2022 Russia-Ukraine Conflict
Contents
Sources
The War
2022-12-16 Friday
- Near Svatove, the Russians attacked Stelmakhivka and Novoselivske
- Near Kreminna, the Russians attacked Ploshchanka, Chervonopopivka, Bilohorivka, and Hryhorivka
2022-12-15 Thursday
- Near Svatove, Russian sources report ongoing Ukrainian attacks against Novoselivske, Chervonopopivka, and Sofiivka
- Near Kreminna, Ukrainian forces continue to attack south of Dibrova
- Russian forces are reportedly attacking Bilohorivka from the south
- More fighting was reported near Verkhnokamyanske
- Near Bakhmut (1, 2)
- Near Donetsk, the Russians attacked Vesele, Marinka, Pobjeda and Novomykhailivka
- In Zaporizhzhia, the Ukrainian military struck targets in Polohy, Tokmak and Berdyansk
- A thread on why the Russians are attacking Bakhmut
- Bakhmut controls major highways running towards Slovyansk
- Controls a rail line towards occupied Luhansk
- Capturing Bakhmut makes it more difficult for Ukraine to hold Siversk
- The terrain behind Bakhmut is more conducive to offensive maneuvers
- Russia will likely launch a major offensive aimed at capturing Bakhmut in the spring
- The overall goal of this offensive will be to capture the remainder of Donetsk Oblast
- There is an inconsistency between the Russian mobilization and the lack of production of artillery ammunition
- Unlikely that Russian can restore offensive potential
- Most likely that mobilized units will be used for defensive purposes and the consolidation of existing gains
- The Economist has interviews with President Zelensky, Gen. Zalhuzny, and Gen. Syrsky
- Do not underestimate Russia
- The mobilization indicates that Russia is in the fight for the long haul
- Worries about supplies and ammunition
- Ukrainian forces hit a hotel in Zalizniy Port, occupied Kherson, that was reportedly being used to house FSB personnel
- Drone footage showcasing the destruction of Opytne, near Bakhmut
- A Russian ammunition depot in Irmino, Luhansk Oblast, has exploded
- Urban combat in Bakhmut, filmed by Ukrainian forces
- The amount of Russian activity in Belarus remains low and consists mostly of units moving to training facilities
2022-12-14 Wednesday
- Heavy fighting in the outskirsts of Bakhmut
- Near Kupyansk, the Russians attacked Hryanykivka
- Near Svatove, fighting is ongoing near Novoselivske, and Russian sources report fighting near Stelmakhivka
- Near Kreminna and Siversk, Russian forces attacked Chervonopopivka, Serebryanka and Bilohorivka
- Near Bakhmut, the Russians attacked Bakhmutske, Soledar, and Kurdyumivka
- Around Donetsk, Russia attacked Nevelske, Marinka, Pobjeda and Novomykhailivka
- According to Pentagon officials, Iran has agreed to supply 6000 aircraft, mostly Shahed loitering munitions, to Russia
- Iran also agreed to set up a UAV factory in Russia's Tartarstan region
- In exchange Russia may also agree to supply Iran with its S-400 air defense system, in addition to the reported Su-35 deliveries
- The US is reportedly planning to send Ukraine JDAM conversion kits to turn Ukraine's unguided bombs into precision weapons
- But how effective will these kits be, given that Ukrainian planes can't drop from medium or high altitudes?
- A Reuters investigation on how Russia smuggles dual-use components for its weapons industry
- Multiple cutouts
- Often use Turkish firms which have German proxies
- Another route is via Hong Kong
- Apparently Russian forces are attacking with smaller groups of infantry
- Smaller groups are easier to manage and motivate
- However, this means that casualties are higher
2022-12-13 Tuesday
- Near Svatove, the Russians attacked Novoselivske, Stelmakhivka, Novojehorivka, Makiivka, and Chervonopopivka
- Near Siversk, the Russians attacked Bilohorivka and Verkhnokamyanske
- Near Bakhmut, Russian forces attacked (2) Yakolivka, Soledar, Bakhmutske, Kurdyumivka, and Klishchiivka
- Yakolivka, Bakhmutske, and Kurdyumivka have all been reported as captured by Russian sources, but fighting is ongoing there
- Near Donetsk, Russia attacked Marinka and Avdiivka
- More intense than usual shelling reported in Zaporizhzhia, but the reason is unclear
- Russian soldiers are fighting in 50-year-old body armor
- Apparently Russian soldiers believe they're fighting Poles in Ukraine
- Seems like they're taking Russian propaganda about this being a war against NATO literally
- The explosion in Klintsy, Bryansk Oblast, was reportedly the result of a strike with a Tochka ballistic missile
- The US Department of Justice indicted 7 people for attempting to smuggle sniper rifle ammunition and sensitive technology to Russia
- The Biden Administration is reportedly finalizing plans to send Patriot air-defense systems to Ukraine
- Let's wait until the plans are actually finalized and officially announced before reacting
- According to the Estonian Defense Forces, Russia has enough ammunition for its heavy weapons to last through 2023
- Russia had huge reserves of Soviet-era weapons and ammunition, and while they may not be the best and most modern systems, they're still functional
- Ukraine is burning through its stocks of anti-aircraft weapons at a rapid rate
- Great Britain supplies more anti-aircraft weapons to Ukraine
- Ukrainian mud is something else
- Highlights the need for Ukraine to receive tracked armored vehicles
- Wheeled vehicles, such as HIMARS, can move more rapidly on paved roads or hard-packed soil, but they'll quickly bog down in this kind of mud
- Russian TV airs a segment where a Russian soldier captured as a POW in Ukraine says that he was treated well and the Geneva Conventions were followed
2022-12-12 Monday
- Near Svatove, the Russians attacked Stelmakhivka and Makiivka
- Near Kreminna, Russian forces attacked Ukrainian troops in the Serebryanka Forestry Area, north of the Siversky Donetsk river from Serebryanka
- Footage of the liberation of Kyslivka and Kotlyarivka, which were recaptured by Ukraine around 2022-12-08
- Near Bakhmut, Ukrainian sources report Russian attacks on Bilohorivka and Soledar, while Russian sources also report that they attacked Pidhorodne and Andriivka
- Donetsk
- Russia also attacked Velyka Novosilka for the second day in a row
- Russian sources are claiming that Ukrainian saboteurs damaged a bridge in Melitopol
- Explosions were reported in Klintsy and Klimovo, Bryansk Oblast, Russia
- There was an assassination attempt on the the deputy head of the occupation authority of Kherson Oblast, Vitaliy Bulyuk
- Car was blown up
- Driver was killed
- Bulyuk was taken to the hospital in serious condition
- Iran will reportedly limit the range of the missiles it ships to Russia, in an effort to avoid further sanctions
- The Russians are expending huge amounts of resources in Bakhmut, for only tactical gains
- Expenditure of artillery ammunition may prove to be especially significnt
- May compromise Russia's ability to defend elsewhere
- TOS-1A strike on Novoselivske
- Not sure what the purpose of that was
- Given how shattered the buildings are, any likely Ukrainian forces are probably either in trenches or underground, neither of which are particularly vulnerable to thermobaric munitions
- The UK Minister of Defense, Ben Wallace, is open to supplying Ukraine with longer ranged weapons if Russia keeps hitting Ukrainian civilian infrastructure
- Mobilized Russians are falling ill with respiratory ailments at training camps in Siberia, where they are reportedly being housed in tents during sub-zero weather
- Tents are being heated by wood-burning stoves
- Soldiers are having to buy their own medicine or have it delivered by relatives
- The fire in the barracks in Crimea (see 2022-12-10) was reportedly caused by the misuse of a potbellied stove for heating
2022-12-11 Sunday
- Near Kupyansk, Ukraine has continuing to struggle to expand its bridgehead across the Oskil River by attacking towards Nyzhnia Duvanka
- Near Svatove, the Russians attacked Andriivka and Novoselivske, in an attempt to push Ukrainian forces back from the P66 highway
- Near Kreminna, the Russians attacked Chervonopopivka, and Zhytlivka
- Russian sources also report a Russian counterattack near Nevske
- The fact that a Russian attack was reported on Zhytlivka seems to indicate that Ukrainian forces are closing on Kreminna
- Near Siversk, Russia attacked Bilohorivka, Serebryanka, and Verkhnokamyanske
- No news out of Bakhmut or Donetsk today
- There was possibly an attack near Velyka Novosilka, but details are sketchy
- Footage of the failed Russian attack near Velyka Novosilka
- Proof that Bakhmut is still under Ukrainian control
- The Ukrainian Minister of Defense, Oleksii Reznikov, admits that the wheeled vehicles that Ukraine is predominantly using struggle with the mud, slush and snow of the Ukrainian winter
- Russian commentators are bemoaning the lack of UAVs in the Russian army — say that Russian artillery is blind due to a lack of UAVs for spotting
- A Russian Su-24 that was lost near Bakhmut was reportedly being flown by a Wagner pilot on behalf of a Wagner ground commander who was calling for air support
- Lack of equipment for mobilized units is being blamed on regional inadequacies
- Rare footage of tank-versus-tank combat from Novselivske as a Ukrainian T-64 engages and destroys a Russian T-72
- Also out of Novoselivske, a Ukrainian drone blows up a pile of Russian ammunition
- The strike in Melitopol yesterday was apparently on a spa/resort that had been converted into a barracks for Russian troops
- Russian soldiers are likely fighting on reduced calories in some cases
- A Russian reporter gives away the positions of Russian artillery near Bakhmut
2022-12-10 Saturday
- Near Kupyansk, Russian forces are posing a challenge near Vilshana, making it difficult for Ukrainians to advance
- Near Kreminna, Russian troops attacked towards Nevske
- Near Bakhmut, Russia attacked (1, 2) Yakolivka, Soledar, Pidhorodne, Opytne, Kurdyumivka, and Druzhba
- Def Mon is is downplaying Russian success around Yakolivka, but it seems to me that Russia has made some progress here
- Near Donetsk, Russia attacked Nevelske, Pobjeda, and Novomykhailivka
- Multiple HIMARS explosions reported in Melitopol
- Video of a new Russian loitering munition
- Designed to be cheap
- 1kg warhead
- Unclear how effective this will be against armored targets with such a small warhead
- Many of the self-propelled artillery pieces sent to Ukraine by NATO countries are not available due to maintenance requirements
- Less than 50% of the PzH 2000s that Germany has sent Ukraine are available for combat because they must be Lithuania for maintenance
- Servicing of Ukrainian weapons is hampered by tension between Germany and Poland
- Poland insists that its own firms carry out repairs with the aid of confidential technical information that Germany is unwilling to supply
- Poland does not impose this requirement on the UK or the United States
- As a result, Germany is turning to Slovakia to set up a new repair center for Ukrainian weapons
- Ukraine lacks the spare parts, workshops and tooling to carry out repairs on Western equipment
- US officials state that Iran will be receiving Su-35 fighter aircraft as of next year
- Iran will reportedly be giving Russia hundreds of short range ballistic missiles in exchange
- The fighters that Iran will be receiving were originally intended for Egypt
- However, Egypt canceled its order under the threat of US secondary sanctions last year
- This means that Iran will have more advanced fighter aircraft than India
- The Pentagon has given Ukraine a tacit endorsement to carry out strikes inside Russia
- US officials are reportedly less concerned now about the escalatory potential of these strikes
- However the US is still wary of publicly endorsing or encouraging these attacks
- Ukraine has been careful to use only its own weapons for these attacks
- More US advisors are suggesting that the US should supply Ukraine with longer-range higher-endurance Gray Eagle UAVs and longer range ATACMS missiles
- Ukrainian road crews are working to repair the road into Kherson city
- Morocco will provide Ukraine with spare parts for its T-72s
- A large fire has been reported in Sovjetske, Crimea, in a building housing Russian soldiers
- The Russian authorities are reportedly deceitfully recruiting immigrants from Central Asia
- Immigrants are being enticed with promises of Russian citizenship
- However, legally, foreigners are not allowed to serve in the Russian military
- In addition, many of the countries that these immigrants hail from prohibit their citizens from serving in foreign militaries
- However, none of this is stopping in immigration centers from offering military service contracts to immigrants
- Migrants from Central Asia have been captured by Ukrainian forces, so it is clear that some of them are getting into combat
- Beyond that, it's unclear how these immigrants are being used by the Russian military
- My theory is that this is less a large conspiracy and more a result of low-level corruption
- Regions have quotas on how many conscripts they need to supply
- Getting immigrants into the recruitment pipeline allows provincial officials to recruit fewer Russian citizens, which reduces political backlash
- Narendra Modi cancels a bilateral summit with Vladimir Putin
2022-12-09 Friday
- Near Kreminna, Russian forces attacked Bilohorivka, Chervonopopivka, and Ploshchanka
- The status of Ploshchanka is still unclear to me
- Near Bakhmut, the Russians attacked Klishchiivka
- Near Donetsk, Russian forces attacked Marinka, and possibly lost some ground in Pisky
- Looks like Pisky is contested once again — Russian forces have been pushed back from the town, but it doesn't look like Ukrainian forces have re-established positions within the town
- Dara Massicot has a good thread on the adjustments the Russian military is making as it transitions to the defensive
- It appears, from Putin's public statements, that Russian's new commander Surovikin is comfortable sharing honest assessments of the war
- Surovikin appears to be the most competent Russian commander thus far
- Organized an orderly retreat from Kherson
- Better prepared defenses
- Increased strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure to stretch and deplete Ukrainian air defenses
- Financial Times article on the battle near Bakhmut
- Bakhmut is a meatgrinder for the Russians
- World War 1 style infatry charges into fixed positions
- Both sides are taking casualties but are not saying how many
- Russian troops have a foothold on the easter edge of the city, but have been unable to advance further
- Both sides are moving reinforcements from other regions to Bakhmut
- Satellite analysis shows fewer Russian tanks in Belarus
- More shelling in central Donetsk
- Putin engages in more nuclear saber rattling
- Talks about formally adding nuclear first strikes as an option in Russian policy
- Is reportedly a response to the US's "prompt global strike" concept, which envisions a capacity to hit any target anywhere with a precision weapon within one hour
- Transport trucks loaded with dragon's teeth spotted heading west in Vesela Tarasivka, Luhansk Oblast
- Putin admits the war may go on for a long time
- A Russian soldier claims that Russia is using tanks as makeshift indirect fire because it doesn't have enough ammunition for its howitzers
- Drifting Humvee on Ukrainian ice
2022-12-08 Thursday
- Near Svatove, Russians attacked Stelmakhivka
- Ukraine has liberated Kyslivka
- Last news from Kyslivka was from 2022-11-01, when Ukrainians and Russians were contesting the town
- It appears that Russian forces have retreated from the area
- Ukrainian forces also appear to have made progress near Stepova Novoselivka and Kotlyarivka, but neither of those villages can be considered liberated yet
- Still making progress towards Yahidne
- Near Kreminna, Russia attacked Ploshchanka, Chervonopopivka, and Bilohorivka
- Near Bakhmut, Russia attacked (1) (2) Berestove, Bilohorivka, Yakolivka, Bakhmutske, Opytne, and Kurdyumivka
- The situation around Yakolivka is unclear — Russian sources are saying that the town is captured, but Ukrainian forces and satellite data indicate that the town is still contested
- The same applies to Kurdyumivka — it's clear that there's still fighting going on there, even though Russian forces say they have captured the town
- This is similar to the situation in Pisky, where Russia claimed that the town was captured in August, but the town wasn't actually captured until October
- Another analogous situation is Soledar, where some Russian soldiers took a selfie in a factory at the south end of the town and claimed that the entire town had been captured
- Near Donetsk, Russian forces attacked Marinka and Novomykhailivka
- Russian sources are reporting Ukrainian activity on Bilohrudove Island in the Dnipro delta, however it's unclear whether this is just raiding activity or whether the Ukrainians are trying to make a concerted push to permanently occupy the island
- A Russian ammunition depot in Chaplynka, Kherson Oblast, blew up
- Ukrainian soldiers use a counter-UAV gun to capture a Russian quadcopter
- The Russian Deputy Minister of Defense visited Tehran recently
- The US completed the exchange of Viktor Bout for Brittney Griner
- Ukrainians mount helicopter rocket pods on a command post vehicle and use it as a makeshift MLRS
- Germany will sell Ukraine 18 RCH-155 self-propelled howitzers
- Looks like a very capable howitzer — only needs a crew of two, and has a fire rate of 30 rounds per minute
- However, deliveries won't begin until 2025
- Turkey is seeking a 25% discount on Russian natural gas
- Turkey wants the discount to apply retroactively, covering payments made in 2022 and 2023
- Apparently Hungary has a 6-month payment deferral for Russian gas
- A Ukrainian pilot managed to snap a selfie of himself after ejecting from his plane after it was brought down by an exploding drone
- Taking "do it for the 'gram" to a whole new level
- Russia is reportedly recruiting more prisoners
- Recruitment is being conducted by the Russian government this time, not Wagner
- Government officials are being scrupulous about ensuring that they record the prisoners volunteering to serve — apparently they are afraid of blowback from wives and mothers if it appears as if prisoners are being conscripted
- A pro-Russia Telegram channel admits that the equipping and provisioning of mobilized units has been uneven
- Admits that there have been some cases of soldiers freezing to death
- Says that "companies" have been lost to pneumonia
- Insists, however, that the majority of mobilized troops are well equipped and provisioned
2022-12-07 Wednesday
- Near Svatove, it's possible that the Ukrainians have pushed the Russians further back near Novoselivske
- Near Siversk, Russians attacked Bilohorivka, Verkhnokamyanske, and Spirne
- Near Bakhmut, Russian forces attacked Yakolivka, Kurdyumivka, and Bila Hora
- The Bila Hora attack is strange because Bila Hora is to the west of Kurdyumivka
- It's possible that the Russians have captured Kurdyumivka, but that doesn't make sense given the reports by the Ukrainians of ongoing fighting in the city
- Another possibility is that Russian forces are attacking northward from near the Shumy/Pivnichne area
- I think the only firm conclusion that can be drawn is the one that has been obvious for months
- Russia is unable to attack Bakhmut directly, so they're launching repeated attacks to its north and south in order to try to encircle the city
- Near Donetsk, the Russians attacked Novobakhmutivka, Krasnohorivka, Marinka, and Novomykhailivka
- Large fires reported near Avdiivka, reportedly as a result of Russian incendiary munitions
- Aid to Ukraine is reportedly depleting German ammunition stockpiles
- Germany is facing bottlenecks in procuring
- Ammunition
- Special steels
- Cotton linters for manufacturing the bags that hold propellant charges
- German ammunition manufacturers are also complaining about the German government's reluctance to commit to additional funding and long-term contracts
- President Putin says no further mobilization necessary at this time
- Says that only 150,000 of the 300,000 mobilized troops have been sent to Ukraine
- Denies reports of mass desertions
- Says that war is taking longer than expected
- Highlights the encirclement of the Sea of Azov as a concrete accomplishment of the war thus far
2022-12-06 Tuesday
- Near Kreminna, the Russians attacked Bilohorivka, and Russian sources are reporting Ukrainian offensives near Pishchane and Chervonopopivka
- Near Bakhmut, the Russians attacked Soledar, Bakhmutske, Andriivka, and Kurdyumivka; Russian sources also reported fighting in Opytne
- Near Donetsk, the Russians attacked Krasnohorivka (I went with the southern one because it seems like that's the one that the Russians attacked most recently)
- Donetsk has gotten quieter over the past few days
- Ukraine attacked a third airfield in Russian territory, near Kursk
- In addition to the airfield, Ukrainians also attacked fuel infrastructure in Lesnoe, Bryansk Oblast, Russia
- This fuel depot was attacked previously on 2022-11-30
- The reason it didn't catch fire this time is because the tanks that were hit happened to be empty
- The US announces more details on increased artillery ammunition production
- Goal is to have a capacity of 40,000 shells per month
- Army is planning to increase production at three factories
- Will also work with foreign partners to increase their production
- Apparently some of the cruise missiles that struck Ukraine in the latest wave of attacks were manufactured after sanctions had been imposed
- Shouldn't find this too surprising
- Sanctions always take longer than expected to have an effect
- All it tells us is that Russia has enough parts in stock (or is able to scrounge enough parts from other domestic sources/smuggling to maintain a limited rate of production)
- President Zelensky visits Slovyansk
- Russian loitering munition strikes against Ukrainian air defense assets
- Footage seems to come from earlier in the year, given the fact that the grass is green
- Interesting to see that the Russian propaganda includes a number of instances where the loitering munition appears to miss the target
- Poland accepts a German Patriot air defense system, but argues that it would have been better placed in Western Ukraine
- Hungary vetoes an €18 billion aid package for Ukraine
- This is speculated to be retaliation for the EU blocking funds to Hungary over concerns about corruption and democratic norms
- A convoy of T-90M tanks spotted in Starobilsk, Luhansk
- Reporting from inside Russia suggests that mobilized troops are largely dependent on civilian-provided aid packages for their basic needs
- Reports also indicate that mobilized units in Ukraine are picking and cooking unharvested corn
- One thing to note is that whenever I see these reports, it's always in the context of some unit from some random ethnic republic in the middle of nowhere, Siberia
- My read is that the outfitting and provisioning of mobilized units was left up to the provincial governments (rather like how it was with the early Union army in the Civil War)
- Given the drastic levels of wealth inequality between provinces in Russia, this has led to large differences in the quality and quantity of supplies provided to mobilized Russian troops in Ukraine
- Igor Girkin once again criticizes the Russian government for not having a clear strategic goal in Ukraine
- Says that most units have no idea what they're doing in Ukraine
- Draws a contrast between "apathetic" regular Russian Army units and his own supposedly more motivated Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republic militias
- Going by battlefield results and external reporting, however, it's difficult to draw any kind of distinction between the performance of the regular Russian army and the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republic militias
- This is likely Girkin trying to make himself look good by comparison
2022-12-05 Monday
2022-12-04 Sunday
- On the Svatove-Siversk axis, the Russians attacked Ploshchanka and Bilohorivka
- Near Kupyansk, the Ukrainians are continuing to push towards Yahidne
- Near Kreminna, Russian sources are reporting that Ukrainian forces have advanced and captured some small settlements, but this is unconfirmed
- Near Bakhmut, Russian forces attacked all across the line, hitting
- Near Donetsk, Russia attacked Vodyane, Pervomaiske, Vesele, Marinka, and Novomykhailivka
- Artillery exchanges between Russian and Ukrainian forces reported in the Kherson region
- Russia continues to randomly shell Sumy and other areas of Northern Ukraine
- Kremlin press secretary Dmitry Peskov is reporting that President Putin will be visiting the occupied Donbas in the near future
- Of course Peskov is also the one who said that mobilization was "not on the agenda", exactly seven days before mobilization was announced
- Is this a technical?
2022-12-03 Saturday
- Near Svatove
- Near Siversk, more airstrikes were reported near Verkhnokamyanka and Spirne, but no ground assaults
- Near Bakhmut, Russians attacked Soledar and Opytne
- Near Donetsk, the Russians attacked Nevelske, Krasnohorivka and Marinka
- Thread on the Russian build-up near Vuhledar, and why that area is so significant
- Russian logistics are heavily rail-dependent
- Russian forces are probably working to secure an alternate rail line to their forces in Ukraine, because of damage to the Kerch Bridge
- Vuhledar, Novomykhailivka and Marinka are all locations from which Ukrainian artillery can shell the railway
- Vuhledar is especially important, because artillery positioned there can also shell Volnovakha, a town that the Russians are using as a supply hub
- Volnovakha was captured by Russia some time around 2022-03-14
- Intense Russian attacks were able to push Ukrainians out of the town just south of Vuhledar, Pavlivka, at great cost
- Pavlivka was captured by Russia early in the war, not sure when
- It was liberated by Ukraine some time around 2022-06-23
- Ukrainians reportedly retreated from Pavlivka on 2022-11-19
- However, the Ukrainian presence in Vuhledar has prevented Russian forces from advancing into Pavlivka, turning the town into a no-man's-land
- It seems like Russian commanders will try another big assault to retake Vuhledar
- The Russian Minister of Defense, Sergei Shoigu, has arrived in Belarus for talks with his Belarussian counterpart, Viktor Khrenin
- Visit was unannounced
- Shoigu and Khrenin reportedly signed amendments to the treaty establishing the Union State alliance between Russia and Belarus
- Changes pertained to defense and security cooperation between the two countries
- Not sure why Shoigu and Khrenin are the ones signing this; I'd have thought that changes to a treaty would required signatures from heads of government, i.e. Putin and Lukashenko
- After meeting with Khrenin, Shoigu met with Lukashenko
- The changes to the treaty might be legal preparation for subordinating the Belarussian military to the Western Military District in Russia
- Konrad Muzyka's assessment is that too much is going on for this to be a diversionary operation aimed at keeping Ukrainian forces fixed near Kyiv
- He expects more direct Belarussian involvement in the war over the coming weeks, but it's not certain what form that involvement will take
- Russian forces are working on defensive fortifications near Kokhane, Zaporizhzhia Oblast
- Thread on the effects of winter weather on Russian soldiers
- It seems that a significant number of Russian soldiers are dying of hypothermia in the field
- Russian commanders are deliberately misreporting causes of death in order to try to obscure this fact
- The mobilization of utility workers is reportedly causing outages of heat and electricity in Russia itself
- More crazy Ukrainian helicopter flying
- A diary of a Russian contruction worker in Mariupol (use Google Translate)
2022-12-02 Friday
- Near Kupyansk, there are reports of Ukrainian forces in Yahidne, but this is unconfirmed
- The last report from this area was on 2022-10-28, indicating fighting in Pishchane
- Near Svatove, the Russians attacked Novoselivske, Stelmakhivka, and Chervonopopivka
- Reportedly, Ukrainian forces have gained a foothold on the southern end of Chervonopopivka
- Russian sources are also reporting Ukrainian offensives south of Kreminna
- Near Siversk, Russians attacked Hryhorivka, Vyimka, and Siversk itself
- First time I've seen fighting around those towns in quite some time
- Vyimka was the town that saw the most recent fighting, and that was in October
- Around Bakhmut, the Russians attacked Soledar, Opytne, Klishchiivka, Kurdyumivka, and Pivnichne
- Near Donetsk, the Russians attacked Pervomaiske, Krasnohorivka, and Marinka
- Video of fighting near Pervomaiske
- Video of fighting in Soledar
- The Financial Times has an article on how the Ukraine War has exposed shortcomings in NATO's preparation of high intensity conventional conflict
- The need to supply Ukraine while maintaining adequate stockpiles at home has exposed weaknesses in US production capacity, especially for systems like Javelins and Stingers
- The UK has had to turn to a "third party" to replenish its stocks of NLAWs
- France could only supply CAESAR self-propelled artillery systems to Ukraine by diverting a shipment that was originally intended for Denmark
- There are two reasons for this inventory depletion
- Countries have reaped a peace dividend after the end of the Cold War by limiting investments in military capacity
- Switched to "just-in-time" manufacturing and lower inventories to reduce cost
- These practices were adequate for lower-intensity counterinsurgencies, but may not be adequate for high-intensity conventional warfare
- The British Army's existing stockpile of artillery ammunition is equivalent to only two days of Russian usage or one week of Ukrainian usage
- There is ongoing budget uncertainty
- European governments have not allocated additional money to rearmament, despite saying that rearmament is necessary
- No defense contractor is willing to build additional capacity without some kind of assurance that customers will be available
- Countries have not streamlined or sped up their procurement processes
- Current procedures are oriented towards topping up inventories only after they've been depleted by conflict, rather than procuring weapons ahead of time
- This creates a very "choppy" demand signal that discourages investment in additional capacity
- I see clear parallels between the bureaucratic failures during the pandemic and the bureaucratic failures during the Ukraine War
- In both instances, Western governments are failing to acknowledge that risk/reward ratios have shifted and it might be okay to pay more in order to have immediate delivery
- For example, look at how the European governments wasted months negotiating with pharmaceutical companies over single-digit percentage discounts for COVID vaccines while their economies were under lockdown and the pandemic was raging
- A fuel depot in the city of Shakhtarsk, Donetsk has caught fire
- Shakhtarsk is within HIMARS range of the front line, but it's unclear whether this was the result of a HIMARS strike, sabotage, or an accident
- The G7 agrees to a $60/barrel price cap on the Russian crude oil
- Applies to seaborne crude
- Price cap agreed to by the G7 + Australia
- Price will be $60/barrel or 5% below market rate, whichever is lower
- Goal is to hurt Russian revenues while limiting the damage to global energy markets
- The Russian republic of Buryatia is sending magic yurts to protect soldiers from HIMARS strikes
- It's easy to laugh at this, but it might be effective at keeping Russian soldiers from panicking
- According to Russian sources, non-essential personnel are being evacuated from Nova Kakhovka
- Germany will be sending another 7 Gepard anti-aircraft systems to Ukraine
- Finland sends electrical grid components to Ukraine
- Transformers, circuit breakers and relays to replace equipment damaged by Russian airstrikes
- Generators and heating equipment to supplement the electrical grid
- Aid will be sent via the EU civil protection mechanism
2022-12-01 Thursday
- Near Svatove, the Russians attacked Novoselivske and Stelmakhivka
- Near Siversk, Russia attacked Bilohorivka
- Near Bakhmut, Russia attacked Yakolivka and Kurdyumivka
- There are reports that Russian forces have advanced into Kurdyumivka, but it appears that the town is still contested
- Near Donetsk, the Russians attacked Kamyanka, Vodyane, Pervomaiske, Krasnohorivka, and Marinka
- Russian MiG-31s, capable of carrying the hypersonic Kinzhal missile, are reportedly leaving Belarus and returning to Russia
- The US is considering increasing the number of Ukrainians it trains at once
- More intense and comprehensive training than what Ukrainians get in Poland or the UK
- Focused on combined arms, specifically on infantry/artillery coordination
- Training would reportedly take place at the US base in Grafenwoehr
- German officials haven't officially been contacted, but indicate that they would be willing to grant the necessary approvals
- The US has commissioned a $1.2 billion contract with Raytheon to manufacture additional NASAMS systems for Ukraine
- Letter bombs were sent to various Ukraine-related targets in Spain
- Letter bombs were mailed to the office of the Prime Minister, the office of the Defense Minister, a Spanish defense contractor, the European Union Satellite Center, the Ukrainian embassy and the US embassy
- The only bomb that went off was the one that went to the Ukrainian embassy, which caused minor injuries to the person opening the package
- All other bombs were intercepted by law enforcement and disposed of by bomb squads
- No demands or explanations have been given
- The Wagner Group has reportedly created a "Wild Company" consisting of its most violent convicts
- Revives practice used in prior wars, going back to World War 1 and the Russian Civil War
- These companies are often known for carrying out war crimes
- Reportedly flies a skull and crossbones flag
- A mobilized soldier reviews his sleeping quarters
- See Jack Watling's thread from 2022-11-27 for why wet sleeping aren't just uncomfortable, but rather pose a danger to combat readiness
2022-11-30 Wednesday
- Near Svatove, Russia launched yet another attack on Stelmakhivka
- Russian sources reported Ukrainian attacks on Chervonopopivka, but this is unconfirmed
- Near Siversk, Russian sources report that the Russian military launched attacks on Verkhnokamyanske, Serebryanka, and Bilohorivka
- Bakhmut
- Near Donetsk, the Russians attacked Marinka, Pervomaiske, and Nevelske
- In Zaporizhzhia, more explosions reported in Tokmak
- Russian mobilized reserves are being housed in unheated tents as the outside temperature drops to -20°C
- Low flying Ukrainian Su-25 with MiG-29 escort
- Lessons from cyberwarfare in Ukraine
- Russia launched numerous cyberattacks on Ukraine in the run-up to the war
- Some of these attacks were successful, such as the ViaSat disruption
- However, unlike in 2014, Russia was not able to disrupt the Ukrainian electricity grid or banking infrastructure
- This is largely due to Ukrainian efforts to harden and secure their computer networks
- Ukraine also engaged in extensive contingency planning, which helped mitigate the damage caused by the cyberattacks that did succeed
- Western assistance was useful
- NATO granted Ukraine access to a library of known Russian malware
- UK supplied firewall and forensic software
- In exchange, Western military and intelligence officials were able to observe Russian cyberattacks on Ukraine, gaining crucial information about how Russian cyberoperations actually work
- The relative age of Ukraine's electrical infrastructure was also an unexpected help
- Less networked than more modern infrastructure
- Many systems still had Soviet-era manual overrides, which Ukrainian engineers were able to operate in order to keep the grid running
- Russian cyberattacks may have been overhyped
- Russian attacks tend to be "loud" and more easily detected than attacks from other major world powers, such as the United States, China, or Israel
- Tend to spill past their intended targets, giving security researchers greater opportunity to study attacks and develop countermeasures
- The Ukraine War has exposed the limits of cyber operations
- Not as difficult to attribute cyberattacks as initially thought
- Requires significant time and preparation to set up successful attacks
- Russia has not launched very many cyberattacks against NATO despite extensive NATO support for Ukraine — might be a signal that the Russian leadership has cooled on its ardour for cyberattacks as a tool of state policy
- Cyberattacks may be more useful in peacetime; in wartime it may be more effective to launch a missile or a drone strike
- RUSI report on the war's lessons for Western militaries
- NATO militaries pledge more vehicles and ammunition for Ukraine at the NATO summit in Bucharest
- Hungary's government promises to ratify Sweden and Finland's NATO membership in February
- The railway bridge in Starobilsk, Luhansk, was reportedly hit by HIMARS
- A fuel depot in Lesnoe, Bryansk Oblast has caught fire
- Unknown whether this was a genuine accident or Ukrainian sabotage
- Lesnoe is approximately 100km from the Ukrainian border
- A Russian military reporter writes that the majority of the families of mobilized troops are unable to contact their mobilized relatives
2022-11-29 Tuesday
- Near Svatove, the Russians attacked Novoselivske
- Near Bakhmut, Ozarianivka has been confirmed captured and Kurdyumivka is under attack
- Donetsk
- Russia attacked near Opytne, Pervomaiske, Nevelske, and Krasnohorivka
- My interpretation of the situation near Opytne is that Russia has the town, but Ukrainian forces are entrenched in the fields between Opytne and Avdiivka, and Russia is attacking north out of Opytne in order to open another angle of attack against Avdiivka
- Further reports of Russian troops concentrating forces in anticipation of a further assault on Vuhledar
- In Zaporizhzhia, the Ukrainian military has reported that it has carried out further strikes on Tokmak, Polohy, and Basan
- Russia is reportedly using landing craft as makeshift ferries for heavy trucks which cannot transit the damaged Kerch Bridge
- The number of reported Shahed-136 drone attacks has declined recently
- Ukraine has begun manufacturing 152mm ammunition for its Soviet-era artillery-pieces
- According to the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service, 250 convicts from the Nizhny Tagil prison will serve their sentences by working at the Uralvagonzavod tank factory
- French MLRS launchers have arrived in Ukraine
- Germany is pledging unmanned ground vehicles to Ukraine
- Will be split between casualty evacuation and route clearance duties
- A Zambian student, serving a prison sentence in Russia, was recruited by Wagner and was killed in Ukraine
- Wagner admits that they're still far from being in a position to capture Bakhmut
2022-11-28 Monday
- Near Svatove, Ukraine liberated the settlements of Tabaivka and Berestove
- Near Bakhmut, Russian forces attacked Yakolivka, Soledar, and Andriivka
- Near Donetsk, Russia attacked Opytne (unclear what's happening here, Opytne had been captured by Russian on 2022-11-12), Vodyane, Pervomaiske, Nevelske and Novomykhailivka
- In Zaporizhzhia, the Ukrainian military claims to have struck Russian positions near Polohy, causing significant casualties
- Ukrainian forces also claim to have struck a railway bridge at Starobohdanivka
- The US Department of Defense is considering giving Ukraine the Ground Launched Small Diameter Bomb (GLSDB)
- Combines the GBU-39 small-diameter bomb with the rocket motor from the M26 MLRS
- 150km range, as compared to 70km with current GMLRS
- Less capable than the 300km ATACMS, but is still a useful improvement over Ukraine's current capabilities
- Cheap and takes advantage of weapons that the US has a significant inventory of
- New York Times article detailing the fighting in and around Bakhmut
- Russia has intensified its efforts near Bakhmut
- Russia has redeployed troops from Kherson to Bakhmut
- Attempts to advance near Bakhmut appear to be driven more by political consideration than military necessity
- Footage of a Ukrainian command center in Bakhmut
- Apparently they're sharing drone video via Google Meet
- The Russian government intends to issue domestic TLS certificates to substitute for foreign certificate authorities that have pulled out because of sanctions
- The Russian interior ministry reports a significant increase in gun crimes, which is being blamed on the availability of stolen guns and ammunition from military sources
- Apparently a common way to smuggle these weapons is with fake humanitarian charities, which bring supplies to the front and then smuggle weapons on the way back
- Many mobilized troops are being issued weapons without their serial numbers being registered, which makes smuggling easier
2022-11-27 Sunday
- Near Svatove, the Russians attacked Stelmakhivka
- Russian sources are reporting additional Ukrainian offensives near Svatove, but there is no confirmation of this from Ukrainian sources
- Near Bakhmut/Siversk, the Russians attacked Bilohorivka, Verkhnokamyanske, Spirne, Opytne, Bakhmutske and Yakolivka
- Near Donetsk, the Russians attacked Pervomaiske, Krasnohorivka, and Nevelske
- The Russians are likely building up for another assault on the Pavlivka/Vuhledar area
- Jack Watling has a good thread on the influence of cold weather on operations
- Cold weather will hamper both sides
- Troops cannot stay outdoors for as long
- Greater need for hot food and areas to warm up in
- Harder to stay dry, and staying dry becomes more important
- However, cold weather will likely hurt the Russian army more
- Ukrainian forces appear to be more disciplined, especially at the platoon/company level
- This discipline is key to ensuring that soldiers remain free of cold-related injuries and illnesses
- Russian troops didn't have great small-unit leadership at the start of this war, and what leadership they did have has been depleted by the past year's fighting
- Ukraine can inflict heavy casualties on the Russian military by skirmishing
- Russian will be more dependent on fixed logistics nodes which can be targeted by long-range weapons (but only if Ukraine has the range to hit those nodes — hence the need for ATACMS)
- Logistics in winter will be road-bound, slowing the pace of operations on both sides
- There will be a reduction in movement as winter sets in, but not necessarily a reduction in the intensity of fighting nor a reduction in the rate of consumption of ammunition and supplies
- This is what the Antonovskiy Bridge looks like today
- There has been a mass outbreak of an unknown respiratory illness, possibly COVID, at a training camp for mobilized soldiers in Elanskii, Sverdlosk Oblast
2022-11-26 Saturday
- Near Bakhmut, the Russians attacked Yakolivka, Soledar, Bakmutske, and Opytne
- Near Donetsk, Russians attacked Pervomaiske, Krasnohorivka, and Nevelske
- Near Svatove, Russian troops appear to be building extensive defensive fortifications
- Footage from Russian soldiers fighting near Novoselivske
- Eerie similarities between the fighting around Bakhmut and The Somme
- A video from Pisky shows the extent of the destruction there
- More shelling reported on Sumy
- A partisan attack reportedly killed a Russian officer in Polohy
- A Ukrainian buggy with a recoilless gun
- The Ukraine War continues to be a strange combination of World War 1, 21st century warfare and Mad Max
- A photo of refuseniks being held in crowded, unsanitary conditions in Zavitne Bazhannaya, Donetsk Oblast
- Russian customs have stopped private charities from importing military-related items, such as quadcopter drones or night-vision goggles
- Not clear why, might be a bureaucratic mix-up
2022-11-25 Friday
- Near Svatove, the Ukrainians stopped attacks on Stelmakhivka and near Dibrova (Dibrova appears to be contested, but not yet liberated)
- Near Bakhmut, the Russians attacked Bilohorivka, Yakolivka, Bakhmutske, and Opytne
- Near Donetsk, the Russians attacked Pervomaiske, Marinka, Krasnohorivka, and Novomykhailivka
- Good thread on the role of tanks in the war
- The Russian military is adapting to the new realities of the conflict in Ukraine and are using their tanks are more effectively now than they were at the start of the war
- Russian troops have picked up on the Ukraininan tactic of using quadcopter drones to spot for and correct long-range tank fire
- This allows tanks to serve both direct and indirect fire — tanks can hit targets 4-6km away, even without line of sight
- Tanks remain useful cor clearing fortified positions in urban terrain — this was especially evident in the siege of Mariupol
- Measures to clear and avoid anti-tank mines have improved on the Russian side
- Artillery is generally ineffective against tanks unless it scores a direct hit
- A tank is like a Swiss army knife on the battlefield — may not be the perfect weapon in any given scenario, but is broadly useful in a wide range of situations
- Not obsolete!
