conquest of Taiwan by Shi Lang provides a compelling historical narrative that informs the PRC's thinking about Taiwan

Chapter 2: What Did the PLA Learn From Its Jinmen, Hainan and Yijiangshan Landing Campaigns

• The Chinese Civil War was primarily a land campaign
• However, after gaining control of the mainland, the PLA did conduct several amphibious operations to gain control of offshore islands
• In 1949, the PLA unsuccessfully assaulted Jinmen (a.k.a. Kinmen or Quemoy)
• In 1950, the PLA successfully attacked Hainan
• The PLA also conducted a successful attack on Yijiangshan, which remains the PLA's only successful joint operation during the Cold War

Jinmen: A Failed Landing

• Mao Zedong founded the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949
• At this time there were still over a million Kuomintang (KMT) fighters in southwest China and on Taiwan
• In late 1949, Chiang Kai-shek moved the seat of his government to Taiwan, making Taipei the new capital of the Republic of China (ROC)
• Chiang prepared for Mao's attack by concentrating his forces on four major islands
  • 200,000 troops on Taiwan
  • 100,000 on Hainan
  • 120,000 on the Zhousan island group
  • 60,000 on Jinmen
• Jinmen is a small island group lying just two miles off the coast of mainland China
• Total land area of approximately 60 sq. mi.
• Had a civilian population of approximately 40,000 at that time
• Lies just off the coast of Xiamen, a major seaport on the southeast mainland — not in open ocean
• After capturing Xiamen on October 17, 1949 the 10th Army Group ordered the 28th Army to prepare for a landing operation against Jinmen
• Poor intelligence caused the 28th Army to pay insufficient attention to battle readiness
• The 28th Army launched its attack on Jinmen on October 24, 1949
• First wave consisted of 10,000 troops
• Found itself tightly encircled by the KMT garrison at Guningtou, a small village near the landing site
• The 28th Army could not apply the tactics that had led to success for the Communists in the past
  • Achieving surprise to avoid superior firepower
  • Outnumbering the enemy
  • Engaging in mobile operations
• The next morning, KMT air and naval forces destroyed 200 small fishing junks around Xiamen before they could be used land PLA reinforcements
• Without the ability to send reinforcements, the 10th Army Group could not reinforce the Jinmen landings
• The 28th Army lost 9,086 landing troops, with more than 3,000 of those troops being taken prisoner
• The KMT defenders lost only about a thousand men
• News of the disaster reached Beijing on October 28
• In response, Mao Zedong drafted a circular instructing his commanders to learn a good lesson from the failure at Jinmen
• PLA commanders took away four conclusions from the failed landings at Jinmen
  1. Cross-strait transportation is a key factor
  2. Coordination and communication are crucial
  3. Landing forces must outnumber the enemy defense
  4. Naval and air forces are necessary for large-scale amphibious campaigns
• The Deputy Commander of the Third Field Army, Su Yu, warned his generals that amphibious operations were a "new warfare" that was "different from all the wars we've fought before"
• The KMT came to different conclusions regarding the Communist failure at Jinmen
  • PLA troops had become arrogant after their victory at Xiamen and understimated the challenge of landing on Jinmen
  • Thought that the landing was successful as soon as they hit the beach, and did not have a plan to deal with counterattacks
  • Had only one landing point
  • Chose to attack in the early morning, allowing defenders to concentrate their firepower during the crucial first 24 hours of the landing
• According to the KMT, the PLA would have had more success in attacking Jinmen if they'd
  • Attacked in two or more places
  • At different times, preferably at night
  • With supporting firepower, especially antitank guns
• Another major factor hampering the Chinese attack was a simple lack of boats — the PLA did not have the boats to launch a second wave or provide major reinforcements to the first wave at Jinmen
• The PLA defeat at Jinmen helped convince the Nationalists that the KMT government could survive on Taiwan, as long as it built up strong defensive forces
• After the disaster at Jinmen, Mao Zedong issued orders changing how the PLA planned and prepared for amphibious landing operations
  1. Centralized national command
     • Landing require coordination across a wide range of military forces
     • Requires a centralized command to coordinate, plan and mobilize the resources needed
     • On October 31, 1949, Mao issued orders halting amphibious operations and instructing his commanders that future amphibious operations could only be authorized by field army headquarters, not local army group commands
  2. Dedicated landing force
     • Mao realized that amphibious operations require the transport of at least an entire field army (40-50,000 men) and supplies for at least three days of operations
     • In 1961 the Central Military Commission (CMC) organized a research group to study past landing campaigns in preparation for another attack on Chiang Kai-shek's forces
     • The conclusion of this group was that attacking forces must be numerically superior to local defenses
  3. More training
     • Su Yu was tasked with developing a training curriculum for large scale amphibious operations
     • In the process of developing this training, Su communicated to Mao that amphibious operations would be extremely difficult without air and sea control
  4. Naval and air support
     • In response to Su's recommendations, Mao created the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)
     • PLAAF was established on November 11, 1949
     • In December 1949, the Twelfth Army Group, Fourth Field Army was reorganized into the PLAN, with its commander, Xiao Jinguang, becoming the PLAN's first commander
• On December 16 1949, Mao visited the Soviet Union
  • Soviets agreed to a loan to arm the Chinese with ships and aircraft
  • Ships worth $150 million
  • $220 million worth of aircraft, with more aircraft requested in follow-up orders
  • Russian military advisers
  • These ships and aircraft would become the first equipment used by the PLAN and PLAAF respectively
  • However, they did not arrive in time for the PLA's landings on Hainan, and, as a result the PLAN and PLAAF were excluded from this operation
• I didn't realize that the PLAAF and PLAN were created specifically because of the failures of the PLA in conducting amphibious operations
• In a very real sense, the entire purpose of the PLA, since the founding of the PRC, has been to recapture Taiwan