- US artillery is wearing out due from overuse in Ukraine
- Ukrainian soldiers are firing thousands of rounds of artillery
- This is wearing out the gun barrels
- Ukrainian military is having to ship artillery pieces to Poland so they can be repaired by US technicians
- US artillery was never meant to operate in the way that the Ukrainians are using it
- In the US military doctrine, tube artillery is meant to be supplemented by air power — this is modeled off Israeli tactics during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War
- As a result, US artillery emphasizes mobility and maneuver over durability — parts are built with titanium rather than steel
- However, Ukraine doesn't have the same air power capacity that the US or Western European countries do, which means that Ukrainians are much more reliant on artillery
- A German-delivered MARS II MLRS in Ukraine
- Tracked vehicles are proving their utility in Ukrainian mud
- Norway has announced more military aid for Ukraine
- Most notable is the spare parts for the M109 self-propelled howitzers they sent earlier
- A possible bombing at the Russian civil administration building in Mariupol
- (Follow-up from 2022-11-23) Vladimir Putin has ordered the creation of a unified military mobilization database, presumably to streamline future mobilization efforts
- Database will unify data from tax services and the health ministry, as well as pre-existing military databases
- Database will track who has had prior military experience
- Russian troops review the canned food they are sent
- A group of people identified as Ukrainian saboteurs and killed by the FSB were reportedly a group of video game enthusiasts engaged in a live-action role play
- A Russian pro-military channel defends the mobilized troops from Serpukhov
- Castigates critics for writing from the warmth and safety of their homes as they blame people stuck in harsh conditions for fleeing
- Asks where was the artillery and heavy weapons support for this hapless unit
- Says that mobilized soldiers don't owe civilian critics anything
2022-11-24 Thursday
- Near Kupyansk, shelling was reported near Vilshana, but no significant territorial changes are evident
- Near Bakhmut, Russia attacked Yakolivka, Opytne, Klishchiivka, Andriivka, and Ozarianivka
- Near Donetsk, Russia attacked Krasnohorivka and Marinka
- There are indications of a troop build-up in southern Donetsk, indicating a possible attack in the coming days
- Kherson City was shelled by Russia, resulting in civilian casualties
- Russian troops say that experience in Syria did not provide adequate training or preparation for Ukraine
- Good thread on the Russian war effort by the director of a Russian non-governmental organization providing support to troops
- Difference in the usage of small drones in Ukraine highlights the lack of multi-domain coordination and integration in the Russian military
- American "gadgets" (i.e. precision munitions) are effective — Russia had underestimated the battlefield utility of precision munitions prior to the war
- Russian forces are made acutely aware of their deficiencies w.r.t. information processing — takes a long time for battlefield reports to get turned into artillery/air strikes
- Argues that many more people need to be mobilized in order to storm Ukrainian defenses in Donetsk
- The fact that Russia is having to use physical attacks to hit Ukrainian electrical infrastructure is a sign that Ukraine's electricity grid is hardened against cyber-attack in a way that it wasn't in 2014
- According to The Guardian, Iranian military advisers were assassinated in Crimea
- 27 hours after being disrupted by a Russian attack, water has been restored in Kyiv
- The value of pro-war memorabilia is falling in Russia, with items having to be discounted or withdrawn from sale entirely
- The decline in value of items with pro-war logos reportedly accelerated after the Russian retreat from Kherson
- Ukraine has disconnected its nuclear power plants from the electricity grid, because the sudden load fluctuations caused by Russian strikes were causing undue stress on the reactors
- The mobilized troops from Serpukhov (see 2022-11-23) are receiving little sympathy
2022-11-23 Wednesday
- Near Siversk, Russian forces attacked Bilohorivka, Spirne and Berestove
- Near Bakhmut, Russian forces have apparently made some forward progress near Kurdyumivka and Klishchiivka
- Russians also attacked Pivnichne
- Pivnichne is near Shumy, which has shown up in the fighting before, although not recently
- Near Donetsk, Russia attacked Novobakhmutivka, Pervomaiske, Nevelske, Marinka, and Krasnohorivka
- Reports of Russian progress in Marinka, although it doesn't seem like they have full control over the town yet
- Reports of increased Russian shelling in the Sumy area
- Not sure what's going on here
- Sumy has been quiet since the Russians retreated in March
- A Russian rocket reportedly hit a maternity ward in Vilnyansk, Zaporizhzhia Oblast
- The EU has designated Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism
- More power outages in Kyiv as Russian missiles continue to strike Ukrainian electricity and heating infrastructure
- I don't understand the logic behind these Russian attacks
- The evidence from World War 2 shows that random strikes on civilian infrastructure do little to demoralize the enemy, and will probably have the opposite effect, hardening resistance
- At least in World War 2, some of these attacks could be justified because they were seen as hurting the enemy's production capacity, but this isn't even having that effect because Ukraine is getting its weapons from outside the country
- Apparently Russian attacks on power infrastructure in Ukraine has led to power outages in Moldova
- According to an independent Russian news outlet, there are plans for a second wave of mobilization over the winter
- No plans for a general mobilization, because Russian authorities have recognized that the military does not have the logistical capacity to equip that many new recruits
- Russia is also reportedly reorganizing its mobilization database, and is in the process of improving its links to other government databases in order to more effectively track people eligible for mobilization
- According to an independent Russian news source, mobilized Russian soldiers near Svatove are being denied medical care unless they agree to return to the front
- Mobilized Russian troops seen fighting with World War 2 era helmets
- A long video filmed by mobilized troops from Serpukhov
- Complain about poor leadership and equipment
- Repeatedly complain about officers running away under fire
- The equipment that they do receive is substandard, such as body armor that's only meant to protect against airsoft pellets, and helmets that can be cracked open with a knife
- Yet another account describing the experience of mobilized troops, this time by troops from Oryol
- Similar complaints re: lack of weapons and training
- No anti-tank weapons
- Troops had few weapons — one recruit didn't even know how to change the magazine on his rifle
- Troops retreated to Svatove, where they were taken into custody by military police
- A general said that they had to go back to the front, otherwise they would be referred for judicial proceedings
- Were forced to stay in a forest without food for five days
- Then were transported to Zaitseve, where they were held in a basement and fed only one meal per day
- Kamil Galeev has a Twitter thread with more details about how Ramzan Kadyrov rules Chechnya as an autonomous province with the blessing of Putin
- Chechnya is best viewed as a monarchy
- More functional and less corrupt, in many ways, than the rest of Russia, especially the other North Caucasus provinces, such as Dagestan
- Saying that Chechnya is a "tribal" society is just Orientalism — Chechen tribes are akin to modern Scottish clans — useful as symbols and reminders of heritage, but don't play a part in the political process
- Kadyrov values personal loyalty over family ties — has elevated deputies who have killed for him with their own hands over family members
- Biden administration officials are concerned that Russia may use chemical weapons in Ukraine
- This is disturbingly plausible
- The area around Bakhmut has been stalemated for more than six months
- In World War 1, both German and Entente armies used gas weapons to try to break the stalemate
2022-11-22 Tuesday
2022-11-21 Monday
2022-11-20 Sunday
- Near Svatove, fighting was reported near Novoselivske and Ploshchanka
- The fighting near Ploshchanka indicates a possible Ukrainian advance, but progress has slowed down considerably since Ukrainian troops reached the P66/P07 highway
- Near Siversk, the Russians attacked Bilohorivka
- Near Bakhmut, Russia attacked Yakolivka, Bakhmutske, Opytne and Klishchiivka
- Break's over; back to work fending off yet more Russian human waves
- A Russian attack on Hulyaipole was reportedly stopped by Ukrainian artillery
- This is interesting, because Hulyaipole hasn't really seen any major action since July
- Iran's provision of UAVs to Russia may be part of a bid to secure advanced fighter aircraft for itself
- The Wall Street Journal has a good analysis of the impact and future implications of Ukraine's victory at Kherson city
- Unlike the withdrawal from Kharkiv, the Russian withdrawal from Kherson was orderly — Russia was able to salvage a great deal of equipment, and was able to destroy whatever equipment it couldn't withdraw
- Ukrainian forces continue to maintain the initiative
- The recapture of Kherson city enables Ukrainian forces to target Russian supply lines into the remainder of Kherson oblast with long-range weapons, such as HIMARS
- US officials say it's clear that Ukrainian forces have a greater will to fight than Russian forces
- The US has indicated that it does not consider Crimea to be Russian territory — US will not object to Ukrainian strikes on Crimea
- Ukrainian mud is nuts
- Explosions reported near the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, raising concerns that fighting in the vicinity of the power station could damage it
- Russian thermite incendiary munitions being used on Berestove
2022-11-19 Saturday
- Near Siversk, Russia attacked Bilohorivka, Verkhnokamyanske, and Spirne
- Near Bakhmut, the Russians attacked Klishchiivka and Kurdyumivka
- Near Donetsk, the Russans attacked Vodyane, Pervomaiske, and Novomykhailivka
- It appears that the Ukrainians have retreated from Pavlivka
- According to US officials, Iran and Russia have struck a deal to produce Iranian UAVs inside Russia
- Will help address Russia's shortage of precision-guided munitions
- Iran believes that it can avert sanctions if the munitions are built in Russia, and Iran merely provides the designs/intellectual property
- Another story on Russian usage of precision-guided munitions
- Russia has increased its imports of precision-guided munitions from Iran and North Korea
- Evidence that Russia had stockpiled microelectronic components from before the war
- Smuggling — obtaining dual use electronic components through front companies
- Using weapons outside their intended design parameters
- Anti-ship missiles used for ground attack
- Anti-aircraft missiles used as indiscriminate bombardment weapons
- Using weapons from reserve stockpiles that had been held back in anticipation of a larger conflict with NATO — now that the Ukraine War has "settled down", somewhat, and the chances of it turning into a wider conflict appear less likely, the Russian military leadership may feel more comfortable allocating "emergency reserve" weapons to the war in Ukraine
- Michael Kofman has more thoughts on the effects of sanctions on the Russian military industry
- Sanctions will have effects, but they'll have effects through second and third order mechanisms
- For example: Western sanctions mean no more machine tools going into Russia
- But the effect of that sanction will only be felt when existing Russian machine tools wear out and break down
- According to Der Spiegel (use Google Translate), procurement issues with spare parts for the PzH 2000 have affected their availability for Ukraine
- Once again, the US DoD's procurement system is the worst… except for all our allies'
2022-11-18 Friday
- Near Svatove, the Russians attacked Novoselivske, and Stelmakhivka
- Fierce fighting reported near Siversk, with Russians attacking Verkhnokamyanske, Spirne, and Bilohorivka
- Near Donetsk, the Ukrainians repelled attacks on Pervomaiske, Vodyane, and Novomykhailivka
- Pavlivka is reportedly split between Russian and Ukrainian forces
- This is disappointing because, previously Pavlivka was fully liberated
- No fighting reported near Bakhmut, which is interesting — that area had a lot of pretty intense fighting going on over the past few months, and it's gone quiet all of a sudden
- Russia has lost 8000 vehicles thus far
- The US may transfer MQ-1C Gray Eagle drones to Ukraine
- This is important because, the Gray Eagle has greater range and payload than the Bayraktars that are Ukraine's current top-end drones
- The US is reportedly running short of 155mm artillery ammunition and Stinger missiles for Ukraine
- This shortage is not affecting US readiness, because the US military has its own independent stockpiles
- The US is working on improving its own industrial base, which should reduce these shortages going forward
- A Russian soldier examines what's left of his truck after a HIMARS strike
- That truck is Swiss cheese
- Drone-based demining
- Mearsheimer continues to make a clown of himself
2022-11-17 Thursday
- Near Svatove Russians attacked Stelmakhivka
- Near Siversk, the Russians attacked Verkhnokamyanske, Bilohorivka, and Soledar
- Near Donetsk, Russians attacked Marinka, Pervomaiske, and Nevelske
- No news out of Zaporizhzhia, but many are expecting the next Ukrainian offensive to take place there
- Russian commanders are reporting that fighting continues around Svatove, Kreminna, and is starting to move towards Lysychansk
- Wagner apparently was apparently using TOS-1A thermobaric munitions neak Bakhmut
- The news here is that this is Wagner using a TOS-1A, whereas all previous usages were by the Russian army
- This is a follow up from the Su-25 pictures from 2022-11-14
- The auto "accident" that Kirill Stremousov, the occupation governor of Kherson, appears to have been an assassination
- A tour of liberated Chornobaivka airport
- Ukrainian helicopters were abandoned, and used for spare parts by Russian troops
- Terminal has been totally destroyed by shelling
- Russians used concrete slabs from runways and taxiways to reinforce their bunkers and trenches
2022-11-16 Wednesday
- Near Siversk, Russia attacked Bilohorivka
- No attacks near Bakhmut
- Donetsk
- Apparently the offensive on Pavlivka was conducted with without any preparatory diversionary attacks, allowing Ukrainian defenders to concentrate their fires
- The missile that landed in Poland was apparently a Ukrainian interceptor that malfunctioned
- Investigation by Ukraine Weapons Tracker that identified the missile
- Explosions heard in Dzhankoi, Crimea
- The performance of NASAMs is impressive, according to the US Defense Department
- Analysis by Michael Kofman on the war thus far
- Ukraine will difficulty taking more terrain in Kherson Oblast this winter because of weather constraints and more entrenched Russian defenses
- Potential for more Ukrainian gains in Luhansk, contingent on how well Russian infrastructure can supply troops in the field over there
- The more Ukraine gains, the harder it will be for them to make more gains because Russian forces will have less and less area to defend
- The Ukrainian approach to taking Kherson favored preserving Ukrainian troops and the city — Russian forces were allowed to leave without a pitched battle
- Russia handled the retreat from Kherson better than it handled the retreat from Kharkiv, both in terms of organization and PR
- According to Russian human rights activists, Wagner has executed at least 40 of its own soldiers in Ukraine
- Wagner has recruited 35,000 - 40,000 prisoners
- Reports of Wagner conscripting people from prison — this contradicts Prigozhin's own claims that he wanted volunteers
- Prisoners are reportedly being beaten and tortured into signing contracts
- Any official inquiries into Wagner's recruitment are met with a response that indicates that details are state secrets
2022-11-15 Tuesday
- Near Svatove, the Ukrainians repulsed an attack on Novoselivske
- Near Bakhmut, the Russians attacked Bilohorivka, and Bakhmutske
- I still don't understand the purpose of the near constant attacks on Bakhmut
- In Donetsk, the Russians attacked Pervomaiske, Novokalynove, Karsnohorivka, Novomykhailivka, and Vremivka
- There were reports of Russians attacking Oleksandropil on August 27; do the attacks on Novokalynove imply that Oleksandropil has been captured?
- In Kherson, Ukrainian forces are consolidating along the right bank of the Dnipro, while Russians have retreated to the left
- Russia launched a barrage of missiles at Ukraine, reportedly targeting heating and electricity infrastructure
- A missile, reportedly from from Russia, has landed in Poland, killing two
- The White House is requesting an additional 37.3bn aid package for Ukraine
2022-11-14 Monday
- Reportedly a Wagner Su-25 flying near Bakhmut
- According to an unnamed Chinese official, Putin did not warn Xi Jinping about the invasion of Ukraine, which led to the deaths of some Chinese citizens who could not evacuate in time
- Explosions reported in Kalanchak, in occupied Kherson
- Another account from a mobilized soldier, complaining about poor leadership and lack of support
- Claims that 2500 soldiers have already perished in his unit
- Describes the Ukraine War as a meatgrinder
- We should be somewhat skeptical of the specific numbers being reported
- This is just one soldier reporting second or third-hand information
- However, it is clear that Russian soldiers are in no way as well equipped or organized as Ukrainian soldiers
- Russian air force sorties are down significantly since the start of the war
- Significant numbers of Russian troops have reportedly arrived in Melitopol
2022-11-13 Sunday
- In the Svatove area, Russia attacked Stelmakhivka and Novoselivske
- Near Siversk, Russia attacked Torske, Spirne and Berestove
- Attacks have quietened significantly near Bakhmut, with the Russians only attacking Toretsk, south of Bakhmut
- Note: I wasn't able to place Toretsk on Google Maps
- In Donetsk, Russians attacked Pervomaiske, Karsnohorivka, Marinka, Novomykhailivka and Pavlivka
- The Russian assault on Pavlivka continues
- Another question for me is whether Ukraine will carry out any offensive operations in Zaporizhzhia Oblast
- Russian forces destroyed multiple radar systems as they retreated from Kherson, rather than allow them to fall into Ukrainian hands
- This shows that the retreat from Kherson was far more organized than the retreat from Kharkiv
- Why has the Russian occupation been so unnecessarily brutal
- The US announced another $400 million aid package for Ukraine
- More precision-guided artillery ammunition
- More HIMARS ammunition
- More Humvees
- 4 Avenger air-defense systems — the Avenger uses Stinger missiles, but carries more of them and is on the back of a Humvee
- This will be especially useful against slower and lower flying targets like loitering munitions
- Hawk air defense systems
- Interesting because the US phased out Hawk in 1994
- Launchers are probably coming from Spain, which still uses the system, with missiles being supplied by the US
2022-11-12 Saturday
- In the Svatove area, Russians attacked Masyutivka, Orlyanske, Novoselivske, Miasozharivka, and Makiivka
- Near Siversk, the Russians launched attacks on Bilohorivka and Verkhnokamyanske
- Near Bakhmut, the Russians attacked Soledar
- Donetsk
- Russian occupation authorities have designated Henichesk as the new capital of occupied Kherson
- Another thread on mobilized Russians in the Svatove area
- Severe casualties reported
- Mobilized troops were sent to recapture Nevske
- Sent to the front line after only two weeks of training
- Given contradictory orders — front line officers have no need for untrained "mobiks", and send them back, while commanders at the rear order them forward
- Russian soldiers had time to destroy their equipment prior to retreating from Kherson — the retreat from Kherson was far more organized than the rout around Kupyansk
- "A static front does not imply a static military situation"
- An English translation of an interview with a Ukrainian special forces soldier, covering his experiences in the war thus far
- The Ukrainian MoD certainly knows how to meme
2022-11-11 Friday
- Good analysis thread on the liberation of Kherson
- The goal for Ukraine is to liberate territory, not kill Russians
- If this means allowing Russian forces to retreat, that's fine, if it saves Ukrainian lives
- That said, Ukraine did not just let Russians leave — the retreat was the result of months of Ukrainian bombardment and slow grinding offensives
- Just like the liberation of Kharkiv Oblast, the offensive in Kherson demonstrates the of Ukraine to liberate territory, and helps solidify Western support
- Near Svatove, the Russians attempted to counterattack at Novoselivske, Miasozharivka, and Makiivka
- Near Bakhmut, the Russians attacked Bilohorivka, Vesele, and Soledar
- In Donetsk Oblast, the Russians attacked Pervomaiske, Nevelske, Pavlivka, Krasnohorivka, and Opytne
- Ukrainian soldiers are greeted by cheering civilians when driving into Kherson
- Rob Lee's Kherson liberation thread
- The Russians destroyed the Anotnovsky Bridge as they retreated from Kherson
- A report detailing the conditions that mobilized russian soldiers face in Ukraine
- Alexander Dugin publishes a letter implicitly criticizing the Russian government
2022-11-10 Thursday
2022-11-09 Wednesday
2022-11-08 Tuesday
- Near Svatove, Russian sources report attacks near Kotlyarivka and Novoselivske
- Russian forces launched counterattacks towards Yampil and Bilohorivka
- Bakhmut
- Donetsk
- Kherson
- Details on Iranian arms sales to Russia
- Russia has reportedly paid Iran €140 million already
- Also sent Iran captured British and American weaponry, such as NLAWs, Javelins and Stingers
- In return Iran supplied Russia with 160 UAVs, including loitering munitions and reconnaisance UAVs
- The source also stated that a further agreement has been reached, with Russia paying €200 million for a second tranche of UAVs
- Italy is going to be sending more air defense systems to Ukraine
- Heavy fighting reported in the Kreminna area, as Ukraine reportedly tries to advance there
2022-11-07 Monday
2022-11-06 Sunday
- Near Kharkiv, the Russians attacked Volokhivka
- Near Svatove, shelling was reported near Ploschanka, and Russia launched counterattacks near Yampolivka and Bilohorivka
- Near Bakhmut, Russia attacked Andriivka, Bakhmutske, Berestove, Ozarianivka, Opytne, and Yakolivka
- In Donetsk, the Russians attacked Marinka and continued their assault on Pavlivka
- Near Vasylivka, the Ukrainians stopped a Russian attack on Scherbaki
- Reports from Pavlivka indicate that the Russians are suffering from a shortage of trained and accurate artillery
- A letter from the troops of the 155th Naval Infatry Brigade states that they have suffered over 300 casualties in 4 days, reportedly in the Pavlivka region
2022-11-05 Saturday
- The Ukrainian offensive near Svatove appears to have stalled
- Near Siversk the Russians attacked Bilohorivka and Spirne
- Near Bakhmut, the Russians attacked Bakhmutske, Opytne, Odradivka, and Ozarianivka
- The Russians are continuing to press their attack near Pavlivka
- Still no news out of Kherson, just rumors and inferences from satellite imagery
- Russians are building fortifications on the left side of the Dnipro river
- Pre-fabricated bunkers are exclusively behind the city of Kherson, indicating a set pre-built defensive fortifications that the Russians would retreat to
- Apparently additional troops have arrived in Baranovichi, Belarus
- Seems like this is that joint Russian-Belarussian training program
- Soldiers from Russia's Rostov Oblast posted a video claiming poor supplies and leadership, this video was taken down and the journalist who publicized it was prosecuted
- One thing I don't understand is the lack of mutinies among Russian soldiers, if conditions are this poor
- We are hearing about soldiers refusing to fight, but it doesn't seem to be occurring on a large enough scale to be hurting the Russian military's ability to conduct combat operations
- On the other hand, given the over incompetence and uselessness of the Russian military in this war, how would we even know? Especially if the threat of mutiny causes Russian officers to not undertake attacks that they might have taken — it's difficult to prove a counterfactual
2022-11-03 Thursday
- Near Kreminna and Siversk, the Russians launched attacks on Makiivka, Nevske, Bilohorivka, Verkhnokamyanka and Spirne
- Shelling was also reported in Ploshchanka
- It looks like the Russians have shifted focus away from Bakhmut, to around Kreminna in the north and Pavlivka in the south
- Near Bakhmut, Russian attacks were once again very sporadic
- In South Donetsk, the Russians attacked Pavlivka, Prechystivka, Vodyane, Novomykhailivka, and Pervomaiske
- Russia appears to be doing whatever it can to hold the Svatove-Kreminna line, including sending in conscripts with little to no training, equipment or leadership
- Reuters confirms the dismissal of General Lapin, citing Russian sources that claim that the general is on a "three week holiday"
- The news out of Kherson is very conflicted
- Reporting on the state of Ukraine's civilian and military infrastructure going into the winter
- Russian loitering munition strikes have had an effect
- Ukraine has told some refugees not to return during the winter, in order to reduce demand for electricity
- However, the Ukrainian military appears to have ample supplies of fuel and cold-weather gear
2022-11-02 Wednesday
2022-11-01 Tuesday
2022-10-31 Monday
- War on the Rocks podcast
- Russia and Belarus sign an agreement to create joint training centers for conscripted Russian troops
- This makes sense for Russia, because many of the Russian forces that would have been dedicated to training new conscripts have themselves been deployed to Ukraine
- Near Kharkiv, Russia attacked Zelene
- On the Svatove-Kreminna front, shelling was reported near Ploshchanka and Chervonopopivka, indicating a Ukrainian presence in that area
- The Ukrainians also fought off a Russian counterattack near Novoselivske, indicating that they have positions close by
- Near Siversk, the Russians attacked Bilohorivka and Mykolaivka
- The report of fighting in Mykolaivka is very surprising, because the last time there was any fighting reported there was in June
- I thought that the Russians had captured it as part of their initial push out of Severodonentsk and Lysychansk
- Near Bakhmut, the Russians attacked Bakhmutske
- Near Donetsk, the Russians attacked Avdiivka, Vesele, Vodyane, Marinka and Novobakhmutivka
- Novobakhmutivka is a new town to show up on the list of attacked towns, but it's near Oleksandropil, which was a site of heavy fighting in August
- Near Pavlivka, the large scale Russian attack is ongoing, but it doesn't seem like the Russians have been very successful at capturing any settlements
- Russian channels are reporting that the Ukrainians have brought reinforcements to the area
2022-10-30 Sunday
- Ukrainian forces appear to have advanced to the outskirts of Chervonopopivka, near Kremmina
- Near Bakhmut, the Russians attacked Yakolivka and Bakhmutske
- Reportedly, the Ukrainians have made some incremental advances here, reversing some recent Russian incremental gains
- Overall, though, this fight looks like a stalemate to me, with neither side having the strength to force a breakthrough or conduct a large counterattack
- Near Donetsk
- Heavy fighting is also ongoing near Vuhledar, with the Russians launching a large attack on Pavlivka
- This area of the front had been quiet for almost a full month, and now the Russians have launched two attacks here in as many days
- Could this be the result of new conscript units arriving?
- Still no word out of Kherson, but it seems like Russia is continuing to entrench and reinforce
- Italy and France will supply Ukraine with SAMP-T air defense systems
- Mobilized Russian conscripts review their weapons
- I'm no expert on guns, but I'm pretty sure that recoil springs aren't supposed to be rusty
2022-10-29 Saturday
2022-10-28 Friday
- Russia has reportedly completed its mobilization
- According to Serhey Haidai, the Ukrainian governor of Luhansk Oblast, Ukrainian forces have captured the P66 highway connecting Kreminna and Svatove
- Russia warns that it may attack commercial satellites if they're involved in the Ukraine War
- Near Svatove, the Russians attacked Andriivka and Bilohorivka
- Near Kreminna, Russian sources indicated fighting in Pishchane, indicating a possible Ukrainian advance in the area
- Note that this is still an unconfirmed rumor
- Near Bakhmut, the Russians attacked Bakhmutske, Soledar, Zelenopillya, and Yakolivka
- Zelenopillya appears to be a new town under attack, but it's right next to Kurdyumivka, so it's not surprising that the Russians are attacking there as well
- Near Donetsk, the Russians attacked Pervomaiske, Novobakhmutivka, Marinka and Nevelske
- Farther west, the Russians launched an attack on Vremivka, attacking in an area of the front which had been fairly calm over the past few weeks
- Visual confirmation of the liberation of Nevske, which had been reported liberated on 2022-10-24
- Today marks the 1-year anniversary of the beginning of the build-up for the war
2022-10-27 Thursday
2022-10-26 Wednesday
- On October 24, the governor of Belgorod Oblast announced that an explosive device had damaged the primary rail link between Russia and southern Belarus; an anti-war group called Stop The Wagons too responsibility for the attack
- Australia commits more armored vehicles and trainers to support Ukraine
- A fuel depot in Shakhtarsk, Donetsk has caught fire, presumably because of a Ukrainian attack
- Near Ternova, the Ukrainians reportedly repelled a major Russian attack, resulting in significant armored vehicle losses
- Near Bakhmut, the Russians attacked Ivanhrad, Bakhmutske, Soledar, Kurdyumivka, and Andriivka
- Near Donetsk, the Russians attacked Novomykhailivka, Nevelske, Marinka, Kamyanka and Krasnohorivka
- According to the Ukrainian general staff, the Kherson offensive has slowed due to bad weather
- Local Russian authorities are mobilizing troops without sending them official summons
- The person being mobilized is a teacher; which I thought was an exempt profession
- Moscow police are reportedly stopping military aged males on the street and handing out mobilization notices
- Reuters has a good investigative report based on captured papers from the abandoned Russian headquarters in Balakliya
- In the weeks prior to the Russian retreat Russian units were struggling with electronic warfare and surveillance
- Not enough drones or trained operators
- Frequent breakdowns of jamming equipment
- A Russian officer describes the demoralizing effect of Ukrainian artillery — says that being in Balakliya is like "playing Russian roulette"
- Documents describe that a Russian colonel referred to only by his callsign, Granit, was responsible for torturing local civilians
- The commander responsible for the Balakliya area was reportedly Colonel Ivan Popov, of the 11th Army Corp, a unit attached to Russia's Baltic Fleet
- Personnel records also show that conscripts from the Luhansk People's Republic were also present in Balakliya
- Were responsible for local policing and garrison duties
- Poorly manned and equipped
- Some servicemen were in their 60s
- One conscript required medical attention because his Mosin-Nagant rifle exploded in his hands
- Documents also show the pay rates for Russian troops
- A Russian sergeant serving in Balakliya was paid approximately $3200 per month, including combat bonuses
- LPR troops were paid significantly less; a sergeant in the LPR militia was paid only $1400 a month
- Many of the separatist troops were reported to have criminal records
- As the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the area gathered momentum, Russia's problems with communication and discipline only worsened
- Many senior Russian officers would give orders, only for the orders to either get lost or be disobeyed by units in the field
- Logistics problems were also reported, with many units reporting that they were short of ammunition
2022-10-25 Tuesday
- Near Bakhmut, Russia attacked Bilohorivka, Verkhnokamyanske, Spirne, Soledar, Ivanhrad, and Klishchiivka
- Near Donetsk, Russia attacked Marinka and Nevelske
- Russia is reportedly recruiting US-trained Afghan special forces soldiers to fight in Ukraine
- Ex-Afghan National Army special forces
- Well-regarded by the US — were some of the few ANA units that put up meaningful resistance when the Taliban took over
- Could not make it out of the country when the US backed Afghan government fell and US forces retreated
- Being recruited by the Wagner group
- Many of these ex-soldiers are refugees in Pakistan or Turkey
- More videos of mobilized Russian soliders being deployed with inadequate equipment
- Soldiers complain about having to buy their own uniforms
- Inadequate food and water
- No tents
- Lack of logistics, lack of orders
- This isn't all that surprising to me
- Russian logistics was struggling even at the beginning of the war
- Now Putin has added tens of thousands of front-line troops without increasing his army's logistical capacity
- I don't understand why the Russians aren't using mobilized conscripts to drive trucks and man warehouses
- Maybe the trucks and warehouses are already fully manned, and there just isn't enough organizational capacity to create more?
- Maybe not enough time for training?