The Hainan Landing and the Taiwan Invasion Plan

• In April 1950, having learned the lessons from the failure at Jinmen, the PLA attacked Hainan Island
• Operation was coordinated from PLA's high command
  • Planning started in January, when Mao instructed the CMC to "solve the problem of Hainan Island"
  • In February, the CMC presented a plan that would combine small and large-scale amphibious crossings in order to negate the Chinese Nationalists' air and naval superiority in the Qiongzhou Strait separating Hainan from the mainland
• The PLA concentrated a large invasion force, consisting of approximately 100,000 troops
• Included supporting elements such as artillery and combat engineers
• PLA also established coordination with guerilla elements on Hainan, consisting of approximately 20,000 men
• Collected over 2,100 fishing vessels and employed more than 6,000 civilian operators to provide cross-strait transportation
• From March 5 to 10, the 15th Army Group, 4th Field Army began small-scale night landings by sending battalion-sized groups across the Qiongzhou Strait
• These vanguard troops made contact with local guerillas and prepared landing sites for the main invasion force
• On the evening of April 16, the first wave of the main invasion force, consisting of 50,000 troops sailed towards Hainan
• This forces was detected by KMT air patrols and KMT sea and air forces moved to engage
• Through the night of the 16th, KMT warships attacked the PLA landing force, but failed to stop them, losing 1 ship sunk and two damaged in the process
• By the following morning, the PLA's invasion force had landed on Hainan
• The invasion force successfully engaged KMT defenses and secured the landing areas
• By April 22 the KMT's 252nd Division, the primary defensive force on Hainan, had been defeated, with the PLA capturing Haikou, the capital
• On April 23, the PLA sent over a second wave of 50,000 troops
• Hainan was fully captured by May 1
• The success of the operation against Hainan Island encouraged the PLA to prepare for a possible invasion of Taiwan in 1950
• Mao emphasized the training of additional airborne forces and authorized the organization of a further four amphibious divisions
• In late spring, the PLA's Third Field Army began preparations for a major amphibious operation against Taiwan
  • Would use the 7th, 8th and 9th Army Groups along with the nascent PLAN
  • Deploy over a half-million troops
  • A further 300,000 troops from the Fourth Field Army would act as reserve
• In May 1950, the 9th Army Group defeated nationalist forces on the Zhoushan island group
• In June of 1950 the same forces also captured the Dongshan and Wanshan island groups
• By late spring 1950, both the PLA and KMT expected a major attack, first against Jinmen and then later against Taiwan itself
• However, on June 25 1950, the Korean War broke out
• The Korean war took Mao and the Chinese leadership by surprise — neither the Soviets nor the North Koreans had warned them about the upcoming attack
• As a result the PRC was caught by surprise by the US policy shift in East Asia
• On June 27, President Truman announced the 7th Fleet's deployment to the Taiwan Strait as a preventive measure designed to stop Communist attacks on Taiwan
• The presence of the US Navy in the Taiwan Strait, along with US involvement in Korea, caused a significant recalculation on the part of the Chinese Communists
• On June 30, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai formally suspended invasion preparations against Taiwan, and the CMC sent word to the forces preparing for invasion that the invasion had been postponed until at least 1952
• The arrival of US forces in the Taiwan Strait signaled to the PRC that there was an international aspect to their heretofore internal struggle and that future plans against Taiwan would have to account for the actions of the United States