- The House Progressive Caucus withdraws its letter after facing blowback
2022-10-24 Monday
- Reports of a car bomb in Kherson
- Near Kharkiv, the Russians attacked Zemlyanky and Chuhunivka
- Near Svatove, the Ukrainians have liberated Karmazynivka, Miasozharivka, and Nevske
- These are some of the last towns before they reach the main Russian defensive line on the P07/P66 highway
- Near Bakhmut, the front line is mostly static; however the Ukrainians have reversed some of the Russian gains over the past couple of days
- Near Donetsk, the Russians attacked Avdiivka, Pervomaiske, Nevelske, Marinka, and Novomykhailivka
- Video of a GMLRS projectile (fired from a HIMARS or similar) impacting a Russian position in the Kherson region
- US considers sending older Hawk air defense systems to Ukraine
- The Hawk is the predecessor to Patriot
- Vietnam-era ground based air defense
- The reason we hadn't sent them to Ukraine before is because the launchers have been in storage for a long time and are thought to require significant refurbishment
- Members of the House Progressive Caucus, including Ilhan Omar, send an open letter to Biden urging negotiations with Russia
- The content of the letter is fairly anodyne but the timing and optics are bad
- Letter urges Biden to open negotiations with Russia without necessarily involving Ukraine
- Letter will be used by the Russians as evidence of American disunity, and will make Putin more likely to prolong the war
- According to the chief of Ukrainian military intelligence, Russian forces are not preparing to withdraw from Kherson
- Instead they're rotating non-essential troops out, and reinforcing with combat troops
- Appear to be preparing to fight a battle for Kherson city
- Belarus has withdrawn the equipment that it deployed to the Ukrainian border and returned it to the bases where it was permanently stored
- An intercepted call from a Russian soldier describes life on the front lines
- Says that his unit doesn't have enough armor-piercing ammunition and that the regular ammunition does nothing against Ukrainian Kevlar vests
- Describes almost getting hit by a Ukrainian mortar strike; says that he has no idea how the Ukrainians managed to see his unit, didn't spot any drones in the area
- Says that, from what he can see, the supply situation is much better for the Ukrainians especially with regards to drones
- Says that none of the humanitarian donations that civilians are gathering in Russia is making it out to his unit on the front lines
2022-10-23 Sunday
- Near Bakhmut, Russia attacked Soledar, Bakhmutske, Ivanhrad, Klishchiivka, Odradivka and Ozarianivka
- Near Donetsk, Russia attacked Marinka, Novomykhailivka, Nevelske, Pervomaiske, and Avdiivka
- Explosions in Tokmak
2022-10-22 Saturday
- Kharkiv
- Kreminna/Svatove
- Bakhmut
- Donetsk
- Kherson
- Russia is reportedly enlisting migrants with promises of Russian citizenship after a 3-month tour of duty in Ukraine
- The soldiers who carried out the mass shooting on October 16 were Tajik migrants who had been recruited under this program
- Ukrainian field commanders report that Shahed-136 loitering munitions are not a problem
- This makes sense, since Ukraine seems to have most of its short-range air defenses out in the field with its soldiers
- Cities and fixed targets are protected by longer-range air defenses such as Buks and S-300s, which are comparatively less effective against small UAVs
- Russia appears to be making a concerted effort to destroy Ukrainian electrical infrastructure
2022-10-20 Thursday
- Content note: today's update is more focused on "big-picture" news, not directly related to the battlefield
- If you want battlefield news, just pretend that Russia attacked Bakhmutske, Soledar, Krasnohorivka and Nevelske again, like every other day
- A Russian journalist claims that the life expectancy of a Wagner contractor is just 9 days
- Russia's use of Iranian loitering munitions is allowing US intelligence to examine the wreckage, and devise ways of countering them
- The White House claims that Iranian troops are in Crimea, supporting Russian troops in the operation of loitering munitions
- The Ukrainian advance near Kharkiv has given Ukrainian troops a substantial amount of captured Russian armor and ammunition
- Over the course of the entire war, photos on social media captured by Oryx have shown that Ukraine has captured
- 460 main battle tanks
- 92 self-propelled howitzers
- 448 infantry fighting vehicles
- 195 armored fighting vehicles
- 44 MLRS
- That is a lot of tanks/IFVs
- This is approximately enough to outfit approximately five US armored brigade combat teams
- The US only has 10 armored brigade combat teams total
- Thread on the presence of Russian troops in Belarus
- Trains carrying troops are carrying just troops and some ancillary trucks and light transports, not armored vehicles
- Troops are all newly mobilized conscripts
- Deployed to existing military bases in northern Belarus, rather than near the Ukrainian border
- From the above, we can conclude that the Russian troops in Belarus are new recruits sent to Belarussian bases for training, because Russian training facilities were overloaded
- Therefore any threats by Putin and/or Lukashenko to open (re-open?) a northern front are likely bluffs at this time
- In addition, Belarus is shipping its own tanks and armored vehicles to Russia — this is not a thing that one would do if preparing for an imminent attack
2022-10-19 Wednesday
- Near Kharkiv, the Ukrainians stopped a Russian attack near Ohirtseve
- Kupyansk - Kreminna
- Bakhmut
- Donetsk
- Russian sources are claiming that Ukraine is advancing on Beryslav, in Kherson Oblast
- It's not clear what this means, or if these sources are accurate
- The last confirmed report of Ukrainian positions in the Kherson area had them around Mylove, which is significantly north of Beryslav
- So this might mean that Ukraine has launched an attack in the direction of Beryslav from Mylove, without necessarily indicating that Ukrainians have advanced to Beryslav
- Russia has declared martial law in the occupied regions of Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Luhansk and Donetsk
- Not sure what this means; as I understand it, these areas were already largely under military authority
- More details on the martial law declaration
- In addition to declaring martial law in the occupied areas of Ukraine, Russia has implemented a 3-part alert system for Russia itself
- Areas bordering Ukraine
- "Average reaction level"
- Local governments are instructed to
- Implement entry/exit controls
- Inspect transport vehicles (i.e. roadblocks and checkpoints)
- Temporarily relocate residents to safe locations (not sure what this means)
- Assert control over transportation and communications infrastructure and make it available to the Ministry of Defense
- Areas east of those directly bordering Ukraine (includes Moscow)
- "Elevated alert level"
- Local authorities are to
- Inspect transport vehicles
- Assert control over transport and communications infrastructure
- The remainder of the country is classified as "Basic alert level", and local authorities are required to be on alert, more or less
- The upshot of this is that as one gets closer to Ukraine, one faces greater and greater restrictions on movement and increased inspections
2022-10-17 Monday
2022-10-16 Sunday
- Kupyansk
- Bakhmut/Donetsk
- Near Bakhmut, Russia launched attacks all along the line, hitting Odradivka, Ivanhrad, Spirne, Berestove, Bilohorivka, Yakolivka, Bakhmutske, Soledar, and Opytne
- Near Donetsk, Russia attacked Krasnohorivka, Pervomaiske, Nevelske, Marinka, Pobjeda and Novomykhailivka
- Another day of Russia just blindly attacking all along the front, trying to see if there are any cracks in the Ukrainian defenses
- No firm news out of Kherson
- Gunmen kill 11 at a Russian military base near the Ukrainian border
- A fuel depot in Belgorod caught fire
- Ukrainians hit targets at the airport in Belgorod, apparently with AGM-88 missiles
- Reports that Iran may be sending short-range ballistic missiles to Russia
- Iran will reportedly be sending the Fateh-110 and Zolfaghar SRBMs
- A video of rebuilding progress from various locations near Kyiv
- France is increasing arms shipments to Ukraine
- Crotale air defense systems
- CAESAR artillery systems
- MLRS (specific system to be decided)
- Lithuania is repairing Ukrainian self-propelled howitzers and returning them to the front lines
2022-10-13 Thursday
- Russian forces are likely trying to stabilize a new set of defensive positions near Mylove, in their defense of Kherson
- Heavy fighting is ongoing in this area, especially farther to west, where Ukrainian forces are pushing the Russians away from the natural boundary of the Inhulets River
- Near Svatove, the Ukrainians have reached the P07 highway, a major road leading into Svatove
- This makes sense, given that they liberated Stelmakhivka on 2022-10-10
- Near Bakhmut, Russia attacked Bakhmutske, Opytne, Ivanhrad, and Ozarianivka
- Near Donetsk, Russia attacked Marinka
- This is the first direct attack on Marinka in some time
- Lately the Russians have been trying to flank Marinka with attacks on Krasnohorivka, Pervomaiske and Pobjeda
- Burning ammunition depot in Belgorod
- The governor's office in Chelyabinsk Oblast reported the first confirmed fatalities among conscripted soldiers
- The Russians are using the Shahed-131 loitering munition in addition to the Shahed-136
- The Shahed-131 is a smaller drone with a shorter range and a smaller warhead
- Interesting to see Russia use so many Iranian drones in this conflict — among the many deficiencies revealed in the Russian military, lack of UAVs and loitering munitions has been among the most visible
- Russian officials suggest that civilians should leave Kherson
- A real vote of confidence in the Russian military's ability to hold Kherson
2022-10-12 Wednesday
- Ukrainian forces have reportedly destroyed several Russian S-300 air defense systems southeast of Zaporizhzhia
- Ukrainian partisans have shot a Russian government official near the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, the official survived, but is in critical condition
- Heavy fighting reported near Dvorichne, north of Kupyansk
- Ukraine may have established another bridgehead across the Oskil river here
- Near Svatove, the Ukrainians repelled an attack on Nevske
- Near Bakhmut, the Russians attacked Spirne, Soledar, Bakhmutske and Opytne
- Near Donetsk, the Russians attacked Pervomaiske and Krasnohorivka
- The Russians appear to be creating a World War 1 style system of trenches in Luhansk Oblast, near Hirske
- Hirske was captured on 2022-06-23, as part of the Russian push on Severodonetsk
- Nathan Ruser has questions about the placement of the trenches
- Significantly behind the front lines
- Largely isolated, not connected to other defensive positions
- Might be connected to Wagner PR
- Mobilized Russian soldiers are receiving 1980s-era Soviet radios and 1950s-era field telephones
- I bet that in practice, the average Russian conscript will resort to using his mobile phone, operational security be damned
- Ukrainians have gotten good at repairing bomb/missile damage
- I wish our road crews worked this quickly
- Long delays at the ferry crossing in Crimea
- Although one of the road spans of the Kerch bridge is technically open, only light vehicles are allowed to travel on it
- Heavier trucks have to take a ferry to get to Crimea
- Repair work on the Kerch Bridge
- A Ukrainian Su-27 flying at low altitude somewhere over Kharkiv Oblast
2022-10-11 Tuesday
- Footage of a Russian cruise missile hitting Kyiv
- More HIMARS systems are arriving in Ukraine
- Ukrainian commanders emphasize the importance of HIMARS
- Conscripts in Bryansk, one of the Russian Army's primary staging areas, are reportedly refusing to go to Ukraine
- However, other recruits from the area deny that there is any large-scale refusal to go across the border
- Recruits are often keeping their phones with them, leading to operational security breaches
- Many rumors about high attrition rates
- A Finnish explosives expert analyzes the Kerch Bridge explosion
- Notes the sparks the explosion set off as a sign of the potential use of thermite or other metallic incendiaries
- Calls out the lack of a waterspout and the presence of scorch marks on top of the bridge as indicating the explosion occurred above the bridge
- The truck that probably exploded might have exploded early
- Would have been more destructive if the explosion had occurred in the center of the bridge
- An explosion in the center would have destroyed both road segments and debris might have blocked the shipping channel running underneath
- The missile barrage fired at Ukraine included 48N6 missiles from the S-300 air defense system
- Further evidence of Russian scrounging
- Though, it is interesting that they're using anti-aircraft missiles in this role when the Ukrainian air-force is still flying
- The first German IRIS-T air defense system arrives in Ukraine
2022-10-10 Monday
- Kharkiv
- Lyman/Kupyansk
- Bakhmut
- Donetsk
- Russia launches a series of air strikes on Ukraine in retaliation for the Kerch Bridge attack
- As part of the attacks, power stations have been hit
- In addition, there have been joint maneuvers with Belarussian forces near the Ukraine-Belarus border
- Thread on Belarus' military potential
- No sign of mobilization or movement to a more threatening force posture in the Belarussian military
- Biden pledges "advanced air defense" systems to Ukraine in light of today's attacks
- A dispatch from Lyman
2022-10-08 Saturday
- Izyum/Kupyansk
- Near Bakhmut, Russia attacked Bakhmutske, Vesela Dolyna, Odradivka, Ozarianivka, and Zaitseve
- Near Donetsk, Russia attacked Krasnohorivka, Kamyanka, Avdiivka, Vesele, Pervomaiske, Pobjeda, Nevelske and Novomykhailivka
- Near Kherson, Russia attacked Ternovy Pody once again
- Kerch Bridge explosion
- Footage of yesterday's explosion on the Kerch Bridge
- Video of the aftermath of the explosion
- Looks like the majority of the damage was to the automobile side of the bridge
- Rail bridge looks intact
- This means that the actual impact on Russian logistics is negligible, assuming that the rail bridge is structurally intact
- Russia's Deputy Prime Minister announces that rail traffic has already been restored on the Kerch Bridge
- Unclear if full-weight trains can cross, but it is clear that some trains are making it across
- Another thread on the explosion with more details and explanations
- An anonymous Ukrainian official states that the attack on the Kerch Bridge was a Ukrainian operation
- Shelling has disrupted electricity to the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, causing it to switch to backup diesel generators to avoid meltdown
- Russia has appointed a new overall commander for the war: Sergey Surovkin
- More details on Surovkin
- Surovkin possibly had de-facto command of the war for months, and this appointment is just updating the org-chart to reflect that
- The first overall commander was Dvornikov
- Dvornikov was replaced by Zhidko
- And now Zhidko has been replaced by Surovkin
- Visually confirmed Ukrainian vehicle losses exceed 1000
2022-10-07 Friday
2022-10-06 Thursday
2022-10-05 Wednesday
- Near Kharkiv, Russia attacked Strilecha and Zelene
- On the Lyman/Kupyansk front, Ukraine liberated Hrekivka, Terny and Yampolivka
- Bakhmut/Donetsk
- Near Bakhmut, Russia attacked Spirne, Vyimka, Bakhmutske, Kurdyumivka and Zaitseve
- Near Donetsk, Russia attacked Novomykhailivka and Vuhledar
- Haven't seen any Russian activity around Vuhledar in some time
- There was a burst of activity around July, when the Ukrainians recaptured Vuhledar, and attempted to push on Mykilske, but things had been pretty quiet in this area since then
- However, in the past few days, I've seen attacks on Pavlivka and Vuhledar, indicating a renewed Russian push in this area
- No more news out of Kherson after the burst of liberated towns yesterday
- US intelligence agencies believe that the Ukrainians were behind the assassination of Darya Dugina
- Well, so much for the theory that she was assassinated in some kind of intra-regime power struggle
- Video of Ukrainian troops advancing under fire in Humvees in Kherson Oblast
- This is why the Ukrainians need tanks
- It's great that they have Humvees, but tanks and IFVs would have been even more effective in this situation
- Mobilization
- There are reports of brawls between newly mobilized conscripts and existing contract servicemen
- Mobilized servicemen in Omsk asking when they'll be paid, and being told that local officials don't actually have the money to pay them
- I see the Russian mobilization is going well, with zero problems
- More information about the so-called "nuclear weapons" unit
- Apparently this is a unit charged with carrying out "classified" tasks for the Russian military
- As a result, it has less scrutiny, and, Russia being Russia, has an even higher level of corruption
2022-10-04 Tuesday
- Russian air force sorties remain at their lowest level since the start of the war
- No usage of strategic bombers
- Russian missiles appear to be adapted surface-launched surface-to-surface or surface-to-air missiles
- Russia has reportedly relieved the commander of the Western Military District, Zhuravlev and replaced him with Roman Berdnikov, who commanded Russian forces in Syria
- This is not surprising, given the absolutely atrocious performance of Western Military District units in Ukraine
- Near Kupyansk, Bohuslavka and Andriivka (location uncertain, could be one of two in the area) have been liberated
- The Ukrainians seem to be focused on connecting and consolidating their two bridgeheads across the Oskil River
- Near Bakhmut, the Russians attacked Ivano-Darivka, Vyimka, Bakhmutske, Zaitseve and Ozarianivka
- Near Donetsk, the Russians attacked Kamyanka, Opytne, Pervomaiske, and Novomykhailivka
- Kherson
- Russia is deploying T-90S tanks that were intended for India to Ukraine
- The T-90S is an export version of the T-90 that, thus far, only has India as a customer
- It's possible that these were stored for some other reason, or that Russia had some other customer and the contract fell through, but it's unlikely
- More T-62s spotted in Kherson Oblast
- This, plus the news of the T-90S models being deployed indicates to me that Russia might very well be running out of tanks
- Certainly, I haven't seen very many photos or videos of new T-72s or T-80s being deployed
- Russia seems to be scrounging
- Russian sources are increasingly pessimistic about Kherson
- The Biden administration announces a further $625 million military aid package to Ukraine
- Another 4 HIMARS launchers and associated ammunition
- Another 16 155mm howitzers
- 75,000 rounds of 155mm ammunition
- 500 precision guided 155mm munitions
- 1000 anti-tank mines
- 200 MaxxPro MRAPs
- The so-called "nuclear weapons convoy" was more likely Russia transporting vehicles with a new turret
- Russia hits a Ukrainian military facility in Bila Tservka with Iranian Shahed-136 loitering munitions
2022-10-03 Monday
- North of Kharkiv, the Ukrainians repelled an attack near Kozacha Lopan
- Izyum
- Lyman
- Bakhmut
- Donetsk
- Kherson
- Remains of a Russian column that was attempting to retreat out of Lyman
- Seems like the Russians took more significant casualties attempting to retreat from Lyman than they did retreating from Izyum
- Polling indicates that a clear majority of Russians now oppose the war
- Just like in Vietnam, everyone supports the losing war until it's their turn to die for it
- Australian supplied armored personnel carriers spotted in Lyman
- The Duma has approved the treaties of annexation that were signed on 2022-09-30
2022-10-01 Saturday
- Lyman has been liberated
- Lyman was captured by the Russians on 2022-05-25
- Unclear how many Russian troops were captured
- President Zelensky has canceled the autumn conscription and postponed the demobilization of serving soldiers
- I think that's because 1. Ukraine has enough soldiers for now and 2. he doesn't want any additional disruptions caused by a large influx of untrained troops and 3. he doesn't want the negative economic impact
- Bakhmut
- Donetsk
- Ramzan Kadyrov lays the blame for the retreat from Lyman squarely at the feet of Generals Lapin and Gerasimov
- Surprising to see this level of open criticism from someone who's as much of an insider as Kadyrov
- On the other hand, maybe Kadyrov thinks he can get away with public criticism because he has his own power base, separate from Putin's regime
- From today onwards, Gazprom will no longer deliver gas to Italy
- A Russian military aircraft skidded off the runway at Belbeck air base in Crimea, and caught fire
2022-09-30 Friday
- Izyum/Lyman
- Bakhmut
- Donetsk
- Reports of civilian casualties after Russia hits a humanitarian convoy in Zaporizhzhia
- Putin's speech
- Russia will be formally annexing Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
- This undoes the decisions made by Soviet rulers which went against the will of the Soviet people
- While the Soviet Union cannot be restored, the mistakes made during its dissolution can be undone
- The status of the annexed territories is not open to negotiation
- The West is plotting to break up Russia, just as it plotted to break up the Soviet Union
- Long rant enumerating various examples of Western imperialism
- Accusation that the US was responsible for the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines
- Suggestion that Russia is fighting for "traditional" family values — says that Russia is fighting to keep families headed by a mother and a father, not "parent 1" and "parent 2"
- Western sanctions are an effort to "cancel" Russia
- Invites representatives from Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson on stage to sign annexation documents
- Ukraine received fragmentation warheads for its HIMARS
- Captured Russian bridgelaying equipment played a key role in the Kharkiv counteroffensive
- Putin criticizes mobilization authorities for "mistakes" made during the mobilization process
- Germany is sending another 3 IRIS-T air defense systems to Ukraine
2022-09-29 Thursday
2022-09-28 Wednesday
- Ukraine shot down a number of Russian jets
- Near Kupyansk, Kivsharivka and Kurylivka have been liberated
- Near Lyman, confirmation of the liberation of Novoselivka
- Near Bakhmut, the Russians attacked
- Near Donetsk, the Russians attacked
- Still no sign of that mythical counteroffensive east of Zaporizhzhia
- Western officials estimate that Russia has stripped 80% of the troops on its border with the Baltic States and in Kaliningrad and sent them to Ukraine
- Russia has some interesting range safety procedures
- The US announces another 1.1 billion dollar aid package for Ukraine
- Another 18 HIMARS launcher plus additional HIMARS ammunition
- Titan electronic warfare systems for counter-UAV
- However, some of the aid might take years to arrive
- Ukraine pleads for tanks, but the West remains hesitant
- The US Army spends money to increase artillery ammunition production, including brand new factories for 155mm ammunition and upgrades to existing facilities
- The commander of a mobilized unit in Russia greets his men
- Says that he was pulled from vacation to lead this unit
- Doesn't know if he'll be deploying with the unit or staying behind to train the next unit raised in that region
- Unit will be in training until Oct. 30
- Admits that he doesn't know where, specifically, they'll be deployed
- Also says that he doesn't know their equipment situation
- Says that soldiers will be inspected by medical staff for conditions like poor vision and hernias, but emphasizes that these are not disqualifying conditions; says that he takes a bunch of pills every day himself
- Good Financial Times report on Ukraine's counteroffensive near Izyum
- Thread on the possibility of Russian nuclear employment
- Russia has a clearly defined escalation procedure
- Have not taken any of the steps along that procedure
- No significant numbers of weapons have been removed from storage and mated to launchers
2022-09-27 Tuesday
- Near Kupyansk, fighting is ongoing near the two bridgeheads at Petropavlivka and Kivsharivka
- Lyman
- Heavy fighting reported east of Siversk, near Zolotarivka
- Near Bakhmut, Russia launched a series of attacks all across the front line
- Russia hit the airports in Kryvyi Rih and Kramatorsk, causing some damage and disruption
- In a first, Ukrainian aircraft conducted more sorties than Russian aircraft, possibly indicating maintenance disruptions caused by sanctions
- Ukrainian special forces or Ukrainian-supporting partisan forces destroyed a Russian supply train in Luhansk Oblast
- TCG_CrisisRisks has been reporting for some time how that Ukraine has been making progress with a counteroffensive east of Zaporizhzhia, but I haven't seen reporting of this anywhere else
- That said, that area is mostly open terrain, so the Ukrainians may have made progress without necessarily liberating any towns, which is what tends to get reported
- Footage of the gas leaks from the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines
- Reportedly Swedish and Danish seismographs recorded explosions shortly before leaks in the pipelines were reported
- Indicates possible sabotage
- But why would Russia or Europe sabotage the pipeline?
- Russia benefits from keeping the pipeline intact, so that if Europe blinks on its sanctions, the pipeline remains ready to ship gas
- Europe notably didn't sanction Nord Stream 1 after the war began, that pipeline was shut down on the Russian side
- Putin's draft
- Local authorities are reporting that draft-eligible people waiting in line at the Russia-Georgia border checkpoint are being served with recruitment notices in their cars
- Similar scenes at the Finnish border, as eyewitneses report that people whose names were on mobilization lists were being detained
- Kazakh authorities have stated that they will not extradite anyone fleeing there to escape conscription
- Thread about a mobilized Russian soldier who was reportedly being sent to the front without any training at all
2022-09-26 Monday
2022-09-25 Sunday
- US warns Russia of "catastrophic consequences" if it were to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine
- Russia has created a new Deputy Minister position specifically for logistics and has appointed Col. Gen. Mizintsev to it
- Based on shelling locations, it is likely that Ukraine has established a second bridgehead across the Oskil River at Hryanykivka
- Near Bakhmut, Russia attacked Vyimka, Soledar, Zaitseve, and Kurdyumivka
- Near Donetsk, Russia attacked Pervomaiske, Novomykhailivka, and Pavlivka
- I thought the Russians had retreated away from Pavlivka
- Near Kherson shelling was reported in Arkhanelske, but it's unclear what the status of the town is
- Ukraine has taken delivery of its first NSAMS air defense system
- Meduza reports that able bodied men will be prevented from leaving Russia as of Wednesday
- This is based off rumors, but it's plausible
- Anti-war protests in Dagestan as a result of mobilization
- Anti-war protests in Yakutsk
- Large crowds in Shermetyevo Airport, Moscow, as people leave for Yerevan and Istanbul to avoid mobilization
- Thread on the economic costs of mobilization
- Russia is having trouble finding officers to lead its units as indicated by the death of a 27-year-old lieutenant who was reportedly leading a battalion
- Yeah, but on the other hand, the US Army in World War 2 also had some shockingly young officers in senior ranks
- Youth doesn't necessarily indicate incompetence, especially in wartime
- Mobilization appears to be disproportionately targeting minority groups that oppose the Russian government
2022-09-24 Saturday
- The Ukrainian offensive east of the Inhulets in Kherson Oblast seems to have been slowed by stronger than expected Russian opposition
- Near Kupyansk, the Ukrainians stopped Russian attacks at Petropavlivka and Podoly, indicating a possible expansion of the bridghead across the Oskil River there
- Near Lyman, there was fighting reported in Nove, Karpivka and Ridkodub, indicating possible Ukrainian progress in that direction
- North of Bakhmut, Russians unsuccessfully attacked Spirne, Vyimka, Soledar and Bakhmutske
- Looks like they're back to attack the north of Bakhmut after taking a short break to focus making progress to the south?
- I still don't know what the Russian plan is here, given that even if they somehow push through Bakhmut in the next few weeks, they haven't made much, if any, progress towards taking Siversk
- South of Bakhmut, Russians attacked Odradivka, Ozarianivka, and Zaitseve
- DefMon3 has Mykolaivka Druha still marked as under Ukrainian control but I don't know how long that will last, given that the Russians are making attacks on Ozarianivka and Kurdyumivka, which are behind it
- It's clear that the Russians have made progress south of Bakhmut — the capture of Semyhirja, Kodema, and Vershyna have been confirmed, and the state of Mykolaivka Druha looks every more precarious
- The problem for the Russian is that while this gives them the southern jaw of an encirclement of Bakhmut, the northern jaw is not close to being in position yet
- Near Donetsk, the Russians attacked Kamyanka, Avdiivka, Opytne, Nevelske and Novomykhailivka
- Unlike near Bakhmut, I have no idea what the Russian plan is here, other than to keep running headlong into Ukrainian machine guns near Avdiivka
- Thread on the scale and impact of mobilization
- Mostly ethnic minorities being summoned
- Fewer people being drafted from Moscow
- University students being given deferments
- This is looking very much like the US draft in Vietnam
- Footage of a Russian Su-30SM with its starboard engine on fire after it was hit by a Ukrainian MANPAD; the plane reportedly crashed later
- The Russian General Staff stated that the 120,000 conscripts currently serving will not be sent to the conflict zone and will not be re-mobilized after their term of enlistment had ended
- Many reports of people with health problems or no prior military experience could be attributed to chaos rather than malice
- Seems like local offices, especially those far from Moscow and St. Petersburg are recruiting everyone in an attempt to meet their quotas as fast as possible and are relying on downstream processing centers to filter out those who are unfit for service
- This also might serve as cover for skipping individuals who are politically connected, etc, by sending old and sick people in their place, knowing that they'll get filtered out, but the quota will still have been met
- Apparently mobilized soldiers will get two weeks of training
2022-09-23 Friday
- Russia begins annexation referenda in occupied areas of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson
- Ukraine seriously wounded Maj. Gen. Tsokov with a HIMARS attack on his HQ in Svatove
- Russia is increasing its use of Iranian loitering munitions
- Yatskivka has been liberated, giving the Ukrainians yet another crossing across the Oskil river
- Russia launched another unsuccessful counterattack against the Ukrainian crossing across the Oskil river at Kupyansk
- Near Bakhmut, the Ukrainians stopped an attack on Spirne
- It looks like the Ukrainians have made some marginal forward progress here too
- Near Donetsk, Russians attacked Kamyanka, Opytne, Zaitseve, and Novomykhailivka, without success
- Large traffic jam on the Russia-Georgia border as Russians flee mobilization
- Another explosion reported in Melitopol, but it's unclear what was struck
- In addition to the Shahed-136 loitering munition, Russia is also reportedly operating larger Mohajer-6 UAVs
- Footage of Ukrainian air defenses shooting down a Shahed-136 loitering munition, somewhere over Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russia attacked Odesa with loitering munitions
2022-09-22 Thursday
- Russia attacked Kupyansk again, unsuccessfully
- Krymky and Oleksandrivka have reportedly been liberated, though there is no photo evidence of that
- Near Bakhmut, the Russians attacked Zaitseve, Ozarianivka, and Odradivka
- Are the Russians trying to bypass Bakhmut?
- Near Donetsk, the Russians attacked Novomykhailivka
- A train station in Yasnuvata, near Donetsk, suffered an explosion, reportedly while a train full of T-62 tanks was parked there
- Newly released footage of GMLRS missiles (i.e. HIMARS) hitting a Russian supply depot
- Although Russian officials have stated that currently serving conscripts won't be sent to Ukraine, there is nothing preventing them from re-mobilizing conscripts at the end of their term of service and sending them
- There is evidence that mobilization is taking place first among ethnic minorities
- Russia has reportedly relieved the commander of the "west" grouping of forces, Roman Berdnikov, and replaced him with the commander of the "center" grouping, Alexander Lapin
- Despite reports that mobilization would be limited to those with prior military service, we're seeing university students get mobilized
- Interesting thread on mobilization from a pro-Russia blogger
- Argues that the mobilization is a violation of the social contract between the people and Putin
- Doesn't see how this will end well for the Russian state
2022-09-21 Wednesday
- Host: Dmitry Alperovitch
- Panelists: Rob Lee, Michael Kofman
- Putin made a major announcement today, by enacting Russia's first mobilization since World War 2
- Up to 300,000 men will be inducted into the military, from a pool of 25 million with prior military experience
- Stop loss order: people currently serving on short term contracts will not be allowed to leave
- Refusing to serve has been criminalized
- Current conscripts will not currently be sent to the front line, but new recruits with prior military experience might be
- Reports of people already having received mobilization orders
- Mobilization will occur in a phased process
- The big open question is what is the ability of the Russian military to train, equip and organize this force?
- One thing to keep in mind is that the 300,000 number may not be reliable
- Shoigu often quotes numbers that prove to be incorrect
- The Russian military no longer possesses the ability to integrate large numbers of untrained/lightly trained people like the Soviet military did
- Instead, at the start of this war, they had a force that was designed to be 2/3s contract servicemen, and 1/3 conscripts
- How many of the officers who were supposed to train and lead that 1/3 have been sent over to Ukraine already?
- Unlike in the west, in Russia, training is not centralized
- Troops show up to their unit, receive training, and serve out conscript duty with the unit
- Will be interesting to compare the performance of mobilized soldiers with the performance of the newly formed 3rd Army Corps
- Third Army Corps is a formation that was created out of whole cloth and manned with volunteers who had signed up with short term contracts
- Reportedly deployed to Kharkiv to try to stop the Ukrainian advance there
- Still had issues with leadership and coordination
- The quantity and quality of the training that mobilized soldiers will receive is questionable
- Unit cohesion and morale will be questionable as well
- These measures will definitely help Russia in the short term
- In some cases recently, you had 20-40% of units refusing to fight — now refusing to fight is a criminal offense punishable by up to 15 years in prison
- The forthcoming annexation of territory in Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson potentially opens the way for Russia's existing conscripts to be deployed there
- Stop-loss prevents contract servicemen from leaving
- But are these solutions tenable beyond the next 3-6 months?
- The Russian military has done most things poorly thus far; why we do we believe they'll handle mobilization better than anything else they've attempted to do?
- The mobilization announcement seems very hasty — lots of details left unclear
- Calling newly mobilized troops "reservists" is an exaggeration — these are civilian veterans
- Does this mobilization improve Putin's prospects for capturing the remainder of the Donbas?
- Unclear
- It was apparent after the Ukrainian counteroffensive around Izyum and Kharkiv that the Russian ability to capture the remainder of the Donbas was pretty much nil
- Putin had to pick between three bad options
- Retrenchment — retreat from e.g. Kherson in order to concentrate more forces in Donetsk and Luhansk
- Probably the least risky option
- Russia has retrenched repeatedly in the past, and has maintained that its focus is on Donetsk and Luhansk
- Mobilization
- Political risks
- Practical difficulties
- Escalation
- Not really an option that generates a path towards war termination
- However, it was an option that could have bought time
- How will Russia deploy newly mobilized troops
- Use them piecemeal to restore existing battalions to full strength
- Soldiers aren't interchangeable parts that you can just plug and play
- Ideally one would be rotating units off the front line in order to integrate replacements, but it's not clear that the Russians have the ability to do that
- Organize new troops along the lines of Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republic Militias
- Infantry-heavy formations with some motorization
- Not very useful as a maneuver force, but can be used to garrison parts of the front lines and prevent further collapse
- Create new maneuver units
- Most effective use of new troops, but also the most complicated and time consuming
- Maybe use the 3rd Army Corps as a model?
- Russia can fix the issues they had with the quantity of soldiers they'd deployed but it's not clear that they have the ability to fix the issues with the quality of soldiers
- Best equipment has already been deployed, and, in many cases, destroyed
- Likewise with experienced troops who could have mentored newly mobilized recruits
- Morale problems are only going to get worse
- Stop-loss policy allows the Russian military to force refuseniks to fight, but some proportion of them will choose to desert rather than continue
- Mobilization extends the war, but it's unclear how much it pushes the final outcome into Russia's favor
- What mobilization does do is increase the political risks for Putin
- Putin and Shoigu both emphasized the size of the front line in their respective announcements
- Stated that newly mobilized troops would be used to defend already captured territory rather than conduct new offensive operations
- Is a sign that Putin has realized that Russia is losing the war, and that his military won't be able to grind down the Ukrainian army over the long term
- Russia has another constraint that mobilization does little to solve: logistics and coordination
- Does Russia have the command and control capacity to coordinate many more troops than it already has in the field?
- Does Russia have the logistical capacity to supply additional forces in the field, especially in the face of a concerted Ukrainian effort to degrade Russian logistical capacity?
- Of course, one thing that Russia could do is use these newly mobilized troops to address its logistical shortfalls
- You don't need much training to drive a military truck if you have experience driving trucks in the civilian world
- The catalyst for this decision may have been the retaking of territory inside Luhansk Oblast by Ukraine
- Russia has maintained since March 25 that the goal of the invasion was the liberation of Donetsk and Luhansk
- Could talk their way around reversals near Kyiv, Kharkiv and Kherson
- No way to talk their way out of losing territory in Luhansk
- Putin has no clear strategy for conflict termination
- Seems to be hoping that if he can just drag the war on for long enough, foreign diplomatic and military assistance to Ukraine will taper off and Ukraine will stop fighting
- The decision to mobilize is another sign of the myopia of Russian leadership — make decisions that keep the war going for the next few months without regard for what happens after
- Over time, the Russian military has deprofessionalized and the Ukrainian military has professionalized
- Most of Russia's best trained and best equipped forces (i.e. those with experience from Syria or Chechnya) have already been deployed
- The forces replacing them have been progressively less experienced and less well equipped
- On the other hand, Ukraine's forces have been receiving training in the UK and have been increasingly armed with better Western weapons
- What are the prospects for nuclear escalation?
- Russia might threaten nuclear escalation to defend annexed territory
- This is ill-judged because it raises questions about Russian willingness to use nuclear weapons to defend Crimea
- The decision to use nuclear weapons will always be a political one
- We can look at Russian nuclear doctrine, but Putin can disregard doctrine
- Probability of nuclear escalation is still low, but even low probabilities can be unacceptable — declassified sources report that the Soviets believed that the prospect for nuclear escalation during the Berlin Crisis was 5%, and this was judged to be unacceptable
- Does Russia have enough equipment to outfit mobilized troops
- Equipment shouldn't be a problem — Russia has lots of old stuff laying around that can be put to good use
- There are questions about maintenance, however — not all of that old stuff may be still in usable condition
- Equipment is less of a problem than trained manpower — driving a tank or APC is not the same as driving a car or a truck
- How will these new recruits be trained on the equipment they will be expected to use?
- Where will their officers come from?
- How effective will these new recruits be with two weeks of training
- Depends on who, exactly, they're calling up
- If we take Shoigu's 300,000 number, and the calculation behind it, at face value, there is no way that a majority of the newly mobilized troops will have prior experience as contract soldiers
- Most Russian conscripts weren't well trained to begin with, so it's an open question how much military skills someone with a year of conscript service 5+ years ago has
- Will be really hard to replace lost technical skills
- Once again, it's useful to contrast this with Ukraine, whose soldiers are getting four week training rotations in the UK, along with coaching from American, British and other western technical experts
- How dangerous are these moves for Putin, politically?
- Putin is increasingly and deliberately painting himself into a corner
- Annexation, especially, is a point of no return — can't use annexed territory as a bargaining chip any more
- Mobilization is also a de facto point of no return — Russia is now on a wartime footing, even if war has not legally been declared
- Putin is staking the survival of his government on this war
- Existing analytical frameworks for Russia are not very useful any more
- Few Russia watchers alive have seen a Russian mobilization
- We are in almost uncharted waters
- The biggest question for Ukraine is, how does their economy keep functioning as the war drags on?
2022-09-20 Tuesday
2022-09-19 Monday
- Izyum
- Russian forces are reportedly surrounded at Lyman
- There are reports of Ukrainian offensives against Yarova, Sosnove and Studenok, however, there is little evidence regarding their success
- According to this photo, Yarova has been liberated, but it's real shaky
- DefMon3 is claiming that Sosnove is liberated based on reports of fighting at Oleksandrivka, which is farther along the same road that Sosnove lies on, but I'm holding out for more confirmation
- Siversk/Bakhmut
- Kherson
- US defense officials say that supplying tanks to Ukraine is being considered, but it would depend on Ukraine being able to maintain and sustain them
- Germany is sending another 4 PzH 2000 self-propelled howitzers to Ukraine
- Rob Lee asks more questions about Russia's command structure in Ukraine
- Argues that Wagner has been tasked with a single objective: gain territory near Bakhmut
- So that is what they're doing, even as Russian lines collapse elsewhere
- This is because it's likely that Wagner is operating outside the normal Russian chain of command, possibly reporting directly to Putin himself
- Rob Lee writes about Ukraine's advantages
- Manpower
- Ability to learn and adapt
- Interior lines
- Unified command and control (see above re: Wagner, and see below re: Luhansk and Donetsk People's Republic militias being outside the Russian chain of command)
- Clear goals (though the fullest extent of those goals, esp. the liberation of Crimea, may not be achievable)
- Precision strike
- Morale
- Ability to strike behind enemy lines with resistance forces
- Access to NATO and commercial satellite intelligence
- US troops are helping Ukrainians conduct maintenance remotely
- Calls out the use of Starlink in facilitating this communication
- According to the BBC, the Russians have lost a disproportionate number of troops from their elite units
- This speaks to the the low level of readiness among regular Russian forces
- Elite counterterror and special forces units are being called upon to conduct routine combat patrols, jobs that regular infantry should be able to easily handle
- According to the USAF, Ukraine has shot down 55 Russian aircraft thus far
- Konrad Muzyka analyzes the Kharkiv offensive
- Ukraine's success took advantage of both short and long-term deficiencies on the Russian side
- Long-term deficiencies
- Entering the war at peacetime strength
- Choosing to increase the number of units by reducing the number of soldiers in each unit
- This meant that, without mobilization, many BTGs could only deploy 50-60% of their rated strength
- And, as Rob Lee and Michael Kofman have pointed out, this overall number obscures the fact that the deficiency was disproportionately concentrated among infantry
- In other words, Russia's mobilization strategy relied on having a most of its vehicle operators as contract servicemen, and its line infantry as conscripts
- When the invasion went ahead without mobilization, many of Russia's motor rifle battalions were severely short-staffed in the number of regular soldiers they could deploy
- This prevented Russian forces from effectively exercising combined arms tactics, which hurt them severely against Ukrainian anti-tank squads early in the war
- Losses early in the war were among the best trained and highest readiness formations (see BBC story above)
- This lack of manpower has affected Russia's tactics
- Conduct artillery bombardments and follow it up with reconnaissance in force
- If defenders are still holding on, retreat and bombard again
- Tactics that would be intimately familiar for British and French generals in World War 1
- The above approach can be effective
- Worked to capture Popasna, and later Severodonetsk and Lysychansk
- However it is extremely inefficient and slow
- Allows defenders ample time to establish secondary lines of defense, as the Ukrainians did at Bakhmut and Siversk after being driven from Severodonetsk and Lysychansk
- This approach stands in stark contrast to the Ukrainian approach during the counteroffensive near Kharkiv, where mobile reconnaissance forces prevented the Russians from establishing secondary lines of defense
- Another long-term deficiency is sustainment
- There were a lot of Russian vehicles at Izyum when it was captured
- Speaks to deficiencies in Russia's ability to repair vehicles and return them to the front lines in a timely manner
- Short-term mistakes
- Russian forces were not sufficient to secure the entire front
- Faced with a choice
- Continue offensive operations out of Izyum, towards Slovyansk
- Continue offensive operations near Bakhmut
- Reinforce Kherson against a Ukrainian counterattack
- Russian generals chose to allocate forces towards options 2 and 3, stripping reserves from Izyum
- This lack of reserves near Izyum was apparent even in open-sources, showing up as a distinct decrease in Russian operational tempo
- It's unclear whether Russian commanders didn't notice the build-up Ukrainian of Ukrainian forces in Kharkiv or whether they underestimated Ukraine's ability to field and coordinate such a large formation
- Future implications
- Unlikely that the Russian military will be able to rebuild its strength to threaten Ukrainian gains in the near future
- Kyiv has seized the initiative
- Ukraine has been able to trade territory for time, and time is on Ukraine's side
- Thread on the culture of institutionalized lying in the Russian military
2022-09-18 Sunday
2022-09-17 Saturday
- Izyum
- Siversk/Bakhmut
- Donetsk
- Russia's 4th Tank Division has lost a full regiment of tanks, half its force
- RFERL article on the growing problem of people refusing to serve in Ukraine
- Soldiers in units being sent to Ukraine for a second tour are deserting
- No good information on the total number of deserters
- Soldiers deserting are being threatened with prosecution, but it's unclear on what grounds they can be prosecuted, since there has been no formal declaration of war or mobilization
- Russia has come up with a special stamp for military ID booklets that indicates that the holder is a refusenik
- The Wall Street Journal is reporting that Iranian loitering munitions are having an effect in Ukraine
- Russia appears to be using the Shahed 136, which it is calling the Geranium 2
- Mostly appears to be deployed as a defensive weapon around Kharkiv
- It's important to note, though, that just as HIMARS was not a war-winning wonder weapon for Ukraine, I don't think these drones will be a war-winning wonder weapon for Russia
- This does explain, however, why Ukraine has made a priority of acquiring new air defense systems
- The New York Times has a report on Wagner's recruitment from prisons originally reported on 2022-09-14
- Ukrainian forces are reportedly dissatisfied with NATO logistics, as they find that different systems, even though they fire the same ammunition, have incompatible parts and logistical supply chains
- This was a major concern for NATO during the Cold War, and it was never adequately addressed
2022-09-16 Friday
2022-09-15 Thursday
- Bakhmut/Siversk
- Donetsk
- No evidence that Ukraine has conducted a major crossing of the Oskil River
- The Russian Ministry of Finance announced a 10% across-the-board budget cut due to declining gas and oil sales
- Germany has sent an additional 2 M270 MLRS launchers, ammunition (which can also be used with HIMARS), and 50 "Dingo" armored vehicles to Ukraine
- This is in addition to the 3 M270 launchers they sent in June
- The head of the German Bundeswehr is reportedly concerned about the Russians opening a second front
- Rob Lee has further commentary
- I mostly agree with Rob's commentary
- Russian military capability has suffered a significant setback which it will take years, if not decades to recover from
- Right now, the prospect of Russia opening up a second front is nil with the manpower that they have
- Even if Russians declared a full mobilization, it's still unclear as to whether they can turn raw recruits into cohesive military units in a short period of time
- Another thread on the quality of German analysis during this war (hint: it's bad)
- Explosions reported in Valuyki, Russia
2022-09-14 Wednesday
2022-09-13 Tuesday
2022-09-12 Monday
- The pontoon bridge that Russia was building across the Dnipro River in Kherson remains incomplete
- There are unconfirmed reports of further Ukrainian counterattacks around Donetsk and Kherson
- Igor "Strelkov" Girkin reports that Ukraine has intensified shelling south of Donetsk
- These are all unconfirmed rumors, so they might turn out to be nothing but panic and paranoia
- Kharkiv
- Ternova has been liberated
- Udy has been liberated
- Udy had been reportedly captured by Russians on 2022-08-29, although the actual state of the village is unclear because the Ukrainian general staff was reporting fighting in Udy even after it had been reported captured
- Video of Ukrainian armed forces entering Kupyansk
- Izyum
- Svyatohirsk has been liberated
- Svyatohirsk was captured on 2022-06-08 as part of the northern offensive out of Izyum towards Severodonetsk and Lysychansk
- Bohorodychne, which previously was a no-man's land that the Ukrainians withdrew from on 2022-07-14, has been reoccupied by Ukraine
- Pro-Russia Telegram channels are reporting that the Ukrainians have set up river crossings at Staryi Karavan and Raihorodok
- Staryi Karavan was recently liberated, and I'm not sure if Raihorodok was ever under Russian control
- However, this information is totally unverified and comes from Russian Telegram, which isn't exactly a reliable source, so take it with a grain of salt
- No reports of shelling south of Izyum (e.g. around Dibrovne, Dovhenke, or Dolyna), but there was shelling reported between Slovyansk and Lyman, possibly indicating a Ukrainian advance there
- The entire area south and southwest of Kupyansk has probably been liberated, given the presence of Ukrainian troops in Senkove
- Based on this, the area south of Izyum has probably been liberated as well, because any Russian troops south of Izyum would now be totally encircled
- A Ukrainian railway engineer surveys the rail infrastructure going into the occupied areas
- Russian equipment losses in this counteroffensive have been significant
- Russian driving schools are shutting down due to a lack of spare parts and rising automobile prices
2022-09-11 Sunday
- Kharkiv
- Izyum
- Kherson
- According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, Russian forces have retreated behind the Oskil river
- Water and electricity supplies are affected in Kharkiv, after Russia strikes "critical infrastructure"
- A Russian Telegram channel describes the command problems Russia faced around Kharkiv
- The LPR and DPR troops guarding that section of the front were dependent on the Russian Army for ammunition and supplies but were not part of the Russian Army command structure
- As a result, they were systematically short of ammunition
- Had extremely poor coordination with Russian units
- A Russian aircraft, likely an Su-34, crashed in Crimea; it may have been shot down by Russian air defenses
- Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov cautioned about the need to secure supply lines and guard against Russian counterattacks
2022-09-10 Saturday
- Ukrainians have recaptured nearly 3000 sq. km. of territory in 48 hours
- Overview of what happened
- Ukraine achieved a breakthrough
- Big offensive out of Kharkiv
- The capture of Kupyansk cut off the ground lines of communication into Izyum
- As a result, the Ukrainians were able to threaten the encirclement of a significant quantity of Russian forces, forcing their retreat or surrender
- Now the Russian positions in Luhansk Oblast are at risk
- Ukrainian forces have momentum, but it's unclear how far they will be able to go
- Significant victory for Ukraine
- How did this unfold and why?
- Initial attention was on Kherson
- Few people were paying attention to Kharkiv
- Russia pulled most of its best forces and redeployed them to Kherson
- The front was being held by Rosgvardia and forces from the Luhansk and Donetsk People's Republics
- The Ukrainian military had conducted a buildup in Kharkiv, but many thought that the intent was to conduct a fixing attack
- Big intelligence and analysis failure for Russia — either didn't see the Ukrainian build-up or misinterpreted its intent
- Another mistake the Russians made was trying to continue to push on Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, tying up significant forces in attacking Bakhmut and Siversk
- Russians did not appreciate how vulnerable their position in Izyum was
- Single ground line of communication from Kupyansk
- Pressed up against the Oskil river
- Kofman argues that the loss of Kupyansk was worse for Russian forces than the loss of Izyum
- The loss of Kupyansk was key to the encirclement that made the position in Izyum untenable
- What are the strategic implications of the loss of Izyum and Kupyansk
- Izyum was a major hub for Russian operations north of Slovyansk
- Was a field HQ for Russia
- I remember Gerasimov visiting here when Russia started the fight for Severodonetsk
- Served as a major source of pressure on Slovyansk and Kramatorsk
- However, the Russian military had not made any major advances out of Izyum after capturing Izyum and the front had become largely static
- The threat against Slovyansk and Kramatorsk is largely gone, now that the Russians have pulled out of Izyum
- Russian forces in the Donbas will be on the defensive, going into the winter
- Where was the Russian air force?
- The Russian response to the offensive was uncoordinated
- Lack of interoperability between Rosgvardia and the Russian regular army
- No locally available reserves
- No reserves, because Russia has been fighting this entire war at a manpower disadvantage
- The reserves that Russia did try to rush to the front were too few and too late
- Russia did attempt to employ its air force, but it was ineffective
- Ukrainians advanced too quickly
- Ukrainians had moved up a significant amount of air defense around Kyiv
- Russian air force has long been criticized by Russian ground forces for being excessively risk averse
- How much of a factor was the fact that the units in these sectors were either Rosgvardia or conscripts from the Luhansk and Donetsk People's Republics
- Quality of the troops certainly was a factor
- Another big factor was the fact that front was very thinly manned
- There were some regular Russian army units in the area, but it's notable that the units were all from the Western Military District
- The Western Military District has performed the worst out of all of Russia's military districts (Western, Central, Eastern and Southern)
- Was badly mauled in the early stages of the war
- Has faced significant challenges with replenishing its losses
- The Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republic units have been manned with forcibly mobilized soldiers
- Have seen increasing reports of these units mutinying
- Not motivated to fight for territory out of Donetsk and Luhansk
- Generally less well trained and motivated
- Donetsk People's Republic forces around Kherson broke under fire too
- Rosgvardia are more like paramilitary police than trained soldiers
- Trained for counterterror, not high intensity conventional warfare
- Not interoperable with regular Russian military
- All of these issues are symptoms of Russia's ongoing problems with manpower and force availability
- Russia does not have the manpower to sustain this war
- The piecemeal approach they've used to find additional manpower is now showing its limitations
- Russian leadership has been kicking the can down the road since the start of this conflict and they may finally be running out of road
- Retention issues
- Many of the troops now fighting are on short term contracts
- How many of those will re-enlist?
- Many of these issues will only get worse for Russia over the next few months
- End of short-term contracts
- End of long-term contracts who signed up before the war started
- Russia has been eating its seed corn by deploying officers that would have been responsible for training new recruits
- Over time both the quantity and quality of Russian troops will decline
- Donetsk and Luhansk are out of men — everyone who could be pressed into service already has been
- Much of Russia's casualties since April have been borne by forcibly conscripted units from Luhansk and Donetsk
- Ukraine has a manpower advantage
- Can reconstitute forces
- Can run more than one offensive at a time
- Can create reserves
- Can rotate forces off the field of battle
- Has a steady supply of new equipment, now that they've transitioned to more Western-spec equipment
- Ukraine has long-term advantages are beginning to tell
- Ukraine managed to competently execute a complex offensive operation despite not training for offensive operations
- Clearly Ukraine is capable of conducting offensive operations
- Capable of integrating different forces to conduct a combined arms offensive
- Shows that Ukraine is capable of coordinating large numbers of troops in an offensive
- These operations have not cost-free for Ukraine — reports of large ambulance convoys heading to Kyiv
- Kherson
- In some ways the Russian position in Kherson is worse than the Russian position was around Kharkiv
- However, the area around Kherson is being defended by units from the Southern Military District
- Shows the effect that quality of troops has on defense
- The Kherson and Kharkiv operations are separate but interrelated
- Kherson offensive is deliberate partially by design
- Separate Russian troops in the northern part of Kherson Oblast from those defending Kherson city
- Press Russian forces against the Dnipro River
- Force Russian troops into a situation where retreat is the only sensible option
- The Russian military has retreated from untenable situations in the past — retreated from Kyiv and, more recently, retreated from Izyum
- Kharkiv offensive was made possible by Russians redeploying experienced units to Kherson
- However Kherson should not be interpred as a feint!
- Kherson and Kharkiv are two operations with two different plans progressing at the same time because Ukraine finally has enough forces to do more than one thing at a time
- Can the Russians mount a counteroffensive in the north to try to retake some of the territory that they lost
- Not enough information to answer
- Don't know how many Russian troops got out
- Don't know how much equipment and supplies they left behind
- Don't know what happened to the reserve units that Russians were feeding in piecemeal to try to stop the Ukrainian offensive
- Don't know where the Russian military will re-establish defensive lines
- How significant is it that Russia has been buying artillery ammunition from North Korea
- It was clear even a couple of months into the war that Russian forces were running low on certain types of artillery ammunition
- 122mm artillery shells
- High caliber MLRS ammunition
- Precision-guided artillery shells
- Kofman's intuition is that the amount of serviceable artillery ammuntion in Russia's stockpile was overstated at the start of this war
- Russia's artillery ammunition production can in no way keep up with their expenditure
- This is true of the West as well — in a high end conventional war, Western nations would also burn through their reserves of artillery ammunition at a prodigious rate
- Is Russia buying ammunition from North Korea because they're thinking ahead or because they're experiencing acute shortages?
- Dmitry seems to think that it must be a shortage, because of the Russian leadership's tendency to procrastinate and dither on other issues
- Russia might be having trouble getting the chemicals needed to manufacture explosives for its artillery shells
- Given how poorly this war is going, what are Putin's options
- Will this counteroffensive by Ukraine prompt Putin into realizing that, in the long run, the Russian military is unable to grind down Ukraine?
- One of the strange things about this conflict is that Putin appears to have been operating under the assumption that the long-term balance of power is in Russia's favor, when the actual long-term balance is in Ukraine's favor
- Putin could declare war and
- Enact stop-loss policies
- Send conscripts into Ukraine
- Start (partial) mobilization (i.e. start mobilizing people with recent military experience)
- However this would require Putin to do something that he's taken every opportunity to avoid for the past six
- Mobilization isn't an instant cure
- Ukraine started a full general mobilization in February, and it's taken them until now to get a decent number of usable units out of their mobilization effort, and that's with a whole lot of Western aid and training assistance
- Final points
- The death of the tank has been highly exaggerated — Ukraine used tanks very effectively in this offensive
- Artillery still matters
- Attrition is still a big issue in high-intensity conventional warfare — this is something that the West needs to pay attention to
- We should be careful of making judgements about this war based on incomplete information
- We don't know as much as we think we know
- Much of what we think we know is wrong
2022-09-09 Friday
2022-09-08 Thursday
- Kharkiv
- Izyum
- Bakhmut/Siversk
- Donetsk
- Kherson
- The Ukrainians might have liberated Ternovy Pody, near Posad-Pokrovske
- Video of the attack on Ternovy Pody
- It seems like things have gone back and forth around here, given that Ukraine was reported to have retaken Zelenyi Hai and Barvinok just to the south in June
- Norway has donated Hellfire missiles and ground-based launchers to Ukraine
- The US has announced details of its latest aid package
- Additional HIMARS ammunition
- 105mm howitzers and 36,000 rounds of ammunition
- This is referring to the M119, which is a lighter weight field gun than the M777
- The M119 can be towed by a Humvee or carried by a helicopter, whereas M777 requires a 2.5 ton truck to tow it
- 100 Humvees
- More AGM-88 missiles
- Lots of artillery and small arms ammunition
2022-09-07 Wednesday
- Kharkiv
- Izyum
- Bakhmut/Siversk
- Donetsk
- Russian forces attacked Opytne without success
- Near Pavlivka, shelling data indicates that Russian forces may have retreated to Petrivka
- This should be taken as speculative, because shelling data correlates only imperfectly with where the fighting is actually taking place
- Kherson
- Rob Lee has a thread summarizing the Russian reactions to the encirclement of Balakliya
- Pro-RU channels are praising junior officers but are openly criticizing the Russian general staff for failing to anticipate Ukraine's offensive in the region
- More calls for mobilization, but I wouldn't necessarily take that as indicative of anything
- Ukraine is using Iranian ammunition for its Soviet-era weaponry
- Good thread by Jack Watling on Russia's manufacturing and supply difficulties for artillery ammunition
- Thread on Russian companies struggling to pay salaries
- Thread on the challenges that Russia and Ukraine will face with combat operations in the winter
2022-09-06 Tuesday
- This will be more of a summary update, given that I was out from 2022-09-02 to 2022-09-06
- Kharkiv
- Izyum
- Siversk/Bakhmut
- Russian forces repeatedly attacked Bakhmutske (1, 2, 3), Vesela Dolyna (1, 2), Zaitseve (1, 2, 3, 4), Soledar (1, 2), and Kodema (1, 2), without success
- Ukrainian forces have reportedly launched counterattacks around Kodema and Siversk, pushing Russian forces back
- Ukrainian forces have also reportedly pushed the Russians back around Ozerne and Brusivka
- Does this mean that the Ukrainians are operating north of the Siversky Donetsk river once again?
- Spirne has reportedly been liberated
- Overall the Russians have been attacking the same towns since the end of June
- Russian forces in the area might have become combat ineffective, allowing the Ukrainians to make limited counteroffensives to retake territory
- Donetsk
- Kherson
- Explosions reported in Melitopol
- Russia has suspended gas delivery via the Nord Stream 1 pipeline until sanctions are lifted
- Russian officials in Kherson announce that the proposed referendum on the annexation of Kherson has been suspended
- Russia has lost over 1000 tanks in this war
- A senior Russian official in Berdyansk was targeted with a car bomb; he was taken to the hospital where he later died of his injuries
2022-09-01 Thursday
2022-08-31 Wednesday
- Kharkiv
- Bakhmut
- Russian forces attacked Vesela Dolyna, Zaitseve and Kodema, without success
- Although the Ukraine-aligned sources state that Russia is having little success near Bakhmut, it does seem like they're making very slow forward progress
- It seems like after the initial incursion on 2022-08-12, the Ukrainians had pushed back Russian forces from Vesela Dolyna
- However, over the past few days, it seems like the Russians have been able to launch successive attacks on Vesla Dolyna
- Donetsk
- Russians attacked Krasnohorivka, Avdiivka, Pervomaiske and Marinka, without success
- On the flip side, the Russian progress out of Donetsk has been nonexistent
- The first mention I have of Russian fighting in Avdiivka was on 2022-04-28, but I'm pretty sure there was fighting going on there before, since Avdiivka has been on the front line since the 2014 Donbas War
- So in five months, the Russians have captured nothing in this area
- Zaporizhzhia
- Kherson
- Situation is extremely confused, and everything in this section should be treated as speculative
- The Russian Telegram channel Rybar (a pro-Russian outlet) is reporting that the Ukrainians have made a breakthrough at Sukhyi Stavok
- It is likely that the Ukrainian objective is Snihurivka, and the railway hub there, but this is speculation
- Ukrainians hit a Russian ammunition depot in Tavriisk, near Nova Kakhovka
- Ukrainian forces have reportedly retaken Oleksandrivka and Pravdyne
- Note: Russian forces had left Pravdyne on 2022-08-10, because of Ukrainian artillery, however Russian artillery had been able to prevent Ukrainian troops from occupying the town, putting it into a no-man's land
- Now it seems that Ukraine has been able to reoccupy Pravdyne
- That said, Pravdyne was under Ukrainian control as of 2022-07-10, so it must have been captured by the Russians sometime around then
- Given that this town has been captured and recaptured by both sides, let's see if the Ukrainians can actually hold on to it this time
- Huge explosion at an ammuntion depot somewhere in Kherson
- Ukrainian forces demonstrate combined arms operations
- Ukrainian soldiers demonstrate how to quickly pack up an M777 towed howitzer
- Gazprom has completely halted gas shipments to Germany until 2022-09-03, citing maintenance requirements
2022-08-30 Tuesday
- Kharkiv
- The Ukrainian General Staff says that fighting is ongoing in Udy
- Maybe the Ukrainians launched a counterattack here?
- Izyum
- Bakhmut
- Donetsk
- Kherson
- Russian units attacked Potomkyne again
- Possible Ukrainian advance near Arkhanhelske
- This is speculative, based off social media reports
- Near Zaporizhzhia, shelling was reported in Kopani, Robotyne, and Novoprokopivka, indicating a possible Ukrainian advance
- This is also speculative
- Shelling could mean anything, and I don't have a good handle on where the front lines are in this area
- That said, the Ukrainians have been pressing hard on Polohy, just to the east, so it's not entirely implausible that they've made advances here
- Ukraine hit the area of the Antonovskiy Bridge in Kherson again, either targeting the bridge itself or the pontoon bridge that the Russians are building next to it
- Ukraine hit the bridge across the Inulets River in Darivka
- There are Indian soldiers participating in the Vostok joint military exercises
- Ukraine has tricked Russia into striking dummy HIMARS made out wood
- Dmitry Alperovitch outlines some myths about Russia and Russian foreign policy
- His argument is that the goal should be to contain Russia and convince it that non-alignment is in its favor
- Regime change probably isn't going to happen — Putin will be replaced in a palace coup, not a popular uprising
- However, the alliance between Russia and China is highly unequal, and in the long term, the Russian elite are not going to be satisfied by being Chinese vassals
- The Ukrainian Air Force has released footage of one of its MiG-29s firing AGM-88 anti-radiation missiles
2022-08-29 Monday
- Kharkiv
- Russian troops capture Udy, near Kharkiv
- There was fighting reported here on 2022-08-15
- At that time, pro-Russia Telegram channels stated that Udy had been captured by Russia, but the Ukrainian General Staff denied those statements
- It seems like Udy has finally actually fallen, two weeks after its supposed capture
- Russian forces attack Svitlychne
- Izyum
- Bakhmut
- Donetsk
- Kherson
- Ukrainian sources are suggesting that a major counteroffensive may not get underway in the Kherson region until November
- The Ukraine war is depleting US ammunition stockpiles
- US military officials are looking at how to improve production, especially of 155mm howitzer ammunition
- Contractors are laying the blame with the Pentagon acquisition process
- This is something that policy analysts have been warning about for almost a decade now
- The US military needs to shake its deep assumption that high-intensity war will last, at most, a matter of weeks
- Russia is reportedly having trouble with the drones they've acquired from Iran
- Not sure what to make of this, since we know that Iranian drones work
- Either the Iranians gave the Russians a bad batch of drones, or this is operator error by the Russians — either theory is plausible
- The behavior of the new Third Army Corps is pretty much the same as the behavior of Russian troops before the war
2022-08-27 Saturday
- Kharkiv
- Bakhmut
- Donetsk
- Izyum
- Russia attacked Brazhkivka
- The tweet mentions that Brazhkivka had been "resecured" by Ukrainians earlier in the week, but I can't find any mention of Brazhkivka falling into Russian hands in the first place
- The only other mention of Brazhkivka I have is a note from 2022-06-11, where the Ukrainians stated that they'd successfully defended Brazhkivka
- Kherson
- Ukrainian harassment operations continued east of Zaporizhzhia, in preparation for a possible offensive there
- Color me skeptical
- TCG_CrisisRisks is good at description, but not so great at prediction — they also predicted massive retaliatory strikes for the Ukraine attack on Saki air base, and those never materialized
- I would be very surprised if there was a major offensive by anyone in the next month
- Russia is setting up a new unit, the Third Army Corps
- Rob Lee's analysis
- Michael Kofman's analysis
- Seems clear that Russia has set up a new unit, consisting largely of the volunteers that it recruited earlier this year
- Unclear what the purpose of the new unit is
- Conducting offensives?
- Supplementing overstretched defenders along weak areas of the front lines?
- Unit does seem to be equipped with modern equipment — T-90s instead of T-62s, etc.
- Unclear whether this unit has met its manpower targets — might have the same problem that plagued Russia at the beginning of this war — too many vehicles, and not enough soldiers to protect them on the battlefield
- Also unclear what the actual terms of enlistment are for these soldiers
- Many of them signed short term contracts, but how short?
- What will happen when these contracts expire?
- The program of offering high salaries and short enlistment contracts seems to have worked as a stopgap to prevent the Russian Army from collapsing, but is it a sustainable recruitment strategy
- Someone set fire to the car of Evgeny Sekretarev, a Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff
- Britain is giving Ukraine six unmanned underwater vehicles to help with demining
2022-08-26 Friday
- On August 24, the Russian Minister of Defense, Sergei Shoigu, claimed to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization that the reason for Russia's slow progress in the Donbas was due to the care that Russia was taking to avoid civilian casualties
"In the special operation, we are strictly observing the norms of humanitarian law. The strikes are carried out with high-precision weapons against the military infrastructure of the Ukrainian armed forces: command posts, airfields, depots, fortifications and facilities of the military-industrial complex. In doing so, everything is being done to avoid civilian casualties. Of course, this slows down the pace of the offensive, but we are doing it deliberately," Shoigu said. "Organized systematic work in the liberated territories to establish a peaceful life. We are providing humanitarian aid, restoring infrastructure and life support systems," the Russian Defence Minister said.
(quote is Google Translated)
- Russian aircraft carried out many "simulation sorties" where they flew missions towards Ukrainian airspace without actually launching any attacks
- Lack of target intelligence
- Lack precision-guided munitions
- Russian forces attacked Karnaukhivka
- Heavy fighting continued in and around Pisky, which remains contested
- Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed a Russian command post at Dudchany, near Kherson
- Dudchany is closer to fighting around Vysokopillya and Olhyne
- Near Bakhmut, Ukrainian forces stopped Russian attacks at Soledar, Bakhmutske, and Kodema
- Partisan forces sabotaged railway lines in Kursk, leading to a delay in freight rail in the area
- There was also a suspicious fire in the Bakhchysarai district of Sevastopol
- Ukraine hit the Antonovskiy Bridge in Kherson
- Ukraine hit the Nova Kakhovka dam, apparently while a Russian convoy was crossing
- Russia is shipping air defense systems that it had deployed to Syria to Ukraine
2022-08-25 Thursday
- Kharkiv
- Russian maneuvers also reported at Staryi Karavan
- Unsure what this means
- Might be an attempt to cross the Siversky Donetsk river there
- Might also be a response to potential Ukrainian Special Operations Forces operating on the other side of the river
- Bakhmut
- Donetsk
- US announces more details about the training that it will be giving to Ukrainian troops
- Putin signs a decree increasing the target number of armed servicemembers to 1.15 million
- No word on what steps will be taken to actually meet that target
- More analysis of the increase in the target number of armed personnel
- Target is, to a certain degree, aspirational
- Might be a bureaucratic change necessary for Russia to assume direct control over DPR and LPR militias
- Russia has started taking delivery of drones from Iran
2022-08-24 Wednesday
- Today is the 6 month anniversary of the beginning of Russia's invasion and Ukraine's 31st independence day
- Near Izyum
- Near Bakhmut
- Near Donetsk
- Near Kherson
- The local Russian commander in Mykhailivka, Zaporizhzhia Oblast was reportedly killed by a car bomb
- Russia has launched a number of strikes deep into Ukraine
- Strike on railway station in Chaplyne, in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Strike on Khmelnytsky Oblast
- Strike on military airfield near Poltava
- Boris Johnson visited Kyiv and walked around the city with President Zelensky
- The US announced more details about that $3 billion aid package
- 6 NSAMS air defense systems
- 24 additional counter-battery radars
- 245,000 rounds of 155mm howitzer ammunition
- 65,000 rounds of 120mm mortar ammunition
- Puma reconnaissance UAVs
- Funding for training and maintenance of the above (which is the most important part)
- Some pro-Russia channels are calling the recent Army Games which Russia held as part of its annual Defense Expo a mockery of soldiers fighting in Ukraine
- Rob brings up a good point re: recruitment
- After the initial push into Ukraine, Russia replenished its army by offering high pay and short term contracts to people willing to sign up as volunteers
- Many of those volunteers' contracts will be expiring towards the end of the year
- What will happen when they return?
- The Economist's analysis shows that increased oil and gas revenue has buoyed the Russian economy
- Russia has posted a record current account surplus on the back of high oil and gas prices
- Sanctions have had a limited impact on oil production
- Russia has sold $85 billion worth of hydrocarbons to Europe since the start of the war
- The Washington Post has an excellent article (archive link) on the opening stages of the war in Ukraine
- We have to be wary of hindsight bias when examining the early days of the war
- The role of Russia's cyber-operations in the early stages of the war has been underestimated
- If the Russians had successfully taken Kyiv in the early stages of the war, as they planned, today we'd be talking about how the ViaSat hack was the first major use of "cyber-combined arms" or something
2022-08-23 Tuesday
- Reuters is reporting that a winter recession is likely in the EU, due to the disruption to energy supplies caused by the Ukraine war
- 9% inflation, mostly due to rising energy prices
- Significant cuts in retail spending
- Steep production cuts in electricity and gas intensive industries
- Aluminum and zinc smelting
- Fertilizer production
- Retail consumers of natural gas have been somewhat sheltered from rising prices by long term contracts, but that sheltering effect will end when contracts have to be renewed
- On the positive side, however, employment is high and interest rates are low, which gives the ECB room to run in raising rates to stave off inflation
- Acute labor shortages mean that there is a chance that there could be a recession without a rise in unemployment
- This smells like copium to me
- The Economist is reporting that wholesale wheat prices have returned to pre-war levels
- Russia has moved barges into place to create a floating counterpart to the Antonovskiy Bridge in Kherson
- Video from Kherson shows that the Antonovskiy Bridge is still standing, contrary to reports from yesterday. However the fact that there is a pontoon bridge under construction below and to the side of the main span indicates that the roadway may be irreparably damaged, at least in the short to medium term
- Pontoons are even easier to kill with HIMARS
- There has been a significant increase in fighting around Polohy as the Ukrainian counteroffensive there gains momentum
- Although fighting remains fierce near Oleksandrivka and Blahodatne (guessing that I've centered the map on the correct Blahodatne), Ukraine is making gains in that area slowly
- Explosions were reported in Maiskii, near Belgorod, with rumors of a Ukrainian SOF attack on a Russian ammunition dump there
- Near Bakhmut, the Russians attacked Soledar, Zaitseve, Kodema and Kurdyumivka
- The attacks on Kurdyumivka, combined with the relative lack of attacks in the northern area, near Siversk, indicate to me that the Russians have shifted focus to the south, and are trying to envelop Bakhmut from the east, with attacks from Pokrovske and Vershyna, and from the south, with attacks going north from the Horlivka area
- Near Donetsk, the Russians attacked Krasnohorivka, Nevelske, and Pervomaiske
- The lack of news out of Pisky indicates that it might have fallen
- Near Pavlivka, the Russians once again tried to stop the Ukrainian counteroffensive at Zolota Nyva and Novomykhailivka
- US public opinion remains strongly supportive of the war in Ukraine
- US set to announce a $3 billion aid package to Ukraine, the largest thus far
- Electricity in Europe has become very expensive
- Prices are around €400 per MWh in the Nordic countries, €600 per MWh in Germany
- By comparison, the average price per MWh for MISO was roughly $98
2022-08-22 Monday
- Russia is reportedly struggling to motivate the DPR and LPR auxiliary troops that it has fighting in the Donbas
- Unsurprising, given that those soldiers have reportedly been used as cannon fodder to get Ukraine to reveal the positions of their artillery
- The FSB is accusing Ukraine of having masterminded the assassination of Alexander Dugin's daughter
- Russia is moving units reportedly in preparation for a retaliatory strike against Ukraine for the explosions at Saki airfield
- More explosions reported in Nova Kakhovka, as Ukraine hits yet more Russian infrastructure
- Heavy fighting reported near the Inhulets River as Ukrainians push on Sukhi Stavok and Blahodativka
- Near Izyum, the Russians once again attempted to advance on Dibrovne and Nova Dmytrivka
- Given the consistency of reports of attacks on Dibrovne, I don't think Dovhenke was actually liberated, contrary to reports on 2022-08-12
- Near Siversk, the Russians attacked towards Vesele
- From the map, it appears that the Russians may have occupied at least part of Spirne
- Fighting continues to be somewhat intermittent and sporadic in that area, compared to the areas to the north and south
- Around Bakhmut, the Russians attacked Soledar, Kodema, and Zaitseve
- I haven't seen any reports of attacks on Vesela Dolyna since 2022-08-12
- I think that's the furthest the Russians have gotten
- The Ukrainian general staff also reported an attack on Kurdyumivka, with unclear results
- That attack probably originated out of the Horlivka area
- Near Donetsk, the Russians attacked Opytne, Krasnohorivka, Pervomaiske and Nevelske
- Near Pavlivka, the Russians attacked Novomykhailivka and Vremivka (near Velyka Novosilka)
- Last I saw, the Ukrainians had liberated Velyka Novosilka on 2022-07-30
- Velyka Novosilka still appears to be under Ukrainian control, but the fact that the Russians are attacking Vremivka indicates that the Ukrainians haven't made much progress beyond that town
- Drone footage of the aftermath on the attack on the ammunition depot in Donetsk city yesterday
- Ukraine hit the Antonovskiy Bridge in Kherson again
- Locals report that portions of the bridge have completely collapsed
- This is an unverified report and should be treated as such until we get satellite images, or photographs taken by locals at the scene
- Turkey sends 50 MRAPs to Ukraine, with reportedly more to follow
2022-08-21 Sunday
- Alexander Dugin's daughter was killed in a car bomb; this was allegedly an assassination attempt against Dugin himself
- Dugin is an advisor who has been very close to Vladimir Putin
- Near Kharkiv, Ukraine recaptured Velyki Prokhody
- This is important, because it pushes Russian artillery farther back from the outskirts of Kharkiv and lessens the amount of harassing fire the Russians can direct at the city
- Fierce fighting at Oleksandrivka, west of Kherson, and Ukraine was reportedly unable to advance there
- Ukraine hit another base behind Russian lines, this time at Lotikove, in Luhansk Oblast
- Ukraine also hit a Russian ammunition depot in Amvrosiivka, Donetsk Oblast
- There were more assassinations of Russian officials in Mariupol, in a notable uptick in partisan activity
- Russians are continuing to try to press south of Izyum, attacking Nova Dmytrivka, Dmytrivka, Bohorodychne, Dolyna/Krasnopillya, Dibrovne, and Karnaukhivka
- Still don't know what the status of Dovhenke is
- Near Siversk, Russians attacked Ivano-Darivka
- Near Bakhmut, Russians attacked Bakhmutske and Zaitseve
- Near Horlivka, the Russians attacked Niu York, and Krasnohorivka, in an area where they haven't made any attempts to advance in some time
- Near Donetsk, the Russians tried once again to fully clear Pisky; whether they were successful is still unclear, but they might have managed it this time
- South of Donetsk, the Russians attempted to flank Marinka by attacking Pobjeda
- Near Kherson, the Russians once again assaulted Tavrijske, and attacked with some success towards Blahodatne
- Note that this is not the same Blahodatne that's near Posad-Pokrovske, but rather one that's further northeast
- Ukraine hits yet another ammunition depot, this time in Donetsk city
2022-08-20 Saturday
- Another UAV struck the headquarters of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol
- Cristopher Dougherty talks about how the US overestimated Russian artillery capabilities prior to the war
- Overly focused on specific highly trained and competent units used for demonstrations and exercises without paying attention to readiness issues across the military as a whole
- Too much credit given to Russian electronic warfare
- I'd also argue that not enough attention was paid to how far behind Russians were with integrating UAVs into their tactics
- Ukrainians have deeply integrated UAVs at all levels, from small handheld UAVs used by squads and platoons all the way up to large Bayraktar TB-2s
- Russians are trying to do the same, but are struggling
- Possible explosion in Sochi, with reports of "thick black smoke" at the airport there
- Near Kharkiv, the Russians attacked Borshchova unsuccessfully
- Russia military activity near Izyum picked up somewhat, with unsuccessful attacks on
- Near Siversk, the Russians once again unsuccessfully attacked Ivano-Darivka and Vyimka unsuccessfully
- The Russians also unsuccessfully attacked Soledar and Bakhmutske
- South of Bakhmut, Russia launched unsuccessful attacks on Zaitseve and Kodema
- It appears that Vershyna is contested
- Near Donetsk, the Russians unsuccessfully attacked Opytne, Pisky and Pervomaiske
- The Ukrainians are still holding a corner of Pisky, despite Russian claims that they've captured the entire town
- Near Pavlivka, the Ukrainians stopped a Russian counterattack near Zolota Nyva
- On the Kherson front, Russian attacks were reported at Blahodatne and Tavrijske
- The attack on Tavrijske indicates the possible presence of Russian soldiers in Oleksandrivka
- Another explosion reported at Chornobaivka airport, outside of Kherson
- Ukraine holds a "parade" of destroyed and captured Russian vehicles in Kyiv
2022-08-19 Friday
- Near Kharkiv, Russia attacked towards Pytomnyk without success
- Near Izyum, Russia attacked Karnaukhivka, Dibrovne, Nova Dmytrivka, Virnopillya and Dolyna/Krasnopillya without success
- Near Siversk, the Ukrainians stopped Russian attacks near Vyimka and Ivano-Darivka
- No progress made by the Russians against Bakhmutske or Soledar
- No progress made by the Russians against Zaitseve or Kodema
- Ukrainians repel Russian attacks on Opytne, Pisky, Pervomaiske and Novomykhailivka
- Pisky is probably still contested, despite reports to the contrary given that we're still getting reports of fighting in the city
- That said, the position in Pisky is looking increasingly tenuous, as the Russians intensify their attacks on Opytne
- Near Kherson, Ukrainians stopped Russian counterattacks near Oleksandrivka and Stanislav
- More details on the Timonovo ammunition depot explosion from yesterday
- The Department of Defense confirms that the Ukrainians are firing AGM-88 missiles from their MiG-29s
- Germany is planning on sending Ukraine guided artillery rounds
- Putin has expressed support for allowing IAEA inspectors to visit the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant
- Ukraine strikes Melitopol once again
2022-08-18 Thursday
2022-08-17 Wednesday
- A Ukrainian airfield was hit by a Russian airstrike in the Zhytomyr region, damage unclear
- Near Kharkiv, the Russians attacked Bazaliivka and Lebyazhe without success
- Near Izyum the Russians attacked Bohorodychne, Mazanivka, and Nova Dmytrivka without success
- In the Siversk area, Russian troops attempted to advance on Spirne, Vesele, Bilohorivka and Soledar, without success
- Near Horlivka, the Ukrainians stopped the Russians at Zaitseve, Shumy and Mayorsk (I have no idea where Mayorsk is; it doesn't seem to be showing up on Google Maps)
- Russians had partial success at Opytne and Novomykhailivka (note this is not the Opytne that's just south of Bakhmut)
- Russia might have also forced a breach in Ukrainian lines at Marinka
- This actually bothers me more than the breach at Pisky
- Little progress made near Pavlivka as Russian and Ukrainian offensives run headlong into one another
- Ukrainians hit a command post in Lysychansk, reportedly with significant Russian casualties
- Video allegedly taken at the scene of the strike
2022-08-16 Tuesday
2022-08-15 Monday
2022-08-14 Sunday
- Pro-Russian channels are claiming that Udy, north of Kharkiv, has been captured by Russia
- This information should be treated as unverified
- Russian forces attacked Dolyna/Krasnopillya again, without success
- Around Siversk, Russian forces attacked Serebryanka, Spirne, and Soledar, without success
- Fighting continues in Ivano-Darivka
- The status of Zaitseve is unclear — Ukrainian sources say that Russians withdrew, but also that fighting is ongoing
- Might have to do with Russian SOF activity in the area
- Although no one's saying it, the consistency of attacks of Zaitseve makes me increasingly certain that Vershyna has been captured
- The Ukrainians continue to hold a small corner of Pisky, however fighting has already started in the neighboring town of Pervomaiske
- Around Pavlivka, the Ukrainians stopped a Russian counterattack near Prechystivka
- Poland joins Finland, Latvia, Denmark and Estonia in ceasing to grant visas to Russian citizens
- Does it matter, though, when they're all in the Schengen area, and Russian citizens can get a visa from elsewhere in the EU and still travel there?
- Kazakhstan signs a deal to export its oil without using Russian pipelines
- Ukrainian forces hit the Antonovskiy bridge once again
- Russian vehicle losses have exceeded 5000
2022-08-13 Saturday
- The two primary road bridges to Kherson as well as the crossing at Nova Kakhovka are likely unusuable
- Fighting continues west of Vershyna, on 3 sides of Dacha and east of Kodema
- Ukrainian forces might have withdrawn from Zaitseve, though this is disputed
- Russian forces also attacked Ivano-Darivka, Vyimka, Spirne and Yakolivka without success
- Sporadic fighting near Soledar and Siversk, with no real gains for Russia
- Fighting occurred around Husarivka, as Russian forces sought to defend the supply corridor leading to Izyum
- Numerous supply depots, vehicles and a command post were hit in the Kherson region
- Russian military leadership has reportedly relocated east of the Dnipro in Kherson
- Explosions reported in Enerhodar
- North of Kharkiv, Russians attacked Pytomynk without success
- Russians attacked Dolyna/Krasnopillya, as well as Dmytrivka again without success
- Out of Donetsk, Russians attempted to advance towards Oleksandropil, Krasnohorivka, Avdiivka and Pisky
- Spartak looks to be totally overrun
- Pisky appears to be mostly occupied by Russia, with Ukrainians conducting a fighting withdrawal to the west
- Fighting continues in Marinka
- Advances on Pavlivka and Novosilka were stopped by the Ukrainians
- Near Davydiv Brid, the Russians tried once again to counterattack Lozove without success
- Germany continues its planned shutdown of 3 nuclear reactors despite reports that it was reconsidering
- Slovakia donates self-propelled howitzers to Ukraine
- Another two ships carrying grain have left Ukrainian ports
2022-08-12 Friday
- It looks like Dovhenke has been liberated
- Around Kherson, Ukrainians hit Russian positions in Bruskynske
- Near Izyum, the Russians tried to advance on Bohorodychne and Dolyna/Krasnopillya without success
- No updates on the Ukrainian counterattack towards Lyman
- Around Siversk, the Russians tried to advance on Spirne and Hryohorivka from Bilohorivka, but were stopped by the Ukrainian army
- Near Bakhmut, Russia attacked Ivano-Darivka, Verkhnokamyanske and Vyimka without success
- The fact that Vyimka is under attack implies that at least one of Berestove or Bilohorivka (note: not the same Bilohorivka as above) has fallen into Russian hands, despite none of these towns showing up in combat reports
- This is a possible intentional retreat by Ukrainian forces
- South of Bakhmut, the Russians attacked Bakhmut itself and Vesela Dolyna without success
- However, the Russians did have some success in the Zaitseve area
- I think Vershyna has been captured by the Russians
- Fighting continues in Kodema
- It looks like the Russians are having some success south of Bakhmut, but any progress is still slow
- Still, it is forward progress, and as long as they're still making forward progress, Putin will be able to justify continuing the war
- Around Donetsk, fighting continued in Pisky, and Russian advances were stopped in Marinka and Spartak
- Near Vuhledar, the Ukrainians held off a Russian counterattack near Pavlivka
- The Wagner Group is calling on people from CIS countries aged 24-52 to join as private military contractors — says that criminal records will be dealt with on a "case-by-case basis"
- Fighting in Pisky from the perspective of DPR/LPR soldiers
- The town is absolutely destroyed
- Brings to mind how Toshkivka was wrecked, in the process of Russian troops achieving a breakthrough there
- Col. Gen. Lapin handing out awards in Lysychansk
- The 64th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade, accused of carrying out many of the atrocities in Bucha, has reportedly almost ceased to exist after taking heavy casualties near Izyum and Slovyansk
- President Zelensky presented bills to the Rada seeking to extend martial law and mobilization
- The Ukrainian Air Force is still flying
2022-08-11 Thursday
- Contrary to earlier speculation, it appears as if Ukraine used some kind of long-range missile to hit the Saki airbase
- Though, who knows, this might be speculation too
- Between 9 and 14 aircraft were destroyed in the strike
- Ukrainian forces gained significant territory near Polohy
- Ukrainian forces conducted significant counteroffensives towards Lyman, regaining some territory
- Russians tried to retake territory from the Ukrainian counteroffensive near Blahodatne, without success
- Near Siversk, Russian units tried to advance without success towards
- Near Bakhmut, Russia attacked without success
- Yakolivka
- Bakhmutske
- Zaitseve
- Vershyna
- Dacha
- Not sure what the status of Vershyna is
- Yesterday, there was fighting reported west of Vershyna, which seemed to indicate that the Russians had occupied the town, but today I read about fighting in Vershyna, which means that either the Russians just passed through it to attack elsewhere or the Ukrainians counterattacked
- Looks like the Russians are making slow progress south of Bakhmut, but who knows whether those gains are sustainable given that the Siversk side of the offensive looks to have stalled out
- Farther south, it appears that the Russians have captured a significant portion of Pisky
- However it seems like they failed to make progress against Avdiivka
- A HIMARS strike on the command post for the 20th Motorized Rifle Division reportedly killed
- The commanding officer
- The chief of staff
- At least two deputy commanders
- Deputy chief of logistics
- Possibly the chief of operations and artillery
- Strikes on command posts don't make for as much viral video as strikes on ammunition dumps but they're arguably more important
2022-08-10 Wednesday
2022-08-09 Tuesday
2022-08-08 Monday
2022-08-04 Thursday
2022-08-03 Wednesday
2022-08-02 Tuesday
- UK MoD update
- Russian forces reportedly take Novoluhanske, Semyhirja, and Vershyna
- This is significant
- Ukraine and Russia have been fighting over these three towns for the past two weeks at least
- The loss of Novoluhanske is less serious because Ukraine withdrew from there on July 26
- On the other hand, this source is arguing that Vershyna is still contested, as is Semyhirja
- Both sources agree that Novoluhanske has been captured
- A Russian attack on Soledar was repelled
- In the Avdiivka region, the Ukrainians repelled another attack on Avdiivka itself, but the Russians reportedly had some success in advancing towards Pisky
- Russian forces have made the least progress in the Donetsk city region
- They've been fighting over Avdiivka since April
- Russians attack Dementiivka and Bairak, but are pushed back
- Russians also conducted reconnaissance patrols towards Dovhenke and Krasnopillya
- Russians launched an attack towards Novopil, but were repelled by the Ukrainians
- Ukrainian forces continue pushing the Russians back near Kostyantynivka
- Russians launch a counterattack against Trudoliubivka, success unclear
- This is significant because of the Ukrainian advance in nearby Myroliubivka yesterday
- The most significant news today has been the reported capture of Semyhirja and Vershyna
- Those were towns that the Ukrainians were holding on the pathway to Bakhmut, and if they're in Russian hands, the Russians can advance on Bakhmut itself
- However, if Russian units are being stripped from the Donbas front to reinforce Kherson, the Russians may not have the reserves to make good on their capture of these towns
- The Russian government has designated the Azov Battalion a terrorist organization, enabling Azov Battalion members to stand trial rather than be treated as POWs
2022-08-01 Monday
2022-07-31 Sunday
2022-07-30 Saturday
2022-07-29 Friday
2022-07-28 Thursday
2022-07-27 Wednesday
2022-07-26 Tuesday
2022-07-25 Monday
2022-07-24 Sunday
- UK MoD update
- The Russians have captured Bilohorivka
- This is disappointing, but Bilohorivka wasn't exactly a tenable position for the Ukrainians to hold after the fall of Lysychansk
- Russians attacked Bohorodychne again, without success
- This area of the front has gone quiet
- Haven't seen any attacks on Krasnopillya or Dibrovne in a while
2022-07-23 Saturday
2022-07-22 Friday
2022-07-21 Thursday
- UK MoD update
- The Azov Battalion has stood up its own tank unit, composed of captured Russian armor
- More Russian recruitment efforts
- 100,000 ruble sign-on bonus (1709 USD)
- The UK is sending another batch of self-propelled howitzers to Ukraine
- Turkey is claiming that they've reached a deal to resume Ukrainian grain exports
- Further details
- Turkey will be inspecting Ukrainian weapons to ensure that no arms are being smuggled into Ukraine
- Really wonder why they bother, when it's clear that Ukraine is getting all the arms it's asking for via Poland and Slovakia
- Minesweeping support provided by an unnamed non-NATO country
- Russia will be free to export grain and fertilizer as well
- Good Reuters summary of the war thus far
- Russians shooting mortars out of Balakliya
- Looks this area of the front has hardly shifted since March
- Jomini assesses Bilohorivka as being in Russian hands
2022-07-20 Wednesday
2022-07-19 Tuesday
- UK MoD update
- It looks like the Russian conscription numbers are fine after all
- Ukrainian forces hit the Antonovskiy Bridge over the Dnipro River in Kherson
- Looks like only minor damage to the bridge
- However this is an indication that the majority of Kherson city is under Ukrainian artillery and HIMARS range
- Russians attacked towards Udy and were pushed back by the Ukrainian military
- Attacks reported in Dmytrivka and Husarivka
- This is interesting because those towns are towards Barvinkove
- The Russians had largely abandoned the push towards Barvinkove in order to redirect forces towards closing the Severodonetsk pocket
- Husarivka is interesting, because that area of the front has been relatively quiet lately, with Ukrainian forces in Husarivka and Russian forces in Balakliya
- Russian units attack Dibrovne, but are pushed back
- Russians attack Siversk once again, and are driven back once again
- I wonder how many casualties the Russians have taken over the past few days
- It seems like they've undertaken a number of frontal assaults onto Siversk and Bohorodychne, which have been repelled by Ukrainian counterattacks
- Russians found some success in Pokrovske, and managed to entrench themselves on the outskirts of the town
- That's a bit worrying
- They keep moving closer to Bakhmut
- Of course, it's not that surprising given the ongoing fighting in Nova Kamyanka
- It looks like the Russians are pushing on a broad front towards Bakhmut
2022-07-18 Monday
2022-07-17 Sunday
- UK MoD update
- Ukrainians hit a Russian tank in Dovhenke
- Indicates that Dovhenke is still contested, even though Russian forces moved into the town on July 1
- Shelling reported in Svitlodarsk
- Interesting because Ukrainian forces retreated from those locations in May
- Could Ukraine be mounting a counterattack?