Yijiangshan: The First Joint Operation

• By 1953, the Chinese understood that they were unprepared for a full-scale war against the United States
• Instead, the PLA chose a strategy of "limited wars"
• Limited attacks in the Taiwan Strait to promote PRC interests while attempting to avoid conflict with the United States
• After the Korean armistice in 1953, the PLA planned a new amphibious campaign against KMT-held islands in the Taiwan Strait
• Zhang Aiping, head of the Zhejiang Command (ZC) in the East China Military Region (ECMR) proposed a piecemeal strategy where the PRC would capture offshore islands one at a time, starting with those farthest away from Taiwan and the US 7th Fleet
• Chose to begin with the Dachen Islands
  • Located in the East China Sea
  • Over 100 miles away from the 7th Fleet, which was posted to the South China Sea
  • Over 200 miles away from Taiwan
• After success in the Dachen Islands, Aiping planned to move south and attack larger islands
• In early May 1954, the PLA began preparing for a landing on Dongji, a group of islands north of the Dachens
• On May 15, PLA troops landed on the islands and eliminated the KMT garrison, capturing 60 prisoners in the process
• With this success, the CMC authorized the ECMR to proceed with the main attack on the Dachens
• The PLA used its lessons from Hainan and Jinmen in its attack against the Dachen Islands
  • Zhang established a joint command in the summer of 1954 in Ningbo
  • Command included officers from the air force, army and navy
  • Began detailed planning for the Dachen campaign on August 31, 1954
  • Sent infantry officers to the navy and air force for cross-training
• Zhang decided to attack Yijiangshan, a small islet north of the main Dachen islands, as the first target
• The landing was scheduled for noon of January 18, 1955, weather permitting
• The attack commenced with aerial bombardment at 8:00 am, with coastal artillery following up
• The pre-attack bombardment destroyed or damaged almost all the defenders' fortifications
• The landing occurred at around 12:15 pm, and by 5:30 pm the entire island was under PLA control
• Both sides suffered relatively heavy casualties for such a small engagement
  • The KMT lost its entire garrison of 1,086 men, with 567 killed and 519 taken prisoner
  • The PLA suffered 2,092 casualties, with 893 dead and 1,037 wounded
  • Nearly half of the first wave of PLA landing forces were killed or injured
  • The PLAN lost one landing craft, and suffered damage to 21 other ships
• The Yijiangshan operation was important because it was the first amphibious landing conducted as a joint operation with participation from land, air, and naval forces
• In addition, Yijiangshan showed that the PLA could conduct operations against the KMT without necessarily inviting US intervention
• Performance across PLA units was uneven during the landing
  • PLAAF units performed well
    • Staffed with pilots who had seen combat over Korea
    • Armed with advanced MiG-15 aircraft, which were significantly more capable than the KMT aircraft in the area
    • In six air engagements with KMT forces, the PLAAF shot down six KMT fighters while losing two of its own
  • PLAN units performed poorly
    • The PLAN also fought a number of engagements against KMT naval forces in the area around the Dachen islands
    • Although the PLAN was successful in pushing KMT forces away from the Dachen Islands, it lost the warship Ruijin, and several other ships were damaged
    • Chinese analysts believe that while strategic success was achieved, the PLAN failed operationally as it took unnecessarily high losses during the campaign