- Good thread on whether the overall diplomatic and political situation favors Ukraine in the long run
2022-07-16 Saturday
2022-07-15 Friday
2022-07-14 Thursday
2022-07-13 Wednesday
2022-07-12 Tuesday
2022-07-11 Monday
2022-07-10 Sunday
- UK MoD update
- Another modern T-90 is confirmed destroyed near Kharkiv
- Another day, another Russian ammo depot explodes, this time near Shakhtarsk
- Shelling reported near Ivanivka, indicating that Russian forces are close to the village
- Russians might be trying to push back some of the Ukrainian gains in this area
- Shelling also reported near Sulyhivka
- Seems like the Russians are pressing on a broad front out of Izyum to see if they can crack the Ukrainian defensive lines anywhere
- It looks like the Ukrainians counterattacked and retook Bilohorivka
- Either that, or the initial claim that Bilohorivka was lost was overstated Russian propaganda
- Also an interesting claim that the Russian artillery barrages have slackened
- Lots more HIMARS strikes in Donetsk region
- Shakhtarks
- Kirovske
- Khartsyzk
- Chystiakove
- Zuhres
- Prydorozhnje
- Ilovaisk
- Kalina Mine
- Donetsk city, Leninskyi District
- Summary of the situation west of Kherson
- Stanislav and Tomyna Balka are still under Russian control
- Pravdyne and Myrne are controlled by Ukraine
2022-07-09 Saturday
2022-07-08 Friday
2022-07-07 Thursday
2022-07-06 Wednesday
2022-07-05 Tuesday
2022-07-04 Monday
2022-07-03 Sunday
2022-07-02 Saturday
2022-07-01 Friday
2022-06-30 Thursday
2022-06-29 Wednesday
- UK MoD update
- Russian forces capture Kodema
- Russian forces are making significant progress towards Bakhmut
- Russian units have established a foothold in Klynove
- Russian public opinion is still strongly in favor of the war
- However, the interesting claim is the relative lack of willingness to fight
- 51% are opposed to their personal participation, even though 64% are in favor of the war
- Ukraine appears to be able to threaten the roads going into Izyum
- Unconfirmed reports that the Ukrainians have retaken Dovhenke
2022-06-28 Tuesday
2022-06-27 Monday
2022-06-26 Sunday
2022-06-26 Geopolitics Decanted Podcast
- Henry Schlottman and Michael Kofman
- Leadership changes in the Russian military
- Not really new leaders, more like they're new to us
- Russians started this war with 4 groupings of units, each tied to the military district that they originated from
- Eastern military district → campaign towards Kyiv (i.e. attacking through Irpin and Bucha)
- Central military district → eastern riverbank, by Chernihiv
- Western military district → Offensive towards Sumy and Kharkiv
- Southern military district → Everything else (significantly higher force concentration than other military districts)
- It looks like the Russians are still doing that, but with fewer groups
- Southern grouping, Central grouping and Eastern grouping
- Dvornikov was in charge of the Southern military district, and, at one point was in charge of the entire operation
- He no longer appears to be in charge of anything
- Dvornikov appears to have been replaced as commander of the southern grouping by Surovikin
- Lapin is still in charge of the central grouping, and had been from the beginning
- Debate as to whether Zhidko is the overall commander or whether he's just in charge of the eastern grouping
- When Minister of Defense Shoigu visited both Zhidko and Colonel General Sergey Rudskoy were present
- Rudskoy is most often seen in a coordinating role
- Doesn't look like Gerasimov is playing a major operational role in coordinating the offensive in Ukraine
- We don't really know who Rudskoy is — position is assistant to Gerasimov
- Was one of the participants in the MoD press conference which announced the shift to the Donbas
- Col. Gen. Alexander Zhuravlyov, head of the Western Military District also appears to be out
- Gen. Serdyuko, head of the airborne forces, has been replaced by Teplinsky
- Overall, Russia does appear to be replacing commanders based on combat performance
- I bet Tom Ricks would approve
- Putin might still be unhappy with the rate of progress
- Russian forces are making gains, but not major breakthroughs or envelopments
- US sources have been consistent in saying that Russian forces were likely to take all of Luhansk Oblast, but would have trouble capturing all of Donetsk Oblast
- With the capture of Severdonetsk, the Ukrainians just have a toehold in Luhansk, in the city of Lysychansk
- The current offensive by the Russians doesn't appear to have the necessary momentum to capture Donetsk Oblast
- Offensive might reach the outskirts of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, but is unlikely to capture those cities
- In the south of the Donbas, Russian attacks haven't been particularly successful
- See above re: retaking of Vuhledar
- What is the situation with Russia's ammunition supplies?
- Russia probably has a 3:1 advantage in systems
- More complicated to calculate rounds expended
- Russia is probably not shooting 50,000 rounds per day
- In order to get to the 10:1 number that the Ukrainians have been stating, Russia would have to be firing 3.5x as many shells per barrel
- Russia definitely has an advantage in the volume of fire
- How will new Western systems change that?
- Western systems are fewer in number but more likely to be effective, due to GPS guidance
- What is happening with Russia's ammunition stores and the maintenance of Russian artillery
- Artillery tubes can fire about 10,000 rounds before they need to be replaced
- Don't know how worn these tubes were before the war started
- Seems like Russia is close to having to cycle out a significant portion of its artillery or decrease the rounds fired per tube
- Russia probably has a significant amount of artillery ammunition saved up from Soviet production
- However, it's unclear how many of those shells are still good — artillery shells have a 20-30 year shelf life, which means that a lot of the Soviet-era artillery shells are coming up on the end of their useful life
- Russia is probably not short of artillery rounds at the moment
- The big question is how much does the Russian military want to leave in reserve for future contingencies
- This question also applies to the US — US can't send all of its artillery ammunition to Ukraine because we need to keep some for contingencies elsewhere in the world
- Why is Russian pulling ammunition from Belarus
- Russia has a substantial amount of artillery ammunition, but they may not have reserves all types in equal amounts
- Might be faster to get ammo from Belarus rather than the interior of Russia
- Stocking up in advance
- Russia probably has less ammunition than people assume, given Soviet production
- Soviet ammunition supplies were distributed among the successor states: Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, etc.
- Russia might have cut down its ammunition reserves when it reformed its military towards being a smaller force
- HIMARS
- The first photos and videos of HIMARS strikes are beginning to filter out of Ukraine
- However, the total number of systems is quite small
- What is the optimal way to use these systems, and how would Ukraine be protecting them from counterattack?
- The main advantage of HIMARS is precision and range
- HIMARS has a 70 km range — can fire from outside the range of Russian counterbattery fire
- Munitions have GPS guidance in addition to inertial guidance — much greater hit probability
- Ukraine will probably be using them to hit high value targets
- Logistics hubs
- Command and control nodes
- Should be kept back from the line of contact — goes against Soviet doctrine, which generally keeps artillery relatively close to the line of contact
- Over time, HIMARS can reduce many of the critical assets that Russia needs to sustain its military in the field
- What HIMARS cannot do is go gun for gun, rocket for rocket against Russian systems
- Fight smarter, not harder
- Attacks launched from Belarus
- Is this a purely a tactical decision, or is this an attempt to get Belarus into the war?
- Russian forces have deployed in Belarus since the start of this war
- Not all of that has been redeployed
- Might be using systems that they had in Belarus since the beginning of the war, but hadn't fully utilized
- Putin has made a big deal of these missiles being nuclear capable, but it's highly unlikely that Russia will be deploying any of its actual nuclear weapons to Belarus
- What is the state of Russia's combined arms capabilities
- The majority of Russian conventional forces are not going in and doing the close fighting
- Majority of fighting has been conducted by DPR/LPR forces
- Russian regular infantry are hanging back and providing fire support
- In certain cases naval infantry and VDV are doing the fighting
- Even now, Russian combined arms performance has been spotty
- VDV and naval infantry can do combined arms, regular motor-rifle and tank units are still performing poorly
- Russia has been piecing together units from naval infantry, VDV and Wagner to make offensive gains
- Russia's reserve battalions are starting to arrive at the front
- Volunteers
- Remaining officers and professional enlisted troops
- Lower grade gear
- These reserve battalions aren't for rotation, they're for holding the line in areas where Russia is not conducting offensives
- Both Russia and Ukraine are using 2nd and 3rd echelon forces in high-end fights where they're taking losses
- Russians deployed DPR/LPR and Chechen troops to the main fight in Severodonetsk and redeployed some of their more competent units farther south, which is how they were able to achieve a breakthrough at Toshkivka
- Both sides are now depending on soldiers mobilized in different ways to backfill losses — mixed level of training
- Best forces on both sides have been attritioned
- The war looks like it's going to grind on
- Ukrainian strikes on Russian infrastructure
- Ukrainian strike on Russian oil infrastructure with cheap UAV
- Missile strikes on Russian gas platforms
- Is this something that we should be paying attention to?
- Ukraine is hitting Russian infrastructure where it can
- This will be an ongoing effort, with Ukraine trying to hit the Russian mainland where it can
- Unlikely that the Ukrainians will be able to hit the Kerch Strait bridge with anything powerful enough to bring it down
- Will be difficult for either Russia or Ukraine to have lasting effects with one-off strategic attacks against targets in the enemy's rear areas
- Logistics
- What are some of the Russian logistics challenges?
- Russia's logistics are primarily rail-bound
- Russians can move approximately 100-200km with trucks from its rail hubs
- Is Russia running out of trucks?
- Don't appear to have a shortage of trucks at this point
- However, part of the reason Russia doesn't have a shortage of trucks is because their maneuver forces have suffered attrition as well, so the existing logistical support doesn't have to support as many maneuver units
- Units carry roughly 3 days of supplies on hand
- Russia has had an easier time of securing its supply lines recently, because Russian units aren't moving as quickly, and are not leaving Ukrainian territorial defense units in their rear areas
- Shortages now would come down to whether Russia has enough stocks on hand
- The logistical picture for Russia is reasonably good
- However, if the war continues for another six months, we could see shortages
- If HIMARS can hit Russian logistical rail hubs, that can also be a factor, but it's very early for that
- Even if Russia runs out of military trucks, they can mobilize trucks from elsewhere in the government and the civilian sector
- The main problem for Russia is that Russia doesn't have the defense-industrial production capacity to replenish its stocks in real time
- This is a problem for everyone, even the US is vulnerable to this effect
- One of the open questions raised by the Ukraine conflict is how can we sustain our forces if there's a great-power war and it lasts more than few months
- People don't appreciate how little defense-industrial capacity we have left
- One of the reasons that countries have been reticent in supplying Ukraine is because they don't actually have that many weapons to begin with
- Ukraine is getting substantial percentages of the advanced artillery systems owned by European countries, even if the absolute numbers are small
- France gave Ukraine 18 CAESAR self-propelled artillerypieces
- Not a huge number, but that represents 25% of the entire CAESAR force
- The Javelin backlog for many countries is now years, because they gave so much of their supply to Ukraine
- People don't realize how much Europe is going to have to spend just to replenish the stuff they've sent to Ukraine
- This will be further impacted by ongoing supply chain issues
- What is the Ukrainian ability to hold Lysychansk?
- The problem for Ukraine is that Russian forces are to the south of Lysychansk
- The Russian goal will be to cut the roads to Lysychansk
- Assuming the Russians are successful in capturing Lysychansk, they will run into the next Ukrainian defensive line running from Bakhmut to Siversk
- It's unclear what forces Russia will be able to bring to that fight
- The ultimate Russian objective appears to be set up a two-pronged offensive on Slovyansk and Kramatorsk
- One axis coming south from Izyum, which has been largely unsuccessful thus far
- Separate offensive from the east, assuming they can get past Bakhmut
- Unclear as to whether the Russians can carry out this plan
- Slovyansk and Kramatorsk are heavily fortified, more so than Severodonetsk was
- Better positioning of natural barriers, such as rivers
- Russia doesn't have the troops to conduct large breakout offensives
- Instead what Russia does is use vast amounts of artillery fires to blast Ukrainian positions
- Ukrainian forces conduct a tactical retreat
- Then Russians units move up a bit and take a small chunk of territory
- This slow creeping pace gives Ukraine time to acquire western equipment and bring it to the front
- The longer this conflict goes, the more costly it will become for Russian forces to make their next incremental gain
- Progozin gets a Hero of Russia medal for the performance of the Wagner Group in the Donbas
- It's pretty hard to track the Wagner Group specifically
- The general impression seems to be that they're performing better than Russian conventional forces
- Wagner were effective in Syria, in comparison to the other forces that Russia was supporting
- Not a lot of Wagner troops, but they're better equipped and many of them are veterans of Syria, etc
- Wagner used to pay better than the Russian military, but the Russian military is now paying extremely well
- $4500/mo equivalent
- 5x average monthly salary
- Debt relief
- This has forced Wagner to offer even better deals
- Equivalent pay
- Better conditions and equipment
- Less likely to cheat you out of your benefits later on — unlike the Russian military, Wagner has a reputation for paying people what they're owed
- Wagner troops are being used in combination with other troops to achieve breakthroughs
- Strikes on Kyiv in the last 24 hours
- Looks like Russia was attempting to strike a particular defense-industrial facility that manufactures guidance systems for missiles
- Strikes weren't particularly successful — hitting residential buildings in the area
- Demonstrates that Russia is not out of long-range missiles
- Ukraine's defense industry prior to the war
- Ukraine was spending approximately 3% of its GDP on defense prior to the war
- However, the total amount of spending wasn't actually all that high because Ukraine's total GDP was low
- Ukraine is performing well compared to how much they spent on defense
- Comparing Ukraine and Poland
- Poland's GDP is roughly 3x that of Ukraine
- However Poland actually has fewer systems than Ukraine does
- So what corners was Ukraine cutting in order to maintain a larger number of tanks and other vehicles?
- We should look at the steps Ukraine took in advance of this war and ask what went wrong and what went right
- We need to step up our defense industrial base
- Ukraine is consuming the entire montly production of US 155mm artillery ammunition every three days
- We're going to need to spin up additional production if we're going to continue to supply Ukraine while meeting our own needs
2022-06-25 Saturday
2022-06-24 Friday
- UK MoD update
- Russian forces have reportedly broken Ukrainian efforts to contain them at Izyum and are on their way to reinforce offensives against Lysychansk and Slovyansk
- Russian troops reportedly secure Mykolaivka, northeast of Popasna
- This could be a huge problem for Ukraine, because Mykolaivka is right on the main highway from Bakhmut to Lysychansk
- A Russian official was assassinated in Kherson
- Ukraine officially withdraws from Severodonetsk
- The bigger worry is that the defensive line around Toshkivka has cracked, so Ukrainians may have to evacuate Lysychansk too
2022-06-24 Economist Webinar
- Last night, the EU formally accepted Ukraine as a candidate for membership
- Ukraine orders its troops from Severodonetsk, effectively ceding control of Luhansk Oblast to Russia
- There have been a number of weeks where there haven't been any significant changes on the front lines
- However, Ukraine has made a significant decision to evacuate Severdonetsk
- The retreat will be dangerous — will have to retreat across the river
- Severodonetsk is not an inherently important town
- Significant because it was the tip of the Ukrainian salient
- Loss of Severodonetsk opens up routes to Slovyansk and Kramatorsk
- Has taken Russia two months to conquer Severdonetsk
- The decision to hang on in Severdonetsk has sapped Russian strength
- This is now a war of attrition between Russia and Ukraine
- What are the attrition rates for Russia and Ukraine
- Ukraine has published some pretty bad statistics about its losses
- Ukraine has lost 1300 armored vehicles, 400 tanks
- Russian attrition is also significant
- Russia is using as much artillery ammunition in a day as it produces in a month
- Of course, Russia has deep stocks of artillery ammunition
- Other movements
- Ukrainian counterattacks on Snake Island
- Russia has put air defenses on Snake Island
- Ukrainians worry that Snake Island could be a bridgehead for an amphibious operation against Odesa
- Ukrainian strategy is denial — make it impossible for Russians to use Snake Island, without actually conquering Snake Island
- Are we beginning to see the effects of Western military equipment
- Important to keep a sense of perspective
- Even though large numbers of Western weapons and ammunition are flowing into Ukraine, it still takes time
- How you use weapons is more important than how many weapons you have — don't try to match the Russians gun for gun
- A major Western challenge is to ensure that the Ukrainians are using their new weapons effectively
- Possibly linked to the training mission announced by Boris Johnson
- Ukraine has lots of recruits but not a lot of trainers and that's something where the West can help
- Lithuania's enforcement of EU sanctions on Russian trains to Kaliningrad
- Russia threatened "serious consequences" for Lithuania
- Lithuania identifies with Ukraine, sees the Ukrainian fight as an extension of Lithuania's own fight for independence
- Hypocritical for Russia to complain about a Lithuanian blockade when Russia is blockading Odesa
- Lithuania hosts a lot of Russian opposition figures, including Alexei Navalny's team
- Lithuania has been outspoken, diplomatically, about calling out Russian imperialism
- Russia does not have the capacity to intervene militarily
- Might conduct cyber-attacks against Lithuanian infrastructure
- However, lately the EU might concede the issue under the logic that trains transiting Lithuania to Kaliningrad are going from Russia to Russia, and therefore aren't subject to international sanctions
- Gas flows are down by 60% into Europe
- No immediate impact
- However, now is when Europe tries to build up its gas stocks against unexpectedly cold weather
- Russia might be trying to prevent Europe to build up its stocks, making Europe more vulnerable next winter
- Impact of the Russian blockade of Odesa
- Odesa is the lifeline of the Ukrainian economy and is Ukraine's main economic link to the rest of the world
- The impact of blockade on Odesa has kept Ukraine in the world's attention — prevents Ukraine from becoming a regional story
- The Russian position is to use the food crisis to blame Western sanctions
- What are the options to open Odesa
- Should NATO enforce international navigation to Odesa?
- Lot of nervousness about this in major NATO powers that this would lead to NATO becoming a co-belligerent with Ukraine
- NATO does not want to bring its naval forces into the Black Sea
- Consensus that if there are convoys, they should be organized by Turkey, Romania and other countries bordering the Black Sea
- Can Ukraine export via land routes?
- Some grain is being exported over land, to Romania and Bulgaria
- As Ukraine goes to harvest, there is a significant possibility that this harvest will be lost, because Ukraine doesn't have sufficient storage capacity
- There is no way to compel Russia to lift its blockade
- Why can't Ukraine proceed with shipments using known safe routes through its own minefields
- Accidents can still happen
- Russians have also mined Odesa
- EU's committments to Ukraine
- EU granted Ukraine candidate status
- Helps ensure that Ukraine remains a country
- Signal that the EU will not tolerate this turning into a frozen conflict
- Affirmation that Ukraine is valued as a democracy on its eastern fringe
- EU has a poor record of progressing countries towards admission on a timely basis → is this just symbolism
- Ukraine has to meet the Copenhagen criteria
- This can take 10-12 years
- EU is a system of laws and those laws have to be incorporated into a country's own legal system
- Lots of things can still go wrong, but this is an important signal
- EU's granting Ukraine candidacy is an important bit of symbolism that tells the Ukrainian people that they are European → culmination of the Maidan revolution
- Granting Ukraine candidate status gives Ukrainian civil society a large boost, especially for anti-corruption
- This is a big contrast with the EU's Minsk process, where the EU had minimal engagement
- Commitment has to be done in good faith → not the same situation as Turkey, which was handled very cynically
- Putin's response has been muted
- EU candidacy for Ukraine is a setback for Russia
- This war began in 2013, effectively, with Russian efforts to keep Ukraine in its economic orbit rather than the EU
- Putin is downplaying the effect of EU candidacy because it's already happened
- War fatigue
- War is falling out of the headlines and out of people's minds
- How do we ensure a continued focus on supporting Ukraine
- Western money and arms are vital for Ukrainian victory
- Ukraine is clearly falling down the agenda
- Leaders need to show how the war in Ukraine affects their constituents' lives
- Explain that this is not just an abstract defense of a democratic ideal, but rather is a defense of Western interests
- Vladimir Putin is helping by taking provocative actions such as cutting off energy supplies
- We need to show that helping Ukraine is in the West's self-interest
- Ukraine also needs to show progress on the battlefield
- This will be a rocky year
- Next year will be a US Presidential campaign, and US support for Ukraine could be in danger if Donald Trump runs
- Another question is Ukraine's effect on the defense-industrial complex
- Initial support for Ukraine was out of existing stocks
- However, continued support will require new manufacturing
- Ukrainian see that their ideal window for a counteroffensive is in October
- Realization that Ukraine will not be able to take back every square inch of territory that it has lost since February 24
- Need to focus on the most impactful areas for a counteroffensive
- What's going on inside Russia
- Talk about Putin's physical condition
- Not a large number of people returning to Russia
- Interior Ministry complaining of shortages of IT specialists
- Strength of the ruble
- Oil and gas prices are up
- Imports are down
- Significant decline in personal incomes → significant decline in purchasing power
- Russia is experiencing deflation → makes it more difficult for the Russian state to pay pensions
- Russia is trying to classify economic data
- Putin is blocking the feedback mechanisms that allow information about public opinion and support to filter out
- Regime is brittle, but not about to collapse — people support Putin because they think everyone else is supporting Putin
- Russian troops are becoming demoralized
- Assessment by British intelligence that showed armed standoffs between officers and soldiers
- More and more inexperienced forces being thrown into the fight
- NATO summit
- Shift towards "foward defense"
- Brigade-sized formations in the Baltics
- Divisional headquarters moved to the Baltics
2022-06-23 Thursday
2022-06-22 Wednesday
2022-06-21 Tuesday
- UK MoD update
- More fighting in Severodonetsk
- Ukrainians are making good use of the weapons that we're sending them
- More fighting reported in Dolyna (near Krasnopillya)
- Ukraine is attempting to retake Pravdyne
- Heavy fighting reported in Pravdyne, Kyselivka and Oleksandrivka
- Konrad Muzyka reports that the Russians have broken through at Toshkivka
- Not sure how much I believe this, given that other sources are still reporting ongoing fighting there
- Confirmation of the capture of Toshkivka
- Russian troops capture Myrna Dolyna
- This puts them very close southeast of Lysychansk
- Threatens the access road to Lysychansk and Severodonetsk even more
- I guess this means that Toshkivka has also been captured?
- However, fighting in this area has been raging back and forth since May 24, and Toshkivka has changed hands multiple times
- German 155mm self-propelled howitzers have been delivered to Ukraine
- Ukrainian forces hit Russian soldiers with artillery in Khudoyarove, southeast of Kharkiv
- Ukrainian forces appear to be finally pushed out of the Azot Industrial Park in Severodonetsk
- This was the last area holding out against Russia, so it looks like the total capture of Severdonetsk is imminent
2022-06-20 Monday
2022-06-19 Sunday
2022-06-19 Geopolitics Decanted Podcast
- Latest update on the fighting
- Ukrainian offensive around Kherson
- Ukrainians have launched further counteroffensives around Kherson and are within 10-15km of the city
- This counteroffensive has been going on for some time now
- Ukrainian gains have been incremental
- Kofman doesn't expect this specific offensive to make a lot of gains
- What it will do is set up Ukrainian forces for future offensives in this area
- Ukrainians don't have the force availability to make a huge breakthrough in Kherson
- Donbas fight
- Slow-paced war of attrition
- Russians are trying to capture Severodonetsk
- Are using non-Russian units
- Luhansk 2nd Army Corps
- Chechens
- Some movement of Russian units coming out of Popasna
- Highway from Bakhmut to Lysychansk is open but contested
- Bridges to Severodonetsk have been cut
- Interesting battles taking place north of Slovyansk and west of Izyum
- Lots of casualties being inflicted, but not a tremendous amount of territory shifting hands
- Lots of steady attritional fighting, with forces retreating to secondary lines when primary defensive positions become untenable
- The Ukrainians are trying to exhaust the Russian offensive in Severodonetsk and Lysychansk
- Losing Severodonetsk may be an acceptable outcome if the effort of taking Severodonetsk exhausts the Russian military and prevents it from progressing further
- Force exhaustion
- UK MoD
- Both Ukrainian and Russian forces in the Donbas have been subject to intense combat conditions over the past few weeks
- Ukraine has suffered desertions
- Russian morale is highly suspect, with increasing reports of units refusing to fight and stand-offs between soldiers and their officers
- At what point will the Russians and Ukrainians have to rotate forces?
- Kofman is skeptical of the UK MoD official Twitter account
- Many of the things posted there are re-summarized versions of other open-source intelligence data
- Both the Ukrainians and Russians are, at this point, largely relying on 2nd and 3rd echelon troops
- Russians
- Increasing share of fighters from Luhansk and Donetsk
- Reservists, some of whom have signed contracts
- Ukrainians
- Greater reliance on Territorial Defense units
- Lower levels of training and morale
- Less sophisticated equipment
- Both sides have lost most of their best troops, and are relying on less well trained units with less cohesion
- This is why we're not seeing much maneuver warfare
- Neither the Ukrainians nor the Russians have the quality or quantity of troops to conduct large-scale maneuver warfare
- This has led to see-sawing battles everywere
- Example: Kharkiv
- Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces back almost to the border
- Russian units counterattacked and drove the Ukrainians back
- Then the Ukrainians renewed their offensive and pushed the Russians back again
- Rotation
- Russia is trying to form reserve battalions and is trying to cycle officers out
- Neither side has the manpower availability to cycle units out
- Russia does not have the units to replace the forces that it has committed to the fight
- Ukraine likely has the same issue, though, we know consistently less about Ukrainian forces than we do about Russian forces
- Artillery
- Kofman has held from the beginning that this is an artillery-oriented conflict
- Russia has the advantage in artillery
- Ukraine is getting western military assistance with its artillery
- Is this assistance arriving in the speed and numbers necessary to push the Russians back or is it too little, too late?
- Russians have a lot more ammunition, especially for MLRS
- Ukrainians are low on artillery ammunition and are out of MLRS ammunition
- Ukrainians are receiving quite a bit of Western artillery
- Main problem is learning how to maintain and service the new systems they're receiving
- Ukraine is trying to wholly transition its military from Soviet-spec systems to NATO-spec while in the middle of a war
- This is very difficult
- Ukraine is probably getting enough systems, the bottleneck is training
- We're trying to figure out how to supply the Ukrainians with weapons without those weapons turning into logistical liabilities when they need maintenance
- The effect of the systems we're providing Ukraine will only be known some months down the line
- This is a dangerous phase for Ukraine because they're out of ammunition for their Soviet-era artillery but they're not fully up to speed on western artillery
- Switchblade loitering munitions
- We sent a lot of Switchblade loitering munitions to Ukraine, but we haven't seen much evidence of their use on the battlefield
- Is there a problem with them?
- Switchblades are a lesson about getting excited of tactical gear
- Lots of instances of new weapons making only incremental changes to a battlefield
- What will make the difference for Ukraine is the total package of aid that they're receiving, not any specific system
- The problem with Switchblade is that it isn't very good at reconnaissance
- Switchblade isn't designed to come back; it's designed to go out and hit a target
- The more complex a piece of technology is, the less likely it is to be used effectively
- Example: Javelins vs. NLAWs
- Some Ukrainians have expressed a preference for the NLAW over the Javelin
- Javelin launcher is a complicated computer
- Requires training to use
- Is expensive
- NLAW launcher is much simpler
- The negative effect of complexity will get worse as Ukraine relies more on second-line troops which don't have as much training
- Air defense systems for Ukraine
- Ukraine has consistently asked for more modern air defense systems
- Is it useful to provide artillery without providing the systems to protect that artillery from air attack?
- The air defense systems that Ukraine has are actually quite effective
- The problem is that Ukraine has suffered from attrition, both in air defense systems and aircraft
- To some extent, the airspace over Ukraine is mutually air-denied
- Russian air power is only being used in specific locales where they have air superiority
- Even then, air power is being used in a stand-off role that isn't very effective at close air support
- As much as people like the Su-25 (or its Western counterpart, the A-10), the Ukraine war has made it clear that these aircraft are functionally obsolete on a modern battlefield, against modern air defenses
- Ukraine will have to transition off Soviet-spec air defense systems to NATO-spec air defense systems at some point
- Need medium-range radar-guided air defenses
- The thing that Ukraine is really missing is infantry mechanization
- Ukraine still has tanks
- Ukraine still has artillery (though the ammunition situation is mixed)
- What they're really missing is APCs and IFVs
- Ukraine has a lot of dismounted infantry, but not enough armored vehicles to move them around
- Need more armored vehicles if they're going to go on the offensive later
- Media narrative on Ukraine has gone from being overly optimistic to overly pessimistic
- Ukrainian forces are certainly taking a beating, but they don't appear to be near collapse
- 60-100 KIA per day makes sense, the higher numbers coming out lately don't
- If Ukraine was really taking casualties at a much higher rate than 60-100 KIA per day, the military situation in the Donbas would be far more dire
- Kofman doesn't think any kind of Ukrainian collapse in the Donbas is imminent
- However this is an estimate with low-to-moderate confidence
- Economic impact
- Food crisis keeps getting worse
- Ukrainian harvest will be down by about 43%
- Ukraine has managed to export 4 million tons of grain since the start of the war
- Prior to the war, monthly exports were in the range of 5-6 million tons
- Erdogan and Putin have been negotiating about allowing some Ukrainian grain exports
- However, Ukrainian ports are mined
- Does Ukraine have the ability to demine its ports?
- Russia could demine the port
- But why would Russia want to?
- I can see Putin agreeing to grain exports, then saying, "Oops, looks like the port of Odesa has a minefield, I guess there aren't going to be any grain exports after all."
- Not clear whether the Russians are stalling in their negotiations with Turkey
- Might be trying to deflect blame on the upcoming food crisis
- Might be trying to prevent a potential NATO convoy into Odesa from being proposed as a solution
- No idea how long it would take to demine the port because we don't know how many mines the Ukrainians put down
- Snake Island
- Haven't heard much about it since the Ukrainians hit the island with airstrikes and TB-2s
- Lot more Russian air defense on Snake Island now
- Will be challenging for Russia to maintain its position on Snake Island over time, because Snake Island is a tiny rock, far from the front lines
- Ukraine's new anti-ship missiles have the potential to create a mutually-denied operating environment on Snake Island
- Russian Navy can prevent Ukrainian forces from retaking Snake Island
- Ukrainians can deny resupply via shore-based anti-ship missiles
- If Ukraine gets any long-range surface-to-surface capability, they'll probably go after Snake Island first, because there's nowhere to hide on that tiny rock
- How much attention should we paying attention to Transnistria
- Kofman doesn't seen Transnistria as being very significant
- Russia has, at most, one or two battalions of light infantry garrisoning Transnistria
- At what point does this offensive culminate
- There will probably be an operational pause in the next month or two
- The trouble with a war of attrition is that you can't really see what's going on
- Changes in territorial control are minor and meaningless until one side runs out of troops and breaks
- Contest of wills and materiel
- There will be a culminating point, but it'll be hard to tell when it'll occur
- Both forces are likely to face exhaustion over the summer
- Then there will be an operational pause
- Then there might be an Ukrainian counteroffensive, depending on how much equipment they've received
- Russia has local military advantage in the Donbas
- Ukraine has an overall military advantage, given their advantage in manpower and extensive western support
- However, Ukraine's military advantage is highly conditional — dependent on them getting substantial military aid from the United States and other countries
- Ukraine does not have the ability to launch a counteroffensive in the short to medium term
- Are the Russians firing 50,000 shells and rockets per day in the Donbas? At what point do the Russians start running out of ammunition
- Kofman doesn't believe the 50,000 shells number
- Just doesn't add up with what we're seeing on the battlefield
- Ukrainians are firing about 5-6000 shells per day
- Russians are firing anywhere between 2x and 3x that amount (10,000-18,000)
- The Russians have a lot of artillery shells, but their supply isn't infinite either
- Kofman is suprised that the Russians aren't rationing
- We've overestimated Russian capabilities in a lot of ways, but we may have underestimated the extent of their ammunition supply
- Same applies to precision-guided munitions — Russians are still using them, even though we thought they'd run out pretty soon into the war
- Russia has the production capacity to supply new artillery ammunition, but it can't keep up with intense battlefield uses
- Russia has likely mobilized production of artillery ammunition
- At some point the Russians are going to have to to start rationing
- Russian "shadow mobilization"
- Bellingcat has an article about Wagner mercenaries fighting in Ukraine
- Russia has also offered 3-12 month contracts at high pay rates to ex-soldiers that have left military as much as 10 years ago
- Expanded age brackets eligible to serve
- Russians are trying very hard to avoid using conscripts
- Are putting together the remaining officers that haven't deployed with newly recruited contract servicemen
- This is a Band-Aid solution that doesn't solve any of the long-term problems that Russia has with force generation
- Reduces the Russian military's ability to train new personnel down the line
- Ultimately, this is not sustainable
- Another problem for Russia is tanks and IFVs
- Russia has sustained very heavy tank losses
- Are pulling older, unmodernized T-80s from storage
- Are pulling T-62s from storage and equipping the DPR and LPR conscripts with them
- Russia has many of these vehicles in storage — aren't going to run out
- However, like Ukraine, Russia has also lost of IFVs
- Don't have a lot of BMP-2s in storage
- Most of the new units that Russia is assembling are fighting with BMP-1s and MT-LBs
- Kofman predicts an operational pause in the next month or two. Will this result in a cease-fire?
- Dynamic battlefield with small shifts of territory on the margin
- Localized counterattacks
- Already transitioning to that kind of battle
- At a certain point, the Russian offensive in the Donbas will run out of steam
- At that point, both sides are going to engage in artillery skirmishes while they try to replenish their forces
- Partisan warfare
- There is already a certain amount of partisan activity, with assassinations of Russian officials, Russian vehicles being blown up with IEDs, etc
- Will this ramp up?
- Partisan warfare appears to be emerging in Kherson
- Depends on Russian force availability
- The more terrain the Russians take, the more people they're going to need to occupy that territory
- The Russian solution has been to conscript people from the captured territories and press them into service
- These aren't great units and it's an open question as to whether the Russian security services will be able to maintain control over time
- We'll probably see more partisan warfare as the Russians try to establish political control over the regions they've captured
- What are some of the lessons that the US military should be taking from this war?
- It's hard to draw lessons from a war that hasn't ended
- Russia will rebuild its military
- We need to be very careful of becoming overconfident
- War is context-dependent — just because the Russians had trouble executing a war against Ukraine, with a bad plan, doesn't mean that they would be as incompetent against NATO
- Wars very often come down to attrition
- Wars don't necessarily end when a particular operational scenario is resolved
- What happens when you win on the battlefield, and the enemy doesn't surrender?
- How do you fight a grinding conflict? How do you win with second echelon troops and previous-generation equipment?
- Both the Russians and Ukrainians have sustained ~10,000 KIA and ~50,000 casualties and they're still fighting
- We need to look at the replaceability of equipment
- Ammunition stores
- The opening phases of World War 1 also included significant amounts of maneuver warfare before the war settled into grinding attritional warfare
- We need to be careful about only taking away validating lessons
- We need to ask ourselves, "Could what happened to Russia happen to us?"
- Many of the Russians' problems could be our problems, especially with regards to attrition and resource usage
2022-06-18 Saturday
2022-06-17 Friday
2022-06-16 Thursday
2022-06-15 Wednesday
2022-06-14 Tuesday
- UK MoD update
- Russia has revived armored trains for the Ukraine conflict
- BBC report on civilians fleeing from Severodonetsk
- Ukrainian forces have reportedly captured the village of Prydonetske, near Izyum
- It's still difficult to see much optimism here, because, for both sides, there's been a big difference between capturing random villages and capturing any cities or population centers of even moderate size
- Russian forces around Izyum are reportedly massing for an attack towards Slovyansk
- I would be surprised if this attack makes much ground
- If it does, that would indicate that the situation for the Ukrainian military is much more dire than I've anticipated
- The situation around Bakhmut continues to be very fluid
- Not much news about what's going on with the southern front, such as the Avdiivka — Niu York axis
- Not much news about what's going on near Izyum
- Doesn't look like Ukraine has made many gains near Kherson
- Russian sources claim that Russia has captured Komyshuvakha and Vrubivka
- Note, even going by optimistic Russian sources, it's taken them a month between the capture of Olesksandropillia and the capture of Komyshuvakha
- Russian finance ministry declares a 1.49 trn ruble surplus for the period of January through May
- More evidence that the war will be decided by the economy rather than on the battlefield
- Russian advance reported near Vidrodzhennya
- Surprised to see the Russians advancing west out of Popasna towards Bakhmut, rather than northeast towards Lysychansk
- Looks like Vidrodzhennya has been occupied
- More fighting reported around Davydiv Brid
2022-06-13 Monday
- UK MoD update
- Ukrainian forces have reportedly captured Spivakivka and Zavody, near Izyum
- Ukrainian counterbattery strikes near Severodonetsk
- Russia is pulling more T-80BV tanks out of storage
- Ukraine wants more weapons, faster
- Highlights the importance of self-propelled artillery
- Also says that guided artillery rounds have been very useful, and they need more of those
- Requests air-defense systems
- The defense official quoted says that Ukrainian forces can learn to field new weapons very quickly
- However, the problem is that learning to field a system is different than learning to maintain a system
- Ukraine needs substantially more aid than what we've provided
- Level of attrition in a modern high-end fight is incredibly high
- Ukraine needs literally thousands of new tanks and armored infantry transport vehicles
- Policy makers don't seem to understand that Russia's goal is more about attriting Ukraine's military than it is about capturing territory in the Donbas
- Russia is taking losses too, but Russia seems to have the confidence that it can withstand the current level of attrition in materiel better than Ukraine can
2022-06-13 War on the Rocks Podcast
- Fitful but incremental gains by the Russian military
- Most attention paid to the battle for Severodonetsk
- Main Russian effort in the Donbas
- Russian forces had initially advanced quite far into the city
- Ukrainian forces launched a counterattack and regained some territory
- Now it's not clear who controls what where
- The attention paid to Severodonetsk has distracted from the wider question, which is what's happening to the Russian offensive overall?
- Russian military has largely taken ground north of the Donetsk
- Not very much success pushing south-southwest from Izyum (towards Slovyansk)
- Not a major breakout from Popasna
- Will a battle for Slovyansk and Kramatorsk happen in the near future
- Both sides are nearing a degree of exhaustion
- Ukrainian counteroffensives have fizzled
- Kherson counteroffensive failed
- Pitched battles north of Kharkiv
- Donbas offensive has progressed slower and slower, but is still progressing
- Original Russian campaign was to have two offensives
- One from Izyum towards Slovyansk
- Sever Severodonetsk and Lysychansk from the rest of the Joint Forces Operation area
- That campaign plan failed when the Russian offensive out of Izyum failed to make much headway
- One of the reasons Gerasimov may have shown up in Izyum was to communicate a change of plans to his commanders
- Russia is shifting forces to where it's making progress
- However the fact that Russia has the potential to apply pressure across a broad front means that Ukraine doesn't necessarily have a lot of reserve forces for a counteroffensive
- Ukraine is in a very challenging spot right now
- Outmatched in terms of
- Artillery
- Air power
- Russian units advancing out of Popasna have made it difficult for Ukraine to stage air defense assets close enough to the front line to block Russian air power
- One of the reasons we've been so surprised by Russian progress in the Donbas is because we've been misled by the photos and videos on social media
- Cautionary tale about relying on OSINT
- Ukraine has also suffered significant levels of attrition
- It's almost as if Russia has fought two different wars
- First month: regime change operation that was a total failure
- Campaign for territorial control
- Russian forces are more organized
- Fighting the way we thought they were going to fight
- Reconnaissance & fire
- ISR
- Counter-battery
- Just because the Russian military didn't do well in the first three weeks of this war doesn't mean that they're an incompetent military
- Ukraine has huge problems with availability of ammunition, especially artillery ammunition
- Ukrainian military has lost some of its best troops
- Relying on territorial defense units, which have lower levels of training and worse equipment
- Suffered considerable materiel attrition as well
- War has been defined by attrition and artillery rather than maneuver in this second phase
- Neither Russia nor Ukraine has the forces to conduct large-scale World War 2 style maneuver warfare
- Russian advance out of Popasna has been contained
- Haven't been able to advance to take Bakhmut or Soledar
- Ukraine also hasn't been able to conduct a significant breakthrough anywhere
- Has Russia had success in its "shadow mobilization"?
- Russia is trying to create reserve battalions
- Goal is to extend Russian staying power
- Won't dramatically alter Russian force availability
- Allow Russia to continue prosecuting this war longer
- How is Russia creating these reserves
- Going after training units which are responsible for inducting and training conscripts
- Offering large amounts of money (equivalent of $5000 per month)
- Trying to induct contract servicemen from the BARS reservist system
- Russia is very keen not to use conscripts
- Not enacting major stop-loss policies
- Not declaring a major state of war
- Russia is eating its seed corn by stripping units of officers and equipment that would be used to train new recruits
- The reason that Russia is sticking with a contract force is because the Russian leadership thinks they're not losing
- Contest of wills
- Think that eventually Western political and military support for Ukraine will wane
- This is a valid concern
- There are already splits developing in the Western coalition supporting Ukraine
- 2024 US elections may shift US support for Ukraine
- Furthermore, many European countries, having slashed their militaries after the end of the Cold War, are already tapped out in terms of the military aid they can give
- US can provide more equipment, but it'll take time
- Betting that time is on their side
- Russia also has escalation dominance
- A good deal of equipment has been promised to Ukraine, but Ukraine is having trouble assimilating and using it
- Maintenance and sustainment is a real issue
- Learning to shoot a howitzer is a lot easier than learning to fix and maintain a howitzer
- This is why new equipment will probably be arriving at a slower rate
- The long-term military balance favors Ukraine, but that balance is strongly conditional on Ukraine receiving continued Western military assistance
- Ukraine also has to be able to assimilate this assistance quickly enough to translate it into meaningful battlefield outcomes
- Given these challenges, we're likely to see an operational pause on both sides after the current offensive in the Donbas culminates
- Book recommendation: Cathal Nolan — The Allure of Battle
- Economic dimension
- Wars are decided by endurance, not the outcomes of individual battles
- This war might be decided by which economy collapses first
- Sanctions' effects will be felt by Russia in late summer
- However there are far more questions about Ukraine's ability to sustain the war, economically
- Has lost a significant amount of territory and population to Russia
- Russia has redefined what victory means
- Originally meant the overthrow of the Ukrainian government and the occupation of the entire country
- Now means capture of territory
- Russia also has significant material constraints
- Lost a lot of equipment
- Pulling older equipment out of storage
- How well can they replace this equipment in the short term — this is an open question
2022-06-12 Sunday
2022-06-11 Saturday
2022-06-10 Friday
- UK MoD update
- Ukraine is struggling with supplying artillery ammunition to units in Severodonetsk
- Russia might be preparing for a renewed offensive in Zaporizhzhia
- Where is Russia getting the troops to conduct this offensive from?
- Has the Russian "shadow mobilization" been more successful than I anticipated?
- On the other hand, this would explain the presence of those reserve units in Vasylivka from yesterday
- Ukraine's counteroffensive near Kherson has met with only limited success
- Russia has apparently recaptured Davydiv Brid
- Better Russian artillery tactics have allowed Russian artillery hitting the Ukrainian breakout from being destroyed by counter-battery fire
- Documentation of Russian war crimes in Makariv
2022-06-09 Thursday
- UK MoD update
- Starlink is playing a vital role in aiding Ukrainian communications
- More details on how the Ukrainians are using Starlink
- One thing I wonder is whether, in the future, the role of Starlink in Ukraine will convince adversary nations to invest in large stockpiles of ASAT weapons prior to the war
- Russia claims that four Su-57s conducted strikes in Ukraine
- Notable because the Russians are estimated to have four production model Su-57s in total
- Ukraine's grain exports are capped at 2 million tons of grain per month, as compared with 6 million tons prior to the war
- The Ukrainians are going to face a shortage of Soviet-standard ammunition soon
- In hindsight, I think it was a mistake to try to sustain the Ukrainian armed forces with surplus Soviet-spec gear
- We should have started moving them to NATO-spec gear much sooner
- But who could have known in March that the Russian offensive towards Kyiv would be so decisively repelled?
- Russians are systematically destroying Ukrainian grain export facilities
- Russians appear to be massing some kind of offensive at Svyatohirsk and Bohorodychne
- Possible that they're trying to force another river crossing in order to threaten Slovyansk directly
- Another report of the Russians crossing the river at Svyatohirsk — I would treat this as an unconfirmed rumor unless there's follow-up confirmation from other sources
- Looks like the Russian offensive out of Izyum, which had been paused for the last two weeks or so, is back on
- Reports of Russian reserve units with T-62 tanks in Vasylivka, Zaporizhzhia Oblast
- Ukrainian artillery is still hitting Russian positions near Marinka
2022-06-08 Wednesday
2022-06-07 Tuesday
2022-06-06 Monday
2022-06-05 Sunday
2022-06-05 Geopolitics Decanted Podcast
- What is the current situation in the Donbas?
- Russians have entered Severodonetsk
- Ukrainians have claimed counterattacks
- Difficult to make a detailed assessment from outside
- Russia posted videos earlier of Russian troops in central Severodonetsk
- However, Ukraine has conducted a counterattack
- How much is Ukraine committing to the fight?
- Ukraine doesn't have to hold Severdonetsk — might be correct for them to fall back
- Mobilized reserves are playing a larger role for Ukraine
- Hard to attack with freshly mobilized units
- Russia has focused on the Donbas for about the last month and a half
- Have made gains
- However, long-term success depends on how many losses Russia has sustained
- Also depends on the state of Ukrainian forces
- Ukraine's new weapons systems will play a greater role as time goes on
- Ukraine is getting a lot western aid; will it arrive in time to save the Donbas?
- Depends on how long the current phase of the war drags out
- Kofman thinks that it will take a while for Ukraine to learn to use these new weapons
- These weapons will make a much bigger difference down the line
- Will prevent Ukraine from running out of ammunition as the war drags on
- Will give Ukrainians the ability to win in artillery exchanges
- Maintenance is more difficult to learn than use
- Need to have more than one crew trained up in order to effectively use equipment
- Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kherson hasn't made a lot of progress — does this augur poorly for Ukrainian forces?
- Kherson is a much more localized counteroffensive than the media is hyping it up to be
- While Russian forces have dug in, that area is fairly difficult to fortify
- Ukraine has also been diverting forces to Donbas, both for the counterattack in Severodonetsk and to establish a secondary defensive line near Bakhmut
- The Ukrainian ability to conduct a counteroffensive with Western equipment has yet to be revealed
- Russians seems to be taking fewer casualties
- The fighting is concentrated in a very small area right now
- Russians are fighting more competently because they're fighting in a smaller area
- Fewer risks → fewer big mistakes
- Much less open source information
- Fewer civilians
- Less back and forth along the front line, because the Ukrainians are not able to capture damaged and destroyed Russian vehicles
- Russians aren't stupid → have learned to fight better
- Russians don't have a lot troops, and so are taking fewer risks
- Ukrainian artillery has been very impressive in the first phase of the fight
- Russia might have been able to build up a local advantage in the correlation of forces
- "Shadow mobilization" created by offering high wages for people signing up as contract servicemen
- Drafting people from the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics
- Rotating troops in from the Kyiv and Chernihiv regions, where Russia conducted a strategic withdrawal
- While Ukraine might have an advantage in the overall number of forces, we have to remember that overall force balances don't fight
- We should know this, from the American war of Independence
- Britain always had the overall advantage in the balance of forces over the Continental Army
- However, the US, with the aid of France, was able to build up local superiority often enough that the British were forced to concede
- Ukraine is taking casualties of 60-100 KIA per day
- This is not sustainable
- Ukraine might be destroying some of its best trained units trying to hold the Donbas
- Ukraine is committing everything to Severodonetsk — even foreign legion units are fighting there
- Russia is also committing reservists
- T-62s pulled out of storage are being sent with reserve units to Kherson and Zaporizhzia
- Older Russian T-80BVs are also appearing on the front lines, as Russia digs into its reserves to replace the tank losses that it sustained in Ukraine
- The "reserve" Russian equipment is not substantially less advanced than the "modern" kit that went into Ukraine in February
- The T-90 tank is a modernized T-72
- The T-80 family is a series tanks based on the T-64
- The Russian military has lost a good deal of its better vehicles, better troops, and better commander at the tactical level
- Russians are using close air support on a much greater scale
- The problem is that the Donbas salient is surrounded on three sides by Russian troops
- This means that Ukraine can't move its longer-ranged air defense systems into the area, otherwise they'd be targets for Russian artillery
- This has allowed Russia to provide a much greater level of close air support
- Russia doesn't have a lot of precision-guided munitions but it might not, because air attacks are disruptive even if they don't hit
- The lack of efficiency does mean that Su-34s etc, need to get closer to Ukrainian forces in order to attack, which does put them at greater risk
- The Ukrainian general staff haven't made a lot of big mistakes
- Donbas salient doesn't look like it's in immediate danger of collapse
- We don't know how sustainable losses are for Ukraine, however
- Russian EW is starting to disrupt Ukrainian UAV operations
- Both the Ukrainians and the Russians are crowdfunding commercial UAVs for their militaries
- UAVs are playing a very important role with regards to ISR and artillery spotting
- However these commercial UAVs are more vulnerable to EW
- One of the reasons the Russians didn't have a lot of EW at the start of the conflict is because the conflict wasn't planned as a military operation
- FSB had a larger role in the planning process than the Ministry of Defense
- Was planned as a quick regime change operation, not a proper combined arms offensive
- Large ground maneuvers without any kind of preparation
- Navy and air force hit targets on their own, without coordinating with ground forces
- Ground units not bringing specialized support units or logistics
- Now, however, we're seeing the Ministry of Defense take over
- Russian units are fighting much more closely to how they fight in their exercises
- Seeing greater coordination between ground forces and air forces
- However, the Russians are being hampered by the fact that they took so many losses in the early phases of the war
- Discussion of Russia's issues with force structure
- Russian military is a tiered military
- Could generate a certain number of battalion tactical groups right away
- Was counting on some kind of state action to raise manning levels afterwards
- Over time, the Russian military kept increasing its force structure, without increasing the number of people
- "Spreading butter over more and more bread" — creating additional divisions without increasing staff
- Reducing size of BTGs
- Reduce ability to field BTGs
- First BTG that a division could generate would be fully staffed
- Second BTG would be 75% staffed
- Etc
- The initial invasion force was quite a bit smaller than many people estimated — approximately 120,000 with 80,000 personnel actually fighting
- The only way the initial could have actually worked is if Ukraine had just surrendered
- Precision-guided munitions
- Russia is firing a lot of cruise missiles
- Russia had a lot more cruise missiles than people expected
- Big weakness: short range PGMs
- Cruise missiles are great for hitting infrastructure targets, but they're not good for hitting mobile military units
- Russia attacking grain terminals
- Russia is stealing Ukrainian grain
- Attacking grain terminals in order to cause food shortages
- No easy military solution to the blockade
- Odessa is blocked by the threat of attack from Crimea
- Has Ukraine blockaded itself with its own mines?
- One of the alleged concerns with demining Odessa is the threat of an amphibious landing
- No threat of an amphibious operation, but Russia might mine Odessa if the Ukrainians remove their own mines
- How much longer can the Russians and Ukrainians sustain the offensive in the Donbas
- How do you tell when an offensive stops?
- These things are only visible in hindsight
- Might be an operational pause in the summer
- Dynamic changes of territory
- Artillery duels
- Russia is trying to cobble together some reserve battalions with the contract servicemen that they've been hiring along with reservists and officers that are still available in the formations
- However, over time this cannibalizes the force — those officers are responsible for training new recruits
- Russia doesn't need a huge reserve force in order to rotate troops off the line
- Russia has options to extend its participation in the war, but it doesn't have the ability to pursue new offensives and pursue maximalist objectives
- An attritional-type conflict is more likely in the future, because offensives require better trained units
- Does Ukraine have the forces to conduct a large scale offensive?
- We don't have great data
- No data about Ukrainian losses
- Poor data about Russian losses
- Any kind of predictions will suffer from the garbage-in/garbage-out problem
- People have been pulling a lot of lessons from this war, but not all of them are correct
- Are tanks obsolete?
- We've known for decades that tanks can be very vulnerable without infantry screens
- Russia went into this war without having enough infantry to support its tanks, and as a result it's lost a lot of tanks
- This doesn't mean that tanks are obsolete
- Is the cause of poor Russian small-unit performance their lack of a dedicated NCO corps?
- The Russian military is structured differently than ours
- Very top-heavy
- Example:
- The initial authorized strength for a motorized rifle battalion is ~500 soldiers
- However, we've seen the deployed strength of these units be around 200 soldiers in some cases
- The reduction appears to be in the number of enlisted personnel, not the number of officers
- This means that, in practice, the ratio of officers to soldiers isn't actually that different than it is in the US military
- The problem with the Russian military is a lack of privates, not a lack of officers
- Another problem with Russian infantry is that it has over-mechanized
- Most Russian infantry has its own armored vehicles
- Normally this is a good thing — infantry don't have to coordinate with other forces for battlefield mobility
- However, given the decline of manning levels, what we're seeing is that when the Russians dismount, they're dismounting with fire teams or, at best, squads, and not entire cohesive units, and the leadership is remaining behind with the vehicles
- This hurts their performance in urban terrain
- This war throws doubt on the VDV's mechanization, especially
- In the '70s, the VDV developed a series of light infantry fighting vehicles that could be air-transported alongside paratroopers
- Given the performance of those vehicles in this war, it might make sense to have the VDV return to a more pure light-infantry doctrine
- The Russian partial mobilization strategy especially hurt its logistical capability
- Most contract servicemen were assigned to combat roles
- Logistical roles were expected to be fulfilled by conscripts
- However, because Putin deployed the military into Ukraine without declaring war, he deployed just the "teeth" without the supporting logistical "tail"
- A big war exposes rot in a military like nothing else
- We need to look at not just the Russian military but NATO militaries as well
- Is NATO minus the United States (i.e. the EU) really much better militarily than Russia?
- Rot can happen to us, and it's important that we take steps to make sure that our force structure is appropriate to the wars we envision fighting
- "Corruption" is a bad word for what happened to Russian military
- Instead many of the problems were due to differences between authorized force strength and actual force strength
- The Russian military has also proven to be highly uneven in its readiness levels
- Shockingly, the Western military district, the formations expected to go head to head against NATO, were probably among the lowest-readiness formations of the overall Russian military
- It's tempting to say that the Ukrainians are doing better because they're more like us, but that's wrong
- Ukrainian NCO corps is very incipient
- Most Ukrainian officers were educated in the Soviet system
- Why Ukraine has performed as well as it has is an open question, which should be an active area of investigation after the war
- It's still an open question as to how much of the poor Russian performance was due to a bad plan and how much was due to poor military readiness
2022-06-04 Saturday
2022-06-03 Friday
2022-06-02 Thursday
- UK MoD update
- Joint article by Rob Lee and Michael Kofman re: the staffing problems in Russia's military
- Article on the ongoing problem of desertion in the Russian military
- I'm unsure what to make of this
- The numbers in the article are bad, but they represent only a small portion of the total invasion force
- Yes, it's not great that Russia is seeing hundreds to low-thousands cases of desertion, but is that enough to significantly degrade their military capabilities?
- The Economist summarizes the tactics behind the artillery duels in the Ukraine war
- Russian forces withdraw from Velyka Oleksandrivka, near Davydiv Brid
2022-06-01 Wednesday
2022-05-31 Tuesday
2022-05-30 Monday
2022-05-29 Sunday
2022-05-28 Saturday
2022-05-27 Friday
2022-05-27 Economist Webinar
- Russian army has regrouped and made further advances in the Donbas
- Zelensky addressed Davos, asking for more sanctions against Russia
- What is the current situation?
- Most movement has occurred in the Eastern Donbas region
- Russian forces are also occupying large tracts of land in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia
- Russia is trying to consolidate its grip on those regions, by
- Russia is trying to envelop Ukrainian forces in the Donbas
- Reduction in ambition has allowed Russia to concentrate its forces on enveloping Severodonetsk
- Breakthrough at Popasna
- Severodonetsk is at risk
- However, a victory at Severodonetsk doesn't mean that Russia will have the forces to push west to Kramatorsk and Slovyansk to capture the rest of the Donbas region
- The majority of Donetsk oblast in is Ukrainian hands, however the Russians have conquered the majority of Luhansk oblast
- Will Russia be able to prevail the longer this war goes on?
- Russia is conducting a "shadow mobilization"
- The advantage is slightly with Ukraine
- Western support is suprisingly firm
- Russians are taking high casualties with every victory
- Retention will become problematic as the fighting becomes more intense
- BTGs are going into the field undermanned — down from ~800 soldiers down to ~600
- How will the Russians actually hold all the territory that they've captured
- What categories of Russian weapons are likely to be severely depleted?
- Precision-guided munitions
- Russians increasingly resorting to dumb bombs
- Don't know how deep the Russian stock is of PGMs
- Have been pulling out T-62s out storage — pushing reserves into the fight with relatively unsophisticated tanks
- Not running out of artillery or artillery ammunition
- What is the morale situation on the Ukrainian side?
- Ukraine is also taking punishing losses — losing up to a hundred soldiers a day
- People are returning to Kyiv
- The first wave of heroic euphoria and surprise at the resiliency of the Ukrainian army has passed
- The Ukrainian military has done a good job of hiding its strength
- People are now starting to ask about how long this war will go on, and how they'll cope with a war that might last for months or even years
- Ukrainians are getting frustrated with calls for cease-fires
- The big problem for Ukraine is the economy — Ukraine needs aid to weather the Russian blockade
- How solid is the support for Ukraine in the US?
- Bipartisan support for Ukraine has been surprisingly strong
- Politicians have been trying to outbid each other in trying to aid Ukraine
- Substantial sums have been committed to Ukraine
- Will lead to an erosion of support over time
- If the belief is preserved that Ukraine will win, then support will be forthcoming
- The war in Ukraine is not front-and-center in the public eye in the US at the moment, which allows Congress to be bipartisan
- Divisions in Europe
- 2 camps about how to end the war
- "Peace" camp
- Cease-fire now
- Negotiations as soon as possible
- "Justice" camp
- Russia needs to pay a price for launching a war of aggression
- French, Italians, and Germans are in the "peace" camp
- Poles, Baltics and British are in the "justice" camp
- US objectives are not clear — US says that its goal is to help the Ukrainians
- Positions will shift depending on battlefield outcomes
- Who does time benefit?
- Ukraine fatigue?
- This might be the peak of European unity on Ukraine
- Ukrainians got very nervous when Kissinger spoke about an immediate cease-fire and negotiations
- Ukrainians were also concerned about the NYT editorial calling for a cease-fire
- A cease-fire would be a win for Russia
- Russia is saying that it's in no hurry
- Putin seems to be working to a plan where they want to take all of Donbas
- Russia has increased its territorial control of Ukraine from 7% to 20%
- What happens if Russia annexes Luhansk, Donetsk and Kherson?
- Russia has been distributing Russian passports and converting these areas to the ruble
- A weaker Russia is not necessarily a safer Russia if Putin remains in power
- Defeat needs to be clear to the Russian elite
- The longer this goes on, the more difficulty it will be to sustain the unity of support that gives Ukraine the military and economic support it needs
- We say Ukraine will determine the terms of its peace, but we all know that's not true
- How could the battlefield outcomes turn out?
- Russians will probably not have the resources to push west and take the rest of Donbas
- Can the Ukrainians mount a large-scale counteroffensive?
- Right now, the Ukrainians have only been able to attack where the Russians haven't been able to defend
- The fighting in Donbas is very reminiscent of World War 1
- Neither side is going to be easily sweep the Russians back
- I disagree with this, because I don't think Russia has the manpower to sustain a World War 1 level stalemate
- Will Ukraine have to submit because its economy becomes too weak to continue?
- Ukraine needs to restructure its economy to fight the war
- Putin hopes that the level of Western aid to Ukraine will result in discontent
- Ukraine is too much of a risk for private investment
- Can Ukraine cede territory in exchange for economic concessions?
- Can Ukraine rebuild its country like Finland did after the continuation war?
- Needs to end the Soviet legacy of corruption
- Opening the port of Odesa
- Ukrainians have mined the port, and Russians have laid the port to siege
- UN Secretary General has been talking to the Turks, Ukrainians and the Russians to open the port of Odesa
- Russians are saying that they'll accede to opening the port if sanctions are lifted
- Russians don't want to be seen as being responsible for a famine in the third world
- Russians are confiscating Ukrainian wheat and are re-exporting it from Russian ports
- Is it feasible for US, UK or Turkish ships to escort Ukrainian vessels
- Montreaux Convention — Turkey has closed the Bosporus to warships
- Need to demine Odesa
- Will take weeks
- Ukraine will ask for additional armaments that will
- Are we willing to shoot at Russian warships — if Russians shoot at the ship you're escorting, what do you do?
- Vladimir Putin is essentially blackmailing the world, threatening famine in exchange for the lifting of sanctions
- We need to do a better job of calling this out
- The blame for this needs to be squarely on Putin, esp. in places like Egypt and India
- Can we export Ukrainian grain through Belarus?
- The role of Erdogan in delaying the Finnish and Swedish bids to join NATO
- Turkey doesn't have to say yes, they just have to not say no
- Turkey has a lot of grievances
- EU arms embargo
- Sweden's approach in Kurdish militancy
- Turkey-France tension in the Mediterraneans
- Turkey is using this occasion to put Turkey's concerns front and center
- Turkey is going to see what it can get, but it will fall into line eventually
- Turkey might need a visit from President Biden in order to get the deal unstuck
- Ukraine might be getting HiMARS MLRS from the US
- Significant — would allow Ukraine to outrange Russians by a significant margin
- Can the war end without Russian reparations?
- Ukrainians demand reparations
- Will be difficult to extract reparations from the Russians
- West is holding a large amount of Russian central bank assets
- Could use that to support Ukraine after a peace deal
2022-05-26 Thursday
2022-05-25 Wednesday
- UK MoD update
- Reports of increased Russian close air support activity around Izyum
- Allowed a supply convoy to leave Izyum
- Not sure what's going on around Bakhmut
- Update from yesterday says that the highway from Bakhumt to Lysychansk may have been cut
- However, this update says that the advance was repelled and the road remains in Ukrainian hands
- In either case, it's clear to me that Russian forces have made significant advances — the loss of Popasna was a significant defeat for Ukraine, more so than the loss of Izyum
- Italy joins Hungary in calling for a cease-fire in Ukraine
- EU unity on Ukraine is starting to crack?
- A Russian tank crew member gives an interview about Ukrainian anti-tank tactics
- Michael Kofman has a thread on the current state of the Donbas situation
- Russian TOS-1A strikes in the Novomykhailivka area
- Ukrainian troops retreating from Lyman
2022-05-24 Tuesday
War on the Rocks Podcast
- Ryan Evans & Michael Kofman
- What's the state of play in the war right now, esp. in the East
- Although the Russians were unsuccessful with their river crossing at Bilohorivka, they were able to break out at Popasna, and have made progress towards Bakhmut
- Threatening to sever ground lines of communication to Severodonetsk
- Ukrainian forces may have conducted a tactical retreat out of Severodonetsk
- Russian forces are still pushing from Izyum
- Shelling Slovyansk and Kramatorsk
- Lyman is under pressure
- Large mix of Russian units heading towards Soledar, near Bakhmut
- The situation around Popasna leads to a wider conversation around the disposition of Ukrainian forces in the Donbas
- Have the Ukrainians lost momentum?
- Ukrainians were focusing their counteroffensive around Kharkiv
- Russians were taking ground near Donbas
- Correlation of forces isn't all that favorable for the Russians
- Russians have advantages in fires, but don't have an advantage in infantry
- Situation is becoming more dynamic
- Russian forces are making advances
- This is important because much of the conversation until now has been wondering when the Russian offensive would culminate
- Saying an offensive has culminated is a hard call to make without firsthand knowledge of the forces on the ground
- In retrospect, many of the calls that said the Russian force was spent were premature
- What about the dispensation of forces around Kharkiv
- Russian forces conducted a tactical retreat
- Ukrainian units are pressuring Vovchansk, which is a potential supply corridor for the Russians
- However, the main supply lines to Izyum are probably farther east
- Russian forces probably willingly ceded that ground so that they could shift those units to areas where the offensive is making progress
- What's going on around Mykolaiv/Kherson?
- Ukraine has not made any significant counterattacks around Kherson
- Has allowed Russian units to dig in and fortify their positions
- Ukraine might be massing forces for a counterattack around Kherson, but we don't have a good way of assessing Ukrainian military strength in the southwest
- Overall, the focus of the Russian offensive is in the east, near Severodonetsk
- The Russians have taken a lot of casualties, but so have the Ukrainians — if it were otherwise, the Ukrainians wouldn't be retreating
- Raises questions about the readiness of the Ukrainian military to conduct a counteroffensive in the near term
- Ukrainians are training up reserve brigades with newly mobilized troops and Western-supplied equipment, but it remains to be seen where Ukraine will choose to send those brigades
- Could send them to the Donbas in order to reinforce the situation there
- Could tactically cede the Donbas to the Russians in order to have troops to counterattack elsewhere
- This is going to be a long war
- Russian forces have a lot of problems but they're still managing to advance
- Russian military is not in danger of collapse or evaporation
- Has Russian tactical performance improved?
- War is a great educational tool
- The Russian units fighting in the Donbas now were units that were pulled off the line in the Kyiv/Kharkiv region
- The soldiers in these units are veterans now — don't make the stupid mistakes that they made in February
- Russia's Western Military District is largely gone as an effective fighting force
- Was committed to the attack on Kharkiv and northeast Ukraine
- Took very heavy casualties trying to push towards Kyiv
- Did not have very good tactical performance (see previous War on the Rocks podcast)
- What is the role of air power?
- Still difficult to assess
- Trying to do close air support
- Not necessarily a huge force multiplier
- Conference in Poland
- Folks may have run off with an overly optimistic narrative about the Russian military — war will destroy Russian military power
- Russian military power will recover sooner than people think
- The war will set the Russian military back by years, but probably not by decades
- People don't underappreciate that militaries learn more from wars they lose than from wars they win
- We need to avoid complacency about Russia
- How fast Russia recovers from this war depends on how this war turns out and how long it goes
- The opening phases of this war were far closer than people realize
- The trouble with living the war through Twitter is that you're seeing the war via tactical events
- Run the risk of losing the long view of the trajectory of the conflict
- Even if Ukraine loses part of the Donbas, it doesn't mean that Ukraine has lost the war
- I don't know — this is starting to smell like cope
- On the flip side, the Russian military hasn't routed and hasn't melted away — might be very difficult for Ukraine to retake territory
- What does this conflict look like 3 months out? 6 months out? 1 year out?
- Effect of sanctions on Russia
- Effect of blockade on Ukraine
2022-05-23 Monday
2022-05-22 Sunday
2022-05-21 Saturday
2022-05-20 Friday
2022-05-19 Thursday
- UK MoD update
- On-the-ground footage from Bilohorivka, showing the results of the failed river crossing
- Looks like there's still fighting going on in Avdiivka
- Russian BTR firing on Ukrainian positions in Pisky, just south of Avdiivka
- Overall, doesn't look like very much has happened in the past two days
- While they've captured Rubizhne, it doesn't look like Russia has followed up by making any serious attempts to capture Severodonetsk
- Similarly, the Russians have captured Popasna, but their progress out of Popasna has been slow
- I wonder if Ukrainian attacks in the Izyum area are disrupting the Russian military's ability to build up for another offensive
2022-05-18 Wednesday
- UK MoD update
- India halts deal to acquire 31 helicopters from Russia
- Oilfield services firms are trying to leave Russia
- We could see the Russian oil industry turned into the Venezuelan oil industry
- Russian troops make minor gains out of Popasna
- The new howitzers we've given the Ukrainians are in the field and are being targeted by the Russians
2022-05-17 Tuesday
- UK MoD update
- The US might be ready to give the Ukrainians HiMARS MLRS
- A dispatch from Lysychansk
- Not much new here
- Russian troops are pushing hard
- The last defenders of Mariupol surrender
- Ukraine is said to be negotiating prisoner swaps for their release
- Russians reportedly stop a Ukrainian counterattack near Hulyaipole
- The last report from near Hulyaipole was on April 10
- Russia is reportedly conducting more night operations
- This is surprising because initially, Russian troops were not well supplied with night vision gear
- This might have been remedied by the arrival of Wagner group soldiers, who are presumably better equipped
2022-05-16 Monday
- UK MoD update
- Will we finally see Belarus take a direct role in the conflict?
- Russian artillery strikes on Ukrainian positions in Zolote
- Ukraine reportedly has the supply corridor from Belgorod to Izyum in artillery range
- Ukrainian forces reinstall a border marker on the border between Ukraine and Russian in Kharkiv oblast
- Ukrainian forces conduct airstrikes on Russian forces attempting to cross a river south of Kryvvi Rih
- Surprised to see Russia conducting any offensive operations in this region
- Reportedly trying to cross the Inhulets River
- Location unclear, could be anywhere between Kryivvi Rih and Kherson
- Heavy fighting continues near Lyman
- Barvinkove has been shelled, but few signs of Russian troops heading in that direction — troops reportedly diverted southeast of Izyum
- This makes sense because it no longer looks like Russia is attempting to encircle Slovyansk
- Russia appears to be taking concrete steps to find reservists with previous military experience and reinduct them into the military
2022-05-15 Sunday
2022-05-14 Saturday
- UK MoD update
- The Russia imposed administration announced that they will ask Russia to annex the Kherson region
- Russian forces are consolidating in Rubizhne, but it doesn't seem like a follow up attack on Severodonetsk is likely
- Russian reconnaissance elements have been engaged near Bakhmut, but it seems like the Russians are focusing on advancing northeast out of Popasna towards Severodonetsk
- Russian forces have captured Oleksandropillia
- Ukrainian forces have had further successes northeast of Kharkiv, making Belgorod less useful as a forward staging area for Russia; as a result, we should expect to see Russia shift its operations to Valuyki
- Where is the Russian counteroffensive against the Ukrainian forces advancing out of Kharkiv?
- Time report on the war
- Takes an uncharacteristically downbeat, but realistic tone
- Ukraine is not losing, but not losing is different from winning
- Ukraine will have trouble importing fuel with its ports closed
- Ukraine is having trouble adjusting to NATO-spec weapons
2022-05-14 War on the Rocks Podcast
- Ryan Evans and Michael Kofman
- Update on the current status of the war
- Battlefield has shifted quite a bit in the past two weeks
- Russians don't have the forces to envelop both Slovyansk and Severdonetsk
- Focusing on Severodonetsk
- Suspects that Gerasimov's visit to Izyum was to refocus the war effort
- Why was Gerasimov that far forward?
- This is Russian military culture
- Generals go to the battlefield to impose order
- Gerasimov was in Izyum to try to untangle the situation
- Immediately after Gerasimov's visit, Russian forces shift the weight of their offensive eastward
- Russian forces attempted to conduct a river crossing across the Siverskyi Donetsk with a pontoon bridge and took heavy casualties as a result
- However, they've had limited success
- Captured towns north of Severodonetsk
- Captured Popasna in the south
- If the Russians manage to capture Severodonetsk, they will have captured all of Luhansk Oblast
- Attempting to push southeast out of Izyum
- Ukrainian forces have had a very successful counteroffensive out of Kharkiv
- Are trying to achieve two things
- Push Russian artillery away from Kharkiv
- Was successful in this
- Erase the Russian buffer inside Ukraine
- Michael is skeptical that the Ukrainian counteroffensive has the forces to threaten the ground lines of communication to Izyum
- Not much is occurring in the south
- Russians are trying to hold a buffer around Kherson city
- Ukrainians haven't launched any major offensives
- There seems to be a clear front line being drawn along the river
- Russians are, for the most part, staying east of the Dniepr river, with the exception of Kherson city
- The Ukrainians could take Kherson city, but probably will not be able to prevent Russian units from blowing the bridges as they retreat eastwards
- The river makes a large natural obstacle
- Strong suspicion that Russia will try to annex Kherson
- Russia is trying to create a new people's republic in Kherson
- It's going to be difficult, but not impossible for Russia to set up a new administration in Kherson that's loyal to it
- The correlation of ground forces is about 1:1, which is short what the Russians need to mount a breakthrough offensive
- It's not a stalemate
- Russian forces have the advantage in firepower on the front line, so they're making incremental gains
- Ukrainian forces are conducting counterattacks
- Battlefield is shifting
- This offensive will drag on — shouldn't try to call it for one side or the other too early
- Russians will make gains around Severodonetsk
- Ukrainians will make gains in other areas where they're pushing counteroffensives
- Is this is a phase of the war where Western artillery could make a real difference
- For Ukraine, the main challenge is ammunition and the correlation of fires
- This is where US artillery systems could make a real difference, but it will take time for them to show up in numbers
- This is also where Ukraine's transition to NATO ammunition standards could make a difference, because, over time, this will be about who brought more artillery and more ammunition for that artillery
- Russian military is short on manpower, but they're not short on artillery
- Why is Russia still being so careful with its air power
- The air war is the most complicated part of this conflict and the least visible to open source intelligence
- For example, we don't know how many TB-2s Ukraine has lost
- May have lost up to 48 drones
- Of course, this is the advantage of drones; when a drone gets shot down, you lose the drone, but not the pilot; drones are meant to fly high risk missions where getting shot down is a substantial possibility
- It's clear that Russia has stepped up the number of sorties it's flying, but there are still substantial challenges
- Russian strategic aircraft haven't trained for the close air support mission — normally rely on dedicated ground attack aircraft and helicopters
- Large number of MANPADs on the battlefield
- Russia has local air superiority over the battlefield, but isn't able to leverage it to provide firepower or further support
- Lack of training on the use of precision guided munitions
- Lack of availability of precision guided munitions
- Mutually-denied air environment
- Russian air force can deny Ukrainian air superiority
- Ukrainian air defenses can deny Russians from using their air superiority to deliver additional firepower to the battlefield
- Snake Island
- The island is tiny
- Has a significance out of proportion with its size or geographic location
- Unclear what the Russians are trying to do there
- Have been repeatedly struck by the Ukrainians, both with TB-2s and with manned aircraft
- The performance of the Russian military has been very uneven
- Performance depends on military district and unit
- The worst performance has been from the Western military district, which is the military district that was supposed to be facing off against NATO
- It's clear that we've been worried about the wrong Russian units — need to re-evaluate the relative readiness and performance of units in the Russian military
- Maritime domain
- Loss of the Moskva has allowed the Ukrainian air force to become more active over that part of the Black Sea
- Russia maintains a blockade of Odesa and the Dniepr river
- Russia is behaving more cautiously — cognizant of Ukrainian anti-ship missile capability
- But Ukraine is still under an enduring economic blockade
- We focus on the economic costs to Russia, but this blockade is having devastating consequences for the Ukrainian economy
- Russia is facing a 12% decline in its GDP, but Ukraine is facing a 50% decline
- The real impact of the sanctions has not been felt by Russia yet
- Wait until August/September
- Russia's clever monetary policy shell game has kept the Russian economy float thus far, but their options are closing
- A lot of Russian policies are them kicking the can down the road, but eventually they're going to run out of road
- Many expected Putin to transition the "special military operation" to a full fledged war on May 9, giving him the authority to commit additional manpower to the Ukraine conflict
- Kofman doesn't think that Putin will issue a formal declaration of war
- The Russian military is fighting this war at peacetime strength
- Battalion counts are meaningless
- Battalions are now cobbled together fragments
- Severely undermanned compared to nominal strength
- No units at home to relieve exhausted units at the front
- They have attempted piecemeal solutions to this manning problem
- Offering a lot of money for short term enlistment contracts
- Turning to reservists and trying to get reservists to sign contracts
- Pressuring conscripts into signing up as contract servicemen
- The Russian military is not set up to induct a large number of untrained conscripts, which is what would happen with general mobilization
- Doesn't have training capacity or empty units that can be filled with large numbers of new recruits
- This is because the Russians have been consuming the units that would have provided training to new recruits in front-line operations in Ukraine
- Unlike the US, the Russian military doesn't have dedicated training facilities
- Conscripts report to unit headquarters, and they're trained there
- However, given the ongoing losses in Ukraine, Russia might have lost its ability to effectively induct new recruits into its military
- There also isn't a large set of "empty" divisions with equipment but no soldiers
- There is a huge space between doing nothing and general mobilization
- In the next few months, Russian leadership will face a choice
- They will have to enact stop loss policies
- As it stands, contract servicemen can refuse to be deployed, because it's not a time of war
- Conscripts are rotated and demobilized as scheduled — currently demobilizing 130,000 personnel at the end of a 1-year training and service cycle
- No statue that allows the Russian military to mobilize additional personnel without declaring war
- Either Russia will have to declare a state of war (unlikely) or they'll have to change the regulations on the use and employment of conscripts and other regulations governing force availability (more likely)
- Russia doesn't need a lot of additional troops to lose slowly
- This is allowing the Russian leadership to get away with doing what does best: dithering, halfway measures and piecemeal solutions
- The main problem for the Russian military is that after the Donbas offensive is done, they won't have the forces available to mount another offensive
- After that, unless Russia is willing to change its regulations, it won't have the forces to sustain an ongoing war of attrition against Ukraine
- Russian policies right now are closing off Russian options later on
- Situation is reminiscent of the situation between April and August 2014
- Back then Russian backed separatists were on the verge of being defeated in July 2014
- Russian political leadership procrastinated, until in August the Russian military intervened decisively and pushed the Ukrainians back
- However, today, the Russians do not have the reserve forces to strike back against a potential Ukrainian victory
- Ukraine has time on its side
- So does this mean that Putin will consider the use of nuclear weapons?
- Russian leadership has options short of nuclear weapons to turn the tide
- Nuclear weapons are still a highly unlikely prospect
- However, the use of nuclear weapons is more likely now that there is a logical course of events that takes us there
- If the Ukrainian military is on the verge of tremendous success, there will be pressure on Putin to use nuclear weapons
- Might start with some kind of demonstration or nuclear test
- Ukraine, thus far is outside of our nuclear umbrella
- On the other hand, Russia might never find itself in a place where it's losing suddenly and badly enough for nuclear weapons to be on the table
- Rolling Russian forces back is going to be much more difficult than preventing Russian forces from advancing further
- This war has been advantageous for the defender — on the defensive, Russian forces will have many of the advantages that Ukrainian forces have
- Ukraine can recapture territory when that territory is lightly defended, but it's unclear whether they'll be able to roll Russia back to the February 23 lines
2022-05-13 Friday
- UK MoD update
- According to this sitrep thread
- Russians are preparing a major offensive to take Severodonetsk
- Might be launching an offensive against Ukrainian gains around Kharkiv
- Ukraine is still launching counteroffensives towards Izyum to disrupt Russian supply lines
- Russia is pushing harder towards Lyman than it is towards Barvinkove
- Indications are that the BTGs coming out of Izyum are significantly undermanned and underequipped
- Ukrainians have thus far repelled Russian advances toward Bakhmut
- Lyman is still reportedly in Ukrainian hands, with another Russian offensive repelled today
- An analysis of Russia's failed river crossing over the Siverskyi Donetsk
- Russia lost most of a BTG attempting to cross the river at Bilohorivka
- River crossings are difficult — test all components of a combined arms formation
- Six phases
- Recon and planning
- Where will the river crossing take place
- What needs to be done once units cross
- Suppression
- Deny enemy access to the crossing site
- Deny enemy access to the assembly areas
- Obscure
- Secure — friendly forces should occupy
- Crossing sites
- Assembly areas (both on home and far banks)
- Reduce — actually build the bridge across the river
- Assault — maneuver force crosses river and fans out on the far side
- Military police, in the US are important to river crossings — a lot of traffic control is required to ensure that the right units get to where they're going at the correct time
- Once a crossing is established, it needs to be protected
- River crossings require a lot of resources, and so commanders only undertake them when they're absolutely necessary
- Therefore river crossings usually only take place on a main planned axis of advance
- The significance of the Ukrainians denying the river crossing at Bilohorivka has been that Russian plans are now thrown off, now that a primary axis of advance has been denied
- More commentary on the failed river crossing
- A battalion from the LNR is reportedly stuck in Russia because of bureaucratic SNAFU
2022-05-12 Thursday
- UK MoD update
- Cavell Group reports another Russian attempt to cross the Siversky Donetsk, this time near Lyman
- Perhaps the Russians are increasing their pressure on the Lyman-Yampil axis
- Shelling reported around Pokrovsk, Kramatorsk, Slovyansk and Bakhmut as Russian forces consolidate the gains they've made after capturing Popasna
- The fact that Bakhmut is in artillery range of the Russians is of concern
- Bakhmut seems like a major road hub
- Previous reports on attacks on Bakhmut were airstrikes
- I think a lot of Western commentators are underestimating the progress that the Russians are making
- More reports on Ukrainian counterattacks west of Izyum
- No photographic evidence, though
- Still have a bad feeling about how the battle of the Severodonetsk salient is going for Ukraine
- In the last few days, we've seen Russian forces take Popasna
- Bakhmut and Pokrovsk are within artillery range
- Russian forces have been reported on the outskirts of Barvinkove
- Repeated attempts to cross the Siversky Donetsk, first around Bilohorivka and now near Lyman
- I wonder what the state of Avdiivka is — no reporting out of there since May 5
- Russia apparently lost 32 armored vehicles in its last attempt to cross the Siverskyi Donetsk
- Ukraine has apparently lost Rubizhne
- This is bad — I wouldn't be surprised if they have to retreat out of Severodonetsk entirely at this point
- Russian servicemen are reportedly refusing to fight in Ukraine
- This is one of the things that Michael Kofman talked about in the webinar below
- As long as Russia is not at war, Russian servicemen can resign from their contracts and the worst that the Russian military can do is hit them with their equivalent of a dishonorable discharge
- Cannot be court-martialed so long as Russia is not in a state of war
- Similarly, conscripts cannot be sent into combat outside of Russia so long as Russia is not in a state of war
- More worrying news out of Severodonetsk
- Moscow Times reports that Russian forces are being transferred out Syria to Ukraine
- Looks like the Russians tried another unsuccessful crossing of the Siversky Donetsk near Bilohorivka
Webinar With Rob Lee and Michael Kofman, hosted by Aaron Stein of FPRI
- Initial introduction by Rob Lee
- Russian forces have seemed to give up on the advance out of Izyum
- Focused on Severodonetsk primarily
- Unclear what Russian strength is — BTG counts are useless because we don't know what the end strength of these BTGs are
- Unclear what Russian morale is
- Materiel supply issue on the Russian side appears to be better, though
- Is the Russian force set up for a war of attrition?