Conclusion

• PLAN amphibious doctrine evolved rapidly from 1949 to 1955
• Chinese generals were constantly adjusting to new information and assessing their own performance
• Learned not only from their own successes and failures, but also from observing US forces in Korea
• Demonstrated 4 key capabilities
  1. Planning
  2. Learning
  3. Adapting
  4. Political control
• Centralized preparations and operations and logistics
• Transitioned from army-led attacks to joint operations involving land, naval and air officers working in close collaboration
• However, PLA leadership was frustrated by the technological gap between itself and the United States, which committed itself to preserving Taiwanese independence
• The Korean War demonstrated the disparity between the PLA and the US military, and PLA generals were realistic about their ability to challenge the US Army, Navy and Air Force in a battle for Taiwan
• One lesson PLA leadership has carried forward from historical analysis of the amphibious landings from 1950-1955 is that success is eminently achievable if the US military does not intervene
• As a result, Chinese forces will likely attempt to first deter the US from intervening in a future Taiwan crisis

Chapter 3: The Six Pillars of PLA Amphibious Doctrine

• What are the guiding principles of the PLA's amphibious force?
• How would these princples apply in a potential Taiwan invasion scenario?

The PLAN's Current Amphibious Missions

• The PLAN is charged primarily with executing three missions
  1. Cross-strait invasion of Taiwan
  2. Asserting and defending Chinese maritime claims in the South China Sea
  3. Out-of-area ("far seas") operations in support of the Belt-and-Road Initiative — protecting Chinese national interests and evacuating Chinese citizens in the event of a crisis
• Of these three, by far the highest priority is given to the cross-strait invasion scenario

Core Principles of PLA Amphibious Doctrine

• Since 1949, the PLA has grappled with a set of problems related to amphibious operations
  • How to provide adequate air support
  • How to establish naval superiority
  • How to transport large numbers of troops across the strait
• To solve these problems, the PLA has studied its own history, other amphibious campaigns, and emulated the best practices of other navies
• By 2006, the PLA had adopted the following general doctrinal guidelines regarding amphibious operations
  • Forces must be organized into two distinct components, sea and land, under a single joint command
  • Air support must be provided to protect the landing force
  • Naval gunfire is required to suppress and/or destroy coastal defenses
  • Specialized landing vessels are required to actually put ground forces "on the beach"
  • Balance force composition between assault forces and reserves in order to crack enemy defenses, but also have sufficient follow-on forces to maintain momentum
  • Units must be loaded on transports such that they can disembark and engage in combat immediately
• By 2013, these general doctrinal guidelines had been refined into the following six principles