- Rob Lee
- Personnel is a known problem of the Russian military
- No NCO corps
- Lack of contract servicemen
- The lack of personnel has been made more apparent by this war
- Contract servicemen are disproportionately in high-skill roles in the air force and navy
- This means that ground forces are disproportionately staffed by conscripts
- This means lack of availability for
- Many of the BTGs that deployed to Ukraine were only 2/3s manned — 400 troops in a troops in a unit that would nominally be 6-900
- This lack of personnel has been exacerbated by the casualties that Russia took in the initial days of the war
- Greater reliance on DNR/LNR militias
- Ad-hoc units formed — low cohesion, less effective
- Russia didn't have time to fix its manning issues before it started the war
- Lack of units means that units can't rotate away from the front
- Reduces the adaptability of Russia
- The fact that Russia did nothing to mitigate these personnel issues speaks to the lack of planning
- Michael Kofman
- Show me your force structure and I'll tell you who you are
- The force itself didn't know the extent of the rot within it
- The suddenness of the war meant that any issues with corruption couldn't be fixed before the war started
- How do you do combined arms when you have no infantry?
- Picture is uneven — different military districts have different levels of problems
- This is Russia's last offensive operation — win or lose, they don't have the forces to follow up
- This war is not sustainable for Russia as a war of attrition — Ukraine is mobilizing, and is getting western armament
- That said, Russia can extend its staying power — it can lose slowly
- Russian political leadership are masters of procrastination and that's probably what's happening now
- Level of Western support for Ukraine
- Rob Lee
- The importance of NATO weaponry has grown
- Ukraine has lost a lot of equipment
- Ammunition has grown short for Soviet-era equipment
- Russia realizes that one of the decisive factors is the level of support that Ukraine gets
- For the time being, turning the war into a war of attrition is beneficial for Ukraine
- US howitzers are going to help Ukraine defend the Donbas
- Longer range
- More accurate
- Aided by loitering munitions and drones
- This means that, militarily, over time Ukraine will be growing more powerful while Russia loses power
- Losing terrain isn't that big of an issue — troops and weapons are more important to preserve than terrain
- Ukraine is now confident that any ammunition losses will be replenished by the US and UK, which gives them the confidence to commit their full arsenal to the fight in the Donbas
- Michael Kofman
- Rob is generally right
- Russia's situation will worsen as time goes on
- This war will not be a stalemate
- There will be offensives and counteroffensives, territory will trade hands
- Big picture
- Russia will not probably experience a sudden dramatic defeat
- Both sides will pursue a strategy of exhaustion
- Russia will try to exhaust Ukraine
- Ukraine has taken significant losses
- Russia holds Ukraine under an economic blockade
- Ukraine is looking at -50% GDP
- The West is trying to exhaust Russia
- Sanctions
- Supplying weaponry to Ukraine
- Will the Ukrainians be just as disadvantaged when they go on the offensive?
- Rob Lee
- Ukrainians have launched counteroffensives around Kharkiv to relieve the city of Russian artillery bombardment
- Another good location for a counteroffensive would be around Kherson
- Lack of Russian troops in both locations
- But over the long run, Ukraine will pay a price
- Attritional warfare favors the defender
- Russian air power might become more effective as Ukraine goes on the offensive
- Ukraine might be waiting to build up its forces before it launches a counteroffensive
- This is an artillery war
- Not what it appears on the internet
- One of the game changers for Ukraine has been their transition to NATO-spec munitions
- Allows Ukraine to get far more ammunition for its guns
- How is Russia structured for a confrontation with NATO
- Rob Lee
- Russian military was structured for a short, high-intensity conflict
- Not designed for occupation
- The personnel issues of the Russian military will only get worse over time
- Permanent readiness units have taken the majority of the casualties thus far
- Need to find long-term contract soldiers, of which there is only a limited supply
- Many training officers have been deployed to the front
- The politics surrounding this war will make it more difficult for Russia to recruit
- The majority of Russia's ground forces will be deployed to Ukraine as long as this war continues
- Reconstituting equipment losses will also be a problem
- Tank losses
- Equipment losses
- Much of the equipment losses are their good tanks
- PGMs
- Russia has depleted its stocks of long-range missiles
- Means that they won't have that many for the next conventional conflict
- Russia has substantially weakened itself and will take years to reconstitute itself
- Michael Kofman
- Russia assumed that it wasn't going to be doing strategic ground offensives
- Assumed that they'd get advance notice to mobilize before the war starts
- Both of these assumptions were diametrically wrong for the current war
- Michael Kofman thinks that equipment is less of an issue than Rob
- Both Michael and Rob are surprised by the number of long-range precision guided munitions that Russia has fired
- Either they had more missiles than we assumed or they're digging into their reserves
- The real question is soldiers
- Will they have to increase the length of service for a draft
- Will economic incentives be useful in convincing people to sign up for contracts in the context of an economic downturn
- The Russian military will require quite a few years to recover, and that's if the war ends right now
- How does a potential annexation of Kherson affect these broader manpower issues?
- Michael Kofman
- Use Rosgvardia
- Start a recruitment program to see if they can hire people within the region
- Overall the Russian military lacks the manpower to hold this terrain
- Another problem is that Russia doesn't seem to have a clear plan for rotating troops off the line of battle
- The more territory that Russia takes, the more territory they'll ultimately have to defend
- Rob Lee
- The problem for Russia is that every offensive for them is occurring at a disadvantageous loss ratio
- When the US invaded Iraq, we had about 40% of our maneuver battalions in the initial invasion force
- Russia invaded Ukraine with 80% of its maneuver battalions
- US had national guard in reserve, Russia invaded with its national guard
- US took far fewer casualties
- It's clear that there wasn't really a long-term plan for what it should do with the territory that Russia has occupied
- No plan for economic integration
- Are they setting the stage for an insurgency
- Ukraine has every reason to continue this war
- Time is on Ukraine's side
- Russia will have to make some kind of choice
- Rob Lee re-emphasizes the procrastination line
- Putin didn't reduce the goals of the conflicts, but neither did he increase the means — he just kicked the can down the road
- Michael Kofman
- The decisive phase of this war was the first three weeks
- Destroyed the Russian political assumptions
- This is the modus operandii of the Russian leadership — seen in 2014 as well
- The difference between today and 2014 is that they don't have the option to reinforce militarily
- Where will this conflict ultimately be headed?
- Michael Kofman
- Despite all the problems that the Russia has had we haven't seen any significant surrenders or routs
- Given the logistics and morale issues, the Russian military has demonstrated staying power
- The Russian forces can sustain a blockade of Ukraine
- Just need to make it so that no one will insure commercial vessels going to Odessa
- Ukraine will suffer, but this will be a catastrophe for Russia
- Sanctions will take time to bite — won't see the effect on Russia until at least late summer
- Rob Lee
- The outcome of this war was not predetermined
- If Russia had planned its operation better, it could have turned out very differently
- Up until mid-March Russia and Ukraine were negotiating
- It's possible that Putin could have walked away with some of his political goals achieved
- Once it became clear that Russia could not take Kyiv or Kharkiv, the window for negotiation closed, especially with the revelations around Bucha
- Russia overplayed its hand — they could have walked away with something, but they held out and now they're probably going to get much less than what they could have
- Michael Kofman
- Be wary of people who claim they have the answers
- We're still debating the Russian defeat in World War 1!
- It will be years, and possibly decades before we have any kind of authoritative answer about what happened and what could have happened
2022-05-11 Wednesday
- UK MoD update
- Ukraine smashes an attempted Russian bridgehead across the Siverskyi Donetsk river near Bilohorivka
- While the fact that the bridghead was defeated is encouraging the location is not
- Looks like the Russians are attempting to place greater pressure on the Severodonetsk and Lysychansk
- The UK and Sweden have announced a bilateral mutual defense agreement
- Russian tank explodes near Mariupol
- Still lots of Ukrainian attacks behind Russian lines
- Russia has taken territory southeast and southwest of Izyum over the past few days
- However, Ukraine has also taken territory towards the the Russian border from Kharkiv
- Ukrainian forces are moving closer towards Kupyansk
- The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense has announced that Ukraininan forces have recaptured Pytomnyk
2022-05-10 Tuesday
2022-05-09 Monday
- UK MoD update
- Putin does not order a general mobilization in his May 9 victory day speech
- Does not declare victory either
- Color me surprised; I thought he'd do something
- MWI article comparing the Russian failure to seize Hostomel with the Allied failures in Operation Market Garden
- Russian troops take Popasna
- There had been a lot of fighting around Popasna for the past month
- The fact that the Ukrainians have been forced out of the city is a sign that the Russian offensive in the Donbas is still making progress, however slowly
- Russian forces take Nyzhnie
2022-05-08 Sunday
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2022-04-26 Tuesday
- UK MoD update
- Notes that Kreminna has fallen to the Russians
- Russians are advancing south of Izyum
- Ukrainians are preparing for an attack on Zaporizhzhia
- Germany reportedly willing to supply the Flakpanzer Gepard to Ukraine
- I'll believe it when I see them on trains heading to Poland
- This has shades of the Leopard I deal, where there were also rumors that Germany was willing to supply them, but the government got cold feet and held up the deal
- Combat in Rubizhne
2022-04-25 Monday
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- Member of Putin's party claims that Russia will either turn its newly occupied territory into pseudo-independent statelets or annex them outright
- This is a bad sign for diplomatic off-ramps
- Of course, this is some random Duma member speaking, and if Putin alters the war aims again, perhaps they'll change their tune again
2022-04-21 Thursday
- UK MoD update
- Putin orders a blockade of the Azovstal steel plant in Mariupol rather than an assault
- But why is Putin even involved in this decision?
- Sergei Shoigu presents a report announcing that the last bastion of resistance in Mariupol is at the steel plant
- The pacification of Mariupol presents a potential off-ramp for Russia
- Allows them to claim denazification, because Mariupol was the home base of the Azov Battalion, a Ukrainian militia with neo-Nazi associations
- Allows them to claim demilitarization, because with Mariupol fallen, Russia can claim to have significantly reduced the threat of long-range ballistic missile attacks against the DPR and LPR
- Igor Girkin, self-declared Minister of Defense of the Donetsk People's Republic and one of the defendants charged in the shoot-down of MH-17, has published an analysis on Telegram of the current state of the "special military operation"
- Says that the first stage was not successful — admits that Russians retreated from Kyiv area
- Contradicts those saying that the attack on Kyiv was a feint
- Says that the current Russian strategy in the second phase is to concentrate forces in the Donbas and try to force a breakthrough with mass and firepower
- This strategy is as obvious to Ukraine as it is to him
- Ukrainians have had time to bring in additional troops as well
- Ukrainians have had time to make fortifications
- Says that the Ukrainians have an advantage in field and artillery reconnaissance, thanks to their superior UAVs
- Even if the Russians have enough mass to force a breakthrough, they don't have enough mass to complete double-envelopments
- Encircled and bypassed Ukrainian forces will be able to threaten Russian supply lines
- Therefore the Russian advance will be slow and grinding, with massive losses
- This will allow Ukraine to fully mobilize its reserves, and the Russians shouldn't count on the Ukrainians being dumb enough to drip-feed units into the front as the Russian high command has been doing
- Draws a comparison with Operation Citadel, where the Germans attempted to maintain an offensive along the Kursk salient, while the Soviets built up a massive reserve
- LPR and DPR are totally drained in terms of force generation
- Russia has two options: move to at least a partial wartime footing, or lose
- The US announces another $800 million round of military assistance to Ukraine
- 72 155mm howitzers
- Enough to outfit 5 battalions of artillery
- Each howitzer will come with a tow vehicle
- 144,000 rounds of ammunition for those howitzers
- 121 "Phoenix Ghost" unmanned aerial systems
- The "Phoenix Ghost" is a new UAV developed specifically with feedback from Ukraine
- More details on the Phoenix Ghost
- Another convoy of Russian equipment in the Kupyansk area
- BBC update on the war
- Russia is still "in a position to win"
- Enjoys a 3:1 advantage in troops overall, but will need to use those forces intelligently
- Ukrainians are continuing to fight back well, but will need more firepower in order to deal with increased Russian concentration
- Russia still has a large number of soldiers in Mariupol
- Was the decision to lay siege to the Azovstal factory driven by the need to reallocate forces northwards?
- Russian usage of long-range cruise and ballistic missiles has declined, possibly reflecting concern about depleting inventories
- However, we have noticed declines in usage in the past, followed by increases
- Russian forces have reportedly occupied Rubizhne and Stara Kraznayaka
- This is concerning because the Ukrainians admitted to losing Kreminna on 4/19
- Russian forces are advancing slowly but steadily towards Severodonetsk
- Reports about the occupation of Rubizhne are conflicted; we don't know how far Russian troops have advanced into the town
- The Ukrainians still holding Rubizhne is more important than them holding Starya Kraznayaka; Rubizhne has an important bridge over the Siverskyi-Donetsk river
2022-04-20 Wednesday
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War on the Rocks article on Ukrainian needs as the conflict moves into its next phase
- Ukraine has blunted the initial Russian attack
- Therefore, it makes sense to send weapons that require a longer lead time and more training for the Ukrainians to use
- Contesting the Air: US F-16s for Egyptian MiG-29s?
- US aircraft will be prohibitively slow for the Ukrainian air force to absorb
- Pilot training
- Ground-crew training
- Polish MiG-29s are also not the best option
- Classified NATO-spec equipment would have to be removed, further slowing deliveries
- Polish airframes are old
- Egypt has a relatively new batch of MiG-29s
- Includes modern R-77 air-to-air missiles, which Ukraine has been requesting
- Egypt also flies the F-16
- Therefore, the US could propose a swap where US provides further F-16s to Egypt in exchange for Egypt providing its MiG-29s to Ukraine
- Securing the Land: Don't Send Odds And Ends
- Ukraine has three primary requirements for its land forces
- Air defense
- Protected mobility
- Artillery ammunition
- Ukraine has had indicated an interested in switching away from Soviet-era air defense systems for several years
- A good option for Ukraine is the Norwegian National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System
- Less well known than Patriot, but still highly capable
- Ukrainian crews would need training to use this system but that training could be provided outside of Ukraine
- When providing mobility, NATO should think about sustainment
- Providing a mish-mash of whatever worn-out armored vehicles are on hand will lead to a logistical catastrophe
- Provide armored vehicles for which the production line is still open
- Provide fewer types in greater quantity
- Ukraine will need a lot of artillery ammunition to replace expended stocks, notably replacement rockets for its Grad MLRS batteries
- Fortunately, ex-Warsaw Pact members of NATO have reserves of Grad rockets that the should be able to send to Ukraine
- Stop second-guessing the Ukrainians — they've demonstrated that they know what they're doing when it comes to defending their country
- Use a "train-the-trainer" approach to build maintenance expertise in the Ukrainian military
- Denying the sea with anti-ship cruise missiles
- Russia has blockaded Odesa
- The Russian maritime presence in the Black Sea could be a major problem if/when Russian forces succeed in taking Mariupol and shift their attentions westward towards Odesa
- Is this likely?
- The analysis I've seen indicates that Russian forces would shift their attentions northwest towards Dnipro
- Russian main effort appears to be capture the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts
- Diverting a significant force towards Odesa would dilute that main effort considerably and would require capturing a number of Ukrainian cities, such as Mikolaiv, which the Russians thus far have been unable to encircle
- The best means of putting the Russian navy at risk is with anti-ship cruise missiles
- Even if we don't send Harpoons, we should send Ukraine a comparable medium-range subsonic system
- Goal is to complicate the Russian naval blockade of Odesa and complicate the Russian navy's ability to provide long-range standoff fires for Russian ground forces
- Ukraine needs to regain the initiative
- Ukraine's allies can assist by providing the right sorts of weapons
2022-04-11 Monday
- UK MoD update
- Claims the use of phosphorus munitions
- Also claims that the Ukrainian military has repulsed a Russian offensive in the Donetsk and Luhansk region
- Fighting in Marinka, Donetsk Oblast
- Marinka is a suburb of Donetsk
- Donetsk is in between Mariupol and the JFO area
- FT article on the battle for Kyiv
- People are focusing on the Ukrainian use of foam mats to hide soldiers from thermal imaging
- However, I think the bigger factor is that the junior officers of the Russian military continued attempting to follow their original orders, even when it was clear that facts on the ground didn't resemble what they were expecting
- Meanwhile, the Ukrainians, having been trained by the US, were able to improvise and adapt to changing battlefield conditions
- Another thing that the Russians seem to have underestimated is how many of the Ukrainian commanders were hardened by service on the front lines in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions
- Furthermore, the Russians seem to have made their battlefield communications systems reliant on 4G cell networks‽
- I still don't understand this — why would you make your battlefield communications reliant on the enemy's physical infrastructure?
- Even if you use encryption to prevent the enemy from listening in on the contents of your transmissions, the enemy can still use traffic analysis to determine where your important communications nodes are
- Furthermore, there appears to have been no thought given to the possibility of a scorched earth strategy, which is surprising because scorched earth retreats are a Russian trademark
- Russian video showing the extent of their advance into Mariupol
- Satellite imagery shows a new Russian buildup of equipment around Valuiki Russia
- This is notable because Valuiki was one of the jumping off points for the original invasion in February
- A renewed buildup could indicate that Russia is gearing up for a second major push
- Russia claims that their strike on the Dnipro airport was to destroy equipment that had been provided by the West
- More details on the fighting in the Izyum region
- I think this is what the UK MoD update was referring to when it said that the Ukrainians had repulsed an offensive
- According to Ukrainian military officials, the resistance in Mariupol continues
- According to Handelsblatt, Rheinmetall is willing to supply 50 Leopard I main battle tanks to Ukraine
- An account of the Russian occupation of Yahidne, a village south of Chernihiv
- Russians using cluster bombs in Kharkiv
- Railroad tracks in Belgorod were destroyed by unknown saboteurs
- Russia is reportedly importing weapons from Iran and Iraq
- Iran has sent RPGs and anti-tank missiles
- Also sent an S300 and a locally made derivative of the S300, a Bavar 373
- Iraqi militias have also sent rocket propelled grenades and two license-built versions of the Brazilian Astros II MLRS
- Not sure what to make of this report
- Is it actually true?
- If true, does this indicate supply problems in the Russian military
War on the Rocks Podcast
- How has the war progressed in the past two weeks?
- Russian defeat around Kyiv
- Russian defeat in the southwest, around Mikolaiv
- As a result of these defeats, Russia has reorganized its effort to focus on the Donbas
- Perhaps looking for some kind of win by May 9
- This war is evolving into a set-piece battle in the Donbas
- What's happening in Mariupol?
- Ukrainian forces have held out much longer than anticipated
- This might be because the Russians have a relatively small force attacking the city
- Russia and Ukraine have opposite problems
- Russia has an abundance of kit but a shortage of manpower
- Ukraine has a shortage of kit but an abundance of manpower
- How is Russia addressing its manpower shortfalls?
- Some of the units pulled from northern Ukraine are still in a good enough condition that they can be transported to the Donbas as-is and used to reinforce the fight there
- However, many will have to be reconstituted
- Replacements for soldiers lost in combat
- Replacement equipment for stuff destroyed in combat
- The main problem with the Russian military is a persistent, pervasive shortage of infantry
- Force designed to fight a large-scale defensive war against NATO
- Designed in a tiered system
- Units able to generate one or two battalion tactical groups immediately
- Then, as mobilization occurs, additional battalion tactical groups could be built up and sent forward
- Russia has committed all the battalion tactical groups it can muster at short notice
- Are trying to raise manning levels by offering a lot of money to incoming conscripts to sign up as volunteers with longer terms of enlistment
- In the short term, though, Russia will have to fight with what it has
- Much of the Russian reserve is support units for Russian equipment, not infantry
- What about auxiliary forces?
- Russia is trying to get additional forces wherever it can
- Syria
- Chechnya
- Wagner mercenaries
- However all of these forces are too small in number and too incompetent to make a meaningful difference
- Syrians and Wagner mercenaries amount to a few thousand troops, at most
- Chechens spend more time taking selfies than fighting
- Separatist forces
- Didn't have much manning before the war
- Conducted a general mobilization just prior to the
- Many of their recruits are brand new recruits
- Russian leadership
- Russia recently appointed General Alexander Dvornikov as the overall commander for the effort in Ukraine
- Prior to this, Dvornikov was the head of the Southern Military District
- Much has been made of Dvornikov's experience in Syria, but we shouldn't read too much into that
- Most of Russia's senior officers have led fighting in Syria
- Dvornikov is competent, but not especially creative
- Russia will have a single commander in the field, which ends the very strange command and control system that they had in the initial phases of this war, with 4 senior generals coordinating via Moscow
- Why has Russia's effort in Ukraine appeared so different from its campaign in Syria
- Russia could pick and choose where it fought in Syria
- Limited expeditionary wars don't tell you much about a country's ability to scale its military
- Context manners — Syria was a much more permissive environment than Ukraine
- Syria also highlighted problems in the Russian air force
- Lack of precision guided weapons
- Lack of suppression of enemy air defense
- Lack of experience with close-air-support
- The Joint Forces Operation (JFO) area in Eastern Ukraine has been somewhat of a black box for open-source intelligence
- Russian forces are attempting a pincer movement to try to encircle the Ukrainians there
- Many analysts, Kofman included, thought that the first thing the Russians would do is try to encircle the Ukrainian forces in the JFO are
- Instead, the Russians tried to do everything all at the same time, and, as a result, failed everywhere all at the same time
- Russian forces took 3 weeks to push through Izyum
- In the south, they advanced to Zaporizhzhia, but weren't able to advance any farther, because the fight for Mariupol sucked in a lot of manpower
- Kofman thinks that the Russians have given up on their attempts at envelopment, and have settled for a more "brutish" frontal assault approach
- But haven't the Ukrainians been preparing for a frontal assault for 8 years?
- Try to break through at Izyum and advance towards Kramatorsk
- Attempt a smaller envelopment around Severodonetsk
- Fighting continues, but the Russians are conducting a second build-up in their staging areas
- Why did Russian forces conduct a full-withdrawal from Kyiv rather than keeping some units in place to pin Ukrainian reinforcements
- The state of the Russian forces was probably more dire than anyone anticipated
- Not enough units in good enough condition to avoid being overrun
- The Russians also need everything they can get for their attack on the Donbas
- Looking at the abandoned and destroyed equipment in that area, it's clear that the Russian forces suffered a lot of attrition
- Russians might also retreat from Kherson
- The majority of the city is on the west side of the river
- In order to maintain a secure position, the Russians have had to set up a sizable perimeter against Ukrainian counterattacks
- If Russia wants to focus on the Donbas and reduce the amount of manpower they need to hold the city, the Russians may abandon the city and try to just secure the bridge
- Why do we think that Chechens were responsible for war crimes in the Bucha and Irpin areas?
- Interviews with survivors indicate that many of the soldiers responsible for killings were not regular Russian, but were Rosgvardia
- Many of the Rosgvardia units posted to that area have been dominated by Chechens
- As time goes on, we'll probably be able to identify which specific units and which specific commanders were responsible
- One of the contributing factors to the war crimes might be the overall violence inherent in the Russian military
- Russian military has always struggled with hazing
- The Soviet military had several years terms of service for conscripts
- The Russian military cut that down to single year terms of service
- The reason for that was because, in the Soviet era, conscripts in their second year would haze the new recruits
- Hazing was far worse than frat-hazing
- Russian military also recruits from many different ethnic groups, and these groups form informal gangs within the military
- The main problem with the Russian military is the fact that it doesn't have an NCO corps with leadership positions
- Discipline is handled by junior officers
- Junior officers are unable to handle disciplinary issues
- Russian military is plagued by organizational and leadership problems
- In a lot of ways, the Russian military hasn't evolved from its bad old days of the '90s
- Making the campaign about "denazification" implicitly relaxes the rules of engagement, and makes it okay for Russian units to engage in war crimes
- What equipment does Ukraine need for the second phase of the war
- Ukrainian military has suffered significant attrition as well
- Artillery ammunition will become a problem in the long term
- Ukrainian military needs to re-equip part of the force
- You can defend territory with ATGMs and MANPADs, but you can't take territory with it
- If this war becomes a war of attrition, that can favor either side
- People in Ukraine are less euphoric than many western commentators, because they are more aware of the possibility of a long war
- Putin could have alleviated some of the staffing issues of the Russian military by holding on to the conscripts whose terms of service were about to expire
- Why didn't he do so?
- The only way to enact stop-loss in Russia is to declare a general mobilization
- General mobilization implies a state of war
- Putin has been adamant thus far in presenting the Ukraine war as less than a total state of war
- Sticking to this narrative allows him to claim victory with limited gains (i.e. the Donbas region)
- If Putin declared a state of war, then the only way he could get out of that is with some kind of maximalist goal (i.e. the capture of all of Ukraine)
- Putin wants to preserve his political options, and so instead of declaring a national mobilization, he's trying to conduct a "shadow-mobilization" where he's trying to raise manpower levels with financial incentives
2022-04-10 Sunday
2022-04-09 Saturday
2022-04-08 Friday
2022-04-07 Thursday
- UK MoD update
- German intelligence suggests that the killings in Bucha were organized
- Russian tanks near Severodonetsk
- Part of the Russian offensive in the Donbas region
- Russia is redeploying units from Belarus into Donbas
- 49th Combined Arms Army reportedly withdrawing from Kherson
- If this is true, then the Ukrainians could liberate Kherson soon
- On the other hand The Cavell Group reports that Russian forces are advancing towards Dnipro
- Moving on Dnipro would make sense if Russia wanted to cut off the Ukrainian forces in the JFO area
- However, given their failure to take Mikolaiv, I'm not sure how realistic it is for them to attack Dnipro, a larger city that's even deeper in Ukraine
- Giving up Kherson is incompatible with Russian forces moving on Dnipro, because giving up Kherson would give the Ukrainians a river crossing and an airfield with which to launch attacks on the Russian's flanks
- Ukrainian troops reportedly repel a Russian attack on Slovyansk
- The Russians seem to be able to take small towns like Izyum, but they struggle to capture anything bigger
- Severodonetsk, Toshkovka, Rubizhne, Lysychansk, and Popasna are under Russian artillery attack
- Severodonetsk and Lysychansk are twin-cities, right next to each other
- Rubizhne is immediately northwest of Severodonetsk
- Toshkovka is approximately 12 miles south of Severodonetsk
- Popasna is about 20 miles south-southwest of Severodonetsk
- Rubizhne — Severodonetsk — Toshkivka — Popasna forms a rough arc that illustrates where the main Russian offensive is
- Ukraine apparently lost 70% of its navy when the Russians took Crimea
- Fighting in Pokrovs'ke, near Mariupol
- Unclear when this footage was taken
- At least one person in Ukraine has seen Red Dawn
- Russia's defense ministry admits "significant losses"
- Reporting on what Russia is doing with the territories it's occupied
- One thing the article highlights is that the Russians seem to have had a plan for setting up sham governments, and they've enacted this plan in the parts of Ukraine that they've captured
- If this is true, then the Russian invasion of Ukraine would present an almost mirror image of the US invasion of Iraq
- When the US invaded Iraq, the conventional military portion of the campaign was handled brilliantly, and the post-invasion occupation was bungled
- Whereas, the Russians appear to have a plan for what they would have done with the territory that they conquered, it's just that they weren't able to conquer as much territory as they thought they would be able to
2022-04-06 Wednesday
2022-04-05 Tuesday
2022-04-04 Monday
2022-04-03 Sunday
2022-04-01 Friday
2022-03-31 Thursday
2022-03-30 Wednesday
2022-03-29 Tuesday
2022-03-28 Monday
2022-03-27 Sunday
2022-03-26 Saturday
2022-03-25 Friday
2022-03-24 Thursday
2022-03-23 Wednesday
2022-03-22 Tuesday
2022-03-21 Monday
- UK MoD update
- A Russian tabloid reports that Russia has suffered 9,861 killed, 16,153 wounded
- Chechen fighters in Mariupol — Russia is sending Chechen fighters, because they're more motivated to fight than their regular infantry
- Civil unrest in Kherson — I predict we'll see more and more of this as time goes on
- Russians are reportedly continuing to attack Mikolaiv
- Heavy Russian air activity reported in the Donetsk region
- Russian forces unloading equipment at Berdyans'k
- This supports my earlier claim that the reason that Russian forces have made so much relative progress in the south is because Russian logistics have worked much better for them there than elsewhere
- My impressions of the war so far
- Current Status
- Northern Front
- Russian forces are on the outskirts of Kyiv, concentrated in Irpin, Bucha and Hostomel
- They've been stuck there since the earliest days of the war
- In light of fierce Ukrainian resistance in that area, the Russians lately have been conducting attacks on the east of Kyiv, most notably around the Brovary area
- Eastern Front
- Russian forces appear to have encircled Chernihiv and Sumy
- Not much news coming out of either of those cities, which is worrying
- That said, the fact that I haven't seen any Russian propaganda about the capture of those two cities is heartening
- Possible evidence of Russian forces on the eastern front pushing towards Kyiv, with Russian vehicles reported in Pryluky, and evidence of Russian movement towards Yahotyn
- Don't know what the status of Kharkiv is
- Appears to be heavy fighting in the area, with lots of use of artillery
- However, it still appears that the city isn't totally encircled, with the Ukrainian government still able to supply its forces inside the city
- A new (to me) area of concern is the "Joint Forces Operations" (JFO) area
- The JFO was the military campaign that Ukraine had against the separatist republics of Donbas and Luhansk
- Comprises a large proportion of the Ukrainian regular military
- Is apparently still in the east of the country, near Donbas and Luhansk
- A Russian military goal appears to be to cut off the JFO, depriving Ukraine of a substantial fraction of its conventional military materiel and personnel
- The most relevant city for the Joint Forces Area is Izyum
- All of the maps I've seen of the conflict thus far have been unreliable, but they've been especially unreliable with regards to the eastern front
- Lots of areas that are colored red for Russian control have a very active Ukrainian insurgency that is hampering the Russian military's ability to resupply its front-line troops
- Southern Front
- This is the area where Russian forces have gained the most ground
- Captured Melitopol, Kherson and Berdyans'k
- Mariupol is completely surrounded and is under constant Russian attack, with devastating consequences for the civilians who are still in the city
- My explanation for the Russian success in this area is that, unlike on the other fronts, Russians have been able to establish a railhead at Melitopol, which has allowed them to use rail transport to bring up supplies
- Advantages of rail transport
- More efficient than truck transport
- Russian logistical forces have more experience with rail transport than with truck transport for long-distance supply lines
- In addition to the railhead in Melitopol, today the Russian military posted footage of soldiers unloading supplies at the port in Berdyans'k
- On the other hand, the southern front is also where I've seen the best evidence of Ukrainian units counterattacking and retaking territory
- Ukrainians counterattacked out of Mikolaiv, and retook Posad-Pokrovs'ke, a town about halfway between Mikolaiv and Kherson
- Significant setback for the Russian effort to encircle Mikolaiv
- I would expect to see Russian attacks towards Kryvvi Rih and Dnipro, in an effort to capture crossings across the Dneiper river
- Also expect Mariupol to fall eventually
- Overall impressions
- Russian efforts until this point have been haphazard and disorganized
- The Russian military has not fought as it has trained
- Initial effort involved units scattering, exceeding the Russian military's relatively limited logistical capabilities, and leaving themselves vulnerable to ambushes
- Not a lot of close air support in the initial days of the conflict
- Little suppression of Ukrainian air forces and air defenses
- The fact that the last few days have been quiet indicates that the Russians are in an operational pause, focusing on consolidating their gains, securing their rear areas, and reorganizing their troops in the field
- The Ukrainian military has greatly exceeded expectations in its performance over the past 4 weeks
- The key question for the Ukrainians is, at what point do they retreat from the Donetsk and Luhansk regions?
- Significant risk of forces being encircled and destroyed there
2022-03-21 War on the Rocks Podcast on the war thus far
- Podcast link
- War started as a minimal force regime change operation
- Has evolved into a more grinding conflict
- In week 3, the Russians transitioned towards more large unit maneuvers, but were still trying to do too much
- Encircle Kyiv
- Encircle Ukrainian forces in the Joint Forces Operation area
- Encircle Mariupol
- Flow units past Mikolaiv towards Odesa
- The Russian military did not have the forces or logistical capability to achieve all these ends at the same time
- Seemed like the Russian military was keen to show some kind of positive result to the Kremlin, and so were trying to advance against many different targets all at once
- Russian military appears to have given up on taking Kyiv for now
- Don't have the forces to properly encircle the city
- Instead, are holding back and maintaining a partial encirclement
- Russian forces were pushed back from Mikolaiv by Ukrainian counterattacks, so are consolidating there as well
- Are holding position outside Kherson
- The front to watch is the Russian attempt to envelop Ukrainian units in the JFO
- South of Kharkiv, via Izyum
- North of Mariupol
- This is the one area where Ukrainian forces could be in a precarious position
- We are probably at the end of the opening chapter
- War aims
- Russia wants to take the Donbas
- Consolidate control over areas that they're currently deployed in order to have political leverage at the negotiating table
- This presumes that Vladimir Putin's understanding of the war is similar to ours
- Does Putin really know how well or poorly his military is doing in the field
- What do we know about the Ukrainian forces in the JFO
- Very little
- Open source intelligence has tended to focus on the Russian military
- Don't know much about Ukrainian military
- These units have been in pitched battle with Russian forces for the past three weeks, so we don't know what shape they're in
- What is the significance of Mariupol
- Taking Mariupol would give Russia control over the entire coastline of the Sea of Azov
- Some logistical advantages
- Would free up forces to focus on the encirclement of Ukrainian forces in the JFO
- Kyiv might not be turned into Grozny, but Mariupol looks like it will
- Not that many Russian army forces in that fight
- Lots of Chechens and Rosgvardia
- More akin to Syria, where we have proxy or client forces doing the majority of the fighting
- In addition, the Russians have sent a force up towards Kryvvi Rih, in order to try to cut off ground lines of communication to the JFO
- Why has the Russian offensive towards Kyiv stalled so badly?
- Western side of the city
- Bad logistical situation
- Only a few roads coming in from Belarus
- No railroads
- Ukrainians blowing bridges
- Ukrainian counterattacks
- Ukrainian air defenses are still up around the capitol, making air support more difficult
- Eastern side
- Logistical situation is a bit easier
- However, there is ongoing fighting around Chernihiv
- Units are trying to link up with forces that made their way around Sumy, several hundred kilometers away
- Fight is slightly different, but appears to be equally challenging for the Russians
- Command and control issues
- The forces on the eastern and western sides of Kyiv have different command and control structures, which makes any kind of coordinated action more difficult
- One of Kofman's critics on Twitter says that these military maneuvers don't really matter all that much, what is Kofman's reply?
- If Russian attacks don't matter, then Ukrainian counterattacks are equally meaningless
- Seizing ground lines of communication and logistics hubs matters
- However, he is in agreement that what Russia has achieved on the battlefield thus far won't get them to their political ends
- Maybe if the Russians cut their war aims down drastically and walk away with concessions re: the Donbas, they could get what they want from this war, but then everyone outside of Russia would know that Russia lost
- That said, we can't cherry-pick certain events in this war and say that only those events matter
- We're operating in a one-sided information environment because Ukraine is dominating the information environment
- We know a lot more about the Russian military than the Ukrainian military
- What do we make of the Russian missile strikes on Ukrainian bases in the west of the country
- All military offensives have primary and secondary objectives
- A secondary objective of the Russian military has been to demilitarize Ukraine
- Attack known military facilities
- Attack known defense-industrial facilities
- Reduce Ukraine's ability to build up its military in the medium to long term
- One mistake the Ukrainians have made has been in sticking to known bases and facilities, even when it's clear that those facilities are targets for Russian missiles
- What is Ukraine's defense-industrial base
- Ukraine was a large part of the Soviet Union's defense-industrial complex
- Gas turbine engines
- Helicopter engines
- Seeker heads from missiles
- Sold technology and parts to China as well
- One of the ironies of this war is that many of the Russian helicopters striking Ukraine have Ukrainian engines in them
- What is the probability of Belarusian forces intervening
- Kofman is skeptical
- Even if the Belarusian forces attack, will they do any better than the Russians?
- Lukashenko will probably be keeping his troops home to defend against regime change
- The more significant development is the fact that Chinese might choose to militarily support Russia
- This aid won't help Russia immediately
- Impact of sanctions
- Will lead to an economic catastrophe for Russia
- Will have significant downstream effects for Russia's defense industry
- No immediate impact on the war in the coming weeks and months
- Will impact Russia's ability to sustain its forces in the field
- The concern for Ukraine is that the war will turn into a war of attrition
- Ukraine has the political will to run a war of attrition
- But it would lead to a tremendous amount of destruction
- Kofman predicted earlier that Russia would have to stop and regroup after two to three weeks into the campaign
- Prediction held up pretty well
- Russian forces are stalled out on two out of three fronts and are making limited progress on the third
- However, Russia is by no means out of troops or out of firepower
- The Russian military that has been committed to the fight thus far has become a spent force, but that's not true of the entire Russian military writ large
- Predictions about the war going forward hinge on the following question: have the past few weeks represented the worst of the Russian military or the best of the Russian military
- We've seen extremely poor planning and lack of coordination
- But, on the other hand, the units that Russia has committed so far have been the units that have been at the highest state of readiness
- Reinforcements will be less experienced, less well trained, and equipped with older gear
- What do the recent arrests of not just senior officials in the FSB, but also officials in the military and the Rosgvardia say about Putin's assessment of his security state
- Putin realizes that his military has been, in some ways, a Potemkin military
- If Putin alienates the FSB and the Rosgvardia, what does that say about the long term stability of the regime?
- FSB secures the regime from elites and handles elite disputes
- Rosgvardia protects the regime against popular uprisings
- In addition, the Rosgvardia have lost a large number of officers and soldiers
- The information about this war will be very difficult to suppress
- Can't hide dead bodies
- POWs will return and will talk
- The ramifications of this war will play out over the next several years
- What do we know about how Russia is administering the territories that it has conquered
- There have been some troubling stories about Russian forces kidnapping people and sending them off into Russia
- We've suspected that Russia had plans to do this
- Rosgvardia units deployed with materials to build internment camps
- Do the Russians intend to permanently occupy this territory, or will they trade this territory back to Ukraine in exchange for political concessions
- Kofman is more confident that the Russians will keep Donbas
- Where are Russian elite infantry still in the fight?
- Russian elite units
- Special forces units
- VDV
- VDV Spetsnaz
- Have taken substantial casualties
- Not clear if the failures were due to failures of the units of themselves, or was it a failure of the overall military structure sending elite units into untenable tactical situations only to see them get crushed?
- Example: plan to take Hostomel airport
- Was it a failure of the elite infantry themselves, because they couldn't hold on to the airport?
- Was it a failure of Russian air forces, because they couldn't suppress Ukrainian air defenses and provide air support to the VDV at Hostomel?
- Was it a failure of the Russian ground forces, because they couldn't push forward and relieve the airborne infantry behind enemy lines?