1. Dominance of the Three Domains

• In order an amphibious landing to be successful, the attacking force must have superiority in the air, on the water and on land at the point of landing
• A challenge in establishing this dominance is demarcating clear lines of authority
• Who is responsible for which domains, at which points during the operation?
• The British, in North Africa, had strong interservice disputes regarding whether command of air support should be centralized in the Royal Air Force, or whether ground forces and the Royal Navy could retain limited command over aircraft for specific operations
• In different theaters, the Allies came to different arrangements regarding the division of labor between sea, air and land domains
• However, over time, it became clear that successful operations established the following preconditions
  • Initial establishment of air superiority
  • Effective dominance by ground forces in land warfare and naval forces in the maritime domain
  • Close coordination between maritime, ground, and air forces
  • Ability to pass control back and forth between domains
• Contemporary PLA doctrine extends this concept of multidomain dominance into the information domain as well
• Emphasizes the need to degrade adversary command and control networks
• It's notable that the PLA is not yet confident in its ability to achieve this multidomain dominance
• PLAN Marine Corps journals have a number of articles discussing invasion scenarios which assume robust enemy capabilities in the air and on sea
  • Series of articles discussing how to best distribute anti-air weaponry on amphibious assault craft
  • Indicates that the PLAN Marine Corps is not confident in the PLAAF or PLAN's ability to keep adversary aircraft away from its ships during a landing operation
  • Or it's just contingency planning — the PLAN MC might be planning for an unlikely scenario because having a plan and not needing it is better than needing an plan and not having it

2. Key Point Strikes

• During World War 2, allied forces focused on using naval gunfire and air strikes to disable key points in enemy defenses
• The PLA has extended this doctrine to encompass attacking all elements of the adversary's defenses
  • Early warning systems
  • Command and control
  • Air defense systems
  • Air bases
  • Harbors
• In order to carry out these strikes, PLA doctrine calls for coordinated strikes using missiles, aircraft, and special forces
• Although the PLA has embraced the doctrine of key point strikes, it doesn't appear to have fully conceptualized how that doctrine would apply in an amphibious invasion scenario
• The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) has contributed personnel to PLA amphibious warfare exercise, suggesting that the PLA is integrating the PLARF's assets into its amphibious warfare plans
• However, studies by PLA researchers have also focused on placing surface attack capabilities on ships, armored vehicles and other more local assets, suggesting a certain lack of confidence in the PLARF's ability to strike and destroy key nodes ahead of an invasion

3. Concentration of Elite Strengths

• In World War 2, the Allies used both concentrated and dispersed landings
  • In North Africa and Sicily, dispersed landings were used, to better match ground campaign objectives and the geography of the landing areas
  • In the Pacific, the size and limited access paths to many Pacific atolls forced the US to concentrate its forces in order to overwhelm heavy Japanese defenses
• PLA doctrine has traditionally called for local superiority at the point of attack
• Therefore, the PLA's inclination is to concentrate its forces
• This tendency is further reinforced by Taiwan's geography, which offers only a few suitable landing beaches
• Concentrating elite strengths is synthesizing high quality troops, high-tech weaponry, and overwhelming material resources into a focused effort on key points in the attack
• Requires advanced command, control and intelligence gathering capabilities
• The goal is to achieve local overmatch of Taiwan's capabilities in one or more of the few landing areas
• Chinese military exercises have focused on developing these C2 capabilities
• Chinese C2 takes place primarily at the brigade level
  • Receives reconnaissance reports
  • Orders attacks on enemy artillery and missile positions
  • Coordinates the use of unmanned vehicles to break up fixed defenses and minefields
• The PLA is experimenting with computerized planning to optimize troop and weapons allocations across ships
• They are trying to create a modern version of the Normandy model, which centralized C2 of the entire allied force during Operation Overlord

4. Rapid and Continuous Assaults

• One of the primary challenges involved in amphibious landing operations is breaching concentrated enemy defenses and then moving inland rapidly with minimal operational pauses
• The PLA's solution to this challenge is to use an echeloned approach
• First wave will secure the beach and clear defenses
• Second wave will move inland
• The PLA is aware that mines, especially, could pose a significant risk to the second wave's ability to land and rapidly deploy for inland maneuver warfare
• In addition to the traditional defensive approaches that the US pursues (i.e. using trained personnel and unmanned vehicles to detect and disable mines), the PLA has explored offensive mining strategies, such as preemptively dropping mines into enemy harbors in order to limit enemy naval mobility in response to an amphibious invasion

5. Integrated and Flexible Support Operations

• Another major challenge of amphibious operations is supplying landing forces once they start to move inland
• The allies struggled with logistics in Operation Torch, with the initial landing forces unable to move inland because of a lack of trucks to supply them with fuel
• Japanese struggled so much with supplying their troops on Guadalcanal that it was nicknamed "Starvation Island"
• To support the D-Day landings, the allies set up a pipeline running from the Isle of Wight to the invasion beaches (PLUTO — Pipelines Under The Ocean) to supply additional fuel more efficiently
• The Chinese are aware that an invasion force on Taiwan will require a significant amount of logistical support
• To provide this support, the PLA calls for
  • Military-civilian integrated supply and logistical support system
  • Flexible and agile modes of support operations
  • Integration and unified command of the units providing logistical support
• This is an extremely difficult challenge, complicated by the fact that the PLA appears to be counting on integration with civilian organizations
• The PLA must also transition from its traditional warehouse-and-depot approach to combat service support in favor of one centered on just-in-time logistics
• According to most observers, the PLA has not sufficiently completed its logistics reforms
  • A particular point of concern for the PLA is the provision of medical care to a Taiwan invasion force
  • Another concern is supplying petroleum, oil, lubricants and spare parts
• To address these challenges, the PLA is studying the Allies' use of artificial harbors on the Normandy beaches
• Is developing computer models to predict supply and parts needs
• Is also developing computer models to determine how the military can efficiently use civilian sealift to transfer forces

6. Psychological Attacks

• A major component of the preparation for the Normandy landings was deception campaigns aimed at Nazi Germany to convince German generals that the landings would take place either in the Scandinavian countries or at Calais
• This deception campaign was comprehensive, involving the creation of a phantom army, complete with realistic message traffic, fabricated intelligence reports drafted by captured and turned German agents, false movements of troops and the appointment of General Patton as the commander
• After the invasion, Allied psychological operations shifted towards asserting the superiority of allied forces and encouraging local populations in France and Germany to engage in sabotage
• The PLA asserts that successful psychological warfare consists of the following three elements
  • Propaganda to affect the mood, morale and fighting spirit of defending soldiers and adversary citizens
  • Displays of overwhelming force and the willingness to use it, to terrify the opposing army
  • Deception, trickery and sleight-of-hand to fool enemy forces into believing an attack will take place at a different location
• The PLA specifically cites the Allies' Operation Body Guard, which they claim lulled the German defenders into believing that the invasion would not take place in Normandy
• The PLA also treats the use of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) as a means of psychological warfare — PGMs reduce the effect of fighting on the civilian population and make them more likely to surrender

Conclusion

• The PLA has accepted most Western findings related to amphibious warfare
  • The importance of maritime and air superiority
  • Establishing effective command and control
  • Loading ships and troops properly to minimize bottlenecks and ensure that landing forces have the materiel they require
  • Escorting amphibious forces and protecting them against enemy attack
  • Isolating the landing areas
  • Conducting preparatory naval strikes against on-shore targets
  • Splitting forces wisely between the initial assault and follow-on echelons
  • Developing specialized landing craft for amphibious functions
• The above six principles reflect the PLA's current thinking on amphibious warfare and, more specifically, the challenges of conducting an amphibious landing on Taiwan
• These principles reflect aspirations, not necessarily current capabilities