- Clear that the Russian employment of elite forces has been very poor
- Using "elite" units in situations that they haven't trained for — an elite airborne unit isn't necessarily more elite in urban combat than regular infantry
- "Elite" doesn't mean omnicompetent, it means specialized, and using specialized forces in a role that they didn't train for turns them into more expensive regular infantry
- Naval forces around Odesa
- Probably won't happen
- With the ongoing fighting around Mikolaiv, there's no way that an amphibious landing would have logistical support to be successful
2022-03-20 Sunday
2022-03-18 Friday
- UK MoD update
- More Russian airstrikes on Lviv
- Further progress on an agreement between Ukraine and Russia
- As noted below, the agreement only covers the political status of Ukraine
- Does not cover what happens to the land that Russia has captured
- This is the world in which we live today — Music videos of drone strikes
- Russia is bringing Tochka ballistic missiles to the front — possible sign that their stocks of Iskander ballistic missiles are running low
- Running out of advanced munitions isn't just a problem for Russia — France and Italy had to request additional stocks of PGMs from the US during the air campaign over Libya
- Further drone incidents
- More speculation on why Russian troops have performed so poorly — Written by Dmitri Alperovitch
- Fighting in Mariupol
- Near miss between a train and a tank near Novooleksiivka, in Kherson Oblast
- Tanks are moving along railroads as well as highways
- Russian forces towing away helicopters from Kherson
- The aftermath of a Russian artillery strike in Mikolaiv
- Rob Lee's thread on the current status of the war
- The war is turning into a war of attrition
- This is not what Russia wants, because it doesn't actually have the numbers to threaten Kharkiv, Kyiv, Mikolaiv, and Mariupol all at once, much less western Ukraine
- One thing that we're seeing is how precarious the Russian military is with regards to logistics
- Russia has the troops and equipment they need to succeed, but they having trouble keeping their army on the move
- The Russian military's overdependence on rail transport means that whenever it has to move more than 100km away from supporting railheads, it struggles
- It's no surprise that they've made the most progress in the south, where they've been able to extend rail transport up to Melitopol, which they captured fairly early in the conflict
- I'm going back and looking at my notes from around 2022-03-01, and it's remarkable how little the front lines have changed
- Russian forces spotted in Rubizhne
- This indicates that the eastern attack is making progress
- This is in the context of fighting in the Izyum area
- I think the greatest danger to Ukraine is, like The Economist described, that its forces are trapped and cut off in the east of the country
- Thread on the Russian information war
- The Russians aren't targeting the west with their propaganda
- Main effort appears to be on other "BRICS" nations
- Goal appears to be to create an alternate set of trading partners that can pick up the slack for Western sanctions
Economist update on the Ukraine situation
- Shashank Joshi
- Have to be able to hold two ideas
- Russian advance has slowed
- Besieged Mariupol but have not taken it
- Don't have the manpower to take cities
- Russians 7000 killed according to American estimates
- Don't have the ratio to capture urban areas
- However this doesn't mean that the Russians are on the cusp of defeat
- High risk of Ukrainian forces getting encircled near the Donbas
- Russian attacks on Kryvvi Rih, Dnipro and Izyum indicate that the Russians might be trying encircle and cut off the bulk of Ukrainian forces in the field
- Russians can choose to assault cities at any time, but might not have the manpower to pull it off successfully
- First battle of Grozny
- 120 tanks went into Grozny, 105 were lost
- However, taking cities is not the only way to win
- Russian air force is still struggling to gain complete air superiority
- The key challenge for Ukraine is to get western supplies to the bulk of its forces in the east
- The battlefield is still key to the political outcome
- Is there a risk for a mutiny in the Russian army?
- Relatively unlikely
- Army is exhausted
- Unable to mount combined arms attacks
- Unlikely to collapse
- Need to be aware that we're only seeing half the picture — not seeing Ukrainian casualties
- Do the Ukrainians have the mass, reserves and will to mount the level of counterattacks needed to drive the Russians out? Likely not
- Edward Carr
- Conditions in Ukraine are awful, especially in Mariupol
- Low supplies of food and water in encircled cities
- Convoys taking civilians out have been shelled
- Putin is waging a war on civilians in order to present Zelensky with a Sophie's choice
- Keep fighting and keep suffering
- Accept a peace that's disadvantageous to Ukraine
- If Putin starts leveling cities like he did in Grozny or in Syria, what options does the West have?
- Increasing pressure on the West to increase its intervention
- Carr still thinks a no-fly zone would be ineffective — can shell cities from the ground
- A no-fly zone would be hugely escalatory
- West's response is to increase aid and gifts of weapons in order to try to shift the balance on the battlefield
- Arkady Ostrovsky
- What's the mood in Russia?
- Putin is fighting a war on two fronts: Ukraine and the home front
- Russian protesters haven't gained the sympathy of the security forces
- Russian propaganda machine is ramping up
- Putin's gave an extraordinarily violent speech at the time when Zelensky was addressing the US Congress
- Called on his people to turn on the "traitors" and "scum" who want Russian to integrate with the West
- Described speech as fascist
- Investigative prosecutors have been told to clear their decks of corruption cases because of forthcoming cases against protesters and others deemed to be traitors
- Peace talks
- 3 sets of things in a peace deal
- Status of Ukraine
- Lifting of sanctions
- What happens to the land that Russia has taken
- We haven't gotten very far down that path
- Progress has been made on the status of Ukraine
- Zelensky has indicated that he's willing to compromise on Ukrainian membership in NATO and the status of Crimea
- However, both of these only have to do with the first part of the deal
- Look at who's doing the negotiating
- Ukrainian side has authority to negotiate
- But does Lavrov?
- What are the models that we should be thinking about to make a neutrality guarantee work?
- Shashank Joshi can't think of an example of a nation that accepted NATO membership
- Sweden and Finland are nominally neutral but they are part of the EU
- EU's Lisbon Treaty has a collective defense clause, just like the North Atlantic Treaty
- How do we guarantee Ukrainian neutrality
- The Finnish model is incompatible with limits on Ukrainian military
- What is Ukraine's willingness to give up territory?
- Ukrainian negotiators indicate that they don't accept Russian sovereignty over any post-1991 territorial changes
- Ukrainians feel they can outlast Russia
- What will it take for Vladimir Putin to claim victory?
- What are the objectives of this "special operation"
- Drivers of the war were internal
- Weakening legitimacy
- Putin's eye for his legacy
- Need find the limits of Putin's power
- Putin can't find the political equilibrium to end the war
- Putin needs to find a victory that can justify the war to the military
- This is Ukraine's "Great Patriotic War"
- Putin's biggest mistake is that he doesn't believe in the will and agency of other people
- But a war is not a parade
- Ukrainians are showing that they have will and agency
- The reality of deaths is undermining Kremlin messaging
- What is the relationship between sanctions and any potential peace deal
- This is a solvable problem if the will to solve them is there
- Will is lacking at moment
- However once the will to get to an agreement is there, the details can be worked out
- Risk of escalation
- What are the odds of Putin using a tactical nuclear weapon?
- Small chance; we're not at the nuclear precipice (yet)
- This is the most nuclear-tinged crisis since the Cuban Missile Crisis
- However this crisis has a lower chance of the use of nuclear weapons
- Any nuclear use on the part of Vladimir Putin invites NATO intervention, rather than deterring it
- However there are still ways for this conflict to escalate
- If Vladimir Putin feels like he's losing and he's losing due to NATO weapons flowing into Ukraine, he could launch strikes or sabotage campaigns that would escalate the situation
- However escalation in the near future is relatively unlikely
- What should the West's reaction be if any of these low-probability events happen
- Use of nuclear weapons would invite western intervention
- Retaliatory strikes against Russian units involved in use of weapons of mass destruction
- The escalation risk would be high, but it would be hard to avoid intervention in the face of public opinion
- We should push really hard on China and India to talk to Russia
- Book recommendation: Putin's Own Words
- Is Putin like a cornered rat now?
- Not yet, they don't think
- Putin had two traits that stopped his rise in the KGB
- Recklessness
- Lack of empathy
- Putin convinced himself that he has escalation dominance
- Nuclear threats don't just affect Putin himself, but also his entourage
- What is the role China is playing
- Some are saying that Russia will be drive into China's arms
- Other's are saying that China doesn't want to be associated with a loser
- Chinese officials see the war as a prelude — real issue is competition between the US and China
- Chinese officials are confident in China's eventual victory
- Chinese government will work Putin
- Doesn't want to be embarrassed by Russian collapse
- But there are limits to that cooperation
- Russia is a small market for China
- A weak and compliant Russia is advantageous for China
- Rights in northern ports
- Further transfers of weapons technology, including nuclear technology
- China sees the conflict through the lens of self-interest
- Won't save Putin
- Can we get China to be a mediator?
- Unlikely
- China doesn't want to end up responsible for peace between Russia and Ukraine
- What are the lessons of this conflict for a potential Taiwan conflict
- Unclear
- Profound distraction for the United States
- But on the other hand, this shows how hard an invasion can be
- Is Xi Jinping questioning his intelligence estimates on the invasion of China?
- Any invasion of Taiwan will be far more difficult than the Russian invasion of Ukraine
- What is India's role in this?
- India is not supporting Russia
- Maintaining neutrality, because India has a dependency on Russia for weapons
- Does not want to alienate Russia in a way that would disadvantage India against China
- However, this might cause officials in the United States to question whether a coalition with India is feasible
- However, India is gambling (not unreasonably) that India is too important to an anti-China coalition for the US to alienate
- What is the follow-up to some of Putin's commanders being put under house arrest
- More arrests
- Deputy head of Rosgvardia has been arrested
- A lot of flights towards the Urals by Putin's personal planes
- Elites are scared of Putin
- Has the probability of an uprising gone up?
- Not significantly higher probability of an uprising in the next six months
- But a palace coup can still occur
- Lots of turbulence but little visibility
2022-03-17 Thursday
2022-03-16 Wednesday
- UK MoD update
- Russians bomb civilian shelter in Mariupol
- Slovakia has agreed to provide Ukraine with S-300 air defense systems
- According to US estimates, the Russians have lost 7,000 troops in Ukraine thus far
- More than the US has lost in 20 years
- Modern combat is high intensity
- Raises an important question: is the US prepared to take these kinds of losses defending Taiwan?
- How many troops have the Ukrainians lost?
- Ukrainians launch artillery strikes on Russian positions outside of Kharkiv
- Looks like the Ukrainians smashed a Russian assault on March 2, near Voznesensk
- FT reports progress on a peace plan
- The real question is whether this will be acceptable to the Ukrainians
- What's happening in Mariupol? No one really knows
- Is this war an example of "cancel culture"?
- Ukrainian artillery strikes Russian units in Trostyanets
- Explosions reported in a number of cities in Belarus
- The aftermath of yesterday's Ukrainian artillery strikes on Kherson airport
- Ukrainian artillery hits a Russian depot near Rahivka
- Russian tank destroyed by multiple anti-tank weapon hits in Mariupol - Content Warning
- Russia is pulling units from South Ossetia for its offensive in Ukraine
- Ukraine exchanges 9 Russian prisoners for the mayor of Melitopol
- Bellingcat discusses the use of cluster munitions in Ukraine
- The US authorizes another significant aid package to Ukraine
- The first possible use of deepfakes in the war
- Cavell group reports Russian units in Pryluky, reportedly advancing towards Yahotyn
- Does this mean that Russian units have neutralized or encircled Sumy well enough that they can confidently advance past it?
- Great use of Sabaton
- Russian transport truck destroyed with RPG-26
- Location unclear
- Geolocation notes
- White fence next to brown fence
- Yellow house with black roof behind brown fence
- Road on right, with sidewalk
- Cross street with yield sign
- 3 red houses in a row
- Houses on right side of road
- At least 6 railroad tracks on left side of road
- Following yellow house w/black roof
- Another red house
- Then blue house
- Video probably takes place close to a train station or rail yard
- Looks like a pretty suburban area
- Lots of detached homes
- Small roads
- Railway appears to be electrified
- Ukrainian government passes law formalizing the legal status of cryptocurrency
- The article says that this "legalizes" cryptocurrency in Ukraine, which I think is the wrong phrasing
- The law sets out a formal set of regulations that govern cryptocurrency exchanges and associated service providers
- Prior to that, cryptocurrencies were legal insofar as the law didn't outlaw them
- However, this law brings greater regulatory certainty and nominates a state agency (the National Commission on Securities and the Stock Market) to regulate cryptocurrency exchanges
- Laws clarifying how cryptocurrencies are to be taxed will be forthcoming, according to the finance ministry
- Explosions in Luninets, Belarus
- Possibly a Ukrainian retaliatory strike?
- We know that Ukraine still retains some ballistic missiles, which it can use for such a strike
2022-03-15 Tuesday
- UK MoD update
- Ukrainian forces carried out an attack on Kherson air base, destroying several Russian helicopters
- Fighting continues around Mikolaiv, with more Russian vehicles being captured by Ukraine
- Fighting continues in Chernihiv
- US Department of defense reports no Russian progress past Mikolaiv
- Really wish there was a clearer picture of what is going on in the south of Ukraine
- There were reports two days ago about Russian forces moving towards Kryvvi Rih, but nothing since then
- Fighting continues in Mariupol
- Russian landing ships spotted via satellite off the coast of Odesa
- Missile strikes in Nikopol
- Makes sense because the Russians captured Enerhodar, which is on the other side of the Dneiper
- No reports of troops, though
- Russian drones destroy Ukrainian vehicles in Zabuyannya
- Zelensky admits that Ukrainian membership in NATO is probably off the table
- This is the best news I've heard since the start of this war
- If Zelensky is willing to bargain about NATO membership, even informally, then that gives Putin an off-ramp
- Lukashenko formally recuses his military from the war
- This is also a good sign
- Even Putin's closest allies are looking at Ukraine and thinking, "We want no part of that"
- Ukrainians are stating that Russian demands are growing "more realistic"
- I think it's important to include a lifting of sanctions in whatever peace deal comes out of this
- That would send a clear message to dictators: invade other countries, get sanctioned. Pull your troops back, get sanctions relief
- You'd think that World War 1, Cuba, Venezuela, Iran, North Korea, etc, would have proved to us that imposing punishing sanctions on a dictatorial regime with no possibility of relief just entrenches that dictatorial regime in power
2022-03-14 Monday
- UK MoD update
- Russian forces have struck the Antonov aircraft factory in Kyiv
- Lots of strikes on Kharkiv
- Russians are launching strikes even where they don't have a troop presence
- Heavy shelling reported in Brovary, east of Kyiv
- Seems like the front lines haven't moved much in the past week
- I haven't seen anything else about Russian forces moving towards Kryvvi Rih or Zaporizhzhia
- Fighting in Volnovakha, in between Donetsk and Mariupol
- Russian supply convoy outside of Kharkiv - Geolocated to Kupyansk, east southeast of Kharkiv, towards Valuiki
- According to Oryx's equipment losses post, Russia has lost more than 200 main battle tanks, and overall vehicle losses have exceeded 1000
- Have the Russians shot down any of Ukraine's TB-2s?
- Even in Nagorno-Karabakh, we saw two TB-2s destroyed with confirmation
- China is playing an interesting double game
- On the one hand, their censorship and propaganda efforts have been anti-American
- On the other hand, their foreign minister is saying that China is not a party to the Ukraine crisis
- Makes it very hard to predict what their role will be as the crisis continues
- Rusi publishes an update on the war
- Indicates that the Russian offensive towards Kharkiv is moving southwest
- Going towards Dnipro, rather than Poltava
- Goal is to encircle the bulk of the Ukrainian army which had been forward-deployed against the Donetsk and Luhansk separatist republics
- Paper argues that Ukrainian forces should withdraw from Kharkiv in order to avoid encirclement, even though it would require the politically difficult decision to abandon the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts entirely
2022-03-14 War on the Rocks Podcast on the war thus far
- Podcast link
- Russia is trying to get its act together
- Work out logistical and force employment issues
- Ukraine is trying to counterattack where it can, but is avoiding large combined-arms fights which could deplete its military
- Russia is still making advances
- Much slower pace
- But, on the other hand, the advances seem more methodical
- Greater employment of capabilities that were missing in the first two weeks of the war
- Drones — greater use of drones for ISR
- Electronic warfare — more EW in theater, but usage is still very scattered
- Better force organization and employment
- Trying to do a better job of securing and clearing areas before moving on
- Don't see small units running around and getting ambushed any more
- Southern Front
- Most successful front for Russia
- Favorable correlation of forces
- Ukrainian forces were heavily outnumbered and had to retreat, leaving equipment behind
- Russians were able to establish railheads by capturing key towns like Melitopol and Kherson
- Encirclement and ongoing siege of Mariupol
- Vicious fight
- Ukrainian marines are holding that city, but they're cut off
- City is being attacked by Russian forces and Russian-allied forces from the Donbas
- Forces outside of Mariupol are moving northwest to try to cut off Ukrainian forces in the Joint Forces Operation (JFO) area
- Farther west, Russian forces captured Kherson, but met stiff resistance in Mikolaiv
- Trying to work around Mikolaiv
- Possible attempt on Odesa, but Kofman doesn't believe that the Russians have the forces or logistics currently to really threaten Odesa
- Also see attacks northeastward towards Kryvvi Rih
- Mikolaiv is really important, because having Mikolaiv cut off also cuts off Odesa
- Eastern Front
- Russian forces haven't been trying to capture Kharkiv
- Have launched artillery barrages against the city, but haven't sent troops in
- The Russians are trying to envelop Kharkiv, and are pushing southeast towards Izyum
- In coordination with forces from the southern front, forces from around Kharkiv are trying to envelop and pocket Ukrainian forces near the Donbas
- Russian forces have been pushed back in places in the east due to Ukrainian counterattacks
- Both Russian and Ukrainian forces are paying a heavy cost in the fighting
- The Russians are taking much heavier losses
- However, as a proportion of their overall military strength, Russian losses may be lower than Ukrainian losses
- We don't know very much about the state of Ukrainian forces
- Might be holding
- Might be close to collapse
- Northern Front
- Logistics continue to be a problem
- Narrow ground line of communication from Belarus
- Entirely truck-based logistics, no rail
- Truck-based logistics is a weakness of the Russian military
- Continued urban fighting around Irpin, Bucha and Hostomel
- Units fanning out northwest to try to cut off roads
- Kyiv is at least semi-encircled on its western side
- Only reliable approaches into Kyiv are from the south
- Russians aren't attempting to assault Kyiv yet; instead they're fanning out around the city
- Chernihiv has been enveloped
- Russian units have approached Brovary, on the eastern outskirts of Kyiv, but were repulsed by Ukrainian artillery
- There has been a long axis of advance from northeast Ukraine to the outskirts of Kyiv
- The "convoy"
- Convoy was never a single convoy
- Was instead a bunch of units in series, making their way towards the capital
- Those units are now slowly fanning out
- Tactical adaptation
- Ukrainians have been pretty successful at adapting to the tactics of the Russian military
- Ambushes of trucks and supply lines
- The Russian operation started out more like a series of raids than a well-planned military operation
- Quick "thunder runs" into cities
- Operating in small detachments
- Moving down roads without clearing rear areas
- Disorganized
- Artillery and air support capabilities sitting on the sidelines
- Now we see Russia slowing down and being more systematic in its offensive
- Larger unit formations
- However, most engagements are still small
- Ukrainians know that they have the disadvantage in large engagements, so they're not setting up large engagements against the Russians
- Ukrainians are also trying to leverage urban terrain
- Russians are finally starting to bring in air power
- The air war
- The Pentagon assesses that most Russian air attacks on Ukraine are being conducted from standoff distances
- Russian air force is running about 200 sorties per day — not that high
- Russian air force is coming into Ukraine, but in much smaller numbers than one might expect
- SEAD missions remain sporadic
- Attack on the base 10km from Ukraine's border with Poland
- Cruise missile strike against training center
- Facility was hosting international volunteers
- The Russians have also said that any convoys coming into Ukraine are fair game
- Most of these convoys are driven by Ukrainians, but there is still a risk of escalation, where Russians might (unintentionally) attack a NATO asset
- The larger concern is if the Russians choose to strike at a point of departure of these convoys
- Or, if the Ukrainian military gets permission to operate or fly assets from foreign territory, that territory might be considered a legitimate target by Russian forces
- FSB has been thrown under the bus, with senior officials being put under house arrest
- The Russian FSB overstated its assessments
- Overstated its capabilities in Ukraine
- FSB told the leadership what the leadership wanted to hear
- FSB assessments turned out to be vaporware
- Wouldn't be surprised if Putin is furious with both his military and his intelligence services
- This is the latest in a long line of case studies of political leadership imposing its assumptions and rationale on a war, and making the military undertake an operation that has no chance of succeeding
- Nuclear threat
- Shouldn't be alarmist
- However this crisis is an indirect contest between nuclear powers
- Need to appreciate the escalation dynamics
- War outcomes
- Sanctions
- Retaliatory actions by Russia
- Russia has civilian control of nuclear weapons
- Command authority is not delegated
- Robust system of authorization around nuclear employment
- Low risk of Russia using any kind of nuclear weapons in Ukraine
- However, if NATO should impose a no-fly-zone over Ukraine, that would be both a de-facto and de-jure act of war
- Russia has always seen itself as being militarily inferior to NATO
- Russian military has depleted its stocks of many of the conventional arms that they would use to defend themselves against a NATO attack
- This could mean that Vladimir Putin could choose to use nuclear weapons in order to fight off a NATO intervention
- Moreover, Russia has a large arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons — nuclear weapons that are designed to be used on a battlefield, rather than attacking an adversary's homeland
- What are some endgame scenarios?
- Russian forces are suffering from exhaustion as they keep advancing
- Increased tempo of negotiation between Russian and Ukrainian leadership
- Russian state media is talking positively about negotiations
- Russia appears to be revising its war aims
- No longer calling for the Ukrainian government to be replaced
- Appears to be looking for
- Independence for the Donbas and Luhansk republics
- Recognition of the Russian annexation of Crimea
- Some kind of neutrality clause in the Ukrainian constitution
- Some kind of prohibition of the presence of foreign military forces in Ukraine
- Isn't this basically what Russia was asking for in the Minsk process
- These are still big asks and Russia will probably have to give up a little bit more before it can achieve a deal
- Even without a deal, however, it's likely that Russia will have to have some kind of pause or cease fire in order to reorganize and resupply its forces in the field
- Might use talks as the excuse to set up a cease-fire
- It's important that these talks are taking place between Russia and Ukraine directly
- The war hasn't been decided yet; either side could still win
- However, the price of victory will be steep
- Wouldn't be surprised if both sides resort to negotiations out of exhaustion
2022-03-11 Friday
2022-03-10 Thursday
2022-03-09 Wednesday
2022-03-08 Tuesday
2022-03-07 Monday
War on the Rocks Podcast on the conflict thus far
- Podcast Link
- 11 days in
- State of play is not very easy to asses
- High pace of operations
- Not easy to tell what's happening day to day on the ground
- Russian forces have made gains but have been frustrated in achieving many of their objectives - no quick victory
- Ukrainian forces have offered robust resistance and are holding
- However, several major cities are either encircled or nearly encircled
- Large breakouts by Russian forces in the south
- Russian forces stalled in the north
- Greater use of Russian air power over the last three days, but that's also led to Russian losses, both helicopters and aircraft
- Which cities are still under assault and which cities have fallen?
- Sustained fighting in the outskirts of Kyiv
- Kharkiv is being steadily enveloped - not clear if it's fully encircled yet
- Mariupol has been encircled and there has been heavy shelling and fighting there
- Melitopol and Kherson are occupied by Russia, but you see quite a few Ukrainians coming out and protesting the occupation
- Difficult to say what Russian forces "control"
- Russian forces are moving out across a large swath of territory
- However, they haven't tried to exert political control over much of the areas that they technically occupy
- Russian forces have been stymied on the outskirts of Mikolaiv, which is past Kherson
- Russian forces in the northeast have been steadily advancing
- Russian forces are trying to get around and envelop Chernihiv
- Reluctance by Russian forces on the ground to fire on civilians
- Protests in Russian-held areas, showing Ukrainians walking, unarmed, towards Russian troops
- Is this a matter of Russian troops being constrained by rules of engagement or is there a genuine reluctance on the part of Russian soldiers to fire on Ukrainians?
- Early on, it's clear that Russians were constrained by tight rules of engagement
- They were told that they were going into Ukraine to help the Ukrainian people liberate themselves
- That's why Russian troops were going into Ukraine went in as if they were still driving around in Russia
- Small unit detachments
- Sticking to roads
- Not really planning to fight
- Not seriously organized for a military operation
- Since then there have been major adjustments in how the Russians have organized themselves
- Now the Russian reaction to Ukrainian protests has been more mixed
- Sometimes Russian forces fire into the air and back off
- Other times, they have fired on protesters
- More violence predicted - things are going to keep getting uglier
- The bulk of Russian forces going into Ukraine seem to have been informed that they were going into Ukraine right when the invasion began; in the past have there been any examples of an aggressor state not telling its army that they were going to invade until the last minute?
- Russia has made two big mistakes, which have made it much more difficult for them to achieve their political objectives
- Hugely mistaken assumptions about the political situation inside Ukraine - smaller big mistake
- Only informed officers that the invasion was happening less than 24 hours before units were ordered into Ukraine - biggest mistake
- Officers were under the assumption that they were on a set of training exercises
- No psychological or material preparation
- No preparation or planning for the invasion
- But why? Is Putin this paranoid? Does he trust his own armed forces this little?
- This is why morale among Russian soldiers has been so low and desertions have been so high - these soldiers felt like they've been sent into a war under false pretenses
- Air power - the Russian air force is still largely MIA. Despite increasing close air support in the past few days, the majority of the air assets mobilized for this conflict are still unused. What explains this?
- First of all, we can't really judge in real time how air power is being used - this is one of the limitations of OSINT
- The Russian air force is plenty capable of performing complex air operations - we saw this over Syria
- The Russians are not out of PGMs, and many of the units seen flying over the past few days have been units that flew in Syria and have experience using PGMs
- The reason we didn't see a lot of air power in the initial days is probably more to do with the planning failure alluded to earlier
- Combined arms operations require a lot of planning in order to properly coordinate air forces and ground forces
- This planning wasn't done, and so ground forces weren't able to call in airstrikes like they usually would
- Another reason for the relative lack of air power is that Russia may be holding its air power in reserve
- The Russian military commanders may be concerned that this will evolve into a regional military conflict
- As a result, they may be holding back their satellite and laser guided bombs until either
- NATO intervenes or
- It becomes clear that the conflict will remain limited to Ukraine
- The Russian air force is not good at suppression or destruction of enemy air defenses, and they know that, so they're not trying to gain air superiority over all of Ukraine
- Instead they're trying to gain limited air superiority over the areas that they're fighting over
- This is very different from US doctrine, which emphasizes having total air superiority over the theater in order to use air power against enemy rear areas
- Seeing increasing use of helicopters to protect convoys
- Social media - what are some of the false narratives out there on social media?
- Lot of misleading takes on social media
- Example: Russia isn't using very many PGMs, therefore Russia must not have very many PGMs
- Russia has plenty of PGMs and we know that they do
- The Russian military is a paper tiger
- The Russians have been making some basic tactical mistakes
- Not doing reconnaissance
- Not using drones
- In some ways, the Russian military is fighting more poorly today than they did against Georgia in 2008
- But that's not because the Russian military is a paper tiger or a bad military - it's because of drastic lack of planning for this operation
- A lot of the gaps in Russian military capabilities can be explained by lack of proper prepositioning
- Russian logistics are bad
- Russian logistics were initially bad, but they're rapidly consolidating their rear areas and working on improving how they're able to support their forces
- Corruption has rotted the Russian military from within
- The Russian military has performed both well and poorly over the last 20 years
- It can't be just corruption that's the cause of poor performance
- Corruption is, at best, a contributing factor
- Aside on military power
- Military power is always context-dependent
- Military power isn't like money
- It's very difficult to analyze military power in the abstract
- Excel spreadsheets don't fight!
- This the largest operation the Russian military has attempted since World War 2 - mistakes are to be expected
- The big worry is that we've gone from a modest overestimation of the Russian military to a drastic underestimation
- This war has strong Winter War vibes
- We don't want to make the same mistake that Germany made in 1940, thinking that the Russian military is a rotten barn and all we have to do is kick the door down and the whole thing will collapse
- The Russian military's performance in this "botched regime change" is not indicative of how they would perform in a high-end conflict against NATO
- The effect of morale has been under-reported
- The Ukrainians have extremely high morale - they're fighting for their existence as a nation-state
- The Russians have low morale - were not told that they were going to be fighting until immediately before the conflict
- Russians would probably have a much higher level of morale fighting against NATO
- One thing the analysts who predicted war got wrong was assuming that the Russian military would be able to fight a normal combined-arms operation
- Assumed there would be a clean hand-off between the political leaders and the military commanders
- But that's not how personalist regimes work
- The regime imposed its own assumptions on the military campaign
- Kofman doesn't believe that the Russians can achieve their political objectives
- Similar to quandary the US found itself in with Iraq
- Political objectives cannot be achieved no matter how much military means are applied
- Book recommendation - Alistair Horne: Hubris: The Tragedy of War in the Twentieth Century
- The convoy north of Kiev
- What is happening
- Do the Ukrainian have the convoy pinned down?
- The reason the Russians are in this predicament is because they stated off the war apparently working on a timetable that had them taking the Ukrainian capital in a matter of days
- Pushed too many forces down one ground line of communications from Belarus
- Ukrainians have blown bridges and flooded some fields, which has had some effect
- However the largest factor appears to be the fighting in Bucha and Irpin on the outskirts of Kyiv
- The convoy needs to reorganize and possibly split up in order to account for the fact that the outskirts of Kyiv are still contested
- The Russians don't have a single 40 mile long convoy - that's due to botched media coverage
- What we're seeing is a series of battalion tactical groups and their associated support units
- Going back to the prepositioning argument above, one of the reasons that these units have been advancing so slowly is because they didn't bring bridging equipment with them
- Thus when they encounter a blown bridge, they have to wait until bridging equipment arrives from Belarus, and only after the bridge is repaired or a new temporary bridge is laid down can they advance
- The initial plan appears to have been that the Russians would seize Hostomel airport quickly and use it as a forward operating base
- When Hostomel did not fall in the initial days of the war, it threw the Russian plans into a bit of a disarray
- The advance northwest of Kyiv, combined with the Russian advance currently attacking Chernihiv reminds Michael Kofman strongly of the Russian attack on Grozny
- The Russians might devastate Kyiv in the same way that they're currently devastating Kharkiv
- What happens after Mariupol falls?
- The Russian advance out of Crimea has already met up with the Russian advance out of the Donetsk People's Republic, northwest of Mariupol
- Mariupol is fully cut off
- The forces from the southeast are probably going to push northwest towards Zaporizhzhia, Dnipro and the like
- This will present a major challenge for Ukrainian forces east of the Dneiper river
- Urban warfare has featured heavily in this conflict
- Lots of fighting for roads and key towns located at the junctions of roads
- The fighting is almost medieval, in this respect
- Not very many engagements in open fields, instead what we're seeing is a series of sieges, with cities as castles
- Urban warfare has not gone well for the Russian military thus far
- The Russians have very little experience with urban warfare in this generation
- Grozny 2000 was a long time ago
- The Russians have not trained for this mission
- Russian airborne troops, especially, have learned some hard lessons as a result of this conflict
- Initial conclusions
- As we've seen in the past, urban warfare strongly favors the defender
- Ukrainian forces have done a great job leveraging the urban environment
- Good tactics at the squad level
- Good use of the capabilities provided by the United States and other western allies
- The Russian military has been increasingly falling back on its traditional approach when faced with stubborn urban resistance
- Use air-power, artillery and MLRS to start leveling blocks to allow units to make progress and entrench themselves
- "It's difficult to shoot someone in the face when you're looking at them, but artillery doesn't have that same problem"
- Russians have faced very stubborn resistance in Mikolaiv and will face even fiercer resistance in Odesa
- The Russians might try a contested amphibious landing in Odesa, but it might not go well for them
- The Russian offensive is going to slow down in the coming weeks
- They need to start encircling and taking cities
- However, as we've seen, the Ukrainians are doing a good job of resisting Russian forces attempting to advance into cities
- The Russians are going have a lot of units tied down attempting to take Kharkiv, Sumy, Mikolaiv and Kyiv
- But that being said the Russians are making progress towards encircling and cutting these cities off from each other
- This war is still very much undecided
- A lot of this depends on the Russian military's morale and ability to stay in the fight
- The bulk of Russian forces are already engaged
- A substantial percentage are committed to the fight
- Russian forces are known for having poor performance at the start of a fight
- There might be a ceasefire soon, in order to allow the Russians to resupply
- There are already more forces heading to the Ukrainian border
- We should not mistake any ceasefire for an end to the war - likely it will be a pause allowing both sides to reorganize and resupply
- How does this relate to regime stability?
- Regime stability is no longer something that Putin can take for granted
- Kofman thinks this is the beginning of the end of Putin's rule
- This might be the beginning of the end, but it still might take a long time
- We should not underestimate the impact of Western sanctions on the Russian economy
- Putin miscalculated badly when he thought that the West was too addicted to Russian oil and gas to retaliate when he ordered the invasion of Ukraine
- In the course of this operation, Putin has thrown under the bus the army, the FSB and the Rosgvardia
- The FSB is the agency that handles internal security and intelligence
- The foreign intelligence agency is the SVR
- Rosgvardia is the national guard and it's used as riot control/protest suppression within Russia itself
- At some point the people in Ukraine are going to come back home
- There's going to be a reckoning inside Russia
- We should always remember the most important thing about Russian history: It can always get worse
- Given the above, it's clear that Putin can't afford to lose
- If this war ends in a humiliating defeat for Russia, regime change is almost a certainty
- This is what we should be thinking about when we ask ourselves if Putin would really level a city like Kyiv
- Remember what happened in Grozny
- Remember what happened in Aleppo
- What should we make of the nuclear dimension
- It's a form of nuclear signaling
- Not a big change in Russian nuclear posture
- Russia appears to be concerned about two things
- Western led intervention
- The damage to the Russian economy caused by sanctions
- The Russian response to western economic sanctions will be asymmetric
- Russia doesn't have the economic means to inflict equal damage in return to the United States
- They will retaliate in some way, and it remains to be seen what form that retaliation will take
- Where does this crisis take us as it keeps going?
- Moscow has drawn a set of red lines
- Has declared an intention to use precision guided munitions to hit convoys bringing Western arms to Ukraine
- Presumably they're going to hit these convoys once they cross the border into Ukraine, otherwise that would be a clear invitation for Poland or Romania to invoke Article 5
- Has declared that any use of foreign airfields by Ukrainian aircraft would constitute participation in the war
- There is a real risk that e.g. Poland will get pulled into this war
- What is the risk that our mistaken optimism about the vulnerability of the Russian military draws us into a forward-leaning posture that draws us closer and closer to direct involvement?
- The longer the war goes on, the greater the probability of spillover effects
2022-03-06 Sunday
2022-03-05 Saturday
2022-03-03 Thursday
2022-03-02 Wednesday
2022-03-01 Tuesday
- Key areas to watch
- Mariupol area - now that Berdyans'k has fallen, will Russian forces make progress towards encircling Mariupol?
- Kherson/Mykolaiv - Will Russian troops be able to reach Mikolaiv and make progress towards cutting off Odesa?
- Poltava - Are Russian troops starting to make it past Kharkiv, and into the interior of Ukraine?
- Zaporizhzhia - Russian troops took Tokmak and Enerhodar, are they going to lay siege to Zaporizhzhia, or are they going to bypass it?
- UK MoD update
- Possible results of a TB-2 strike around Horodnya
- Russian convoy reaches the Antonov airport at Hostomel
- Vasylkiv still hasn't fallen
- Confirmed that Russia landed paratroopers there and attacked with cruise missile strikes
- Still no evidence of the shoot down of those Il-76 transports
- Washington Post travelogue between Kharkiv and Dnipro
- Seems pretty reasonable for a drive exiting a war zone
- Lots of checkpoints, some suspicious troops
- Buzzfeed news reporting on Vasylkiv
- Ukrainian forces raid another supply convoy - raid took place in Borodyanka, northwest of Kiev
- Heavy fighting around Mariupol
- Russian shelling in Okhtryka - is this a sign that Russian forces are pushing towards Poltava?
- Artillery or missile strike in central Kharkiv - Looks like Russians are increasing the amount of firepower they're using against civilian areas, now that's it's apparent that Ukrainian forces won't immediately surrender
- More MLRS fire against Kharkiv - Russians are definitely increasing the firepower they're using in the area
- The aftermath of a Russian strike in Kharkiv
- Iskander strike on a Ukrainian military headquarters - odd that it took so long
- Russian troops patrolling through Kherson
- Russian artillery hitting targets in Kherson
- Russian troops in Komyshany, Kherson Oblast - This means that Russian troops have crossed the Dneiper at Kherson, will they pushing on Mikolaiv soon?
- Unconfirmed reports of Belarusian troops entering the Chernihiv region - It makes sense that Belarus would be participating, but we need confirmation before jumping to conclusions
- Seems to me that Kherson has fallen
- Destroyed column in Borodyanka
- Fighting in Borodyanka
- Abandoned Russian vehicles
- Kupyansk, a key road junction near Kharkiv, has been captured
2022-02-28 Monday
- UK MoD update
- Looks like the Ukrainians inflicted significant losses on the Russians in Bucha
- Fighting now reported in Poltava Oblast
- The actual location is unclear, but it seems that Russian forces are starting to bypass Kharkiv
- Explosions seen in Mirgorod, Poltava Oblast — Unclear if these are the result of airstrikes or ground troops
- Civil disobedience in Zaporizhzhia oblast forces a Russian tank to turn around
- The Russians have mounted an amphibious landing near Mariupol
- Large explosion in Cherkasy — Unclear whether ground troops have reached that area or not, however this is the first I've seen fighting in that region
- Viktor Medvedchuk, who is speculated to be the Kremlin's preferred front-man for a puppet regime, escapes house arrest — this is worrying for Ukraine, as Russia might create a fake government around this person and say that the existing regime is illegitimate
- Satellite imagery of the Antonov airport in Hostomel — Looks like the runways are intact, although there is substantial damage to the buildings and facilities
- Russian convoy moving towards Kyiv — Russia is increasing the pressure on Kyiv
- The Economist is reporting heavy fighting near Vasylkiv air base
- The Economist also reports that none of the four airfields around Kiev have been taken by Russians
- Reports of Russian troops in Berdyans'k — There were earlier reports that Berdyans'k had been bypassed by the offensive on Mariupol
- EU countries to supply fighter jets to Ukraine — Likely this means countries like Poland, Bulgaria, and Slovakia giving Ukraine their old MiG-29s
- Zelensky agrees to hold peace talks with Russian negotiators at the Ukraine-Belarus border
- Russia might be switching to siege tactics — looks like the attacks are getting bogged down and Russia is switching to sieges, with increasing use of rocket artillery in civilian areas
- Zelensky discusses EU membership for Ukraine with Ursula Von Der Leyen — Could Putin have scored the ultimate own goal?
- This is who Putin is
- Belarus is allegedly preparing to send troops to Ukraine
- The Russian ruble is in free-fall
2022-02-27 Sunday
2022-02-26 Saturday
- UK MoD update
- Continued heavy fighting in the outskirts of Kiev
- President Zelensky continues to be defiant — Zelensky has really stepped up to the occasion
- Heavy fighting reported outside Kharkiv and Sumy, Chernihiv reportedly bypassed by Russian forces
- Melitopol has reportedly fallen to Russian attack
- Look to see what happens with Dnipro, Poltava, Kremenchuk and Cherkasy and Mikolaiv
- All of those are cities that are on main road links between major cities or bridges across the Dneiper
- Looks like there are Russian forces in Tokmak, on the road to Dnipro - the next big city in their path is Zaporizhzha, which is on the path to Dnipro
- Still heavy fighting around Kharkiv
- Of course, Russian forces might try to bypass Dnipro
- Looks like Russian forces have bypassed Berdyans'k, and are trying to encircle Mariupol'
- People are trying to make the Russia-Ukraine conflict about their own thing
2022-02-25 Friday
2022-02-24 Thursday
2022-02-23 Wednesday
- Russia announces that it will be conducting a "special military operation" in Ukraine — this is a de-facto declaration of war
- Tweet threads
- Questions
- Why hasn't Russia used its air force more extensively?
- Why hasn't Russia used more electronic warfare to cut off communications in the eastern part of Ukraine
2022-02-22 Tuesday
- Russia declares that it recognizes the independence of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions and order troops to those areas
Preparation for war
Russian Assembly areas
- Belgorod, Russia
- Luninets, Belarus
- Kursk, Russia
- Bryansk, Russia
- Machulishchi, Belarus
- Valuiki, Russia
Long Term Causes
- Donbas territories
- Seizure of Crimea