Part 2: The Joint Amphibious Force

Chapter 4: The PLAGF Amphibious Force

• One of the most important missions assigned to the PLA is deterring Taiwan from taking further steps towards independence
• If this deterrence fails, the PLA may be called upon to conduct a joint island landing campaign
• While there is little indication that a traditional over-the-beach landing is the first choice or even the first military choice for Chinese policmakers, the PLA is preparing to execute such an attack should other options fail
• The PLAGF's contribution to the Taiwan deterrence and war-fighting mission consists primarily of six amphibious combined arms brigades (ACABs)
• The three army groups stationed closest to Taiwan in the Eastern and Southern Theater Commands (TCs) have two each of these brigades
• The capabilities of these brigades have been enhanced by reforms that began in 2017
  • Increased capabilities of PLA helicopter units
  • More special-operations forces
  • More air defense
  • More long-range strike, via rocket launchers
• In an invasion scenario, these ACABs will be reinforced by other PLA ground units, as well as units from other services, militia forces and civilian assets
• In peacetime, these supporting forces are dispersed, and, as a result it will take the PLA days, if not weeks to move all necessary forces within striking distance of Taiwan and prepare for an assault
• I think this is still too optimistic — the Russians required the better part of six months to assemble the invasion force for Ukraine
  • That was a far simpler exercise — invading via roads over a land border
  • And it still wasn't enough — the invasion force was not powerful enough to take Kyiv in the opening weeks of the war, and Russia was not able to successfully execute a coup de main against the Ukrainian government
• If the PLA has learned anything from Ukraine, they'll be spending the better part of a year assembling the invasion force
• Once the invasion forces land, they will be faced with Taiwan's inhospitable terrain
  • Only a few beaches along Taiwan's west coast are suitable for an invasion
  • Once inland, the terrain quickly turns mountainous
  • Many rice paddies
  • Lots of urban sprawl
• In order to deal with these challenges, PLA leadership has sought to reform the PLAGF in order to shift the decisive phase of a Taiwan invasion away from an amphibious over-the-beach operation
• Instead they seek to use helicopter and airborne forces to seize key infrastructure ahead of time, paralyzing Taiwan's ability to respond to an amphibious invasion, when it comes
• However, a large scale assault by multiple ACABs may still be necessary

Order of Battle

• Prior to the 2017 reforms, PLAGF amphibious capabilities were concentrated in three units, all stationed on China's east coast
  • 1st Amphibious Mechanized Infantry Division, 1st Group Army (GA) — Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province (Nanjing military region)
  • 14th Amphibious Armored Brigade, 31st GA — Zhangzou, Fujian Province (Nanjing military region)
  • 124th Amphibious Infantry Divison, 42nd GA — Boluo, Guangdong (Guangzhou military region)
• In 2017, these units were disbanded
  • 1st Amphibious Mechanized and 124th Amphibious Infantry were each split into 2 ACABs
  • 14th Amphibious Armored was transformed into a fifth ACAB
  • The sixth ACAB was formed from elements of the former 91st Motorized Infantry Division, also based in Zhangzhou
• These units were transferred to new garrison locations, with the result that 4 ACABs report to the Eastern Theater Command and the remaining 2 report to Southern Theater Command
• The six new ACABs are assigned as follows

  Group Army	Brigade Name	Location
  72nd	5th ACAB	Hangzhou, Zhejiang
  	124th ACAB	Hangzhou, Zhejiang
  73rd	14th ACAB	Zhangzhou, Fujian
  	91st ACAB	Zhangzhou, Fujian
  74th	1st ACAB	Boluo, Guangdong
  	125th ACAB	Bao'an, Guangdong

PLAGF Amphibious Combined-Arms Brigades

• Each ACAB is structured similarly to a heavy combined-arms brigade
• Instead of tanks and APCs, they are assigned amphibious assault guns and amphibious IFVs
• Each ACAB is composed of
  • 4 combined-arms battalions
    • 2 amphibious assault gun companies
    • 2 amphibious mechanized infantry companies
    • Firepower company (mortars, man-portable air defense systems)
    • Support company (reconnaissance and combat engineering)
  • Reconnaissance batallion
    • Amphibious reconnaissance vehicles
    • UAVs
  • Artillery battalion
    • Amphibious 122mm howitzers
    • Amphibious rocket launchers
    • Antitank guided missile launchers

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